10 C.F.R. § 53.440 – Design requirements.

(a)
1. (1) Analysis, appropriate test programs, prototype testing, operating experience, or a combination thereof must demonstrate that each design feature required by § 53.400 meets the defined functional design criteria required by §§ 53.410 and 53.420. This demonstration must consider interdependent effects throughout the commercial nuclear plant and the range of conditions under which the design features required by § 53.400 must function throughout the plant's lifetime.
2. (2) The design processes for SR and NSRSS SSCs under this part must include administrative procedures for evaluating operating, design, and construction experience and for considering applicable important industry experiences in the design of those SSCs.
(b) The design features classified as SR must, wherever applicable, be designed using generally accepted consensus codes and standards that have been endorsed or otherwise found acceptable by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
(c) The materials used for each SR and NSRSS SSC must be qualified for their service conditions over the design life of the SSC as appropriate to satisfy the special treatments established for the SSC under § 53.460.
(d) Possible degradation mechanisms related to aging, fatigue, chemical interactions, operating temperatures, effects of irradiation, and other environmental factors that may affect the performance of SR and NSRSS SSCs must be evaluated and used to inform the design and the development of integrity assessment programs under § 53.870.
(e)
1. (1) Safety-related SSCs and, where appropriate, NSRSS SSCs must be designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements in this part, the probability and effect of fires and explosions.
2. (2) Noncombustible and fire-resistant materials must be used wherever practical throughout the facility, particularly in locations with SR and NSRSS SSCs.
3. (3) Fire detection and fire suppression systems of appropriate capacity and capability must be provided and designed to minimize the adverse effects of fires on SR and NSRSS SSCs.
4. (4) Fire suppression systems must be designed to ensure that their rupture or inadvertent operation does not significantly impair the ability of SR and NSRSS SSCs to perform their safety functions to satisfy § 53.230.
(f) Safety and security must be considered together in the design process such that, where possible, security issues are effectively resolved through design and engineered security features.
(g) The reactor system and waste stores for each commercial nuclear plant must be capable of achieving and maintaining a subcritical condition during normal operations and following any LBE identified in accordance with § 53.240.
(h) Each commercial nuclear plant must have a capability to provide long-term cooling of the reactor fuel and waste stores during normal operations and following any LBE identified in accordance with § 53.240.
(i) The design, analysis, staffing, and programmatic controls for each commercial nuclear plant must consider the number of reactors, waste stores, and other significant inventories of radioactive materials and the associated operating configurations, common systems, system interfaces, and system interactions.
(j) [Reserved]
(k) Design features, related functional design criteria, programmatic controls, or a combination thereof must be defined such that analyses demonstrate a low risk of permanent injury to the public due to the health effects of the chemical hazards of licensed material.
(l) Measures must be taken during the design of commercial nuclear plants to minimize, to the extent practicable, contamination of the facility and the environment, facilitate eventual decommissioning, and minimize, to the extent practicable, the generation of radioactive waste in accordance with § 20.1406 of this chapter.
(m)
1. (1) Each commercial nuclear plant must include criticality monitoring capabilities meeting the requirements of either § 70.24 of this chapter or paragraph (m)(2) of this section.
2. (2) In lieu of maintaining a monitoring system capable of detecting criticality as described in § 70.24 of this chapter, criticality accident requirements may be satisfied by—
  1. (i) Demonstrating the sub-criticality of special nuclear material, except when it is inside the reactor and the reactor is being operated, by maintaining k-effective below 0.95 at a 95 percent probability, 95 percent confidence level, under conditions that maximize reactivity for the applicable storage and handling configurations, and
  2. (ii) Providing radiation monitors for fuel storage and associated handling areas when fuel is present to detect excessive radiation levels and to support initiating appropriate safety actions.
3. (3) While a spent fuel transportation package approved under 10 CFR part 71 of this chapter or spent fuel storage cask approved under 10 CFR part 72 is in the special nuclear material handing or storage area, the requirements in 10 CFR parts 71 or 72, as applicable, and the requirements of the certificate of compliance for that package or cask, are the applicable requirements for the fuel within that package or cask.
(n)
1. (1) The design of each commercial nuclear plant must reflect state-of-the-art human factors principles for safe and reliable performance in all locations that human activities are expected for performing or supporting the continued availability of plant safety or emergency response functions.
2. (2) The design must provide for the capabilities described in § 53.730(b) to ensure the plant staff are able to monitor plant conditions and respond to events.
3. (3) The means by which the design and human actions together will achieve the safety requirements of subpart B of this part must be evaluated and used to inform the design and the development of the concept of operations required by § 53.730(c).
4. (4) A functional requirements analysis and function allocation must be used to ensure that plant design features address how safety functions and functional safety criteria are satisfied, and how the safety functions will be assigned to appropriate combinations of human action, automation, active safety features, passive safety features, or inherent safety characteristics.