N.M. Const. art. IV, § 24
The legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following cases: regulating county, precinct or district affairs; the jurisdiction and duties of justices of the peace, police magistrates and constables; the practice in courts of justice; the rate of interest on money; the punishment for crimes and misdemeanors; the assessment or collection of taxes or extending the time of collection thereof; the summoning and impaneling of jurors; the management of public schools; the sale or mortgaging of real estate of minors or others under disability; the change of venue in civil or criminal cases. Nor in the following cases: granting divorces; laying out, opening, altering or working roads or highways, except as to state roads extending into more than one county, and military roads; vacating roads, town plats, streets, alleys or public grounds; locating or changing county seats, or changing county lines, except in creating new counties; incorporating cities, towns or villages, or changing or amending the charter of any city, town or village; the opening or conducting of any election or designating the place of voting; declaring any person of age; chartering or licensing ferries, toll bridges, toll roads, banks, insurance companies or loan and trust companies; remitting fines, penalties, forfeitures or taxes; or refunding money paid into the state treasury, or relinquishing, extending or extinguishing, in whole or in part, any indebtedness or liability of any person or corporation, to the state or any municipality therein; creating, increasing or decreasing fees, percentages or allowances of public officers; changing the laws of descent; granting to any corporation, association or individual the right to lay down railroad tracks or any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise, or amending existing charters for such purpose; changing the rules of evidence in any trial or inquiry; the limitation of actions; giving effect to any informal or invalid deed, will or other instrument; exempting property from taxation; restoring to citizenship any person convicted of an infamous crime; the adoption or legitimizing of children; changing the name of persons or places; and the creation, extension or impairment of liens. In every other case where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.
Comparable provisions. — Idaho Const., art. III, § 19.
Iowa Const., art. III, § 30.
Montana Const., art. V, § 12.
Utah Const., art. VI, § 26.
Wyoming Const., art. III, § 27.
"General law" defined. — A "general law" is one that relates to a subject of a general nature, or that affects all the people of the state, or all of a particular class. State v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 1915-NMSC-062, 20 N.M. 562, 151 P. 305.
If a statute is general in its application to a particular class of persons or things and to all of the class within like circumstances, it is a general law. City of Raton v. Sproule, 1967-NMSC-141, 78 N.M. 138, 429 P.2d 336.
To be a "general law," it is only necessary that the law be framed in general terms and operate on all objects of legislation distinguished by a reasonable classification. It must be general in its application to a particular class and all of the classes within like circumstances. Davy v. McNeill, 1925-NMSC-040, 31 N.M. 7, 240 P. 482.
A law is general in nature if the subject of the statute may apply to, and affect the people of, every political subdivision of the state. Keiderling v. Sanchez, 1977-NMSC-103, 91 N.M. 198, 572 P.2d 545.
Meaning of "special law". — A "special law" is one made for individual cases, or for less than a class of persons, or subjects, requiring laws appropriate to peculiar conditions or circumstances. State v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 1915-NMSC-062, 20 N.M. 562, 151 P. 305.
A special statute is one that relates to particular persons or things of a class, or is made for individual cases, or for less than a class of persons or things requiring laws appropriate to its peculiar condition and circumstances. City of Raton v. Sproule, 1967-NMSC-141, 78 N.M. 138, 429 P.2d 336.
A special law is generally defined as legislation written in terms which makes it applicable only to named individuals or determinative situations. Keiderling v. Sanchez, 1977-NMSC-103, 91 N.M. 198, 572 P.2d 545; Battaglini v. Town of Red River, 1983-NMSC-067, 100 N.M. 287, 669 P.2d 1082.
What special laws proscribed. — It is only local or special laws relating to enumerated subjects, and those to which a general law can be made applicable, that are proscribed by this section. Hutcheson v. Atherton, 1940-NMSC-001, 44 N.M. 144, 99 P.2d 462.
