I. Introduction
Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss and supporting brief filed by Defendants Robert Keber, Roger Kowal, and Kimberly Locher. (Docket Nos. 21, 22). Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition, to which Defendants replied. (Docket Nos. 30, 33). Also pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss and supporting brief filed by Defendant Megan Mealie. (Docket Nos. 24, 25). Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition, to which Mealie replied. (Docket Nos. 31, 32). After careful consideration of the parties' submissions; the allegations contained in Plaintiff's Complaint, (Docket No. [1] ); the standards governing motions to dismiss set forth by the Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly ,
II. Background
In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following relevant facts, which the Court accepts as true for the purpose of deciding the pending motions to dismiss.
Plaintiff was hired as the Superintendent of Ambridge Area School District ("AASD") on March 20, 2013. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 29). At the time of her hiring, several school board members opposed her selection and preferred to hire a male candidate who was a high school principal from the area. (Id. at ¶ 31). As a consequence of Plaintiff's hiring over the male candidate, Defendants Roger Kowal and Brian Padgett began a targeted retaliatory campaign to foster a hostile working environment and recruited other board members to further their discriminatory objective. (Id. at ¶¶ 36-37). The pattern of retaliation and creation of a hostile work environment was consistent and pervasive from the outset of Plaintiff's employment. (Id. at ¶ 39).
During a board meeting on June 12, 2013, Defendant Padgett screamed, "You mother fucker, you better watch yourself. I will go after you. You better watch yourself, you mother fucker," and "I will get you," at Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 42-44). Defendant Padgett was subdued by other board members, who separated him from Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 46). Defendant Kowal laughed during the threat and thereafter. (Id. at ¶ 47). After Plaintiff filed a police report on June 13, 2013, Defendant Padgett was charged with harassment and terroristic threats. (Id. at ¶ 51). After word circulated that Defendant Padgett was going to shoot Plaintiff at a future board meeting, police were present at subsequent board proceedings. (Id. at ¶¶ 52-53). Defendant Padgett concluded his term on the school board in November 2013 and pled guilty to the harassment charges in July 2014 after Plaintiff refused to withdraw the criminal complaint. (Id. at ¶¶ 54-56). After Defendant Padgett entered his plea, Defendant Kowal informed Plaintiff, "I will ruin you if it's the last thing I do; if it means ruining this school district." (Id. at ¶ 57). Concerted activity was thereafter undertaken by Defendants Kowal, Badgett, and Mealie for the purpose of causing harm to Plaintiff's professional reputation and employment. (Id. at ¶ 59). For example, Plaintiff was publicly and falsely accused of running a meth lab and engaging in Satanic worship. (Id. at ¶ 62). Defendants engaged in a deliberate, malicious, and ongoing pattern of abusive and threatening behavior to cause Plaintiff physical, emotional, and economic harm. (Id. at ¶ 63).
In September 2014, School Resource Officer Nate Smith mistreated and restrained without authorization J.H., an African American student with a documented disability. (Id. at ¶ 67). Based upon video surveillance and school policy, Plaintiff reported that incident to the Pennsylvania Department of Education, Bureau of Special Education, as an improper restraint and requested that the local police department remove Smith from his role as a School Resource Officer. (Id. at ¶¶ 68-74). After Defendant Kowal informed the police chief that he should not heed Plaintiff's concerns, Smith remained on school grounds. (Id. at ¶¶ 75-77). When Plaintiff suggested offering a summer school graduation ceremony for students with special needs, Defendant Locher stated, "Fuck those kids." (Id. at ¶¶ 77-78). Several board members directly interfered with Plaintiff's attempts to satisfy the rights of special needs students in an effort to force her resignation through an oppressive and retaliatory work environment. (Id. at ¶¶ 80-82).
