Lead Opinion
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS: FRED ZUCKERMAN, AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GENERAL DRIVERS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS LOCAL UNION NO. 89 AND WILLIAM LONDRIGAN, AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE KENTUCKY STATE AFL-CIO, ITS AFFILIATED UNIONS AND MEMBERS, William E. Johnson, Johnson Bearse, LLP, Irwin H. Cutler, Jr., Benjamin S. Basil, Matthew P. Lynch, Priddy Cutler Naake & Meade PLLC, Robert Matthew Colone, Teamsters Local 89, David O'Brien Suetholz, Devon Nora Ros Oser, Branstetter Stranch & Jennings PLLC.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: MATTHEW G. BEVIN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, Mark Stephen Pitt, Stephen Chad Meredith, Matthew Kuhn, Office of the Governor.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: DERRICK K. RAMSEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE KENTUCKY LABOR CABINET, Michael Gary Swansburg, Jr.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES BARRY BRIGHT, JACOB PURVIS, AND WILLIAM PURVIS, William L. Messenger, National Right to Work Foundation, Richard Lynn Masters, Masters, Mullins, & Arrington.
COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE: KENTUCKY CENTER FOR ECONOMIC POLICY, Pamela Joy Pendorf Thomas.
COUNSEL FOR AMICI CURIAE: INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA; UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA; UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY, RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION; AND KENTUCKY PIPE TRADES ASSOCIATION: Kevin Crosby Burke, Jamie Kristin Neal, Burke Neal PLLC, Tony Oppegard
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE VANMETER
Under Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act,
*586Significantly, this Act amended KRS
I. Factual Background.
Bills virtually identical to 2017 HB 1 were introduced in almost every session of the legislature beginning in 2000
The House Economic Development and Workforce Investment Committee convened a hearing on HB 1 on January 4, 2017. At the hearing, proponents of the Bill testified in support of the Bill.
In May 2017, Fred Zuckerman, et al. ,
In June 2017, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss. The Unions subsequently filed a motion for partial summary judgment. After a September 2017 hearing, the trial court issued its Order denying the Unions' motion and granting the Commonwealth's motion. The Unions appealed. Because this case involves significant and important constitutional issues of great and immediate public importance, we granted transfer of the case from the Court of Appeals. CR
II. Standard of Review.
This case involves a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the Act under the Kentucky Constitution. We recognize, of course, that all laws "contrary to this Constitution, shall be void." KY. CONST. § 26. "Our functions are to determine the constitutional validity and to declare the meaning of what the legislative department has done. We have no other concern." Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith ,
courts are not at liberty to declare a statute invalid because, in their judgment, it may be unnecessary, or opposed to the best interests of the state.... [A]n act will not be declared void on the ground that it is opposed to the spirit supposed to pervade the Constitution, or is against the nature and spirit of the government, or is contrary to the general principles of liberty, or the genius of a free people.
Craig ,
Since the issues involve questions of law, our review is de novo , and we do not defer to conclusions of the trial court. Adams v. Sietsema ,
III. Labor-Management Background.
A detailed history of Labor-Management relations would unduly prolong this opinion, but an overview is helpful to the analysis of the issues before us, particularly because 1) the Unions base their challenges under the Kentucky Constitution, in part, on "the letter and the spirit of the document,"
A. Kentucky Labor Law History to 1890.
Trade or labor unions in Kentucky were initially formed in the more urbanized areas of Louisville, Northern Kentucky, i.e. , Covington and Newport, and in the coal fields of Eastern Kentucky. See generally John Hennan, Toil, Trouble, Transformation: Workers and Unions in Modem Kentucky , 113 R EG . OF THE K Y . H IST . S OC'Y 233, 236-37 (2015) (attributing this formation to the post-Civil War period, although some scholars believe union activity existed in antebellum Kentucky). The first reported Kentucky case we have found involving a trade organization was Sayre v. Louisville Union Benevolent Ass'n ,
Surprisingly, in the period pre-dating the 1890-91 Kentucky Constitutional Convention, that is it. In that era, and although courts recognized workingmen's right to organize, they also recognized employers' rights to conduct business as they saw fit and, absent a contract, to hire and fire employees generally at will. Furthermore, statutory laws regulating labor contracts, maximum hours, minimum pay, and the like, were generally held unconstitutional as an infringement of the employer's and individual employee's right of contract. See generally F. J. Stimson, HANDBOOK TO THE LABOR LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1896), 1-19. Perhaps the most famous, or infamous, case of this era is Lochner v. New York ,
Two cases which post-date the 1890 Constitutional Convention, but which indicate the state of Kentucky labor law in this era are Hetterman v. Powers ,
