N.M. Const. art. III, § 1
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution otherwise expressly directed or permitted. Nothing in this section, or elsewhere in this constitution, shall prevent the legislature from establishing, by statute, a body with statewide jurisdiction other than the courts of this state for the determination of rights and liabilities between persons when those rights and liabilities arise from transactions or occurrences involving personal injury sustained in the course of employment by an employee. The statute shall provide for the type and organization of the body, the mode of appointment or election of its members and such other matters as the legislature may deem necessary or proper. (As amended November 4, 1986.)
The 1986 amendment, which was proposed by H.J.R. No. 7 (Laws 1986) and adopted at the general election held on November 4, 1986, by a vote of 173,989 for and 92,419 against, added the last two sentences.
Cross references. — For the workers' compensation division, see 52-5-1 NMSA 1978.
Comparable provisions. — Idaho Const., art. II, § 1.
Iowa Const., art. III, § 1.
Montana Const., art. III, § 1.
Utah Const., art. V, § 1.
Wyoming Const., art. II, § 1.
Cap on medical malpractice damages does not violate separation of powers. — The cap on medical malpractice damages in 41-5-6 NMSA 1978 does not violate the separation of powers clause in Article III, Section 1 of the constitution of New Mexico. Salopek v. Friedman, 2013-NMCA-087.
Abrogation of common law jurisdiction to correct illegal sentences. — Paragraph A of Rule 5-801 NMRA, which abrogated the common law jurisdiction of the district court to correct illegal sentences, does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. State v. Torres, 2012-NMCA-026, 272 P.3d 689, overruled by State v. Romero, 2023-NMSC-008.
State constitutions are not grants of power to the legislative, executive or judiciary branches, but are limitations on the powers of each, and no branch of the state may add to, nor detract from, its clear mandate. State ex rel. Hovey Concrete Prods. Co. v. Mechem, 1957-NMSC-075, 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069, overruled, Wylie Corp. v. Mowrer, 1986-NMSC-075, 104 N.M. 751, 726 P.2d 1381.
Each of three departments of government is equal and coordinate and responsible only to the people, and the courts are not warranted in assuming that their department is the only one to which it is safe to entrust enforcement of provisions of constitution regulating enactment of statutes. Kelley v. Marron, 1915-NMSC-092, 21 N.M. 239, 153 P. 262.
Functions of departments. — The legislature makes, the executive executes and the judiciary construes the laws. State v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Court, 1932-NMSC-023, 36 N.M. 151, 9 P.2d 691.
What delegation impermissible. — No one of the three branches of government can effectively delegate any of the powers that peculiarly and intrinsically belong to that branch. State v. Roy, 1936-NMSC-048, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646, 110 A.L.R. 1.
Members of one department not to manage affairs of others. — This article of constitution means that powers of state government shall be divided into three departments, and that members of one department shall have no part in management of either of the others. State ex rel. Chapman v. Truder, 1930-NMSC-049, 35 N.M. 49, 289 P. 594.
Exercise of powers and duties. — One branch of the state government may not exercise powers and duties belonging to another. State ex rel. SCC v. McCulloh, 1957-NMSC-096, 63 N.M. 436, 321 P.2d 207.
Occasional overlapping of powers contemplated. — Our constitution does not necessarily foreclose exercise by one department of the state of powers of another but contemplates in unmistakable language that there are certain instances where the overlapping of power exists. State ex rel. Holmes v. State Bd. of Fin., 1961-NMSC-172, 69 N.M. 430, 367 P.2d 925.
The doctrine of separation of powers allows some overlap in the exercise of governmental functions. Mowrer v. Rusk, 1980-NMSC-113, 95 N.M. 48, 618 P.2d 886.
Rule 5-805 NMRA does not violate separation of powers. — Subsection H of Rule 5-805 NMRA, which requires dismissal of a probation violation proceeding if the time limits to hold an adjudicatory hearing are not met, does not infringe upon the substantive rights granted by the legislature in 31-11-1 and 31-21-15 NMSA 1978 and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. State v. Montoya, 2011-NMCA-009, 149 N.M. 242, 247 P.3d 1127, cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-001, 150 N.M. 558, 263 P.3d 900.
Subsection H of Rule 5-805 NMRA, which requires dismissal of a probation violation proceeding if the time limits to hold an adjudicatory hearing are not met, does not infringe upon the substantive rights granted by the legislature in 31-11-1 and 31-21-15 NMSA 1978 and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. State v. Montoya, 2011-NMCA-009, 149 N.M. 242, 247 P.3d 1127, cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-001, 150 N.M. 558, 263 P.3d 900.
The interests protected by maintaining separation of powers can best be furthered, not by requiring a total separation of functions among the branches, but by ensuring that adequate checks exist to keep each branch free from the control or coercive influence of the other branches. Board of Educ. v. Harrell, 1994-NMSC-096, 118 N.M. 470, 882 P.2d 511.
A legislator's appointment as a special assistant district attorney does not violate the separation of powers doctrine in Article III, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution. — The New Mexico Constitution prohibits a person charged with the exercise of the powers of one branch of government from exercising the powers of the other branches of government, prohibits service as a legislator by any person who, at the time of qualifying, holds any office of trust or profit with the state, county or national governments, and prohibits a legislator from being appointed to a civil office in the state during the legislator's term of office. A district attorney occupies an office of trust, is a quasi-judicial officer, and exercises core executive functions; as a result, a district attorney is constitutionally ineligible to serve as a member of the legislative branch. A private attorney appointed as a special assistant district attorney, however, is neither a public officer nor a public employee of the appointing district attorney and exercises the power and authority of the district attorney only in the specific case or matter for which they are appointed, and therefore a legislator's appointment to such a role does not unduly encroach upon or interfere with the authority of the executive or judicial branches. A private attorney's isolated exercise of district attorney authority while serving as a special assistant district attorney and a legislator does not violate the separation of powers doctrine of Article III, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution. 2024 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 24-04.
Compulsory arbitration. — The "principle of check", which entails courts retaining power to make enforceable, binding judgments through review of agency determinations, requires that courts have an opportunity to review decisions of arbitrators in statutorily compelled arbitration such as is required by 22-10-17.1 NMSA 1978. Board of Educ. v. Harrell, 1994-NMSC-096, 118 N.M. 470, 882 P.2d 511.
This article does not relate to municipal offices. State ex rel. Chapman v. Truder, 1930-NMSC-049, 35 N.M. 49, 289 P. 594.
This section does not apply to the distribution of power within local governments. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Padilla, 1990-NMCA-125, 111 N.M. 278, 804 P.2d 1097.
Applicability of section to public employees. — This section applies to public officers, not employees, in the different branches of government. State ex rel. Stratton v. Roswell Indep. Schools, 1991-NMCA-013, 111 N.M. 495, 806 P.2d 1085.