Also, in March 2015, a teacher filed a complaint, alleging that Defendant Mealie was subjecting her to sexual harassment by making unwelcome visits to her home. (Id. at ¶¶ 89-90). The teacher turned over sixty pages of text messages demonstrating that the harassment had occurred. (Id. at ¶ 91). Plaintiff suspended Defendant Mealie pending an investigation and participated as a witness in the district's independent investigation. (Id. at ¶¶ 92-93). In addition to revealing sexual harassment by Defendant Mealie, the text messages between February and March 2015 illustrated collusion between board members and Defendant Mealie to create a hostile work environment for Plaintiff, an intent to physically harm Plaintiff, a desire to effectuate Plaintiff's discharge, and malice. (Id. at ¶¶ 94-97).
In July 2015, Plaintiff was denied a 2% pay increase, after all other active administrators were given a 2% pay increase and one-time bonuses ranging from $1,000 to $2,000. (Id. at ¶¶ 98-99). Defendant Locher indicated that the board would not give raises to any individual who had not yet had an evaluation. (Id. at ¶ 101). Pursuant to school district policy and the terms of Plaintiff's employment contract, the board was required to perform her annual evaluation prior to the end of the school year. (Id. at ¶¶ 102-103). By refusing to perform the evaluation, the board denied Plaintiff an increase which she was otherwise due. (Id. at ¶ 104). Additionally, the board interfered with Plaintiff's ability to attend educational conferences and required her to exhaust vacation days to attend same, despite conference attendance being permitted under the terms of her contract. (Id. at ¶ 105).
On October 12, 2015, Defendant Keber told custodial staff members that if they came to a special board meeting and looked up, they would see Plaintiff with her head in a noose hanging from the bridge. (Id. at ¶ 109). Thereafter, the board members engaged in intensifying public actions to foment public antipathy toward Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 110). After outlining Defendants' actions and text messages between June 2013 and October 2015, Plaintiff alleges that she was hospitalized for stroke-like symptoms. (Id. at ¶¶ 112-117). As a result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression, requiring her to take medical leave. (Id. at ¶¶ 119-120). The medical leave, which commenced less than twenty-four hours after Defendant Keber's noose comment, was extended, and Plaintiff was ultimately not released to return to work. (Id. at ¶¶ 121-122).
Plaintiff asserts nine claims against Defendants. (Id. at ¶¶ 123-236). Relevant to the pending motions to dismiss, Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (1) a claim for sex discrimination and retaliation at Count III against Defendants AASD, Keber, Kowal, Locher, and Padgett, (id. at ¶¶ 147-153); (2) a claim pursuant to
III. Legal Standard
When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must " 'accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.' " Eid v. Thompson ,
Although the Court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true, " '[it is] not compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.' " Morrow v. Balaski ,
Consistent with these principles, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has prescribed a three-step analysis for purposes of determining whether a claim is plausible. First, the court should "outline the elements a plaintiff must plead to a state a claim for relief." Bistrian v. Levi ,
IV. Discussion
A. Count III-Sex Discrimination and Retaliation (PHRA)
As to Count III, Defendants Keber, Kowal, and Locher argue that Plaintiff's claim fails for four reasons. First, Defendants assert that they are not "employers" under the PHRA. (Docket No. 22 at 7-8). It is well settled that "[w]hile.... Title VII does not permit individual liability, the PHRA does provide for individual liability in cases where a person aids and abets acts of discrimination." Clinkscales v. Children's Hosp. of Phila. , No. 06-CV-3919,
Here, Plaintiff has alleged that the individual defendants held voting authority to undermine her and that they acted with the purpose and intent to discriminate against her based upon her gender. At this initial stage of the litigation, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to state a claim for relief under 43 Pa.C.S. § 955(e). See