Special laws concerning localities. — Prohibition in this section against passage of local or special laws regulating county, precinct and district affairs has reference to such affairs as concern localities in their governmental or corporate capacity. State ex rel. Interstate Stream Comm'n v. Reynolds, 1963-NMSC-023, 71 N.M. 389, 378 P.2d 622.
Though a county is created and holds title to its property as a state instrumentality, legislative control over such property cannot be exercised by local or special law. State ex rel. Dow v. Graham, 1928-NMSC-022, 33 N.M. 504, 270 P. 897.
Special laws permissible where general law cannot be made. — When a general law cannot be made applicable, but a law is required, special laws are permissible. Albuquerque Metro. Arroyo Flood Control Auth. v. Swinburne, 1964-NMSC-206, 74 N.M. 487, 394 P.2d 998.
There is nothing in the constitution which would invalidate a legislative act merely because it is special in character provided a local situation exists which under particular facts makes a general law inapplicable. Albuquerque Metro. Arroyo Flood Control Auth. v. Swinburne, 1964-NMSC-206, 74 N.M. 487, 394 P.2d 998.
This section does not exclude special legislation when a law is required and general legislation cannot apply. Thompson v. McKinley County, 1991-NMSC-076, 112 N.M. 425, 816 P.2d 494.
The Energy Transition Act is not unconstitutional special legislation. — Where the public regulation commission (Commission) gave leave for the public service company of New Mexico (PNM) to issue energy transition bonds of up to $361,000,000 in connection with the abandonment of its interests in the San Juan generating station units one and four and to collect separate and non-bypassable energy transition charges from its customers in repayment of the bonds, pursuant to the Energy Transition Act (ETA), §§ 62-18-1 to 62-18-23 NMSA 1978, and where appellants, two organizations that represent energy co0nsumers, claimed that the ETA is special legislation, and therefore unconstitutional, because only the San Juan generating station and the four corners generating station may qualify as a “qualifying generating facility" and that only PNM may qualify as a “qualifying utility” under the act, appellants claim is without merit because although the classification drawn by the ETA is special, it is not so devoid of reason that the classification amounts to mere caprice, and given the unique nature of the class and issues involved, the legislature could reasonably conclude that the circumstances surrounding a public utility's abandonment of its coal-fired generating facilities are of such a special character that a general law could not be made to apply. Citizens for Fair Rates & the Env't v. NMPRC, 2022-NMSC-010.
What classification authorized. — Statutory or constitutional provisions against special legislation on a subject do not prevent legislature from dividing legislation into classes and applying different rules as to each. But classification must be based on substantial distinctions, and not be arbitrary, and must apply to every member of the class or every subject under similar conditions, embracing all and excluding none whose condition and circumstances render legislation necessary or appropriate to them as a class. State v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 1915-NMSC-062, 20 N.M. 562, 151 P. 305.
Weight given legislature's classification. — Legislative voice upon subject of classification for purposes of legislation is supreme so long as there is to be found any reasonable basis for the distinction employed; fact that it appears unreasonable to the courts is not decisive. Hutcheson v. Atherton, 1940-NMSC-001, 44 N.M. 144, 99 P.2d 462.
Correspondence with equal protection clause. — There is a close correspondence in meaning and purpose between the principles underlying the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions and the general versus special law provisions of the Springer Act, 48 U.S.C. § 1471 and of this section. Board of Trustees v. Montano, 1971-NMSC-025, 82 N.M. 340, 481 P.2d 702 (1971).
Repeat drug trafficking offenses. — Section 30-31-20B(2) NMSA 1978 applies to all second and subsequent drug trafficking offenses; it does not violate the prohibition against special laws of this section. State v. Bejar, 1985-NMCA-093, 104 N.M. 138, 717 P.2d 591, cert. quashed, 104 N.M. 54, 716 P.2d 245 (1986).
