MEMORANDUM OPINION
This action is before the Court upon defendants’ renewed motion for summary judgment. To facilitate an appreciation of the issues currently before this Court, we believe it appropriate to present the background of this litigation.
A. History of this Action.
This civil damage action constitutes a challenge to warrantless electronic surveillance of the offices of the Jewish Defense League (JDL) conducted by personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 1 in October 1970 and from January 5 through July 3, 1971, as authorized by then-Attorney General John N. Mitchell. Mr. Mitchell authorized the surveillances during a period of JDL harassment of personnel of the Soviet Union located in New York City, ostensibly in an effort to protect the ability of the President to conduct and maintain peaceful relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Plaintiffs argue that the warrantless surveillances vi- *1298 dated their statutory rights under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (hereinafter Title III) and under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and their constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment.
This Court on July 20, 1973 dismissed the action, entering summary judgment for defendants and denying plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.
Defendants have not advanced the second defense in their renewed motion for summary judgment, preferring to reserve this issue until the Supreme Court rules on the question of official immunity in a constitutional tort context in
Butz v. Economou,
The third defense, that of good faith, is likewise not reached by the Court at this time. 2
B. Analysis.
We therefore direct our attention to the issue of retroactive application of the Keith decision, framed by our Court of Appeals as follows:
“If the illegality of these wiretaps is based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Keith, . . . there are strong factors which dictate that that decision should not be applied retroactively in this damage suit, which is based upon surveillance which occurred before the date of that decision.”
As a preliminary and necessary inquiry to our analysis of the retroactivity question, we note that the
en banc
Court of Appeals has found that “this case does indeed involve the foreign affairs of this country and therefore falls outside the holding in
Keith
and into the area it reserved for future disposition.”
(1)
Constitutional cause of action.
We therefore turn our attention to the criteria summarized and endorsed by the Supreme Court in
Chevron Oil v. Huson,
“First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. Second, it has been stressed that ‘we must weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.’ Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for ‘where a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the “injustice or hardship” by a holding of nonretroactivity.’ ” [citations and quotations omitted].
We have concluded that application of these criteria compels a determination that this decision should be applied prospectively only and that civil damage liability for the illegal electronic surveillance should not be assessed in this action. We analyze the Chevron criteria consecutively.
(a) New principle of law. First, we believe that the
Zweibon
decision established a new principle of law. The necessity of securing a warrant prior to the institution of electronic surveillance of domestic organizations in situations where the national security is involved had not been judicially determined prior to its presentation in this litigation.
3
In
Katz v. United States,
Furthermore, we conclude that the Court of Appeals’ resolution of this controversy was not “clearly foreshadowed” at the time these surveillances were instituted over seven years ago. In fact, caselaw and historical precedent at that time indicated that a contrary resolution would be forthcoming from any court reviewing warrantless wiretaps in the national security — and particu
*1300
larly the foreign security — context. District courts had consistently held that a warrant was not required in such circumstances.
See United States v. O’Neal,
Cr. No. KC CR 1204 (D.Kan., Dec. 1, 1970);
United States v. Dellinger,
No. 69 CR 180 (N.D.Ill., Feb. 20, 1970).
See also United States v. Smith,
(b) Purpose and effect of the rule. For our analysis of the remaining two factors of the Chevron retroactivity test, we rely heavily upon the well reasoned memorandum of Judge Gasch in Sinclair v. Kleindienst, No. 610-73 at 6 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 1977), analyzing the question of retroactive application of Zweibon in the context of domestic security surveillances. We believe that the purposes of the Fourth Amendment will not be advanced by a retroactive application of the Court of Appeals’ determination that a warrantless domestic national security electronic surveillance is unconstitutional. The effect of the Court’s determination of unconstitutionality will be the protection of an individual’s interest in privacy against warrantless domestic national security electronic surveillances. No amount of monetary damages can restore the privacy which was improperly invaded by the action of defendants in the subject conduct. Furthermore, plaintiffs have achieved the result envisioned by the Fourth Amendment: the Department of Justice's electronic surveillance policy was revised following the Supreme Court decision in Keith and accommodated the directive of the Zweibon decision. See Statement of Attorney General Edward H. Levi, July 9, 1975 (Exhibit 8, Appendix to Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment).