To be a public officer, the person must be invested with sovereign power. State ex rel. Stratton v. Roswell Indep. Schs., 1991-NMCA-013, 111 N.M. 495, 806 P.2d 1085.
Governor lacked authority under separation of powers doctrine to bind the state by unilaterally entering into compacts and revenue-sharing agreements with Indian tribes which would permit gaming on Indian lands pursuant to the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 1995-NMSC-048, 120 N.M. 562, 904 P.2d 11.
Constitutional powers of the legislature and executive branches when administering federal funds. — When federal funds come with specific conditions attached, the executive branch is merely administering the funds consistent with the requirements established by the federal government, and no legislative appropriation is required. If a state retains wide discretion, then such funds must be appropriated—a function constitutionally reserved for the legislature. State ex rel. Candelaria v. Grisham, 2023-NMSC-031
When the state retains wide discretion in administering federal funds, the power to appropriate the funds falls exclusively within the purview of the legislative branch. — Where the federal government, through the federal American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA), provided approximately $1.75 billion in COVID-19-related financial assistance to New Mexico, and where the New Mexico legislature attempted to appropriate the ARPA funds through the General Appropriation Act of 2021, and where the governor vetoed the portions that related to ARPA funds, asserting that the legislature lacked the authority to direct the executive’s administration of federal funds, and where the governor also spent approximately $600 million of the $1.75 billion in ARPA funds, and where petitioners filed suit against the governor, seeking a writ of mandamus and stay prohibiting her from expending or appropriating any additional ARPA funds, the New Mexico Supreme Court issued a prohibitory writ of mandamus and order providing that the governor and state treasurer shall not transfer, encumber, commit, expend or appropriate any additional ARPA funds absent legislative appropriation, because the amount of discretion the federal government left to New Mexico in allocating the ARPA funds compelled a conclusion that the federal funds were subject to legislative appropriation. State ex rel. Candelaria v. Grisham, 2023-NMSC-031.
Mandamus proceeding against governor. — The supreme court's issuance of writs commanding the governor to abide by a legislative decision extending the term of an agreement pursuant to the Public Employee Bargaining Act (Chapter 10, Article 7E NMSA 1978) and to recognize a statutory or constitutional right of petitioners to organize and collectively bargain would require the court to exceed its constitutional powers in violation of this section. State ex rel. AFSCME v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-031, 128 N.M. 481, 994 P.2d 727.
Nature of functions of state corporation commission (now public regulation commission). — Functions of state corporation commission (now public regulation commission) are not confined to any of the three departments of government, but its duties and powers pervade them all. In re Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 1933-NMSC-029, 37 N.M. 194, 20 P.2d 918.
Power of governor to pardon criminal contempt. — Criminal contempt is an offense against authority of court, community and state, not the judge personally, and hence is one in which state has power, through its governor, to extend grace and forgiveness, by means of pardoning power, without violating this section. State v. Magee Publ'g Co., 1924-NMSC-023, 29 N.M. 455, 224 P. 1028, 38 A.L.R. 142, overruled by State v. Morris, 1965-NMSC-113, 75 N.M. 475, 406 P.2d 349.
Selection of specific programs for which funds to be used. — The governor's veto of the following language that appears as overstricken was valid: "Included in the general fund appropriation to the New Mexico center for women is fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) to be used for providing a training program for female inmates." The legislature is authorized to define the basic purpose for which funds are appropriated, but the selection and identification of specific programs is the responsibility of the executive branch of government. State ex rel. Coll v. Carruthers, 1988-NMSC-057, 107 N.M. 439, 759 P.2d 1380.
Appropriation for specific data processing system. — The legislature, in appropriating funds for data processing services, overstepped its traditional oversight and appropriation functions when it used the appropriation process to name the general services department as the contracting party and the ISD-2 system as the system to be contracted for. Such legislative action effectively "swallowed up" the executive management function. State ex rel. Coll v. Carruthers, 1988-NMSC-057, 107 N.M. 439, 759 P.2d 1380.
Necessity of preserving error. — On appeal, for a party to challenge a statute requiring registration of engineers, on constitutional grounds, as making a delegation of either legislative or judicial power to an administrative board, a motion must be presented, ruled on and excepted to at trial in order to preserve the error for appeal. Hatfield v. New Mexico State Bd. of Registration for Prof'l Eng'rs & Land Surveyors, 1955-NMSC-067, 60 N.M. 242, 290 P.2d 1077.
The legislature’s delegation of authority in the Occupational Health and Safety Act, to the environmental improvement board to promulgate regulations addressing violence against convenience store workers does not violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. New Mexico Petroleum Marketers Assn. v. New Mexico Envtl. Improvement Bd., 2007-NMCA-060, 141 N.M. 678, 160 P.3d 587.
Legislature may lawfully delegate authority to an administrative agency when that authority is restricted by specific legislative standards. Montoya v. O'Toole, 1980-NMSC-045, 94 N.M. 303, 610 P.2d 190.
Where legislature delegates powers, reasonable standards must be provided as a guide in the exercise of the discretionary power conferred. State ex rel. State Park & Recreation Comm'n v. New Mexico State Auth., 1966-NMSC-033, 76 N.M. 1, 411 P.2d 984.
Workers' compensation administration. — Creation of a workers' compensation administration and vesting in it the power to decide controversies thereunder, is a valid exercise of legislative power. Wylie Corp. v. Mowrer, 1986-NMSC-075, 104 N.M. 751, 726 P.2d 1381, overruling State ex rel. Hovey Concrete Products Co. v. Mechem, 1957-NMSC-075, 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069.
Creation of administrative board. — Powers conferred upon state loan board, created by Laws 1912, ch. 16 (executed), were not judicial but administrative, so that act did not violate this section. State v. Kelly, 1921-NMSC-073, 27 N.M. 412, 202 P. 524, 21 A.L.R. 156.
Administrative body may be delegated power to make fact determinations to which the law, as set forth by the legislative body, is to be applied. Fellows v. Shultz, 1970-NMSC-071, 81 N.M. 496, 469 P.2d 141; Cont'l Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 1962-NMSC-062, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809.
Powers in arbitration board. — Former annexation statute which provided that board of arbitrators should order annexation when it found that benefits of municipality were or could be made available in reasonable time to territory desired to be annexed and that board could not arbitrarily withhold annexation was not invalid as a delegation of legislative power. Cox v. City of Albuquerque, 1949-NMSC-041, 53 N.M. 334, 207 P.2d 1017.
Reduction of annexation area by arbitration board. — Fact that board or arbitration provided for under former annexation act limited its finding of benefits to less than the whole area described in the plat, so that the area subject to annexation became reduced, did not constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Cox v. City of Albuquerque, 1949-NMSC-041, 53 N.M. 334, 207 P.2d 1017.
