All persons are born equally free, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, among which are the rights of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of seeking and obtaining safety and happiness.

ANNOTATIONS

Comparable provisions. — Idaho Const., art. I, § 1.

Iowa Const., art. I, § 1.

Montana Const., art. II, § 3.

Utah Const., art. I, § 1.

Supremacy of federal constitution. — This section's guarantee of the right of "seeking and obtaining safety" does not prevail over the state's duty under the extradition clause of Art. IV of the United States constitution, which has been long held to be mandatory on the states. New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed, 524 U.S. 151, 118 S. Ct. 1860, 141 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1998).

Rights described in this section are not absolute, but are subject to reasonable regulation. Otero v. Zouhar, 1984-NMCA-054, 102 N.M. 493, 697 P.2d 493, aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 1985-NMSC-021, 102 N.M. 482, 697 P.2d 482.

Physician aid in dying is not a fundamental right protected under the inherent rights clause. — Where petitioners, two doctors and their patient, sought declaratory and injunctive relief to the effect that either 30-2-4 NMSA 1978, New Mexico’s criminal statute prohibiting assisted suicide, did not apply to the conduct defined by petitioners as physician aid in dying, or even if the statute did apply to physician aid in dying, such an application would be unconstitutional, the petitioners failed to establish a fundamental or important right to aid in dying under N.M. Const., Art. II, § 4, because the inherent rights clause has never been interpreted to be the exclusive source for a fundamental or important constitutional right, and on its own has always been subject to reasonable regulation. Morris v. Brandenburg, 2016-NMSC-027, aff’g 2015-NMCA-100, 356 P.3d 564.

Aid in dying is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the inherent-rights guarantee of N.M. Const., Art. II, § 4. — Where plaintiffs, two doctors and their terminally ill patient, sought a court declaration that they cannot be prosecuted under 30-2-4 NMSA 1978, alleging that the statute does not apply to aid in dying, and if it does, such application offends the inherent-rights guarantee afforded by N.M. Const., Art. II, § 4, the district court erred in permanently enjoining the state from enforcing 30-2-4 NMSA 1978, because aid in dying is not a fundamental liberty interest under the New Mexico constitution because such an interest is diametrically opposed to the express inalienable right to life and the fundamental constitutional protection sought by plaintiffs protects a very narrow class of citizens and does not uniformly apply to all New Mexicans; therefore, a mentally competent, terminally ill patient’s interest in a physician’s assistance in dying is not a fundamental liberty interest protected under the provision protecting inherent individual rights to life, liberty and happiness provided for in N.M. Const. Art. II, § 4. Morris v. Brandenberg, 2015-NMCA-100, cert. denied, 2015-NMCERT-008.

Deprivation of "happiness" not tort claim. — Vague references to "safety" or "happiness" in this section are not sufficient to state a claim under 41-4-12 NMSA 1978 (liability of law enforcement officers). Waiver of immunity based on such constitutional grounds would emasculate the immunity preserved in the Tort Claims Act. Blea v. City of Espanola, 1994-NMCA-008, 117 N.M. 217, 870 P.2d 755, cert. denied, 117 N.M. 328, 871 P.2d 984.

Economic policy adopted by state. — A state is free to adopt an economic policy that may reasonably be deemed to promote the public welfare and may enforce that policy by appropriate legislation without violation of the due process clause so long as such legislation has a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. Rocky Mt. Whsle. Co. v. Ponca Whsle. Mercantile Co., 1961-NMSC-015, 68 N.M. 228, 360 P.2d 643, appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 31, 82 S. Ct. 145, 7 L. Ed. 2d 90.

Laws 1937, ch. 44, § 2, Fair Trade Act (49-2-2, 1953 Comp., repealed), was unconstitutional and void as an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police power without any substantial relation to the public health, safety or general welfare insofar as it concerned persons who were not parties to contracts provided for in Laws 1937, ch. 44, § 1 (49-2-1, 1953 Comp., now repealed). Skaggs Drug Ctr. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 1957-NMSC-083, 63 N.M. 215, 315 P.2d 967.

The right of association emanating from the first amendment is not absolute. Its exercise, as is the exercise of express first amendment rights, is subject to some regulation as to time and place. Futrell v. Ahrens, 1975-NMSC-044, 88 N.M. 284, 540 P.2d 214, 78 A.L.R. 3d 1101.

The right of association has never been held to apply to the right of one individual to associate with another, and certainly it has never been construed as an absolute right of association between a man and woman at any and all places and times. Futrell v. Ahrens, 1975-NMSC-044, 88 N.M. 284, 540 P.2d 214, 78 A.L.R. 3d 1101.