B. 1890 Constitutional Convention .
Following the Civil War, special legislation was used as a means to encourage Kentucky's economic development. To say that these enactments got out-of-hand would be an understatement. Most scholars accept that Kentucky's 1890 Constitutional Convention was necessitated by excessive proliferation of special legislation for the benefit of individual persons and corporations, an unequal tax burden and mounting local public debts, a desire to exercise control over railroads and railroad rates, and the 1850 antebellum constitution's indefensible protections for slavery. See generally Thomas D. Clark, A HISTORY OF KENTUCKY (Ashland, Ky.: The Jesse Stuart Found., 1988), 419-28. This Court has on many occasions recognized the need to curtail special legislation as the primary reason for the 1891 Constitution. See, e.g. , Yeoman v. Commonwealth, Health Policy Bd. ,
To illustrate the problem of special legislation, in its 1888 session, the legislature passed 1,403 local and private acts, which took up 3,146 pages in a three-volume set. 1888 ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY (Frankfort, *590KY: John D. Woods, 1888).
Some of the special legislation exempted railroads and other corporations from taxation and created monopolies, which were decried by a number of the delegates. E.g. , I 1890 KY. CONST. DEBATES (Frankfort, Ky.: E. Polk Johnson, 1890), 466 (Del. Knott comments). Another point of view was that this legislation had encouraged economic development, expansion of railroads, and development of the state's natural resources. See Clark, A HISTORY OF KENTUCKY , 419-20 (describing editor Henry Watterson and his efforts to promote industrial development).
We include these comments not to re-debate the issues of the late nineteenth century, but merely to point out that the framers of the 1891 Constitution were a varied assortment of men, representing different parts of the Commonwealth and economic interests. See Clark, 431 (stating "[t]his fourth convention was composed of as motley a delegation of constitutionalists as had ever been seen in a convention hall.... Farmer members opposed the sinister influence of corporations; and corporation *591lawyers, lobbyists and self-styled constitutionalists opposed [Farmers'] Alliance leadership[ ]"). Thus, selective quotations from a four-volume set of over 6,000 pages is not a useful exercise in "divining the intent of the framers." Our task, in the interpretation of Kentucky's Constitution,
rests on the express language of the provision, and words must be given their plain and usual meaning. City of Louisville Mun. Hous. Comm'n v. Pub. Hous. Admin. ,261 S.W.2d 286 , 287 (Ky. 1953). This Court is "not at liberty to construe ... plain and definite language of the Constitution in such a manner as to thwart the deliberate purpose and intent of the framers of that instrument." Harrod v. Hatcher ,281 Ky. 712 ,137 S.W.2d 405 , 408 (1940). In fact, our predecessor Court recognized as a "cardinal rule" of constitutional interpretation the principle that rules of construction may not be employed where the language of the provision is clear and unambiguous. Grantz v. Grauman ,302 S.W.2d 364 , 366 (Ky. 1957). "It is to be presumed that in framing the constitution great care was exercised in the language used to convey its meaning and as little as possible left to implication[.]" City of Louisville v. German ,286 Ky. 477 ,150 S.W.2d 931 , 935 (1940).
Fletcher v. Graham ,
To demonstrate the point that the 1891 Constitution does not reflect a "pro-labor, populist, progressive" point of view, as argued by the Unions and the Union Amicae , the Convention adopted only three explicitly pro-labor provisions. These sections were Section 243 relating to the minimum age of child labor, Section 244 requiring all wage earners to be paid in lawful money, and Section 253 restricting the labor of penitentiary labor to public works.
*592The Convention adopted specific sections directed at corporations and railroads. KY. CONST. §§ 190 - 218. These provisions, however, ran to the benefit of the public at large, and were designed to correct the abuses which had occurred as a result of special legislation. See, e.g. , § 194 (requiring all corporations organized or carrying on business in the state to have a place of business and a registered agent); § 197 (prohibiting common carriers from issuing free passes to public officials); § 212 (subjecting railroad rolling stock and personal property to execution and attachment); §§ 213-15, 217-18 (requiring railroads not to discriminate or to give preferential treatment or rates). Similarly, and as to taxation, several provisions addressed special legislation abuses. E.g. , § 174 (subjecting corporate and individually owned property to uniform tax rates); §§ 177, 179 (prohibiting Commonwealth, counties or municipalities from becoming shareholders in corporations).
After the publication of the proposed Constitution in April 1891, the reaction of labor groups was mixed. Herbert Finch, Organized Labor in Louisville, Kentucky, 1880-1914 (1965) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Kentucky) (on file with the William T. Young Library, Univ. of Kentucky), 206-07. The Trades and Labor Assembly in Louisville "decided almost unanimously to vote against" the new Constitution. Against the New , THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville), Mon., Jun. 15, 1891, p. 5, col. 4, https://www.newspapers.com/image/32457788/ (visited Sep. 5, 2018). Conversely, the Knights of Labor did endorse it at its annual state convention in July 1891, "by a close vote." Knights' Labor , THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville), Wed., Jul. 29, 1891, p. 8, col. 2, https://www.newspapers.com/image/32461411/ (visited Sep. 5, 2018).