In its reply, Defendants Keber, Kowal, and Locher argue that Count III must be dismissed because Plaintiff did not cite to 43 Pa.C.S. § 955(e) in her Complaint or in her charge of employment discrimination before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Docket No. 33 at 2-3, 5). The Court finds Defendants' argument meritless, as their names are included in Plaintiff's administrative charge. (Docket No. 22-4). "Naming [Defendants] in the body of the charge satisfies the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement." Hitchens v. Greater Pittsburgh Cmty. Food Bank , No. 06-CV-792,
Second, Defendants Keber, Kowal, and Locher contend that Count III must be dismissed because they did not take adverse employment actions against her. (Docket No. 22 at 8-10). "An adverse employment action is one that alters the terms, conditions or privileges of employment and includes actions that are more than trivial or minor changes in an employee's working conditions, such as suspension without pay and transfer to an undesirable position." Williams v. Pa. Human Rels. Comm'n , No. 14-CV-1290,
Third, Keber, Kowal, and Locher maintain that Count III must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to state a viable hostile work environment claim. (Docket No. 22 at 10-15; Docket No. 33 at 5-7). In this Court's estimation, as discussed, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts demonstrating that she was subjected to a hostile work environment. To this end, to establish a hostile work environment under the PHRA, Plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she suffered intentional discrimination because of her gender; (2) the harassment was severe or pervasive and regular; (3) the harassment detrimentally affected her; (4) the harassment would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same protected class; and (5) the harasser was a supervisory employee or agent. Brooks v. CBS Radio , No. 07-CV-519,
Fourth, Defendants Keber, Kowal, and Locher argue that Count III must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to state a viable retaliation claim. (Docket No. 22 at 15-18; Docket No. 33 at 7-9). Defendants assert that Plaintiff failed to timely file her retaliation claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (Docket No. 22 at 16-17). As Plaintiff has noted, District Courts within the Third Circuit have held that where constructive discharge is included as an adverse employment action, the PHRA's 180-day statute of limitations begins to run on the date the constructive discharge is effectuated. See, e.g. , Stremple v. Nicholson , No. 01-CV-890,
Defendants also contend that Plaintiff has failed to state a viable retaliation claim because she did not engage in any protected activity, Defendants Locher and Kowal did not take adverse action against Plaintiff, and there is no causal connection between Plaintiff's protected activity and the alleged adverse actions. (Docket No. 22 at 16-18; Docket No. 33 at 7-9). To establish a prima facie case of
In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she opposed the mistreatment of J.H., an African American student with a documented disability, and requested that Smith be removed as a School Resource Officer. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 67-74). Accepting Plaintiff's allegations as true, the Court finds that her actions fall under the opposition clause. See, e.g. , Mathis v. Christian Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. ,
For the reasons previously delineated, the Court rejects Defendants' contention that Locher and Kowal did not take adverse action against Plaintiff. With respect to the element of causal connection, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's retaliation claim fails because Locher's alleged threat in June 2014 and Kowal's alleged threat in July 2014 occurred before Plaintiff attempted to remove Smith as a School Resource Officer. (Docket No. 33 at 8-9).
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Defendants Keber, Kowal, and Locher's motion to dismiss Count III, without prejudice to the parties renewing their arguments at the motion for summary judgment stage of this matter.
B. Count IV-
As to Count IV, Defendants Keber, Kowal, and Locher argue that Plaintiff's claim is redundant because she has sued them in their official capacities in addition to having sued AASD. (Docket No. 22 at 18-19). In response, Plaintiff states that her claim is "against the district and only select individual board members" and clarifies that she "did not sue the district and the school board collectively." (Docket No. 16 at 30). In their reply, Defendants Keber, Kowal, and Locher agree with Plaintiff and state that "the official capacity claims (but not the individual capacity claims) asserted against them should be dismissed with prejudice as duplicative." (Docket No. 33 at 9 (emphasis in original) ).
