N.M. Const. art. IV, § 22
Every bill passed by the legislature shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the governor for approval. If he approves, he shall sign it, and deposit it with the secretary of state; otherwise, he shall return it to the house in which it originated, with his objections, which shall be entered at large upon the journal; and such bill shall not become a law unless thereafter approved by two-thirds of the members present and voting in each house by yea and nay vote entered upon its journal. Any bill not returned by the governor within three days, Sundays excepted, after being presented to him, shall become a law, whether signed by him or not, unless the legislature by adjournment prevent such return. Every bill presented to the governor during the last three days of the session shall be approved by him within twenty days after the adjournment and shall be by him immediately deposited with the secretary of state. Unless so approved and signed by him such bill shall not become a law. The governor may in like manner approve or disapprove any part or parts, item or items, of any bill appropriating money, and such parts or items approved shall become a law, and such as are disapproved shall be void unless passed over his veto, as herein provided. (As amended September 15, 1953.)
Compiler's notes. — The First Judicial District Court’s decision in State ex rel. New Mexico Legislative Council v. Honorable Susana Martinez, Governor of the State of New Mexico et al., D-101-CV-2017-01550, affirmed by S.Ct. Order No. S-1-SC-36731, on April 25, 2018, held that Article IV, Section 22 of the New Mexico Constitution requires that objections must accompany a returned bill to properly effect a veto.
The 1953 amendment, which was proposed by S.J.R. No. 13 (Laws 1953) and adopted at a special election held on September 15, 1953, with a vote of 17,787 for and 10,351 against, substituted "approved by him within twenty days after the adjournment" for "approved or disapproved by him within six days after the adjournment" in the fourth sentence of this section.
Cross references. — For consideration by regular sessions of the legislature convening during even-numbered years of bills of the last previous regular session vetoed by the governor, see N.M. Const., art. IV, § 5.
For computation of time, see 12-2A-7 NMSA 1978.
Comparable provisions. — Idaho Const., art. IV, § 10.
Iowa Const., art. III, § 16.
Montana Const., art. VI, § 10.
Utah Const., art. VII, § 8.
Wyoming Const., art. IV, § 8.
Scope of partial veto power. — A governor uses the partial veto properly if the veto eliminates or destroys the whole of an item or part, otherwise leaving intact the legislative intent regarding the remaining provisions in the bill. All language that relates to the subject to be proscribed by the veto must be vetoed for the veto to be valid. In addition, the remaining legislation must continue to be a workable piece of legislation. State ex rel. Stewart v. Martinez, 2011-NMSC-045, 270 P.3d 96.
Appropriations for judicial salaries are subject to governor’s veto power. — Judicial salaries must annually be established by the legislature in an appropriations act, as set forth in Subsection E of 34-1-9 NMSA 1978, and are subject to the governor’s partial veto authority. State ex rel. Cisneros v. Martinez, 2015-NMSC-001.
Unconstitutional veto must be disregarded and bill given effect intended by the legislature. State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975.
Words "the bill" or "it" include original blue jacketed copy of the bill, as well as the enrolled and engrossed copy. State ex rel. Wood v. King, 1979-NMSC-106, 93 N.M. 715, 605 P.2d 223.
Effect of enrolled bill. — An enrolled bill which has been signed by the speaker and president of the respective houses, as required by N.M. Const., art. IV, § 20, and approved by the governor and deposited with the secretary of state, as required by this section, is conclusive upon the courts as to the regularity of its enactment, since the signatures are a solemn declaration by the officers of a coordinate department that the bill as enrolled was enacted and approved. Kelley v. Marron, 1915-NMSC-092, 21 N.M. 239, 153 P. 262; see Dillon v. King, 1974-NMSC-096, 87 N.M. 79, 529 P.2d 745.
Use of mandamus to question veto. — The manner in which the governor exercises the veto power is not beyond judicial review or control when its exercise is beyond the governor's constitutional authority, therefore, mandamus is a proper proceeding in which to question the constitutionality of vetoes or attempted vetoes. State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975.
Certificate of two-thirds vote. — Fact that certificates of presiding officers and chief clerks of respective houses showing passage of a bill by two-thirds vote over objections of governor were not attached to enrolled and engrossed bill was immaterial. Earnest v. Sargent, 1915-NMSC-050, 20 N.M. 427, 150 P. 1018, overruled on other grounds, Dillon v. King, 1974-NMSC-096, 87 N.M. 79, 529 P.2d 745.