In the final analysis, Dr. Clark has been quoted,
[T]he 1890 convention created a static document to protect [Kentucky's] agrarian society from an emerging industrial order: "One gets the impression ... that many of the delegates were, in fact, little Red Riding Hoods trudging alone and frightened through the perplexing forest of constitutional law, hoping that the big bad wolves of industrial and progressive changes were mere figments of their badly agitated imagination, and that a rigid constitution with static provisions would serve to dispel these threatening wraiths."
William Green, Constitutions , THE KENTUCKY ENCYCLOPEDIA (Lexington: The Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1992), 225 (emphasis added). No doubt exists but that the 1890 Convention sought to rein in the reign of special legislation, i.e , elimination of special tax breaks for railroads, equalization of tax burden, elimination of implied powers. The resulting document was "[n]ot so much a fundamental rule of government as a piece of omnibus legislation." Clark, 432.
C. Federal Labor Law .
With the enactment of major labor laws between 1932 and 1935, Congressional policy towards labor unions transformed from one of indifference (at best) to one of encouragement. These laws were the Norris-LaGuardia Act, c. 90, § 4,
By enacting these laws, "Congress largely displaced state regulation of industrial relations," and thus, states "may not regulate activity that the NLRA protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or prohibits." Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc. ,
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.
The historical context of the relevant aspects of the Taft-Hartley Act is instructive. See Commc'ns Workers v. Beck ,
Against this historical backdrop, section 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act attempted to accomplish the "twin purposes" of eliminating "the most serious abuses of compulsory unionism ... by abolishing the closed shop" but still allowing certain union-security agreements to counter the *594free rider problem. NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp. ,
"While § 8(a)(3) articulates a national policy that certain union-security agreements are valid as a matter of federal law, § 14(b) reflects Congress' decision that any State or Territory that wishes to may exempt itself from that policy." Mobil Oil ,
With that background, we turn to the claims in this case.
IV. Analysis.
As previously noted, the Unions raise four constitutional challenges to the Act: (a) violation of Kentucky's equal protection of the laws provisions; (b) violation of Kentucky's prohibition on special legislation; (c) violation of Kentucky's prohibition of takings without compensation; and (d) improper designation as emergency legislation. We address each claim in turn.
A. Equal Protection .
Citizens of Kentucky enjoy equal protection of the law under the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Kentucky Constitution. D.F. v. Codell ,
Currently, three levels of review may apply to an equal protection challenge. See, e.g. , Steven Lee Enters. v. Varney ,
Rational basis review is appropriate for evaluating the Act since the Act is expressly permitted by the Taft-Hartley Act § 14(b). The Supreme Court long ago held that, under federal law, union membership is not a suspect classification triggering strict scrutiny. City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters ,
*596Jones v. Russell ,
In Varney , we quoted at length from Heller v. Doe by Doe ,
We many times have said, and but weeks ago repeated, that rational-basis review in equal protection analysis is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. Nor does it authorize the judiciary to sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines. For these reasons, a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity. Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose. Further, a legislature that creates these categories need not actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification. Instead, a classification must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.
A State, moreover, has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification. A legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. A statute is presumed constitutional, and the burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it, whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record. Finally, courts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legislature's generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends. A classification does not fail rational-basis review because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations-illogical, it may be, and unscientific.
Varney ,
In Elk Horn Coal , we explained that the statute under consideration, KRS 26A.300, did not treat all unsuccessful appellants the same, and thus was "discriminatory. But the state may discriminate in certain matters if there is a rational basis for such discrimination."
In Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Revenue Cabinet , in upholding a sales and use tax classification, we held:
The standards for classifications under the Kentucky constitution are the same as those under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal constitution. A single standard can be applied to both the State and Federal constitutions in regard to classification for sales tax exemptions. This Court has determined that economic factors are valid considerations which the legislature may take into account in developing a legitimate tax classification. The legislature has a great freedom of classification and the presumption of validity can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that it is hostile and oppressive against particular persons and classes.
The Unions and the Union Amicae strenuously argue that the Act creates a classification which has no substantial or justifiable basis. They claim right-to-work policies reduce wages for union and non-unions employees, have mixed impact on employment outcomes, and have no statistically significant impact on overall state employment. They argue the true motivation is "to starve labor organizations and their members based on perceived political bent." The Commonwealth, conversely, argues that the legislature reasonably could conclude that the Act would, as testified by the proponents of 2017 HB 1, benefit Kentucky and its citizens by joining other right-to-work states with superior economic development, employment growth in both union and non-union jobs, and eliminate Kentucky's disadvantage with respect to its neighboring right-to-work states in competing to attract new businesses. The Commonwealth further argues that the legislature might have sought to provide economic freedom for workers who desired not to support any union activities.