Juvenile detention homes in first class counties. — Statute authorizing first class counties to establish and equip juvenile detention homes was not, by reason of its limitation to first class counties, local or special law. Hutcheson v. Atherton, 1940-NMSC-001, 44 N.M. 144, 99 P.2d 462.
School district consolidation. — Subsection B of 22-4-3 NMSA 1978 does not contravene the prohibitions imposed by this section, as the statute has applicability to any and all school districts which come within the classification created thereby, the reasons for the classification of school districts are substantial and the classification is clearly reasonable. State ex rel. Apodaca v. New Mexico State Bd. of Educ., 1971-NMSC-058, 82 N.M. 558, 484 P.2d 1268.
Community land grants. — In view of the difference in the nature and origin of different community land grants, the long legislative history of enactments relating to control or management of the lands of specific grants, the fact that there is some discretion in the legislature to determine in which cases special laws should be passed, and in view of the special presumptions indulged in favor of the validity of legislation, the prohibitions against special legislation are not applicable to enactments relating to the governing or managing bodies of specific community land grants or to the manner in which these bodies exercise their powers of control, management and disposition over grant lands. Board of Trustees v. Montano, 1971-NMSC-025, 82 N.M. 340, 481 P.2d 702.
Irrigation districts. — Laws 1919, ch. 41 (73-9-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.), relating to irrigation districts, is a general law. Davy v. McNeill, 1925-NMSC-040, 31 N.M. 7, 240 P. 482.
Funds for irrigation reservoirs under federal trust grant. — Laws 1961, ch. 181 to 183, appropriating funds for purpose of carrying out terms of a federal trust grant for the establishment of reservoirs for irrigation purposes do not violate this section; in carrying out the purposes of the trust the passage of a general law would be virtually impossible. State ex rel. Interstate Stream Comm'n v. Reynolds, 1963-NMSC-023, 71 N.M. 389, 378 P.2d 622.
Arroyo Flood Control Act. — The Arroyo Flood Control Act (72-16-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.) does not violate this section. Albuquerque Metro. Arroyo Flood Control Auth. v. Swinburne, 1964-NMSC-206, 74 N.M. 487, 394 P.2d 998.
Former Conservancy Act. — The Conservancy Act (Laws 1923, ch. 140, now repealed) is a general law within the purview of this section. In re Proposed Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 1925-NMSC-058, 31 N.M. 188, 242 P. 683.
Intoxicating liquors. — Laws 1919, ch. 151 (later repealed), relating to intoxicating liquors, was not a special law within prohibition of this section. State v. Foster, 1922-NMSC-058, 28 N.M. 273, 212 P. 454.
Larceny of livestock. — Portion of larceny statute (30-16-1 NMSA 1978) making it a felony to steal livestock regardless of the value thereof applies to all persons who steal livestock in this state and does not constitute special legislation contrary to this section. State v. Pacheco, 1969-NMCA-127, 81 N.M. 97, 463 P.2d 521.
Mishandling of certain animals. — Since no one was excluded from operation of Laws 1901, ch. 23, § 4, (40-4-32, 1953 Comp.), providing penalty for mishandling certain animals, it did not violate this section. State v. Brooken, 1914-NMSC-075, 19 N.M. 404, 143 P. 479, 1915B L.R.A 213.
Tax for construction of road. — This section does not prohibit enactment of special law levying tax for construction of state road, the assessment and collection being governed by general law. Borrowdale v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs, 1915-NMSC-093, 23 N.M. 1, 163 P. 721, 1917E L.R.A. 456.
Tax levies for schools. — Laws 1919, ch. 83 (since repealed), relating to tax levies for schools, was not a local and special law violating this section. McKinley Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State Tax Comm'n, 1922-NMSC-064, 28 N.M. 221, 210 P. 565.
Residency requirements for divorce. — Establishment of different residency requirements for jurisdiction in divorce cases involving the military than for the population in general is not violative of this section as the requirements have a uniform operation throughout the state. Crownover v. Crownover, 1954-NMSC-092, 58 N.M. 597, 274 P.2d 127.
