113 F.2d 601 | 3rd Cir. | 1940
We cannot but admire appellant’s persistence. Its insured died on April 30. 1937. His widow’s claim for payment under the double indemnity clause of defendant-company’s policy
From this verdict there was an appeal to us and on March 29, 1939, we were constrained to reverse. That reversal was based on some language found in the charge of the learned trial judge. We felt that he had gone beyond the policy and used words from the testimony rather than from the contract, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Young, 3 Cir., 103 F.2d 839. We left open the question of the exact state of the Pennsylvania law by which we are of course bound.
The case has been retried. The facts adduced at the second trial are substantially the same and as they are set forth in our first opinion we do not repeat them here. We say substantially because those facts are, if anything, more favorable to the plaintiff-appellee. The second jury followed the first and the defendant-insurance company followed its first appeal with this second.
We see no merit in it whatever. The learned trial judge delivered, as we thought, a most careful charge. Furthermore he had the benefit, as we did not, of a recent decision of the Pennsylvania Su
Appellant’s brief does not make altogether clear his point about the “inference on an inference” rule. It is not necessary to labor it because as we pointed out in our earlier opinion, Pennsylvania permits the duplication.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
The clause was in the standard and much litigated form.
Ruhlin v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 58 S.Ct. 860, 82 L.Ed. 1290; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 304 U.S. 261, 58 S.Ct. 871, 82 L.Ed. 1329; Rosenthal v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 263, 58 S.Ct. 874, 82 L.Ed. 1330.
Kelly v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 334 Pa. 143, 6 A.2d 55.
Silverstein v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 254 N.Y. 81. 171 N.E. 914, 915.
In Neely v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co., 322 Pa. 417, 185 A. 784.