The legislature is permitted to set the economic policy for the Commonwealth. Even assuming that the Act creates a classification that discriminates between labor unions and all other organizations operating in the state,
One does not need an advanced degree in labor economics to recognize that employers might be attracted to locate in a state where wages are lower as opposed to a state where wages are higher. To the extent this conclusion might be characterized as speculative, it is undoubtedly rational. The legislature can clearly make a policy decision that the Act might result in more jobs, albeit at lower wages, and that this result, in turn, might benefit the overall economic climate of Kentucky. In fact, this result is supported by some of the economic studies noted by the Unions. See Robert Bruno, Affidavit at 5 (stating that some studies suggest right to work laws increase manufacturing employment, while other studies find no effect). All the while, of course, for any given workplace, the majority of workers retain the federally-protected right to organize.
The Act does not violate the equal protection provisions of the Kentucky Constitution. We are unable to say the legislature's "classification is so arbitrary and capricious as to be hostile, oppressive and utterly devoid of rational basis." Delta Air Lines ,
As to the Unions' claim that the Act impairs their freedom to contract, Kentucky law has long recognized that the police power, based on "the general welfare of the community," may validly infringe on the right to contract. City of Covington v. Sanitation Dist. No. 1 ,
B. Special Legislation.
The Unions claim the Act constitutes special legislation in violation of Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution. Specifically, Section 59 states: "[t]he General Assembly shall not pass local or special acts concerning any of the following subjects, or for any of the following purposes, namely: ... Twenty-fourth: To regulate labor, trade, mining or manufacturing." The purpose of this section is not to prevent the legislature from enacting any laws concerning labor, trade, mining or manufacturing. That would be absurd.
Special legislation is defined as arbitrary and irrational legislation that favors the economic self-interest of the one or the few over that of the many. Yeoman ,
In Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith , our predecessor court noted a clear distinction between a general and a special law, stating " '[a] statute which relates to persons or things as a class is a general law, while a statute which relates to particular persons or things of a class is special.' "
Our case law has long recognized a simple, two-part test for determining whether a law constitutes general legislation in its constitutional sense: (1) equal application to all in a class, and (2) distinctive and natural reasons inducing and supporting the classification. Yeoman ,
Frankly, the Act applies to all collective bargaining agreements entered into on or after January 9, 2017, with the exception of certain employees covered or exempted by federal law. KRS 336.132. With the exceptions required by federal law, it applies to all employers and all employees, both public and private. It does not single out any particular union, industry or employer. It applies statewide. We have previously rejected constitutional challenges to legislation that purportedly promoted or harmed organized labor as claimed special legislation, so long as a rational basis existed for the statute. See Hamilton ,
C. Taking for Public Purpose without Just Compensation .
Next, the Unions argue that the Act constitutes a public taking of labor union property without just compensation, in violation of Sections 13 and 242 of the Kentucky Constitution. Section 13 provides, in pertinent part, that no "man's property [shall] be taken or applied to public use without the consent of his representatives, and without just compensation being previously made to him." Section 242 provides:
Municipal and other corporations, and individuals invested with the privilege of taking private property for public use, shall make just compensation for property taken, injured or destroyed by them; which compensation shall be paid before such taking, or paid or secured, at the election of such corporation or *601individual, before such injury or destruction.
The Unions' argument is two-fold. First, they assert that the Act takes union property because unions are required to provide valuable services to all employees in a bargaining unit irrespective of union membership without being compensated in return.
1. Providing required service without compensation.
The Unions rely on this court's decision in Bradshaw v. Ball ,
The Court addressed the arguments advanced to justify non-members' payment of agency fees, specifically that because unions are required by law to represent the interests of all employees in the bargaining unit, whether union members or not, it is unfair that non-members, i.e. , free-riders, are not required to pay fees. The Court noted that unions in many states represent employees who do not pay agency fees.
interest in keeping control of the administration of the collective bargaining agreement, since the resolution of one *603employee's grievance can affect others. And when a union controls the grievance process, it may, as a practical matter, effectively subordinate the interest of [an] individual employee to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit.
Id. (quotations and citations omitted); see also Vaca v. Sipes ,
Other courts have similarly held that unions are fully and adequately compensated for any loss of fees from nonmembers through the exclusive representation designation. Sweeney v. Pence ,
The foregoing analysis applies equally to private sector employees and effectively distinguishes the present case from Bradshaw . A union's representation of a nonmember employee through collective bargaining or grievance processing serves the union's interest, irrespective of whether it receives an agency fee. A union is not "compelled" by the Act to represent nonmembers without compensation. By contrast, the uncompensated attorney receives nothing for his or her time and effort. Because exclusive designation fully and adequately compensates unions for free-riders, the Act does not constitute a taking of private property without compensation, and therefore does not violate Sections 13 and 242 of the Kentucky Constitution.