Return of partially vetoed bill to legislature not required. — Nothing in the language of the last sentence calls upon the governor, once he has acted upon a measure submitted to him, to return the same to the legislature if such action takes place prior to adjournment; he may do so, if he so desires, and in such event it is only the part approved or disapproved which he is called upon to resubmit to the legislature, as the parts of the bill approved become a law without further action upon the part of the legislature. State ex rel. Dickson v. Saiz, 1957-NMSC-010, 62 N.M. 227, 308 P.2d 205.
Partial veto rendered the act unworkable and incomplete. — Where the legislature amended Subsection I of 51-1-11 NMSA 1978 to change the effective date of a formula-based contribution schedule to calendar years after 2012 and to set a fixed contribution schedule for the year 2012 at Schedule 3; the governor vetoed the provision that fixed the 2012 contribution schedule at Schedule 3; and the partial veto resulted in the elimination of a contribution schedule for 2012 which effectively exempted established employers from making mandatory contributions to the unemployment compensation fund for calendar year 2012, the partial veto was unconstitutional because what remained after the partial veto was an incomplete and unworkable piece of legislation and the court ordered that the legislation be reinstated as passed by the legislature. State ex rel. Stewart v. Martinez, 2011-NMSC-045, 270 P.3d 96.
Partial veto of act not appropriating money invalid. — The governor's veto of Laws 1981, ch. 39, § 129, the severability clause of the Liquor Control Act (60-3A-1 NMSA 1978), was unconstitutional under this section because that act does not appropriate money and the governor's power of partial veto is limited to bills appropriating money. Chronis v. State ex rel. Rodriguez, 1983-NMSC-081, 100 N.M. 342, 670 P.2d 953.
Exercise of veto power requires judgment and discretion on the part of the governor and he cannot be compelled by the legislature or by this court to exercise this power or to exercise it in a particular manner. State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975.
Power of partial veto is the power to disapprove, a negative power to delete or destroy a part or item, and not a positive power to alter, enlarge or increase the effect of the remaining parts or items or to enact or create new legislation by selective deletions. State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975.
Act not nullified by partial veto. — Where governor exercised partial veto as to portion of Liquor Control Act, Laws 1939, ch. 236 (former 60-3-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.) in order to prohibit Sunday sales, such partial veto did not nullify the whole act. State ex rel. Dickson v. Saiz, 1957-NMSC-010, 62 N.M. 227, 308 P.2d 205.
Governor’s partial veto must eliminate the whole of an item to be valid. — Where the legislature provided for two separate judicial raises in two separate appropriations, the governor’s partial veto of one appropriation failed to eliminate the second appropriation providing for judicial raises. State ex rel. Cisneros v. Martinez, 2015-NMSC-001.
Bill appropriating money distinguished from general appropriation. — The language found in the proviso "any bill appropriating money" is not synonymous with the phrase "general appropriation bills". State ex rel. Dickson v. Saiz, 1957-NMSC-010, 62 N.M. 227, 308 P.2d 205.
Partial veto power broadened. — Purpose for inclusion of the terms "part or parts," "item or items" and "parts or items" in our constitution was to extend or enlarge the partial veto power thereby conferred beyond the partial veto power conferred by the constitutions of other states; however, this does not mean that there are no limitations on the partial veto of bills appropriating money. State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975.
No authority to reduce an appropriation. — The governor’s partial veto authority does not include the power to reduce an appropriation. State ex rel. Smith v. Martinez, 2011-NMSC-043, 150 N.M. 703, 265 P.3d 1276.
Where the legislature appropriated $150,000 for operations of the New Mexico mortgage finance authority and the governor struck the single numerical digit "1" from the appropriation to reduce the appropriation to $50,000, the governor violated the separation of powers doctrine and the partial veto was invalid and unconstitutional. State ex rel. Smith v. Martinez, 2011-NMSC-043, 150 N.M. 703, 265 P.3d 1276.
Legislature may not abridge governor's veto power by subtle drafting of conditions, limitations or restrictions upon appropriations, and the governor may not properly distort legislative appropriations or arrogate unto himself the power of making appropriations by carefully striking words, phrases or sentences from an item or part of an appropriation. State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975.
Governor may not defeat legislative purpose. — The legislature has the power to affix reasonable provisions, conditions or limitations upon appropriations and upon the expenditure of the funds appropriated, and the governor may not distort, frustrate or defeat the legislative purpose by a veto of proper legislative conditions, restrictions, limitations or contingencies placed upon an appropriation and permit the appropriation to stand. State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975.
Various line item vetoes of General Appropriation Act of 1988 upheld as proper and not gubernatorial enactment or creation of new legislation by selective line item veto decisions. State ex rel. Coll v. Carruthers, 1988-NMSC-057, 107 N.M. 439, 759 P.2d 1380.