Determination of prevailing wage by commissioner. — Laws 1937, ch. 179 (former 6-6-6 to 6-6-10, 1953 Comp.), dealing with minimum wages on public works, was not unconstitutional as an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the state labor commissioner (now replaced by the chief of the labor and industrial bureau of the employment service division) because the act did not establish any standard or formula by which he could determine the prevailing wage. City of Albuquerque v. Burrell, 1958-NMSC-070, 64 N.M. 204, 326 P.2d 1088.
Spacing unit standards adequate. — The standards of preventing waste and protecting correlative rights, as laid out in 70-2-11 NMSA 1978, are sufficient to allow the oil conservation commission (now the oil conservation division) power under 70-2-18 NMSA 1978 to prorate and create standard or nonstandard spacing units to remain intact, the latter section not being an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 1975-NMSC-006, 87 N.M. 286, 532 P.2d 582.
Assessment powers. — Procedure outlined in former Conservancy Act (Laws 1923, ch. 140) was not an unlawful delegation of the power of taxation vested in the legislature by the organic law. In re Proposed Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 1925-NMSC-058, 31 N.M. 188, 242 P. 683.
Investigative powers in boundary commission. — Commitment to boundary commission of power to investigate question of proper location of a boundary is not a delegation of improper power. State ex rel. Clancy v. Hall, 1917-NMSC-070, 23 N.M. 422, 168 P. 715.
Authorization of administrative rule-making not unconstitutional delegation. — Statute authorizing state game commission to promulgate rules concerning game animals and fish is a proper exercise of state's police power, and is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. State ex rel. Sofeico v. Heffernan, 1936-NMSC-069, 41 N.M. 219, 67 P.2d 240.
Conferring of quasi-judicial powers on agencies. — Legislature, in exercising its police powers, may confer certain "quasi-judicial" powers on administrative agencies with regard to laws affecting the general public, but such powers do not extend to determinations of rights and liabilities between individuals. Fellows v. Shultz, 1970-NMSC-071, 81 N.M. 496, 469 P.2d 141.
Quasi-judicial school board functions. — School board functions which are quasi-judicial do not constitute a violation of the separation of powers clause of the constitution as a delegation of judicial powers to the board. McCormick v. Board of Educ., 1954-NMSC-094, 58 N.M. 648, 274 P.2d 299, superseded by statute, Sanchez v. Board of Educ. of Town of Belen, 1961-NMSC-081, 68 N.M. 440, 362 P.2d 979.
Control of liquor traffic. — Pursuant to 60-6B-4 NMSA 1978, the delegation of the legislative authority to disapprove the transfer of a liquor license on moral as well as on safety and health grounds is within the traditional definition of the state's police power and thus constitutional. Dick v. City of Portales, 1993-NMCA-125, 116 N.M. 472, 863 P.2d 1093, rev'd, 1994-NMSC-092, 118 N.M. 541, 883 P.2d 127.
Revocation procedure not improper legislative delegation. — Former 67-21-21, 1953 Comp., purporting to confer power on the state board of registration for professional engineers and land surveyors to revoke the certificate of any registrant who is found guilty by the board after trial of gross negligence, incompetency or misconduct in the practice of his profession, is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Hatfield v. New Mexico State Bd. of Registration for Prof'l Eng'rs & Land Surveyors, 1955-NMSC-067, 60 N.M. 242, 290 P.2d 1077.
Formation of college districts by petition not improper delegation. — This section was not violated by authorization in former 21-13-4 NMSA 1978 (repealed) for formation of junior college districts by petition method, as this was not a delegation of power but merely a statutory method for implementing the legislative determination of a purpose to be fulfilled. Daniels v. Watson, 1966-NMSC-011, 75 N.M. 661, 410 P.2d 193.
Direction to governor to conform national guard. — Statute directing governor to issue such orders as might be necessary to conform the national guard of New Mexico to that prescribed by the war department was not a delegation of legislative authority. State ex rel. Charlton v. French, 1940-NMSC-010, 44 N.M. 169, 99 P.2d 715.
Determination of property misuse improperly delegated. — Subdivision [Subsection] A(2) of 30-14-4 NMSA 1978, proscribing the remaining in or occupying of any public property after having been requested to leave by the lawful custodian or his representative, who has determined that the public property is being used or occupied contrary to its intended or customary use, is without sufficiently definite standards to be enforceable and, thus, an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. State v. Jaramillo, 1972-NMCA-071, 83 N.M. 800, 498 P.2d 687.
Legislature cannot delegate power to appropriate money. — Under constitutional separation-of-powers principles, the legislature cannot delegate its power to appropriate money unless specifically authorized by the state constitution. State ex rel. Schwartz v. Johnson, 1995-NMSC-080, 120 N.M. 820, 907 P.2d 1001.
The legislature did not delegate to the secretary of state the authority to reinstate straight-ticket voting in New Mexico. — Where the New Mexico secretary of state sought to reinstate straight-ticket voting in the November 2018 general election, and where petitioners, a coalition of voters, political parties, and political organizations, filed a petition for writ of mandamus requesting an order prohibiting the secretary of state from further efforts to reinstate the straight-ticket option on the grounds that she does not possess the authority to do so, the writ of mandamus was issued because N.M. Const., Art. VII, § 1(B) gives the legislature plenary authority over elections, an authority which cannot be delegated and which is limited only by the New Mexico constitution. Moreover, the history of straight-ticket voting in New Mexico indicates that the legislature never delegated or attempted to delegate to the secretary of state the authority to decide whether straight ticket voting shall be an option to voters in general elections, and 1-10-12(F) NMSA 1978, which gives the secretary of state the authority to prescribe the form of the ballot, was never intended to authorize the secretary of state to decide questions related to straight-ticket voting. Unite New Mexico v. Oliver, 2019-NMSC-009.
Reduction of budgets by board unconstitutional. — The unrestricted and unguided power contained in Laws 1961, ch. 254, § 24 (an appropriation section), whereby state board of finance could impose a reduction of up to ten percent on operating budgets simply if in its opinion the legislature had been overly generous, was an unconstitutional grant of legislative power and the board could not legally proceed thereunder. State ex rel. Holmes v. State Bd. of Fin., 1961-NMSC-172, 69 N.M. 430, 367 P.2d 925.
Executive control of expenditures permissible. — Legislature, without the same constituting any violation of N.M. Const., art. IV, § 22, or of this section, may provide in the general appropriation bill for the executive to control the expenditure of the amounts appropriated. State ex rel. Holmes v. State Bd. of Fin., 1961-NMSC-172, 69 N.M. 430, 367 P.2d 925.
Pharmacy board allowed to schedule drugs. — To allow the board of pharmacy to schedule drugs, resulting in the attachment of differing criminal penalties for the possession of different drugs, is not an unconstitutional delegation of authority. Montoya v. O'Toole, 1980-NMSC-045, 94 N.M. 303, 610 P.2d 190.
