Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-503
(1) As used in this rule:
(4) There is no privilege under this rule:
Source: Laws 1975, LB 279, § 23.
The party asserting a lawyer-client privilege has impliedly waived it through his or her own affirmative conduct where (1) assertion of the privilege was a result of some affirmative act, such as filing suit, by the asserting party; (2) through this affirmative act, the asserting party put the protected information at issue by making it relevant to the case; and (3) application of the privilege would have denied the opposing party access to information vital to his or her defense. State v. Roeder, 262 Neb. 951, 636 N.W.2d 870 (2001).
If the district court determines a party asserting the attorney-client privilege has made out a prima facie claim, it shall (1) order the alleged protected material produced to the court, (2) order the asserting party to submit an index directing the court to the specific portions of each of the listed documents that allegedly constitute protected material, (3) privately review the material outside the presence of all counsel, (4) make a determination of whether the material is protected, and (5) seal the material for purposes of appellate review. Greenwalt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 253 Neb. 32, 567 N.W.2d 560 (1997).
In response to a motion to compel production, a party asserting the attorney-client privilege must make out a prima facie claim that the privilege applies by submitting a motion for protective order, in affidavit form, verifying the facts critical to the assertion of the privilege, which must (1) verify that it accurately describes each of the documents in question; (2) list the documents and provide a summary that includes (a) the type of document, (b) the subject matter of the document, (c) the date of the document, (d) the author of the document, and (e) each recipient of the document; and (3) state with specificity, in a nonconclusory manner, how each element of the asserted privilege or doctrine is met, to the extent possible, without revealing the information alleged to be protected. Greenwalt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 253 Neb. 32, 567 N.W.2d 560 (1997).
A communication concerning the date, time, and place of a scheduled trial is not confidential in nature and is not protected from disclosure by this section. State v. Hawes, 251 Neb. 305, 556 N.W.2d 634 (1996).
A litigant is not permitted to thrust his lack of knowledge into litigation as a foundation or condition necessary to sustain his claim against another while simultaneously retaining the lawyer-client privilege to frustrate proof of knowledge negating the very foundation or condition necessary to prevail on the claim asserted. League v. Vanice, 221 Neb. 34, 374 N.W.2d 849 (1985).
Under the provisions of this section, a communication between a lawyer and a client is not privileged if the services of the lawyer are sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a fraud. Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 202 Neb. 599, 277 N.W.2d 36 (1979).