Provisions governing expenditures. — Although only the legislature can make appropriations, and the veto power can only be exercised as provided in the constitution, a distinction is recognized between appropriations and expenditures and there is no inhibition in the constitution to inclusion within the general appropriation law of provisions governing how the amounts appropriated are to be expended. State ex rel. Holmes v. State Bd. of Fin., 1961-NMSC-172, 69 N.M. 430, 367 P.2d 925.
Control of expenditures by executive. — The legislature may constitutionally provide in the general appropriation bill for the executive to control the expenditure of amounts appropriated. State ex rel. Holmes v. State Bd. of Fin., 69 N.M. 430, 367 P.2d 925 (1961).
Conditions imposed on purchase of equipment. — Legislation imposing conditions on the purchase of automation and data processing equipment by district attorneys was not an unreasonable injection of the legislature into the executive managerial function, and the governor's veto of such legislation was invalid. State ex rel. Coll v. Carruthers, 1988-NMSC-057, 107 N.M. 439, 759 P.2d 1380.
Bill carrying emergency clause becomes law upon approval of governor by his signing said bill. 1951 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 51-5338.
Calculation of final three days. — In determining the final three days, Sundays excepted, in which bills are presented to the governor, legislative days are now to be used as opposed to calendar days. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-45.
Calculating 20-day period following adjournment. — In computing time after adjournment for the governor to sign a bill, calendar days must be used; the day of the event is excluded. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-45.
Bills presented to the governor on last three days of session must be approved by him within 20 days following adjournment to become law; in measuring this period, adjournment day is excluded. 1959 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 59-28.
The method of computation of this time is as follows: the day of adjournment does not count, and the twentieth day does count. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 57-56.
Veto power strictly construed. — This power has generally been viewed as an executive encroachment on the legislative function (an exception to the doctrine of the separation of powers), and as such it must be strictly construed. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-13.
The provisions of this section prescribing the manner of veto are mandatory, and failure to follow the defined procedure would nullify the veto. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-13.
Veto procedure mandatory. — The provisions of this section prescribing the manner and time of performance of vetoes by the governor are mandatory. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-20.
Deviations fatal to veto. — Deviation from constitutional provisions relating to the veto of bills by the governor, in respect to manner and time of the performance of the acts prescribed, result in the veto becoming a nullity and the vetoed bills become law. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-20.
An attempted veto was invalidated by failure to return the bill to its house of origin within three days as required by this section. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-21.
Unnecessary technicalities should not be allowed to frustrate purpose of constitutional veto provisions. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-13.
Purpose satisfied so long as house given opportunity to consider veto. — So long as the legislative body is given the opportunity to consider the executive veto, constitutional purposes are satisfied. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-13.
Return of enrolled and engrossed copy not essential. — The failure of the governor to return the enrolled and engrossed copy of a senate bill to the senate with the veto message does not render the veto invalid under this section. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-13.
Resolutions and proposed constitutional amendments not subject to veto. — Resolutions and proposed constitutional amendments do not have to be presented to the governor for approval and are not bills. 1965 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-212.
Procedure for overriding veto. — A legislature has authority to promulgate rules governing the procedure of reconsidering a vote to override a chief executive's veto. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-147.
A legislature has power, absent constitutional provisions governing the subject, to decide the procedure to be used in considering a vetoed bill not acted upon before adjournment of the first session. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-147.
The legislature has authority to determine whether the house of origin must again vote to override the governor's veto at the next even-year session, when during the odd-year session the house of origin voted to override the veto but the other house either failed to override or failed to take any action before adjournment. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-147.
Right of partial veto quasi-legislative. — When the governor exercises his right of partial veto he is exercising a quasi-legislative function. State ex rel. Dickson v. Saiz, 1957-NMSC-010, 62 N.M. 227, 308 P.2d 205. See 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-09.
The governor is exercising a legislative function in the use of a line-item veto. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-116.
Power of partial veto is power to disapprove. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-12.
Legislature cannot abridge governor's power. — The legislature cannot by putting purpose, subject and amount inseparably together and calling it an "item" coerce the governor to approve all of the appropriation of an agency or nothing. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-25.
Appropriation by resolution usurpation of governor's power. — To appropriate a specific sum for a specific purpose out of any fund by legislative resolution is to deny the governor his constitutional veto power and his line item veto power over bills appropriating money and is an unconstitutional usurpation of the chief executive's constitutional powers. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-22.
Partial veto power not limited to language appropriating money. — The power of partial veto is not limited to language appropriating money but extends to any part of a bill of general legislation which contains incidental items of appropriation. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-12.
Governor may strike entire items within an appropriation act which includes both the amount of money designated and the accompanying language pursuant to this section, but if he wishes to veto either the amount of money or the accompanying language, he must veto both. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-25.