Unconstitutional delegation of zoning power. — Section 3-21-18 NMSA 1978, which permits private individuals to "create" a special zoning district without any limitation on the size and location of the district, is void as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because there is no standard to guide the private individuals in determining the size or location of the district. Deer Mesa Corp. v. Los Tres Valles Special Zoning Dist. Comm'n, 1985-NMCA-114, 103 N.M. 675, 712 P.2d 21.
A. LEGISLATION VALIDLY AFFECTING COURTS.
Court decisions may be modified by legislative enactment. — The legislature's plenary authority is limited only by the state and federal constitutions. Court decisions may be modified by legislative enactment in any manner and to any degree decided by the legislature, so long as the legislation conforms to constitutional standards. Ferguson v. New Mexico State Hwy. Comm'n, 1982-NMCA-180, 99 N.M. 194, 656 P.2d 244, cert. denied, 99 N.M. 226, 656 P.2d 889 (1983).
Impartiality provision valid. — It is no invasion of judicial power for the legislature to say that such power shall not be exercised by judges who are believed by the litigants to be partial. State ex rel. Hannah v. Armijo, 1933-NMSC-087, 38 N.M. 73, 28 P.2d 511.
Longarm statute not violative of courts' powers. — Section 38-1-16 NMSA 1978 is not an unconstitutional invasion of the judicial branch in violation of the separation of powers provision of the constitution. Gray v. Armijo, 1962-NMSC-082, 70 N.M. 245, 372 P.2d 821.
Provision in 38-1-16 NMSA 1978, which allows substituted service on nonresidents involved in automobile accidents, does not constitute unconstitutional exercise of judicial powers by the legislature. Clews v. Stiles, 303 F.2d 290 (10th Cir. 1960), rev’g 181 F. Supp. 172 (D.N.M. 1960).
Domicile presumption valid. — The presumption of domicile established for military personnel stationed in this state for six months, under 40-4-5 NMSA 1978 (relating to jurisdictional requirements for dissolution of marriage), is not an unconstitutional interference with the judicial branch of government. Crownover v. Crownover, 1954-NMSC-092, 58 N.M. 597, 274 P.2d 127.
No unconstitutional delegation of judicial powers. — Section 30-20-13 NMSA 1978, regarding interference, trespass and damage to public facilities and providing penalties therefor, does not unconstitutionally delegate judicial power since it contemplates ultimate determination by judge or jury that the person accused committed disruptive acts. State v. Silva, 1974-NMCA-072, 86 N.M. 543, 525 P.2d 903, cert. denied, 86 N.M. 528, 525 P.2d 888.
Constitutional power to regulate the practice of law encompasses the regulation of attorney fees generally, but not regulation of attorney fees within the workers' compensation context specifically. — Regulation of attorney fees generally falls within the purview of the New Mexico supreme court's inherent powers and power of superintending control, but regulation of attorney fees specifically within the workers' compensation context does not. Pena v. State, 2025-NMSC-041.
52-1-54(I) NMSA 1978 infringes on the New Mexico supreme court's power to regulate attorney fees in appeals brought from the quasi-judicial workers compensation administration to the judiciary's courts. — By purporting to regulate attorney fees within the courts for appeals from the workers' compensation administration, 52-1-54(I) NMSA 1978 infringes on the New Mexico supreme court's constitutional power to regulate the practice of law and thus is nonbinding on courts. Pena v. State, 2025-NMSC-041.
Establishment of penalties for criminal behavior is solely within the province of the legislature. State v. Mabry, 1981-NMSC-067, 96 N.M. 317, 630 P.2d 269.
Legislative act making a sentence mandatory, and thus denying any right of the courts to suspend sentences, does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers. State v. Mabry, 1981-NMSC-067, 96 N.M. 317, 630 P.2d 269.
Procedural statute effective unless conflicts with court rule. — Since the supreme court has no quarrel with a statutory arrangement which seems reasonable and workable, a statute regulating practice and procedure, although not binding on the supreme court, is given effect until there is a conflict between it and a rule adopted by the court. State v. Herrera, 1978-NMCA-048, 92 N.M. 7, 582 P.2d 384, cert. denied, 91 N.M. 751, 580 P.2d 972.
Legislation dealing with procedure in judicial proceedings is not automatically in violation of this section; rather, such legislation is unconstitutional only when it conflicts with procedure adopted by the supreme court. Otero v. Zouhar, 1984-NMCA-054, 102 N.M. 493, 697 P.2d 493, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 1985-NMSC-021, 102 N.M. 482, 697 P.2d 482.
Legislative power to determine appealability. — The legislature has the power to determine in what district court cases, civil and criminal, the supreme court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction, except for those cases in which the district court has imposed a sentence of death or life imprisonment, for which the constitution has directly conferred appellate jurisdiction. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 1976-NMSC-031, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906, 98 S. Ct. 2237, 56 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1978).
Tort Claims Act constitutional. — The legislature acted constitutionally in enacting the Tort Claims Act (41-4-1 to 41-4-27 NMSA 1978) following judicial abolition of sovereign immunity. Ferguson v. New Mexico State Hwy. Comm'n, 1982-NMCA-180, 99 N.M. 194, 656 P.2d 244, cert. denied, 99 N.M. 226, 656 P.2d 889.
Authorization of rule-making. — Laws 1933, ch. 84, §§ 1, 2 (38-1-1 and 38-1-2 NMSA 1978), having authorized the supreme court to promulgate court rules, such rules do not delegate an exclusive legislative function to the courts. State v. Roy, 1936-NMSC-048, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646, 110 A.L.R. 1.
Receiver appointment provision directory, not mandatory. — Provision in former 48-7-8, 1953 Comp., dealing with insolvency and involuntary liquidation of state banks, that the court should appoint the state bank examiner as receiver amounted to no more than a recommendation to the judiciary to appoint him, as otherwise, the enactment would be unconstitutional in view of this section and N.M. Const., art. VI, § 13. Cooper v. Otero, 1934-NMSC-008, 38 N.M. 164, 29 P.2d 341.
Judicial power validly conferred by Conservancy Act. — Powers and duties conferred upon district court by Conservancy Act (73-17-1 to 73-17-24 NMSA 1978) are essentially judicial, and do not violate this section. Gutierrez v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 1929-NMSC-071, 34 N.M. 346, 282 P. 1, 70 A.L.R. 1261, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 610, 50 S. Ct. 158, 74 L. Ed. 653 (1930).
Drainage District Law. — Drainage District Law of 1912, ch. 84 (73-6-1 to 73-7-56 NMSA 1978), providing for creation of drainage districts by petition filed in proper district court, did not violate this section, the duties imposed by the act being judicial in character. In re Dexter-Greenfield Drainage Dist., 1915-NMSC-097, 21 N.M. 286, 154 P. 382.