Right is not waiver of government tort immunity. — Assuming the right to intimate association is encompassed within N.M. Const., art. II, §§ 4 and 17, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs, who are children of the deceased killed by law enforcement officers, were unforeseeable as injured parties and defendant officers had no duty towards them. The plaintiffs' allegations of violations of their constitutional right to associate with their father and receive his love, guidance, and protection are not sufficient to waive immunity. Lucero v. Salazar, 1994-NMCA-066, 117 N.M. 803, 877 P.2d 1106, cert. denied, 117 N.M. 802, 877 P.2d 1105.

Constitutional rights of teachers and students. — Neither students nor teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate; school officials do not possess absolute authority over their students, and among the activities to which schools are dedicated is personal communication among students, which is an important part of the educational process. Futrell v. Ahrens, 1975-NMSC-044, 88 N.M. 284, 540 P.2d 214, 78 A.L.R. 3d 1101.

A regulation of the board of regents of the New Mexico state university which prohibited visitation by persons of the opposite sex in residence hall, or dormitory, bedrooms maintained by the regents on the university campus, except when moving into the residence halls and during annual homecoming celebrations, where the regents placed no restrictions on intervisitation between persons of the opposite sex in the lounges or lobbies of the residence halls, the student union building, library or other buildings, or at any other place on or off the campus, and no student was required to live in a residence hall, did not interfere appreciably, if at all, with the intercommunication important to the students of the university, the regulation was reasonable, served legitimate educational purposes and promoted the welfare of the students at the university. Futrell v. Ahrens, 1975-NMSC-044, 88 N.M. 284, 540 P.2d 214, 78 A.L.R. 3d 1101.

Although personal intercommunication among students at schools, including universities, is an important part of the educational process, it is not the only, or even the most important, part of that process. Futrell v. Ahrens, 1975-NMSC-044, 88 N.M. 284, 540 P.2d 214, 78 A.L.R. 3d 1101.

Status of resident for divorce purposes. — The New Mexico legislature may constitutionally confer the status of resident for divorce purposes upon those continuously stationed within this state by reason of military assignment. Wilson v. Wilson, 1954-NMSC-069, 58 N.M. 411, 272 P.2d 319.

Tort liability not found. — Although the language of this section is broader than that of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, the plaintiff can not support a liability action against a school board or its officers when the plaintiff's decedent, while interviewing for the job of security officer and attempting to complete a physical agility test, suffered a heart attack and subsequently died. Simple negligence in the performance of a law enforcement officer's duty does not amount to commission of a tort. Tafoya v. Bobroff, 865 F. Supp. 742 (D.N.M. 1994), aff'd, 74 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 1996).

Right to protect property. — The right to protect property being a specifically mentioned right, its presence in this section might provide the basis for additional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Sutton, 1991-NMCA-073, 112 N.M. 449, 816 P.2d 518, cert. denied 112 N.M. 308, 815 P.2d 161, modified, State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1.

Reclamation district contract. — A provision of a reclamation contract allowing a reclamation district to enter into a lawful contract with the United States for the improvement of the district and the increase of its water supply does not violate this section or art. II, § 18. Middle Rio Grande Water Users Ass'n v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 1953-NMSC-035, 57 N.M. 287, 258 P.2d 391.

Cause of action as property right. — Cause of action which Indian acquires when tort is committed against him is property which he may acquire or become invested with, particularly if tort is committed outside of reservation by a state citizen who is not an Indian; where Indian is killed as result of such tort, the cause of action survives. Trujillo v. Prince, 1938-NMSC-024, 42 N.M. 337, 78 P.2d 145.

Recovery of damages as property right. — Intermediate scrutiny should be applied to determine the constitutionality of the cap on damages in Subsection A(2) of 41-4-19 NMSA 1978 of the Tort Claims Act. Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1990-NMSC-083, 110 N.M. 621, 798 P.2d 571, appeal after remand, 1995-NMSC-027, 119 N.M. 602, 893 P.2d 1006, overruled by 1998-NMSC-031, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305.

Ordinance denying right to canvass. — Green River ordinance was held valid despite contention that it deprived photographer who employed solicitors to canvass residential areas of right to acquire and enjoy property. Green v. Town of Gallup, 1941-NMSC-050, 46 N.M. 71, 120 P.2d 619.

Unreasonable interference with others. — This section means that each person may seek his safety and happiness in any way he sees fit so long as he does not unreasonably interfere with the safety and happiness of another. 1966 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-15.

Graduated income tax provisions are in no way related to or in conflict with the inherent rights provision in this section. Such income tax provisions do not prevent or deny a person's natural inherent and inalienable rights. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-09.

Law reviews. — For survey, "The Statute of Limitations in Medical Malpractice Actions," see 6 N.M. L. Rev. 271 (1976).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law §§ 439 to 446, 552 to 573.

Civil Rights: constitutionality of civil rights ordinance, 93 A.L.R.2d 1028.

Validity of regulation by public-school authorities as to clothes or personal appearance of pupils, 58 A.L.R.5th 1.

Observation through binoculars as constituting unreasonable search, 59 A.L.R.5th 615.

16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 444 to 454; 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 472 to 500; 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 977 to 991.