Distribution directions subject to veto. — The governor's power to veto "part or parts" of an appropriation bill allows him to veto specific directions as to the manner and purpose of distribution of an appropriation found in the general appropriation act so long as the appropriation in the approved portions of the act was not made dependent or contingent on the vetoed provision. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-25.
Governor may not defeat legislative purpose. — A partial veto must be so exercised that it eliminates or destroys the whole of an item or part and does not distort the legislative intent, and in effect create legislation inconsistent with that enacted by the legislature, by the careful striking of words, phrases, clauses or sentences. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-12.
Test for validity of partial veto. — The test of whether a partial veto is valid requires more than a determination that legislative intent has been defeated, for indeed, that would be the result of any partial veto. Rather, the determination must be made whether the remaining language is so distorted by the veto as to create legislation inconsistent with that enacted by the legislature. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-12.
Sections upon which appropriation contingent not to be vetoed. — The governor cannot constitutionally veto provisos or conditions upon which the appropriation in the approved portions of the appropriation act was made dependent or contingent. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-25.
Since under Section 6 of House Bill 300 (general appropriations act), the entire appropriations act is made contingent upon the definitions contained in Section 1, upon Section 5 (repealing a previous appropriation) and upon Section 6 (the contingency clause), the governor could not line item veto Sections 1, 5 or 6 in whole or in part without vetoing all of House Bill 300. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-18.
Act not subject to partial veto. — As laws 1966, ch. 65 (67-12-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.), the Highway Beautification Act, is neither an appropriations bill nor a bill appropriating money, it does not qualify as one of those types of measures upon which the governor can exercise his partial veto power, and the governor did not act within his constitutional authority in attempting to veto portions thereof. 1966 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-133.
Reduction of item invalid. — The attempted reduction by the governor of any appropriation, where that result was not full disapproval of such an item, is ineffective and a nullity. 1953 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 53-5738.
Effect of invalid veto attempt. — A legislative enactment is not invalidated by an invalid attempt to partially veto it; rather, the entire bill becomes law. 1966 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-133.
Effect of line-item veto on appropriation. — When the governor line-item vetoed one item for $22,400 in the appropriation for the labor and industrial commission (now the employment services division of the human services department) the only reasonable legislative intent discernible was that the commission then had $22,400 of unearmarked funds which could be used for the general purposes of the agency. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-116.
The labor and industrial commission (now the employment services division of the human services department) could spend any of the unallocated $22,400 found in its appropriation after the governor had vetoed a line-item earmarking this amount for any purpose within its statutory powers. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-58.
Legislative intent to be considered. — Legislative intent should be considered in examining an appropriation law after the governor has exercised his line-item veto power. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-116.
Total appropriation unchanged. — If the governor were to veto a line item for "salaries" in a state agency's appropriation, vetoing both amount and purpose, the total amount appropriated to the agency would not change, but the agency would be left without an appropriation for any salaries. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-25.
Return of partially vetoed bill to legislature should be done. — A bill, whether wholly or partially vetoed, during the legislative session which reached the governor during any period prior to the last three calendar days of the legislative session should be physically returned to the house originating the bill accompanied by the governor's veto message. 1959 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 59-28 (characterizing contrary language in State ex rel. Dickson v. Saiz, 1957-NMSC-010, 62 N.M. 227, 308 P.2d 205, as a "permissive procedure").
Law reviews. — For student symposium, "Constitutional Revision - The Executive Branch - Long or Short Ballot?" see 9 Nat. Resources J. 430 (1969).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes §§ 69, 70, 76, 78, 79.
Vote necessary to pass bill over veto, 2 A.L.R. 1593.
Governor disapproving bill in part or with modifications, 35 A.L.R. 600, 99 A.L.R. 1277.
Unconstitutional veto as protection against civil or criminal responsibility for act or omission in reliance thereon, 53 A.L.R. 268.
Effect of initiative and referendum clause, 62 A.L.R. 1352.
What amounts to adjournment within constitutional provision that bill shall become law if not returned by executive within specified time unless adjournment prevents its return, 64 A.L.R. 1446.
Power of executive to sign bill after adjournment or during recess of legislature, 64 A.L.R. 1468.
Sunday as included in computing time for presentation of bill, 71 A.L.R. 1363.
Effect of failure of officers of legislature to sign bills as required by constitutional amendment, 95 A.L.R. 278.
Stage at which statute passes beyond the power of the legislature to reconsider or recall, 96 A.L.R. 1309.
Validity of veto as affected by failure to give reasons for vetoing or objections to measure vetoed, 119 A.L.R. 1189.
Devolution, in absence of governor, of veto and approval powers, upon lieutenant governor or other officer, 136 A.L.R. 1053.
82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 47 to 59.