Filling municipal court vacancies. — A municipal ordinance establishing a procedure for filling a temporary vacancy on the municipal court did not violate this section. Aguilar v. City Comm'n, 1997-NMCA-045, 123 N.M. 333, 940 P.2d 181.
B. LEGISLATION IMPROPERLY CONFERRING POWERS ON COURTS.
Placing of original administrative jurisdiction in courts invalid. — A statutory amendment to 72-12-3 NMSA 1978 which permitted removal of application for use of underground water from the jurisdiction of the state engineer to be placed within the original jurisdiction of the courts was unconstitutional as violative of the separation of powers doctrine of this section. City of Hobbs v. State ex rel. Reynolds, 1970-NMSC-133, 82 N.M. 102, 476 P.2d 500.
The 1967 amendment to 72-12-7 NMSA 1978, purporting to remove proceeding relating to change in location of well or use of water from administrative jurisdiction, and placing it within the original jurisdiction of the courts, violated separation of powers doctrine. Fellows v. Shultz, 1970-NMSC-071, 81 N.M. 496, 469 P.2d 141.
De novo review of commission's decisions by courts unconstitutional. — Insofar as 70-2-25 NMSA 1978 purports to allow the district court, on appeal from order or decision of the oil conservation commission, to consider new evidence, to base its decision on the preponderance of the evidence or to modify the orders of the commission, it is void as an unconstitutional delegation of power, contravening this provision of the New Mexico constitution. Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 1962-NMSC-062, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809.
Review of engineer's decision limited. — Section 72-7-1 NMSA 1978 does not permit the district court, in reviewing a decision of the state engineer, to hear new or additional evidence; review by the court is limited to questions of law and restricted to whether, based upon the legal evidence produced at the hearing before the state engineer, that officer acted fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously, whether his action was in accordance with the law and the evidence, and whether it was within the scope of his authority. Kelley v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 1963-NMSC-049, 71 N.M. 464, 379 P.2d 763, superseded by statute, Fort Sumner Irrigation Dist. v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 1974-NMSC-082, 87 N.M. 149, 530 P.2d 943.
Courts generally not to perform administrative functions. — Just as a commission cannot perform a judicial function, neither can the court perform an administrative one. Fellows v. Shultz, 1970-NMSC-071, 81 N.M. 496, 469 P.2d 141; Kelley v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 1963-NMSC-049, 71 N.M. 464, 379 P.2d 763, superseded by statute, Fort Sumner Irrigation Dist. v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 87 N.M. 149, 530 P.2d 943.
Prerequisites to exercise by courts of administrative functions. — Before a court may exercise an administrative function, such as granting an extension of time to pay taxes and waiving penalty and interest for delinquency in payment, belonging inherently to another department of the government, it must appear that an appropriate attempt has been made to delegate such function to the courts, and that the attempt is not repugnant to this section. State v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Court, 1932-NMSC-023, 36 N.M. 151, 9 P.2d 691.
Granting liquor permits not for court. — The district court does not have the administrative function of determining whether or not a liquor permit should be granted. Baca v. Grisolano, 1953-NMSC-028, 57 N.M. 176, 256 P.2d 792; Floeck v. Bureau of Revenue, 1940-NMSC-014, 44 N.M. 194, 100 P.2d 225.
Cancellation of licenses. — The Liquor Control Act (former 60-3-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.) gave the court authority only to determine whether upon the facts and law, the action of the official in cancelling a license was based upon an error of law or was unsupported by substantial evidence or clearly arbitrary or capricious; otherwise it would be a delegation of administrative authority to the district court in violation of the constitution. Baca v. Grisolano, 1953-NMSC-028, 57 N.M. 176, 256 P.2d 792; Floeck v. Bureau of Revenue, 1940-NMSC-014, 44 N.M. 194, 100 P.2d 225.
Impermissible for courts to zone. — To the extent that Laws 1927, ch. 27, § 8 (repealed) purports to allow the district court to zone land, it is void as an unconstitutional delegation of power to the judiciary, contravening this section. Coe v. City of Albuquerque, 1966-NMSC-196, 76 N.M. 771, 418 P.2d 545, appeal after remand, 1968-NMSC-069, 79 N.M. 92, 440 P.2d 130.
C. IMPROPER INTERFERENCE WITH JUDICIARY BY LEGISLATURE.
Infringement upon judiciary by state or local government barred. — This article bars any infringement upon the power and the authority of the judiciary by the executive and legislative branches at any level of state or local government. Mowrer v. Rusk, 1980-NMSC-113, 95 N.M. 48, 618 P.2d 886.
Legislative enactments on procedure. — The distinction between substantive law and those rules of pleading, practice and procedure which are essential to the performance of the constitutional duties imposed upon the courts is not always clearly defined. There may be areas in which procedural matters so closely border upon substantive rights and remedies that legislative enactments with respect thereto would be proper. Southwest Underwriters v. Montoya, 1969-NMSC-027, 80 N.M. 107, 452 P.2d 176.
Judiciary determines rules of procedure for cases within the judicial system, pursuant to its authority under the separation of powers doctrine. Angel Fire Corp. v. C.S. Cattle Co., 1981-NMSC-095, 96 N.M. 651, 634 P.2d 202.
Attempts to regulate pleading, practice and procedure invalid. — The supreme court's constitutional power under this section and N.M. Const., art. VI, § 3, of superintending control over all inferior courts carries with it the inherent power to regulate all pleading, practice and procedure affecting the judicial branch of government, and statutes purporting to regulate practice and procedure in the courts cannot be made binding, for the constitutional power is vested exclusively in the supreme court. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 1976-NMSC-031, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906, 98 S. Ct. 2237, 56 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1978); State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, 1975-NMSC-032, 88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006.
In the absence of the clearest language to the contrary in the constitution, the powers essential to the functioning of the courts are to be taken as committed solely to the supreme court to avoid a confusion in the methods of procedure and to provide uniform rules of pleading and practice. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 1976-NMSC-031, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906, 98 S. Ct. 2237, 56 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1976).
Court has the power to regulate pleading, practice and procedure within the courts so that, on procedural matters such as time limitations for appeals, a rule adopted by the supreme court governs over an inconsistent statute. AAA v. SCC, 1985-NMSC-037, 102 N.M. 527, 697 P.2d 946.
Procedural statute infringing on court's duties. — Statute providing for dismissal of actions not brought to conclusion within three years and exempting cases and proceedings in which there is to be a jury from the dismissal requirement is a procedural statute which infringes on court's completion of its duties under the constitution; the rule of court in effect at that time will prevail. Southwest Underwriters v. Montoya, 1969-NMSC-027, 80 N.M. 107, 452 P.2d 176.
