Authority over the disposition of a civil matter, once it is referred to the Department of Justice, resides in the Attorney General or his/her delegate, and the client agency may not control its handling or disposition. I, 22 F. Supp. 190, 191 (N.D. Okla. 1938); FTC v. Guignon, supra; E.O. 6166 § 5, June 10, 1933. In rare cases a statute may provide continuing settlement or other authority in the referring agency. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2348. An agency's recommendation (which may be couched in terms such as "we have accepted the offer of settlement," for example) should not be construed as an acceptance but rather only as a recommendation. Such powers as other officials of the government had theretofore with respect to litigation were withdrawn by E.O. 6166, June 10, 1933, leaving the Attorney General with complete authority. See Duncan v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 962, 964 (W.D. Ky 1941); Aviation Corp. v. United States, 46 F. Supp. 491, 494 (Ct. Cl. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 771 (1943); 38 Op. Att'y Gen. 124, 125. Where the authority of the Attorney General has been redelegated to United States Attorneys, and the client agency involved objects to the compromise, dismissal, or closing, the case may not be compromised, dismissed, or closed without the consent of the Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Division. " In Tort cases, although all relevant agencies should be consulted, the agency "involved" for purposes of requiring referral to the Assistant Attorney General does not ordinarily encompass the agency whose acts or omissions gave rise to the tort since the agency is not a proper party to an FTCA suit.

[updated April 2018]