Highway construction. — Construction of a Y to become part of a main trunk highway traversing the entire state was not violation of this section. Gallegos v. Conroy, 1934-NMSC-007, 38 N.M. 154, 29 P.2d 334.
Laws 1915, ch. 23, creating a designated route for a state highway extending into more than one county, did not violate this section, even though provision was made for working the road in one county only. Borrowdale v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs, 1915-NMSC-093, 23 N.M. 1, 163 P. 721, 1917E L.R.A 456.
Creation of county and authorization of bond use. — Laws 1921, ch. 48 (4-11-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.), creating a county and providing for bonds in aid thereof, and authorizing use of bonds for courthouse and jail purposes without submission to vote, was not special legislation. Martinez v. Gallegos, 1922-NMSC-053, 28 N.M. 170, 210 P. 575.
Annexation. — Sections 4-33-1 to 4-33-7 NMSA 1978, relating to annexation with or without a contest, do not violate this section. Youree v. Ellis, 1954-NMSC-002, 58 N.M. 30, 265 P.2d 354.
Statute (4-33-1 to 4-33-7 NMSA 1978) providing for change of county lines and boundaries and annexation of portion of county by another is available to the inhabitants of any area in state where prescribed conditions obtain and is therefore a general and not a special law. Crosthwait v. White, 1951-NMSC-003, 55 N.M. 71, 226 P.2d 477.
Former Public Moneys Bill. — The "Public Moneys Bill" (Laws 1915, ch. 57, § 12, amended by Laws 1917, ch. 70, § 2, both since repealed) was not violative of this section, but was entirely general in its character, operating in every county throughout the state with like effect. State ex rel. Farmers' & Stockmen's Bank v. Romero, 1918-NMSC-119, 24 N.M. 649, 175 P. 771.
Limitations on suit against builders. — Section 37-1-27 NMSA 1978, which limits the time in which actions may be brought against builders, does not violate guarantee of equal protection and is not special legislation under this section, since there is a rational basis for distinguishing between those covered by the statute and owners and tenants (both of whom maintain a greater degree of control over premises) and materialmen (who use more standardized goods). Howell v. Burk, 1977-NMCA-077, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214, cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413.
Limitation on appeal of tax judgment. — Laws 1921, ch. 133, § 436 (since repealed), limiting time for appeal from tax judgment, did not violate this section. Grant v. State, 1929-NMSC-005, 33 N.M. 633, 275 P. 95.
Lien priorities. — Statutes elevating special assessment liens to parity with liens for general taxes did not violate constitutional provision against the enactment of special or local laws. Waltom v. City of Portales, 1938-NMSC-022, 42 N.M. 433, 81 P.2d 58.
Suits against municipalities. — Prohibition against special legislation does not apply to 37-1-24 NMSA 1978, relating to suits against cities, towns and villages, since the statute is framed in general terms and operates on all causes of action distinguished by a reasonable classification. Hoover v. City of Albuquerque, 1954-NMSC-043, 58 N.M. 250, 270 P.2d 386.
State Bar Act. — State Bar Act (former 36-2-2 NMSA 1978, repealed) was not void as special legislation, special taxation or relinquishment of indebtedness to state or municipality. In re Gibson, 1931-NMSC-042, 35 N.M. 550, 4 P.2d 643, abrogated, In re Bristol, 2006-NMSC-041, 140 N.M. 317, 142 P.3d 905.
Constitutionality of textbook loan program. — The Instructional Material Law (IML), §§ 22-15-1 to -14 NMSA 1978, in which the New Mexico public education department purchases textbooks that are loaned free of charge to public and private school students enrolled in first through twelfth grade and in early childhood education programs, does not violate Article IV, Section 31, Article IX, Section 14, or Article XII, Section 3 of the New Mexico constitution. The textbook loan program, which provides a generally available public benefit to students, does not result in the use of public funds in support of private schools as prohibited by Article XII, Section 3, and is consistent with Article IV, Section 31, which addresses appropriations for educational purposes, and Article IX, Section 14, which limits any donation to or in aid of any person, association or public or private corporation. Moses v. Ruszkowski, 2019-NMSC-003.