"Where individual defendants are named in their official capacities, only the liability of the agency which the officers represent is really at issue." McCachren v. Blacklick Valley Sch. Dist. ,
Defendant Mealie argues that Count IV must be dismissed because she was Plaintiff's subordinate. (Docket No. 25 at 6-8; Docket No. 32 at 2-4). She asserts that she was an Assistant to the Superintendent, that she was not Plaintiff's supervisor, and that Plaintiff was empowered by her position to discipline her. (Docket No. 25 at 8). It is well settled that "[t]he question of whether a particular individual holds a 'supervisory position' over another must be answered by reference to the power that the individual actually holds, not by reference to his or her formal job title." McCleester v. Mackel , No. 06-CV-120,
C. Count VI-
As to Count VI, Defendants Keber, Kowal, Locher, and Mealie argue that Plaintiff's claim fails because her allegations are conclusory, they are entitled to qualified immunity, and they are agents of AASD. (Docket No. 22 at 20-21; Docket No. 25 at 9-15; Docket No. 32 at 4-7; Docket No. 33 at 5-7). The Court need not address the parties' arguments, as it is well settled that
Here, Plaintiff does not state that the conspiracy was based on alleged constitutional violations. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 179-191). Rather, Plaintiff clearly avers that the alleged conspiracy was based upon a violation of Title VII. (See
In dismissing Count VI, the Court further notes that Plaintiff's allegations are conclusory. To this end, a plaintiff must allege the following elements in order to state a claim pursuant to
Here, Plaintiff avers only that she is a member of a protected class and includes conclusory allegations with respect to a conspiracy. (See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 179-191). "[C]onclusory allegations of concerted action without facts actually reflecting such action may be insufficient to state a conspiracy claim." Pellegrino Food Prods. Co. v. City of Warren ,
D. Count VIII-Tortious Interference With Contractual Relations
As to Count VIII, Defendants Keber, Kowal, Locher, and Mealie argue that Plaintiff's claim fails because they are entitled to immunity and they are agents of AASD. (Docket No. 22 at 21-22; Docket No. 25 at 16-17; Docket No. 32 at 7-8). To establish a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the existence of a contractual relation between the complainant and a third party; (2) purposeful action on the part of the defendant, specifically intended to harm the existing relation; (3) the absence of privilege or justification on the part of the defendant; and (4) the occasioning of actual legal damage as a result of the defendant's conduct. Crivelli v. Gen. Motors Corp. ,
With respect to school board members' immunity, " '[a]n official's status as a high public official for purposes of absolute immunity is determined on a
The Court finds, however, that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged her claim as to Defendants' potential liability in their personal capacities. To this end, Plaintiff has alleged, inter alia, that Defendants maliciously and recklessly interfered with her contract by spreading false and unsubstantiated claims regarding her efficacy as superintendent. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 204-220). Plaintiff's factual allegations as a whole, which the Court must accept as true at this stage of the proceedings, include Defendants' conduct as occurring outside the scope of activities that were in connection with school district business. See, e.g. , Afrika v. Khepera Charter Sch. ,
Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' respective motions to dismiss Count VIII to the extent that Plaintiff asserts her claim against Defendants in their official capacity. The Court will deny Defendants'
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS, in part, and DENIES, in part, Defendants Keber, Kowal, and Locher's Motion to Dismiss, (Docket No. [21] ). The Court GRANTS, in part, and DENIES, in part, Defendant Mealie's Motion to Dismiss, (Docket No. [24] ). An appropriate Order follows.
Notes
In support of their argument, Defendants attach meeting minutes dated March 20, 2013. (Docket No. 22 at 12-13; see also Docket No. 22-1). It is well settled that "[i]n adjudicating Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the court may consider 'only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim.' " Gross v. Stryker Corp. ,
Defendants also assert that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her hostile work environment allegations against Defendants Locher and Kowal. (Docket No. 22 at 14-15). As previously noted, Plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies. Hitchens ,
Defendants initially argued that there was no causal connection between Plaintiff's involvement in the investigation of Mealie and Defendants' alleged adverse action. (Docket No. 22 at 17-18). In their reply, however, Defendants state that their argument relates only to Plaintiff's alleged protected activity with respect to her attempt to remove Smith as a School Resource Officer. (Docket No. 33 at 8-9).