Haw. Rev. Stat. § 663-10
(b) Where an entity licensed under chapter 432 or 432D possesses a lien or potential lien under this section:
(3) In any proceeding under this section to determine the validity and amount of reimbursement, the court or arbitrator shall allow a lienholder or person claiming a lien sufficient time and opportunity for discovery and investigation.
For purposes of this subsection:
"Third-party claim" means any tort claim for monetary recovery or damages that the individual has against any person, entity, or insurer, other than the entity licensed under chapter 432 or 432D.
"Timely notice of a third-party claim" means a reasonable time after any written claim or demand for damages, settlement recovery, or insurance proceeds is made by or on behalf of the person.
[L Sp 1986, c 2, §16; am L 2000, c 29, §2; am L 2002, c 228, §2]
Where plaintiff, an insured motorcyclist who sustained injuries when plaintiff was struck by a vehicle and obtained a $1.5 million tort settlement against the third-party driver of that vehicle, alleged that state statutes barred health insurer's claim for reimbursement for medical expenses insurer paid and insurer's lien on the settlement, the appellate court affirmed that this section and §431:13-103 did not conflict with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and did not impermissibly expand the scope of liability under §502(a) of ERISA. Instead, this section and §431:13-103 only impacted the insurer's subrogation rights against a third party tort settlement fund and there were no statutory provisions of ERISA that addressed reimbursement limitations. 937 F.3d 1262 (2019).
Where plaintiff, an insured motorcyclist who sustained injuries when plaintiff was struck by a vehicle and obtained a $1.5 million tort settlement against the third-party driver of that vehicle, alleged that state statutes barred health insurer's claim for reimbursement for medical expenses insurer paid and insurer's lien on the settlement, the appellate court affirmed that under the saving clause of §514 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, this section and §431:13-103 were saved from express preemption because they were directed at insurance practices and impacted risk pooling. Read together, these statutes prohibited an insurer from seeking certain types of reimbursement, thus impacting the eventual net value of any payment made to a plan member, i.e., insurers face more risk than they would otherwise. 937 F.3d 1262 (2019).
Appellant's motion to determine its lien on settlement was properly denied, because this section unambiguously applies to collateral source payors, which appellant was not. 76 H. 266, 874 P.2d 1091 (1994).
Where personal injury plaintiffs petitioned for a ruling that health insurance company had no lien or subrogation rights in their personal injury settlements, the circuit court did not err in granting plaintiffs' petition because: (1) a health insurer does not have equitable subrogation rights against a third-party tortfeasor in the context of personal insurance; (2) a health insurer's subrogation and reimbursement rights are limited by this section and §431-13:103(a)(10); and (3) any contractual provision that conflicts with this section is invalid. This section takes precedence over health insurer's contractual subrogation rights. 140 H. 285, 400 P.3d 486 (2017).
Cited: 73 H. 403, 833 P.2d 890 (1992).
Discussed: 183 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (2016).