Haw. Rev. Stat. § 291C-105
(a) No person shall drive a motor vehicle at a speed exceeding:
(b) For the purposes of this section, "the applicable state or county speed limit" means the maximum speed limit established:
(c) Any person who violates subsection (a) shall be guilty of a petty misdemeanor and shall be sentenced as follows without the possibility of probation or suspension of sentence:
(1) For a first offense not preceded by a prior conviction for an offense under subsection (a) in the preceding five years:
(2) For an offense that occurs within five years of a prior conviction for an offense under subsection (a):
(d) Notwithstanding subsection (c), any person who violates subsection (a) within five years of two prior convictions for the same offense shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sentenced as follows without the possibility of probation or suspension of sentence:
[L 2006, c 129, §1; am L 2008, c 231, §16; am L 2025, c 170, §1]
Where prosecution did not provide a sufficient foundation for the admission of officer's testimony regarding the speed reading given by the officer's laser gun, and no other evidence was admitted at trial indicating the speed that defendant was driving defendant's motor vehicle, disregarding the officer's testimony resulted in a record that was devoid of any evidence of the speed that defendant was driving defendant's motor vehicle; as this material element was not supported by substantial and admissible evidence, defendant's conviction reversed. 121 H. 204, 216 P.3d 1227 (2009).
There was insufficient evidence in the record to sustain defendant's conviction under this section for speeding excessively where, given the relatively small margin of error of five miles per hour greater than the threshold established, officer's testimony that officer's speedometer appeared to have been operating normally throughout the previous year alone was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the speedometer on officer's police vehicle was accurate to within five miles per hour on the night of the offense. 122 H. 354, 227 P.3d 520 (2010).
As the offense of driving at an excessive speed under subsection (a) is not a strict liability offense and requires proof that the defendant acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, the requisite state of mind must be charged in the offense; where the charge against defendant failed to allege the requisite state of mind, judgment vacated and charge dismissed without prejudice. 128 H. 314, 288 P.3d 788 (2012).
Charge of excessive speeding under subsection (a)(1) against petitioner dismissed where the charge did not allege that petitioner acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, thus failing to allege the requisite state of mind. A charge that fails to charge a requisite state of mind cannot be construed reasonably to state an offense and thus the charge was dismissed without prejudice because it violated due process. 130 H. 353, 311 P.3d 676 (2013).
As §291C-161(c) requires every person convicted under this section to be sentenced in accordance with this section, trial court erred in sentencing defendant to a six-month driver's license suspension under §286-125; the plain language of this section required the sentencing court to impose the list of sanctions as specified under subsection (c), including a thirty-day license suspension for a first-time offender. 121 H. 117 (App.), 214 P.3d 1107 (2009).