2. Taking of a Contract Right in Future Renewals.
The Unions do not spend too much time on this argument, presumably because the Act effectively carves out current contracts and will apply only to renewals of collective bargaining agreements. The Unions, however, argue that unions have negotiated for decades over union security clauses, have an expectation that these provisions will continue and that collective bargaining agreements are different from regular commercial contracts. We disagree.
Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act has been part of the NLRA since 1947. Congress has for 70 years expressly permitted states to enact right-to-work laws. Right-to-work legislation has been proposed in Kentucky for almost 20 years. We fail to perceive that any expectation in the continuation of a union security clause could be a reasonable expectation. See Morrisey v. West Virginia AFL-CIO ,
The Commonwealth correctly argues that Kentucky law has long recognized that the police power, based on "the general welfare of the community," may validly infringe on the right to contract. City of Covington v. Sanitation Dist. No. 1 ,
D. Emergency Legislation .
Finally, the Unions argue that the legislature impermissibly designated the Act as emergency legislation in violation of Section 55 of the Kentucky constitution, and that the trial court erred by failing to consider this argument. The trial court reasoned that the court is not the proper body to determine whether the stated emergency existed, and that the legislature is merely required to state an emergency purpose. This constitutional section states:
No act, except general appropriation bills, shall become a law until ninety days after the adjournment of the session at which it was passed, except in cases of emergency, when, by the concurrence of a majority of the members elected to each House of the General Assembly, by a yea and nay vote, entered upon their journals, an act may become a law when approved by the Governor; but the reasons for the emergency that justifies this action must be set out at length in the journal of each House.
KY. CONST. § 55. The reason set forth in the Act was that "it is critical to the economy and citizens of Kentucky to attract new business and investment into the Commonwealth as soon as possible, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act takes effect upon its passage and approval by the Governor or upon its otherwise becoming a law." 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 1, § 14.
In Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Geary ,
In this case, and although the Unions disagree, we are unable to conclude that the legislature's proffered reason for an emergency has no rational basis. We therefore will not disturb that determination.
*605V. Conclusion.
Based on the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Unions' constitutional challenges to the Act are without merit. In this area of economic legislation, the legislature and the executive branch make the policy, not the courts. Long ago, in an opinion upholding a provision of the Railway Labor Act that authorized a union shop agreement notwithstanding a state's right-to-work law, Justice William O. Douglas aptly wrote, "[m]uch might be said pro and con if the policy issue were before us." Ry. Emps. Dep't v. Hanson ,
the question is one of policy with which the judiciary has no concern.... [The legislature], acting within its constitutional powers, has the final say on policy issues. If it acts unwisely, the electorate can make a change. The task of the judiciary ends once it appears that the legislative measure adopted is relevant or appropriate to the constitutional power which [the legislature] exercises.
Id. at 234,
All sitting. Minton, C.J., Hughes and Venters, JJ., concur. Minton, C.J., concurs by separate opinion in which Hughes and Venters, JJ., join. Keller, J., dissents by separate opinion in which Cunningham and Wright, JJ., join. Wright, J., dissents by separate opinion in which Cunningham and Keller, JJ., join.
United States Code.
House Bill.
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2000 HB 12; 2003 Senate Bill ("SB") 77; 2004 HB 173; 2005 SB 205; 2006 HB 38; 2007 HB 328; 2009 SB 165; 2011 HB 345; 2013 HB 308; 2014 HB 496; 2015 SB 1; 2016 SB 3. Legislative Research Commission, http://www.lrc.ky.gov/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2018). Our research uncovered no version of the bill in the biennial sessions 1986 through 1998.
The House Committee hearing was accessible on KET (Part 1: https://www.ket.org/legislature/?archive& program=WGAOS& nola=WGAOS+018003& part=1& epoch=2017; Part 2: https://www.ket.org/legislature/?archive& program=WGAOS& nola=WGAOS+018003& part=2& epoch=2017) (last visited Aug. 30, 2018). Witnesses in favor of the Bill were Governor Bevin, Speaker of the House Jeff Hoover, Majority Whip Jonathan Shell, David Adkisson, President & CEO of the Kentucky Chamber of Commerce, Kevin Grove, an executive with CBRE, a commercial real estate firm in Louisville, and Julia Crigler, state director for Americans For Prosperity, Kentucky chapter. Witnesses opposing the Bill were Anna Baumann, policy analyst for the Kentucky Center of Economic Policy, whose affidavit was attached to Appellants' brief in this Court, and Bill Londrigan, one of the plaintiffs/appellants herein.