The appropriation of educational funds to private schools is unconstitutional. — N.M. Const., Art. XII, § 3 expressly prohibits the appropriation of public funds to sectarian, denominational or private schools. A public school under the control of the state can directly receive funds, while a private school not under the exclusive control of the state cannot receive either direct or indirect support. Moses v. Skandera, 2015-NMSC-036, 367 P.3d 838, rev’g 2015-NMCA-036, 346 P.3d 396, vacated sub nom. N.M. Ass’n of Non-public Sch. v. Moses, 137 S.Ct. 2325 (2017) (mem.).
Where petitioners filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against the secretary of the New Mexico public education department seeking a declaration that the state issuing instructional materials to students attending private schools is unconstitutional, the New Mexico supreme court held that the Instructional Material Law, §§ 22-15-1 through 22-15-14 NMSA 1978, in which the New Mexico public education department purchases and distributes instructional material to school districts, state institutions, and private schools as agents for the benefit of eligible students, violates N.M. Const., Art. XII, § 3, because the constitutional provision expressly restricts the use of public funds to other than sectarian schools and expressly prohibits the appropriation of educational funds to private schools. Moses v. Skandera, 2015-NMSC-036, 367 P.3d 838, rev’g 2015-NMCA-036, 346 P.3d 396, vacated sub nom. N.M. Ass’n of Non-public Sch. v. Moses, 137 S.Ct. 2325 (2017) (mem.).
Furnishing of instructional material to students attending private schools is not an unconstitutional appropriation. — The Instructional Material Law (IML), 22-15-1 through 22-15-14 NMSA 1978, in which the New Mexico public education department purchases and distributes instructional material to school districts, state institutions and private schools as agents for the benefit of eligible students, does not violate this section because under the IML, no funds are appropriated to any private school; the mere indirect or incidental benefit to the private schools does not violate this section. Moses v. Skandera, 2015-NMSC-036, 367 P.3d 838, rev’g 2015-NMCA-036, 346 P.3d 396, vacated sub nom. N.M. Ass’n of Non-public Sch. v. Moses, 137 S.Ct. 2325 (2017) (mem.).
Grandfather clause in licensing act. — Provisions of former Real Estate Broker's License Act (Laws 1951, ch. 224, now repealed), requiring real estate board to issue a broker's license to all persons who possessed a license under the prior act without regard to whether or not such persons were competent to act as such, while at the same time requiring an examination of all other persons, did not contravene this section. State v. Spears, 1953-NMSC-033, 57 N.M. 400, 259 P.2d 356, 39 A.L.R.2d 595.
Special Hospital District Act. — The Special Hospital District Act (Chapter 4, Article 48A NMSA 1978) does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority. State ex rel. Angel Fire Home & Land Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. South Central Colfax Cnty. Special Hosp. Dist., 1990-NMCA-072, 110 N.M. 496, 797 P.2d 285, cert. denied, 110 N.M. 330, 795 P.2d 1022.
Establishing highway in single county. — Laws 1921, ch. 77, establishing a state highway wholly within one county, violated this section. De Graftenreid v. Strong, 1922-NMSC-031, 28 N.M. 91, 206 P. 694.
Changing county lines. — Statute attempting to abolish Catron county and to distribute its territory between an existing county and a county to be created violated provision of this section prohibiting passage of local or special laws changing county lines, except in creating new counties. State ex rel. Dow v. Graham, 1928-NMSC-022, 33 N.M. 504, 270 P. 897.