Creation of journalist's privilege invalid. — In view of the clear and unambiguous assertion of the supreme court in Rule 501, N.M.R. Evid. (now Rule 11-501 NMRA) that no person has a privilege, except as provided by constitution or rule of the court, and since under the New Mexico constitution the legislature lacks power to prescribe by statute rules of evidence and procedure, which power is vested exclusively in the supreme court, the journalist's privilege purportedly created by Subsection A of 38-6-7 NMSA 1978 is constitutionally invalid and cannot be relied upon or enforced in judicial proceedings. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 1976-NMSC-031, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906, 98 S. Ct. 2237, 56 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1978).
Expedition of criminal cases for courts. — Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the matter of expediting the flow of criminal cases through the courts is a peculiarly judicial function. State ex rel. Delgado v. Stanley, 1972-NMSC-024, 83 N.M. 626, 495 P.2d 1073, abrogated, State v. Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025, 148 N.M. 301, 236 P.2d 20.
Legislative interference with quo warranto improper. — Since the constitution provides for separate and equal branches of government in New Mexico, any legislative measure which affects pleading, practice or procedure in relation to a power expressly vested by the constitution in the judiciary, such as quo warranto, cannot be deemed binding. State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, 1975-NMSC-032, 88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006.
Portion of 44-3-6 NMSA 1978 which requires the name of the person rightfully entitled to the office involved in a quo warranto proceeding to be set forth in the complaint is invalid. State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, 1975-NMSC-032, 88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006.
Legislature not to interfere with appellate procedure. — It would be utterly impossible for the court to live up to its responsibilities and to properly and expeditiously handle the matters which come before it on appeal and otherwise, if the legislature could determine and define the nature of the appellate process, establish the procedures to be followed in that process and fix time limitations within which the court must act. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 1976-NMSC-031, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906, 98 S. Ct. 2237, 56 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1978).
Time of hearing appeals for court. — The time within which the supreme court must consider a matter before it is for that court to determine; it is purely a procedural matter. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 1976-NMSC-031, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906, 98 S. Ct. 2237, 56 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1978).
Substitution of de novo hearing for appeal improper. — Legislature has no power to substitute a de novo hearing for an appeal from a judgment or order of the district court. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 1976-NMSC-031, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906, 98 S. Ct. 2237, 56 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1978).
Legislature not to control practice of law. — Legislative attempts to confer any power over the control of the practice of law, including the power of suspension or disbarment, are violative of this section. In re Patton, 1974-NMSC-017, 86 N.M. 52, 519 P.2d 288, abrogated, In re Bristol, 2006-NMSC-041, 140 N.M. 317, 142 P.3d 905.
Bar admission requirements. — The legislature may enact valid laws in fixing minimum but not maximum requirements for admission to the bar, but it may not require admission on standards other than as accepted or established by the courts; any legislation which attempts to do so is an invasion of the judicial power and violative of the constitutional provisions establishing the separate branches of government and prohibiting the legislature from invading the judiciary. In re Sedillo, 1959-NMSC-095, 66 N.M. 267, 347 P.2d 162.
Conflict of interest laws not regulation of law practice. — The application to former executive branch attorneys of Subsection C of 10-16-8 NMSA 1978, prohibiting former public officers and employees from representing persons for pay before their former government agency employer, is not an attempt by the legislature to regulate the practice of law and the provision does not violate separation of powers. Ortiz v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 1998-NMCA-027, 124 N.M. 677, 954 P.2d 109.
Power to make law is reserved exclusively to legislature, and any attempt to abdicate it in any particular field, though valid in form, must necessarily be held void. State v. Roy, 1936-NMSC-048, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646, 110 A.L.R. 1.
Emergency clause for legislature. — It is exclusive function of legislature to determine whether legislation should carry an emergency clause precluding a referendum. Hutchens v. Jackson, 1933-NMSC-051, 37 N.M. 325, 23 P.2d 355.
Statutory construction upholding constitutionality adopted. — Where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one supporting the act and giving it effect and the other rendering it unconstitutional and void, court must adopt that construction which will uphold statute's constitutionality. Abeytia v. Gibbons Garage, 1920-NMSC-064, 26 N.M. 622, 195 P. 515; State ex rel. Clancy v. Hall, 1917-NMSC-070, 23 N.M. 422, 168 P. 715.
Validity of legislation presumed. — The supreme court has repeatedly held that every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity and regularity of legislative enactments. A statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless the court is satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that the legislature went outside the constitution in enacting the challenged legislation. McGeehan v. Bunch, 1975-NMSC-055, 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238.
A statute is presumed to be constitutional unless it clearly violates some specific provision of the constitution. Likewise, an ordinance as well as a statute, is presumed to be valid, and the one who attacks it has the burden of establishing its invalidity. City of Albuquerque v. Jones, 1975-NMSC-025, 87 N.M. 486, 535 P.2d 1337.
There is a presumption of the validity and regularity of legislative enactments. Courts must uphold the efficacy of statutes unless they are satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that the legislature went outside the constitution in enacting the challenged legislation. Gallegos v. Homestake Mining Co., 1982-NMCA-052, 97 N.M. 717, 643 P.2d 281.
Every presumption is in favor of the validity of legislative enactments. Garcia v. Albuquerque Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 1980-NMCA-081, 95 N.M. 391, 622 P.2d 699, cert. quashed, 95 N.M. 426, 622 P.2d 1046 (1981).
Supreme court will not enquire into the wisdom, policy or justness of legislation. Garcia v. Albuquerque Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 1980-NMCA-081, 95 N.M. 391, 622 P.2d 699.
Review of legislative action. — The legislature is a coordinate branch of our state government; its prerogative in the matter of legislation is to be questioned solely from the standpoint of our federal or state constitutional limitations. Fellows v. Shultz, 1970-NMSC-071, 81 N.M. 496, 469 P.2d 141; State v. Armstrong, 1924-NMSC-089, 31 N.M. 220, 243 P. 333.
The function of the courts in scrutinizing acts of the legislature is not to raise possible doubt nor to listen to captious criticism, since as the legislature possesses the sole power of enacting law, it will not be presumed that the people have intended to limit its power or practice by unreasonable or arbitrary restrictions. Every presumption is ordinarily to be indulged in favor of the validity and regularity of legislative acts and procedure. Fellows v. Shultz, 1970-NMSC-071, 81 N.M. 496, 469 P.2d 141; State v. Armstrong, 1924-NMSC-089, 31 N.M. 220, 243 P. 333.
Legislature to determine public need. — A determination of what is reasonably necessary for the preservation of the public health, safety and welfare of the general public is a legislative function and should not be interfered with, save in a clear case of abuse. State v. Collins, 1956-NMSC-046, 61 N.M. 184, 297 P.2d 325.
Courts may not inquire into statutory policy. — Under the separation of powers doctrine, the courts may not inquire into statutory policy and may not substitute their views in the formulation of legislative provisions or classifications for those of the legislature. Gallegos v. Homestake Mining Co., 1982-NMCA-052, 97 N.M. 717, 643 P.2d 281.