We are further persuaded by Judge Gasch’s assessment in
Sinclair
that retroactive application of an illegality determination in criminal cases via the exclusionary rule might be appropriate in a given situation while a retroactive creation of a civil damage cause of action for the same privacy intrusion might be inappropriate.
Sinclair v. Kleindienst, supra,
at 6-7.
See Marks v. United States,
(c) Equitable concerns. The third factor in the
Chevron
analysis is similarly satisfied here. We believe that the creation of personal liability for conduct consistent with the then prevailing statutory or constitutional norms and with long standing historical precedent is precisely the form of injustice or hardship which a holding of nonretroactivity could, and indeed should be implemented to, avoid. We reach this determination fully cognizant of, but unpersuaded by, plaintiffs’ assertions that a non-retroactive application will frustrate honest and well-motivated litigation to redress constitutional wrongs. We have balanced the equitable interests presented and feel confident that the results of such balancing support our determination. This is not to be interpreted as a minimization of the privacy interest admittedly violated by the illegal actions of these defendants; the significance of the right invaded is not determinative in a retroactivity analysis.
See Cipriano v. City of Houma,
We therefore find that, “insofar as the rules of law established in Keith and Zweibon are to serve as the basis for civil liability, they should be limited to prospective application only.” Sinclair v. Kleindienst, supra, at 7.
(2)
Statutory causes of action.
The foregoing analysis of the retroactivity question in the constitutional context similarly is dispositive of plaintiffs’ claim for relief under Title III. Any alleged illegality of the electronic surveillances of 1970 and 1971 involved in this action under Title III must be founded upon the subsequent Supreme Court determination in 1972 in
Keith,
and upon the Court of Appeals’ determination in 1975 in
Zweibon
that the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment was applicable to domestic national security surveillances.
5
See Zweibon v. Mitchell, supra,
We believe that a similar disposition of the claim as advanced under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 is appropriate.
C. Conclusion.
For these reasons, we hold that plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief sought and that defendants’ renewed motion for summary judgment should be granted. In view of our determination, it is not necessary to reach the separate affirmative defenses of good faith and official immunity.
An Order consistent with the foregoing has been entered this day.
Notes
. Plaintiffs have not opposed the dismissal as to these individuals, nine in number, originally named in the complaint.
. The factual issues relating to the good faith defense are subject to a jury trial pursuant to the recent suggestion of our Court of Appeals.
In re Bertram Zweibon,
. Throughout this opinion we will refer to security surveillances pursuant to the following categorization: surveillances of domestic organizations impacting on purely domestic activities as “domestic security” surveillances; surveillances of domestic organizations which are independent of foreign influence but impact on the conduct of foreign affairs (the present factual situation) as “domestic national security” surveillances; and to surveillances of foreign organizations as “foreign national security” surveillances. “Foreign security” surveillances shall encompass the latter two categories. The Court of Appeals in treating this case as “foreign security surveillance” (170 U.S. App.D.C. at 19,
. This conclusion is strongly supported by the determination by Judge Gasch that the illegality of warrantless domestic security wiretaps was not “clearly foreshadowed” prior to
Keith. Sinclair v. Kleindienst,
No. 610-73 at 6 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 1977). We believe that our controversy presents an even more compelling case for nonretroactivity than
Sinclair
since a domestic
national
security wiretap involves, to however limited a degree, the President’s ability to conduct foreign relations, which is an essential ingredient to any exemption from the warrant requirement that potentially may emanate from our Court of Appeals.
See Zweibon v. Mitchell, supra,
. This disposition makes it unnecessary to determine the precedential significance of the plurality opinion of the
en banc
Court of Appeals that Title III applies to all electronic surveillances for which a search warrant is constitutionally required. Absent this expression by a plurality of the Court, we would adhere to our original conclusion of law that Congress, by Title III, did not attempt to legislate with respect to the national security powers of the President.
