181 Pa. Super. 48 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1956
Opinion by
This action in equity involves the application of the doctrines of “unjust enrichment” and “restitution.”
The lower court found, upon ample evidence, that the defendants, appellants, sold certain real estate to a purchaser under general warranty deed, warranting that the property was free and clear of any incumbrances. The attorney who searched the title for the purchaser failed to discover the liens of certain unpaid taxes against the property for years prior to the date of purchase. Subsequently the purchaser, who was threatened with a tax sale, paid the delinquent taxes and claimed reimbursement from the attorney. Plaintiff, appellee, the insurer on the attorney’s liability policy covering the title search, upon being notified of the claim by the attorney, paid the purchaser the amount of the delinquent taxes. Appellee, after demand for reimbursement, filed a complaint in equity
Appellants have appealed from the lower court’s final decree entering a money judgment for appellee to reimburse it for the money paid to reimburse the purchaser.
The principal argument of appellants is that this is not a suitable case for the application of the above mentioned doctrines. With this contention we do not agree.
Section 1 of Restatement, Restitution, provides: “A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other.” Comment a under this section provides: “A person is enriched if he has received a benefit. A person is unjustly enriched if the retention of the benefit would be unjust. A person obtains restitution when he is restored to the position he formerly occupied either by the return of something which he formerly had or by the receipt of its equivalent in money. Ordinarily, the measure of restitution is the amount of enrichment received, but as stated in Comment e, if the loss suffered differs from the amount of benefit received, the measure of restitution may be more or less than the loss suffered or more or less than the enrichment.” Comment b under the same section provides: “A person confers a benefit upon another if he gives to the other possession of or some other interest in money, land, chattels or choses in action, performs services beneficial to or at the request of the other, satisfies a debt
Section 3 of Restatement, Restitution, provides: “A person is not permitted to profit by his own wrong at the expense of another.” Section 2 of Restatement, Restitution, provides: “A person who officiously confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution therefor.”
Appellee paid a debt which was rightfully owed by appellants. This payment by appellee was not officious since appellee was under a contractual duty to the at: torney who searched the title. If his clients, the purchasers, had instituted an action against their title searcher and had recovered a judgment against him, the claim against the appellee could have been enforced by attachment execution and the appellee would have been obligated to pay the same to the purchasers. Moses v. Ferrel and Indemnity Compmiy of America, 97 Pa. Superior Ct. 13. Appellants have been unjustly enriched because appellee has discharged an obligation owed by appellants under such circumstances that appellants would bé unjustly enriched by the retention of the benefits thus conferred. Appellants had, by general warranty deed, conveyed the premises to the purchasers. A vendor by general warranty is obliged to deliver a deed that is free of liens for taxes and he covenants to defend the grantee’s title against all mankind, the whole world. Memmert v. McKeen, 112 Pa. 315, 4 A.
Appellants argue that appellee did not prove that appellants authorized appellee to pay the money; that appellee did not prove that it was acting in behalf of appellants or that it had any authority from appellants to so act; and that there was no promise, either express or implied, that appellants would reimburse appellee. None of these proofs were necessary when it was proved that appellants were unjustly enriched at the expense of appellee.
Appellants also argue that appellee was a mere volunteer and present some cases which are not applicable to the facts of this case and which therefore need not be discussed. This argument is completely nullified by proof that appellee was under contract to make good to the purchaser for the attorney title searcher’s mistake. Appellants argue that there was no privity of contract. Under the doctrines here considered there need be no privity of contract. If there had been, privity of. contract appellee could have sued appellants in ah assumpsit action at law. Equity for a long period of time has entertained jurisdiction of restitution actions for, inter alia,'the reason that there'was no privity of contract.. '
Appellants argue that the lower court erred when it excluded from evidence a release given by purchaser to appellants. The release identified by the purchaser was dated December 26, 1951. The appellants testified that this release concerned certain defects in the heating system. The purchaser also testified that he first discovered the taxes were delinquent in May 1952. The release in question was not printed in the record but we have examined a copy of it furnished by counsel for appellants and we are convinced that it concerned the gas-fired Perkoflash boiler and that it was never intended to be.a general release. It is also clear that it could not have been the intention of the parties on December 26,1951 to have this release apply to taxes since the purchasers did not have any knowledge on that date that there were taxes due and owing. A waiver or release is to be construed strictly so as not to bar a claim that had not accrued at the date of the execution of the release.. Henry Shenk Co. v. Erie, 352 Pa. 481, 43 A. 2d 99; Crum v. Penna. R.R. Co., 226 Pa. 151; 75
Judgment affirmed at cost of appellants.