No power in court to stay corporation commission (now public regulation commission) order. — A district court had no power to stay an order of state corporation commission (now public regulation commission) (an administrative board exercising a legislative function) pending a determination of whether the order was lawful and reasonable, in view of separation of powers doctrine. State ex rel. SCC v. McCulloh, 1957-NMSC-096, 63 N.M. 436, 321 P.2d 207.
Power to review legislation prior to enforcement action. — The court of appeals did not have authority to review the constitutionality of the New Mexico Mining Act (69-36-1 to 69-36-20 NMSA 1978) in an appeal challenging regulations on their face before the mining commission took action to enforce the act. Old Abe Co. v. New Mexico Mining Comm'n, 1995-NMCA-134, 121 N.M. 83, 908 P.2d 776, cert. denied, 120 N.M. 828, 907 P.2d 1009.
Governor’s emergency orders addressing gun violence and drug abuse did not violate the separation of powers doctrine. — Where Petitioners, including New Mexico legislators, Bernalillo County gun and gun shop owners, two political parties, retired law enforcement officers, and a national advocacy group, petitioned for a Writ of Mandamus, arguing that the governor’s emergency orders addressing gun violence and drug abuse as public health emergencies exceed the proper scope of the Public Health Emergency Response Act, the proper scope of the police power, and the separation-of-powers doctrine, Petitioners failed to show that the emergency orders unconstitutionally encroached on or interfered with areas of law reserved to the legislature or that they disrupt the proper balance between the executive and legislative branches. Amador v. Grisham, 2025-NMSC-024.
Judicial standards commission. — Because the judicial standards commission plays no role in the traditional functions of the judiciary, the governor’s actions in removing the executive appointees to the commission did not infringe on the judiciary’s performance of those functions. State ex rel. N.M. Judicial Standards Comm’n v. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 134 N.M. 59, 73 P.3d 197.
Public service commission's order unconstitutional. — Orders of the public service commission that effectively deregulated the retail side of the electric power industry in New Mexico in the absence of a statutory mandate from the legislature exceeded the commission's authority and violated the separation of powers doctrine. State ex rel. Sandel v. New Mexico Pub. Util. Comm'n, 1999-NMSC-019, 127 N.M. 272, 980 P.2d 55.
Executive created public assistance policy unconstitutional. — Governor's implementation of public assistance policy through the human services department violated the separation of powers doctrine, because in changing eligibility requirements, it was an executive creation of substantive law. State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1998-NMSC-015, 125 N.M. 343, 961 P.2d 768.
Cease and desist order against executive officers. — Cease and desist order was proper contempt sanction against governor and executive agency that continued implementation of public assistance program for several months following issuance of writ of mandamus by supreme court ordering the cessation of the program. State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1998-NMSC-015, 125 N.M. 343, 961 P.2d 768.
Granting power to mining director constitutional. — Regulations of the mining commission granting power to the director, an employee of the commission, were not violative of the separation of powers doctrine. Old Abe Co. v. New Mexico Mining Comm'n, 1995-NMCA-134, 121 N.M. 83, 908 P.2d 776, cert. denied, 120 N.M. 828, 907 P.2d 1009.
State engineer regulations to determine water rights priorities. — The state engineer exceeded the state engineer’s statutory authority under 72-2-9.1 NMSA 1978 and violated the principles of separation of powers under Article III, Section 1 of the constitution of New Mexico when the state engineer adopted regulations that permitted the state engineer to determine water right priorities as among water rights owners and to curtail water usage based upon evidence contained in subfile orders, offers of judgment, hydrographic surveys, and permits issued by the state engineer. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n, Inc. v. D’Antonio, 2011-NMCA-015, 149 N.M. 394, 249 P.3d 932, rev’d, 2012-NMSC-039, 289 P.3d 1232.
Executive privilege recognized. — Recognition of an executive privilege is required by the constitution of the state of New Mexico. State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 1981-NMSC-053, 96 N.M. 254, 629 P.2d 330, abrogated, Republican Party of N.M. v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2012-NMSC-026, 283 P.3d 853.
Executive privilege is a recognition by one branch of government, the judiciary, that another coequal branch of government, the executive, has the right not to be unduly subjected to scrutiny in a judicial proceeding where information in its possession is being sought by a litigant. The legislative and judicial branches of state government enjoy similar privileges which are required to be recognized by the supreme court under the constitution. State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 1981-NMSC-053, 96 N.M. 254, 629 P.2d 330.
Purposes of privilege. — Inherent in the successful functioning of an independent executive is the valid need for protection of communications between its members. The purposes of the executive privilege are to safeguard the decision-making process of the government by fostering candid expression of recommendations and advice and to protect this process from disclosure. State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 1981-NMSC-053, 96 N.M. 254, 629 P.2d 330.
Limitation on privilege. — Executive privilege does not protect communications, whether intended as confidential or not, between the executive department and members of the public or others not employed in the executive department. State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 1981-NMSC-053, 96 N.M. 254, 629 P.2d 330.
Privilege not absolute. — The mere fact that the executive department holds information and claims executive privilege does not of itself render the information exempt from judicial process. Nor does the fact that the privilege is of constitutional origin make the privilege absolute. State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 1981-NMSC-053, 96 N.M. 254, 629 P.2d 330.
Balancing test applied to determine disclosure. — Trial courts are required to determine whether the claim of executive privilege has been properly invoked in each situation. Once it is found that the privilege applies, the trial court must balance the public's interest in preserving confidentiality to promote intra-governmental candor with the individual's need for disclosure of the particular information sought. State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 1981-NMSC-053, 96 N.M. 254, 629 P.2d 330.
Executive conditions on grants of capital outlay appropriations. — Executive Order 2013-006, which requires state agencies, local public bodies and other entities to meet criteria that exceed the conditions required under the 2013 Work New Mexico Act, Laws 2013, ch. 226, before they can receive and use capital outlay appropriations, violates the separation of powers mandated by Article III, Section 1 of the constitution of New Mexico. 2013 Op. Att’y Gen. No.13-03.
Appointment of legislator to executive council. — A state representative's appointment to an executive advisory council does not violate this section providing for the separation of powers. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-03.
Public school teachers and administrators in legislature. — School teachers are not "public officers" but only employees, and they are not barred by the separation of powers provision from being legislators. State ex rel. Stratton v. Roswell Indep. Schs., 111 N.M. 495, 806 P.2d 1085 (Ct. App. 1991).
A member of the state legislature is not precluded by state law from serving as an elected local school board member. 1991 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 91-02.
This state's strong constitutional separation-of-powers doctrine precludes public school teachers and administrators from serving in the legislature. 1988 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 88-20.
Representative serving on state defense force. — A New Mexico state representative may not serve in the New Mexico state defense Force; the offices of legislator and state defense force member are incompatible and serving on both would create a conflict of interest. 1988 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 88-71.