This quotation recited in the hearing appears to come from Jeffrey A. Eisenach, Right-to-Work Laws: The Economic Evidence , NERA Economic Consulting, http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2015/PUB_Right_to_Work_Laws_0615.pdf (last visited Sep. 21, 2018). The quoted private sector employment growth rate, 17.4%, in right-to-work states compared with the comparable rate, 8.2%, in non-right-to-work states.
Louisiana State University.
Except for the Act's designation as emergency legislation, purportedly in violation of Ky. Const. § 55, no claim is made that the Act's passage and enactment did not comport with the requirements of the Constitution for a valid law.
The plaintiffs/appellants are Fred Zuckerman and William Londrigan, as representatives respectively of the General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 89 and the Kentucky State AFL-CIO, Affiliated Unions and their Members (collectively "the Unions").
The defendants/appellees are Office of the Governor, ex. rel. Matthew G. Bevin, in his official capacity as Governor, and the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Kentucky Labor Cabinet, ex rel. Derrick K. Ramsey, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Kentucky Labor Cabinet (collectively "the Commonwealth").
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
E.g. , Appellants' Brief at 11, Union Amicae's Brief at 1-5, 7. We recognize the importance of labor unions in United States' history and that of Kentucky. We acknowledge that unions have played a significant role in providing a path for many working families to the middle class, for improving working conditions and pay, for general acceptance of the forty-hour work week, and for other benefits. In 1933, our predecessor court had recognized the important function of labor unions:
the rights of economic self-preservation; of improving economic and social conditions; of agreement among men; of free speech and action; of pursuing one's safety and happiness; of striving to achieve legitimate ends and benefits by concert of action or collective bargaining; and the privilege of assembling together in a peaceable manner for the common good. Upon this side may be placed also the unconscionable sweatshops and lamentable conditions under which employees are all but compelled to work-those things which challenge an enlightened, humane society to opposition.
Music Hall Theatre v. Moving Picture Mach. Operators Local No. 165 ,
The issues in this case, however, are not whether unions are beneficial organizations, but whether the legislature's passing of the Act violated any provision of the Kentucky Constitution as argued by the Unions and the Union Amicae .
These numbers come from the table of contents of the Kentucky Acts' volumes. Interestingly, a number of the Public Acts had a decidedly local or restricted impact. See, e.g. , 1888 Ky. Acts ch. 632 (amending Ky. Gen. Stat. ch. 70, § 6 to increase from sixty days to six months the time period in which to file a mechanics' lien, but such amendment applied only to Madison County); 1888 Ky. Acts ch. 650 (exempting the Nicholasville, Danville and Lancaster Turnpike Company from the provisions of 1886 Ky. Acts ch. 1127 (requiring State's Sinking Fund Commissioners to approve the directors of a turnpike company in which the State of Kentucky owned stock) ); 1888 Ky. Acts ch. 1347 (amending Ky. Gen. Stat. ch. 106, art. 2, § 3 (relating to taverns, tippling-houses, etc.), but such amendment applied only to Madison County).
To quote Dr. Clark:
Henry Watterson and his "new departure" Democrats were diligent on the behalf of new industry. In Louisville, Watterson took the lead in pointing out new and profitable industrial opportunities. Boards of commerce distributed thousands of circulars at home and abroad describing Kentucky's resources and proclaiming Kentucky a land of unlimited business promise. Using the state's credit to encourage corporations was too unusual, however, for conservative agrarian legislators, and enthusiastic "new departure" partisans had to content themselves with granting generous tax exemption and special privileges. This encouragement to capital was soon noticeable, for railway mileage increased from 567 miles built and projected in 1860, to more than 1,500 miles in operation, in 1880. These roads represented a stated capital investment of $100,000,000. Along with the expansion of the Kentucky railway system, eastern capital poured into the state to develop timber and coal resources, and to build distilleries and tobacco warehouses.
Clark, A History of Kentucky , at 420.
Burnam stated:
I would hold these corporations to their just responsibility for every infraction of private right or public law, but I shall never consent by my vote, in obedience to popular clamor, to strike down those great benefactors of the Commonwealth ... which are daily and hourly giving employment and to thousands of laborers, who have linked with bands of iron the different portions of the country, and strengthened and consolidated the power, the civilizations and true greatness of the human race.
Prior to 1891, neither the constitution nor statutes limited where convict labor could be employed. Employers therefore could lease convict labor to lower wages or to take the place of free, striking workers. See Henry C. Mayer, Glimpses of Union Activity among Coal Miners in Nineteenth-Century Eastern Kentucky , 86 Reg. of the Ky. Hist. Socy 216, 220 (1988).