Reimbursement to municipal utilities. — The provisions of Laws 1959, ch. 289, attempting to provide reimbursement of relocation costs for municipally-owned utilities retrospectively to March 29, 1957, were in direct conflict with the section. State ex rel. City of Albuquerque v. Lavender, 1961-NMSC-096, 69 N.M. 220, 365 P.2d 652.
Amendment of court rule. — Laws 1965, ch. 132, attempting to amend Rule 41(e), N.M.R. Civ. P. (see now Rule 1-041 E NMRA), to provide for dismissal of actions not brought to conclusion within three years infringed on court's duties and was also void under this section and N.M. Const., art. IV, § 34. Southwest Underwriters v. Montoya, 1969-NMSC-027, 80 N.M. 107, 452 P.2d 176.
Consent to particular negligence suit. — Laws 1949, ch. 55, granting consent by state to be sued for personal injuries suffered by four minors because of negligence on part of state penitentiary employees, was unconstitutional as a special law inasmuch as a general law could have been made applicable. Vigil v. State, 1952-NMSC-054, 56 N.M. 411, 244 P.2d 1110.
Laws 1947, ch. 162, allowing a particular person to sue the state for injuries resulting from its negligence, was a special law; since a general law could have been enacted, the act in question was void. Lucero v. New Mexico State Hwy. Dep't, 1951-NMSC-017, 55 N.M. 157, 228 P.2d 945.
Employers mutual company. — Under existing New Mexico case law, the legislation creating the employers mutual company appears to be an unconstitutional special law chartering or licensing an insurance company. Because the company is intended to be operated as a private entity, it is not clear that the exemption from the prohibition against special laws created by other states' courts for public corporations would save the legislation. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-25.
"General law" defined. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-74.
Meaning of "special law". — A "special" law is a law relating to particular persons or things within a larger class. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-74 and 1965 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-21.
Special laws permissible where general law cannot be made. — The constitution does not forbid special laws; it states that no special law shall be enacted where a general law can be made applicable. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-74.
Reasonable classification permissible. — Neither the guarantee of equal protection of the laws nor the prohibition against local or special laws denies to the legislature the right to classify along reasonable lines. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-08.
Some reasonable basis for the creation of a special class affected by a law must exist before a special law is constitutional. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-48.
Appropriation for county bridge. — An appropriation to aid in the construction of a county wagon bridge over the Pecos river is not a special act regulating county affairs and is not prohibited by this section. 1913 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 13-994.
Prescribing park locations. — Although Laws 1971, ch. 311, a temporary provision containing an appropriation to the state park and recreation commission (now the state parks division of the natural resources department) named specific locations where parks should be constructed, all of which were within the city of Albuquerque or Bernalillo county, the courts' reluctance to find legislative enactments unconstitutional or to "second-guess" the legislature on the need for a special law would probably result in a holding that this section is constitutional, even though it is of very narrow special interest and effect. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-74.
Qualifications for magistrates. — The requirement that magistrates in magistrate districts having a population of 100,000 persons or more be lawyers is a reasonable legislative classification and does not violate N.M. Const., art. II, § 18 or this section. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-08.
Voluntary reappraisal program. — Laws 1966, ch. 26 (former 72-2-21.1, 1953 Comp. et seq., relating to reappraisal of property) did not violate this section, as the act applied equally to all counties and to all real property within the respective counties, and the fact that participation by a county was optional and that certain incentives were offered to induce participation did not render it special legislation within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-13.
Age of Majority Act. — The Age of Majority Act (28-6-1 NMSA 1978) does not contravene this section because it applies to and affects alike, all persons and things of the same class. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-117.
Watercourse name change. — There is nothing in this section to prevent the adoption of legislation to change the name of a watercourse from Whiskey Creek to Rio de Arenas. 1912 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 12-889.
Moral claims against state. — Moral claims against the state can be recognized only by the legislature; it can, upon proper recommendation of the governor, grant relief to one injured while in the employ of the state. 1924 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 24-3767.
