Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706-644
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1986, c 314, §36; gen ch 1992; am L 1996, c 137, §2; am L 1998, c 269, §6; am L 2000, c 205, §6; am L 2021, c 81, §4]
The Code equates a fine with a court-imposed civil obligation in favor of the State. Thus the contempt power is utilized to enforce that obligation. Subsection (1) provides that the court may summon the defendant, or issue a warrant for the defendant's arrest, and order the defendant to show cause why the defendant's failure to pay the fine should not be regarded by the court as contumacious. If the defendant cannot, the defendant will be imprisoned as in the cases of civil contempt.
In the case of convicted corporations or unincorporated associations, subsection (2) places a similar duty to pay, or to justify default of payment, on the officer or agent of a corporation or unincorporated association authorized to distribute its assets.
Subsection (3) sets the limit on the period of imprisonment for contumacious nonpayment of fines. The terms are intended to be coercive, but not debilitating. The credit allowed is the same as that under previous law.[1]
Subsection (4) permits the court to take a flexible approach to noncontumacious default. The court may lower the amount of each payment or may revoke the fine in whole or in part.
Subsection (5) makes clear that all the processes for collection of an unpaid civil judgment are available for collection of a fine. This subsection is in accord with prior law.[2]
Act 137, Session Laws 1996, amended this section to provide that fines and costs may be collected in the same manner as a civil judgment, and that the state attorney general may institute proceedings to collect the fine and costs, including interest and attorney's fees, as a civil judgment in the court of appropriate jurisdiction. The legislature found that the Act (which also amended the traffic code by enacting a new section with similar provisions) would assist the judiciary in collecting fines and costs imposed in traffic and criminal cases. The Act also deleted the first sentence of subsection (5) to remove potential conflict between existing law and the provisions of the Act. House Standing Committee Report No. 379-96, Senate Standing Committee Report No. 2987.
Act 269, Session Laws 1998, amended this section by, among other things, allowing victims of crime to enforce a criminal restitution order in the same manner as a civil judgment. Conference Committee Report No. 89.
Act 205, Session Laws 2000, amended this section by adding that the nonpayment of any fees, in addition to the nonpayment of any fine or restitution ordered by a court, would be subject to the penalties and consequences imposed under this section.
Act 81, Session Laws 2021, amended this section to: (1) modify the ratio of imprisonment term to contumacious nonpayment, from a maximum of one day for each $25 of a fee or fine, to a maximum of one day for each $250 of a fee or fine; and (2) increase the amount of credit given to a person committed for contumacious nonpayment, from $25 per day to $250 per day. The legislature found that the financial hardship task force, established pursuant to Act 112, Session Laws 2019, made several recommendations to address the needs of traffic offenders who are experiencing financial hardship. Act 81 implemented several recommendations from the task force. Conference Committee Report No. 76, Senate Standing Committee Report No. 1091.
Provision relating to imprisonment for contumacious nonpayment mentioned. 60 H. 160, 587 P.2d 1220 (1978).
From and after July 20, 1998, the amended provisions of this section statutorily provide for free standing orders of restitution (FSOs) to be imposed, inter alia, as a condition of probation; where original sentence of defendant on March 29, 1995, made restitution a condition of probation, restitution could not later be ordered as an FSO pursuant to this section. 103 H. 269, 81 P.3d 1184 (2003).
Where a case predates July 20, 1998, the effective date of amendments to this section, a free standing order of restitution (FSO) could have been separately and independently imposed at the time of a defendant's original sentencing, in addition to any other sentence such as probation or imprisonment; however, an FSO could not be imposed as a modification of a probation condition, or as a new term of probation following revocation, or otherwise. 103 H. 269, 81 P.3d 1184 (2003).
Mentioned: 55 H. 632, 525 P.2d 1119 (1974).
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§706-644 Commentary:
1. See H.R.S. §712-5.
2. See id. §§712-1 and 712-3.