Laura Clay, leader of the women's suffrage in Kentucky and daughter of Cassius Marcellus Clay, the "Lion of White Hall," was permitted to address the Convention. Her plea was not for recognition of women's suffrage as a constitutional right, but merely for a provision authorizing the legislature to enact women's suffrage "when the time shall come." II 1890 Ky. Const. Debates 2090-93. This limited provision was not included in the drafted Constitution; Section 145 limited suffrage to "[e]very male citizen ... of the age of twenty-one." In 1912, the legislature authorized women to vote in elections for county school superintendents, as authorized by Ky. Const. § 155. Crook v. Bartlett ,
Section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act contains a broad declaration of public policy and of the need to protect workers in joining unions, pursuing collective bargaining and resorting to concerted activities.
An earlier law, the National Industrial Recovery Act ("NIRA"), c. 90,
The Unions make no claim under the 14th Amendment. That provision requires persons who are similarly situated to be treated alike. Federal courts have held that right-to-work laws do not violate any provision of the United States Constitution. Lincoln Fed. Labor Union No. 19129, A.F. of L. v. N.w. Iron & Metal Co. ,
In Elk Horn Coal , we acknowledged that, on occasion based on particular facts, we had elected to apply a higher level of scrutiny to equal protection analysis in cases involving social and economic legislation.
We reject the Unions' analogy that labor unions are akin to the Kentucky Bar Association ("KBA") for purposes of the Act. Historically, labor unions, as opposed to trade or craft unions, arose as associations of workers/employees to improve pay and working conditions and to provide a unified group to assert rights against their employer. See Music Hall Theatre ,
to maintain a proper discipline of the members of the bar in accordance with these rules and with the principles of the legal profession as a public calling, to initiate and supervise, with the approval of the court, appropriate means to insure a continuing high standard of professional competence on the part of the members of the bar, and to bear a substantial and continuing responsibility for promoting the efficiency and improvement of the judicial system.
Kentucky Rules of the Supreme Court ("SCR") 3.025. The KBA is not a voluntary association, SCR 3.030(1), except in the sense that no one is required to practice law in Kentucky. The essential tenor of SCR 3.025 is that the KBA exists for the protection of the public: "proper discipline ... of the bar," "high standard of professional competence" and "efficiency and improvement of the judicial system[.]"
If the meaning were to prohibit all laws addressing these subjects, then entire Titles of the Kentucky Revised Statutes would be void. E.g. , KRS Title XXVII: Labor and Human Rights; KRS Title XXVII: Mines and Minerals; KRS Title XXIX: Commerce and Trade. Examples of Chapters within these titles are KRS Chapter 341, Unemployment Compensation; KRS Chapter 350, Surface Coal Mining; and KRS Chapter 355, Uniform Commercial Code.
The concurring in part/dissenting in part opinion seems to suggest that any time the legislature seeks to alter any policy yet grandfather pre-existing rights, duties or obligations, then the resulting legislation is constitutionally infirm under Sections 59 and 60. Such analysis ignores the longstanding case law cited in this opinion that establishes the two-part test for analyzing legislation under a special legislation challenge, and would severely hinder any legislative effort to effect change in socio-economic policy.
A union's duty of fair representation arises from its statutory designation as the exclusive representative of the bargaining unit and has been established by case law. See, e.g. , Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. ,
the rule announced in Vaca v. Sipes ,386 U.S. 171 , 190,87 S.Ct. 903 , 916,17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967) -that a union breaches its duty of fair representation if its actions are either "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith"-applies to all union activity, including contract negotiation. We further hold that a union's actions are arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union's actions, the union's behavior is so far outside a "wide range of reasonableness," Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman ,345 U.S. 330 , 338,73 S.Ct. 681 , 686,97 L.Ed. 1048 (1953), as to be irrational.
A careful reading of Bradshaw demonstrates that its holding must be considered in the historical and factual context in which it was decided. All Kentucky cases regarding attorneys' representation of indigent defendants prior to Bradshaw held that, as officers of the court, attorneys were expected to perform these services as a collateral function of the profession. E.g. , Slavens v. Commonwealth ,
At oral argument, the Unions sought to distinguish Janus by virtue of the Court's addressing the First Amendment right asserted by a public employee. While we acknowledge that difference, we note the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act's legal requirements for public unions share many features of the NLRA. See 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 315/6 (West 2016) (requiring vote in a bargaining union for union representation; exclusive representation of all employees by the union; exclusive union negotiation with the employer on matters relating to "pay, wages, hours and other conditions of employment," including policy matters; union duty to represent the interests of all employees).
Recent examples of union organizing efforts in right-to-work states have occurred in South Carolina and Tennessee. See Doug Cameron, Boeing May Face Union Vote at 787 Plant , Wall St. J. (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-may-face-union-vote-at-787-plant-148492373l?mod=searchresults& page=1& pos=4 (visited Aug. 29, 2018) (article noting "long-running efforts to organize" by International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers); Christina Rogers, UAW Plans Another Push at Volkswagen , Wall St. J. (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uaw-sets-up-local-at-volkswagen-in-tennessee-1410975613?mod=searchresults& page=1& pos=2 (visited Aug. 29, 2018) (article noting "[a] foothold in Tennessee would represent a major advance after a long series of failed attempts to organize Southern factories operated by foreign auto makers[ ]").