Laws abolishing counties. — The legislature would be prohibited from passing a special law that would in effect or specifically abolish a county. When two or more counties consolidate under a general statute, however, they effectively are abolished, and a new entity would emerge. 1987 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 87-55.
Community ditches in particular counties. — Sections 73-3-1 NMSA 1978 et seq., relating to community ditches and made applicable only to certain counties, were invalid because they are in conflict with constitutional provision against local or special laws. 1916 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 16-1790.
Discrimination between water right holders. — To provide legislatively for carriage loss allowance only to those with water rights within artesian conservancy districts unconstitutionally discriminates against those with water rights in areas outside of artesian districts, and is precisely the type of legislation which this section was designed to prevent. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-23.
Changing county lines. — A new county consisting of all territory included in an existing county and portions of another cannot be created by statute, which would be a local or special law, for the result is to change county lines and not to create a new county. 1937 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 37-1531.
Preferential placement on ballot. — Listing the incumbents first on the primary election ballot and requiring all other candidate positions to be determined by lot is special legislation violative of this section. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-13.
Payment of particular account. — Passage of a special bill to provide for payment from public funds of an account for supplies sold to the state in good faith but in violation of the State Purchasing Act would probably violate this section, which prohibits enactment of special laws where general law can be made applicable. 1965 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-21.
Law reviews. — For article, "Medical Malpractice Legislation in New Mexico," see 7 N.M. L. Rev. 5 (1976-77).
For article, "Indian Sovereignty and the Tribal Right to Charter a Municipality for Non-Indians: A New Perspective for Jurisdiction on Indian Land," see 7 N.M. L. Rev. 153 (1977).
For note, "Annexation of Unincorporated Territory in New Mexico," see 6 Nat. Resources J. 83 (1966).
For survey, "The Statute of Limitations in Medical Malpractice Actions," see 6 N.M. L. Rev. 271 (1976).
For comment, "The Use of an Information Following the Return of a Grand Jury No Bill: State v. Joe Nestor Chavez," see 10 N.M. L. Rev. 217 (1979-80).
For article, "Separation of Powers and the Judicial Rule-Making Power in New Mexico: The Need for Prudential Restraints," see 15 N.M. L. Rev. 407 (1985).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes §§ 4 to 10, 32.
Special legislation as affected by distinction between political and nonpolitical nature, 50 A.L.R. 1163.
Statute regulating banks and trust companies as special or class legislation, or as denying the equal protection of the laws, 111 A.L.R. 140.
Construction and application of constitutional provisions against special or local laws regulating practice in courts of justice, 134 A.L.R. 365.
Workmen's Compensation Act as in violation of constitutional provision prohibiting special or local laws regulating practice in courts of justice, 135 A.L.R. 383.
Moratorium statute as special legislation, 137 A.L.R. 1380, 147 A.L.R. 1311.
Constitutional provision prohibiting local or special legislation as applied to statutes relating to juries, 155 A.L.R. 789.
Constitutionality of statute appropriating money to reimburse public officer or employee for money paid or liability incurred by him in consequence of breach of duty, 155 A.L.R. 1438.
Validity of contract by officer with public for rendition of new or special services to be paid for in addition to regular compensation, 159 A.L.R. 606.
What constitutes moral obligation justifying appropriation of public moneys for benefit of an individual, 172 A.L.R. 1407.
Constitutional exemption from taxation as subject to legislative regulation respecting conditions of its assertion, 4 A.L.R.2d 744.
Validity and construction, as to claim alleging design defects, or statute imposing time limitations upon action against architect, 93 A.L.R.3d 1242.
Validity of statutory classifications based on population - jury selection statutes, 97 A.L.R.3d 434.
Validity of statutory classifications based on population - zoning, building, and land use statutes, 98 A.L.R.3d 679.
Validity of statutory classifications based on population - intoxicating liquor statutes, 100 A.L.R.3d 850.
82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 166, 168.