Haw. Rev. Stat. § 708-831
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1 and c 102, §1; am L 1974, c 201, §1; am L 1975, c 158, §1; am L 1979, c 106, §6; am L 1981, c 68, §1; am L 1986, c 314, §64; am L 1987, c 176, §2; am L 1990, c 28, §3; am L 1992, c 54, §2 and c 289, §2; am L 1993, c 218, §3; am L 1998, c 228, §1; am L 2005, c 182, §3; am L 2006, c 156, §6; am L 2012, c 125, §6; am L 2016, c 231, §37; am L 2021, c 5, §2 and c 147, §5; am L 2022, c 52, §2]
Welfare fraud cases may be prosecuted under this section despite existence of §346-34. 61 H. 79, 595 P.2d 291 (1979).
History of this section and §346-34 reveals no legislative intent to limit welfare fraud prosecutions to §346-34. 62 H. 364, 616 P.2d 193 (1980).
Where there is a single intention, general impulse, and plan, there is only one offense even though there is a series of transactions. 62 H. 364, 616 P.2d 193 (1980).
Substantial direct and circumstantial evidence existed from which jury could have convicted defendant of theft in the first degree by extortion. 64 H. 65, 637 P.2d 407 (1981).
No irreconcilable conflict with unemployment fraud statute; State may proceed under either. 67 H. 406, 689 P.2d 753 (1984).
Not a lesser included offense of fraudulent use of a credit card. 70 H. 434, 774 P.2d 888 (1989).
In order to convict a defendant of theft in the second degree, in violation of §708-830(8)(a) and subsection (1)(b), the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to steal property or services valued in excess of $300. 90 H. 359, 978 P.2d 797 (1999).
Where defendant testified that defendant harbored no belief at all regarding the value of the stolen property, §708-801(5) could not afford defendant a mitigating defense to second degree theft under subsection (1)(b). 90 H. 359, 978 P.2d 797 (1999).
Inasmuch as the "intent to defraud" component of second degree theft by shoplifting, as defined by §708-800, prescribes two alternative means of establishing the state of mind requisite to the offense of second degree theft by shoplifting, trial court plainly erred in failing to instruct jury as to the alternative states of mind requisite to the charged offense. 101 H. 389, 69 P.3d 517 (2003).
The alternative states of mind potentially requisite to the charged offense of second degree theft by shoplifting, as prescribed by the definition of "intent to defraud" set forth in §708-800, does not implicate a defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict, as guaranteed by article I, §§5 and 14 of the Hawaii constitution; a proper elements instruction, which sets forth the alternative states of mind prescribed by the "intent to defraud" component of second degree theft by shoplifting, does not violate defendant's constitutional right. 101 H. 389, 69 P.3d 517 (2003).
Trial court erred in failing to give a unanimity instruction to the jury as to the lesser included offense of theft in the second degree under this section where the only way that the jury could conclude that the evidence adduced supported a conviction on the theft II charge but not the theft I charge, would have been by rejecting some quantum of the evidence presented by respondent, and absent a unanimity instruction, it would have been impossible to know which "series of acts" resulted in the theft II conviction. 122 H. 271, 226 P.3d 441 (2010).
Circuit court erred in declining to give requested jury instruction on lesser-included offense of theft in the second degree under this section, because a juror could rationally have chosen not to believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, that all of the transactions causing the theft at issue to exceed $20,000 had occurred. Thus, there was a rational basis for the jury to acquit defendant of theft in the first degree under §708-830.5 and convict defendant of theft in the second degree under this section, and the error was not harmless. 139 H. 94, 384 P.3d 870 (2016).
Valuation of stolen goods; airline tickets. 1 H. App. 644, 623 P.2d 898 (1981).
Evidence of moneys wrongfully converted, constituting violation of subsection (1)(b). 1 H. App. 658, 624 P.2d 381 (1981).
Where store security manager's testimony regarding the price/value of items, based on a universal price code with the price on the item that the manager verified through the store register system, was inadmissible hearsay, State failed to introduce substantial evidence of the value of the items necessary to support the charged offense of second or third degree theft; however, evidence was sufficient to support conviction of lesser included offense of fourth degree theft. 95 H. 169 (App.), 19 P.3d 752 (2001).