Naming of commission members by legislature. — Oil Conservation Act is not unconstitutional on the ground that since the legislature has named the members of the oil conservation commission there has been an invasion of the executive power of appointment. 1951 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 51-5397.
Charging fees for services. — In the absence of express authority, fees may not be charged by the board of trustees of the New Mexico supreme court law library to patrons using the library in order to generate income for the library. Administrative bodies do not have implied authority to charge fees for services. 1988 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 88-78.
Grand jury is a function of the courts; that is, of the judicial branch of government. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-14.
Delegation of authority to administrative agency. — The legislature has the power to establish administrative agencies and to delegate to them the enforcement of statutes regulating the conduct of professions. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-09.
Governor does not have authority to legislate the regulation of massage practitioners and he cannot delegate it to a massage board. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-09.
Executive agency controlling expenditure of appropriations. — The legislature may provide in the general appropriations bill for an executive agency to control the expenditure of the amounts appropriated without constituting a violation of the separation-of-powers provisions in this section. 1987 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 87-32.
Promulgation of collective bargaining rules by personnel board. — The words "among other things" at the beginning of 10-9-13 NMSA 1978 do not constitute a valid delegation of legislative power, authorizing the personnel board to promulgate rules allowing state employees to bargain collectively with state agencies, since the state constitution commits New Mexico to the doctrine of separation of powers and also vests the legislative powers in the legislature. It is fundamental that no one of the three branches can delegate effectively any of the powers which belong to it. 1987 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 87-41.
Legislative review of administrative regulations proper. — Legislative review of administrative rules and regulations promulgated under delegated rule-making powers is consistent with the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, and does not interfere with judicial prerogative. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-12.
Applicability of motor pool provisions to judiciary. — Procedures adopted under Laws 1968, ch. 43, § 11 (15-3-25 NMSA 1978) for operating the state motor pool are binding upon the judicial branch of the government unless the supreme court determines that such compliance would unreasonably impede or impair the functions of the judiciary. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-64.
Legislative grant of water rights invasion of judiciary's function. — Where exclusive jurisdiction has been given to the judiciary to determine water rights, the separation of powers doctrine forbids the legislature from granting such rights; therefore, proposed bill which would grant a water right of two-acre inches per acre foot to those holding water rights in the artesian basins would be unconstitutional. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-23.
Divestment of office by judicial action of questionable validity. — There is a very serious question as to whether a person can be divested of his legislative office by judicial action pursuant to a constitutional provision which on the face of it would disqualify him from holding office, because this presents a question of separation of power, and the courts will not interfere with the organization of one of the other equal branches of government. 1956 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 56-6400.
Attorney general not to interfere with legislative qualifications. — The attorney general has been granted no statutory authority to intervene in a determination by the legislature of whether public school teachers are qualified to serve, and, in fact, is barred from doing so by the separation of powers doctrine. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-21.
Law reviews. — For comment on Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962), see 3 Nat. Resources J. 178 (1963).
For comment on Kelley v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 71 N.M. 464, 379 P.2d 763 (1963), see 3 Nat. Resources J. 340 (1963).
For note, "Separation of Powers Doctrine in New Mexico," see 4 Nat. Resources J. 350 (1964).
For note, "Annexation of Unincorporated Territory in New Mexico," see 6 Nat. Resources J. 83 (1966).
For article, "Constitutional Limitations on the Exercise of Judicial Functions by Administrative Agencies," see 7 Nat. Resources J. 599 (1967).
For article, "The Writ of Prohibition in New Mexico," see 5 N.M. L. Rev. 91 (1974).
For article, "Medical Malpractice Legislation in New Mexico," see 7 N.M. L. Rev. 5 (1976-77).
For note, "Conservation, Lifeline Rates and Public Utility Regulatory Commissions," see 19 Nat. Resources J. 411 (1979).
For article, "Separation of Powers and the Judicial Rule-Making Power in New Mexico: The Need for Prudential Restraints," see 15 N.M. L. Rev. 407 (1985).
For annual survey of New Mexico criminal procedure, see 16 N.M. L. Rev. 25 (1986).
For survey of workers' compensation law in New Mexico, see 18 N.M. L. Rev. 579 (1988).
For 1984-88 survey of New Mexico administrative law, 19 N.M. L. Rev. 575 (1990).
For comment, "Deannexation: A proposed statute," see 20 N.M. L. Rev. 713 (1990).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law §§ 294 to 359.
Delegation of powers by various branches of government, 2 A.L.R. 882, 12 A.L.R. 1435, 27 A.L.R. 927, 32 A.L.R. 1406, 40 A.L.R. 347, 47 A.L.R. 70, 48 A.L.R. 454, 54 A.L.R. 1104, 55 A.L.R. 372, 70 A.L.R. 1243, 84 A.L.R. 1147, 86 A.L.R. 1554, 88 A.L.R. 1519, 91 A.L.R. 799, 92 A.L.R. 400, 96 A.L.R. 312, 96 A.L.R. 826.
Delegation of power to the judiciary, 6 A.L.R. 218, 18 A.L.R. 67, 34 A.L.R. 1128, 64 A.L.R. 1373, 69 A.L.R. 266, 70 A.L.R. 1284, 71 A.L.R. 821, 87 A.L.R. 546.
Delegation of power to the people, 6 A.L.R. 218, 18 A.L.R. 67, 20 A.L.R. 1491, 29 A.L.R. 41, 53 A.L.R. 149, 64 A.L.R. 1378, 70 A.L.R. 1062, 72 A.L.R. 1339, 76 A.L.R. 105, 123 A.L.R. 950.
Power of court to force the legislative body to apportion representatives or election districts as required by the constitution, 46 A.L.R. 964.
Censorship laws as delegations of power, 64 A.L.R. 505.
Governmental powers in peace-time emergency, 86 A.L.R. 1539, 88 A.L.R. 1519, 96 A.L.R. 312, 96 A.L.R. 826.
Emergency as affecting validity of delegation of power to executive, 86 A.L.R. 1554, 88 A.L.R. 1519, 96 A.L.R. 312, 96 A.L.R. 826.
Constitutionality, construction, and application of provisions of state tax law for conformity with federal income tax law or administrative and judicial interpretation, 42 A.L.R.2d 797.
Validity, construction, and effect of statute, ordinance, or other measure involving chemical treatment of public water supply, 43 A.L.R.2d 453.
Arbitration statute as unconstitutional delegation of judicial power, 55 A.L.R.2d 432.
Construction and application, under state law, of doctrine of "executive privilege," 10 A.L.R.4th 355.
Automobiles: validity and construction of legislation authorizing revocation or suspension of operator's license for "habitual," "persistent," or "frequent" violations of traffic regulations, 48 A.L.R.4th 367.
16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 111 to 227.