Even if we were to agree with the Unions, the Act would not be rendered void. First, we note that the Act has a severability clause, such that the invalidity of any section does not affect the other provisions. 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 1, § 13. Second, even absent a severability clause and an invalid emergency provision, the Act became effective ninety days following the adjournment of the legislature. Ky. Const. § 55 ; see McIntyre v. Commonwealth ,
Justice Felix Frankfurter, concurring in Railway Employes' , concluded his opinion with the following quotation:
"Where there is, or generally is believed to be, an important ground of public policy for restraint, the Constitution does not forbid it, whether this court agrees or disagrees with the policy pursued. It cannot be doubted that to prevent strikes, and, so far as possible, to foster its scheme of arbitration, might be deemed by Congress an important point of policy, and I think it impossible to say that Congress might not reasonably think that the provision in question would help a great deal to carry its policy along. But suppose the only effect really were to tend to bring about the complete unionizing of such railroad laborers as Congress can deal with, I think that object alone would justify the act. I quite agree that the question what and how much good labor unions do, is one on which intelligent people may differ; I think that laboring men sometimes attribute to them advantages, as many attribute to combinations of capital disadvantages, that really are due to economic conditions of a far wider and deeper kind; but I could not pronounce it unwarranted if Congress should decide that to foster a strong union was for the best interest, not only of the men, but of the railroads and the country at large."
Ry. Emps. ,
These quotations apply equally to both the Kentucky legislature and the United States Congress. In 2018, several members of the Kentucky House minority party filed a bill to reverse the Act. 2018 HB 237. Granted, this bill did not receive a hearing, but that fate was similar to that of any number of minority party bills seeking passage of right-to-work legislation prior to 2017. On the federal level, since § 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act represents an exception to federal preemption in labor-management relations, Congress can change that as well.
Concurrence Opinion
I completely concur with the majority's well analyzed opinion. I write separately to address the weaponization of Sections 59 and 60 in accompanying opinions in both this case and Commonwealth v. Ezra Claycomb .
"Section[s] 59 [and 60] ... prohibit[ ] 'local or special acts.' "
As it currently stands, "[t]he test as to whether legislation is special was formulated by this Court in Schoo v. Rose .
Considering the accompanying opinions of my colleagues in this case and others, I am convinced that continued adherence to the Schoo test is untenable. It would appear from our precedent that the determination of whether certain legislation constitutes unconstitutional special legislation rests in the hands of a majority of the seven Kentucky Supreme Court justices who can choose to define the "class" at issue in whatever way they would like, because under the first prong of the Schoo test, how one defines the "class" determines whether legislation is constitutional or not.
For example, Justice Keller, instead of articulating how the "class" at issue should be determined under our "longstanding precedent," accepts the Commonwealth's articulation of the "class" created by the Right to Work Act ("RTWA") as "all employers" and "all employees." This articulation of the "class" at issue leads the dissent to then conclude that because the RTWA treats certain employers and employees differently from others-employees under an existing contract mandating labor-organization participation entered into before January 9, 2017, still must contribute to the labor organization, unlike all other employees-the RTWA is unconstitutional special legislation. Justice Wright, on the other hand, has defined the class as "contracts." And because he argues that the RTWA treats some types of contracts differently than others, he concludes in dissent that the RTWA constitutes unconstitutional special legislation.
But instead of defining the "class" at issue in the present case as "all employers" and "all employees," or "contracts," what if we chose to define the "class" as "all labor organizations" because the RTWA is really targeting labor organizations? The RTWA does not differentiate *607treatment between, for example, labor organizations in western Kentucky versus those in eastern Kentucky-all labor organizations must refrain from forcing employee participation-so therefore the RTWA applies equally to all within the "class." And this simple "reclassification," turns what was once unconstitutional special legislation into constitutional legislation. Simply choosing to define the "class" at issue differently than my colleagues in the dissent changes the outcome.
As evidenced above, how this Court defines the "class" at issue could mean the difference between rendering legislation constitutional versus unconstitutional. Such a fluid determination in defining the "class" at issue-in conjunction with the Schoo test's rigid rule that the law "must apply equally to all in a class" or else the law is unconstitutional-gives the judiciary too much leeway.
Justice Keller believes that I have conceded that the RTWA is unconstitutional special legislation under the Schoo test. I do not concede that point at all. Justice Keller's conclusion here misses my point: the dissent argues the unconstitutionality of the RTWA under "longstanding Kentucky precedent" that fails to articulate any rule for defining the "class" at issue to which the Schoo test then applies. Under the "longstanding Kentucky precedent" that the dissent claims faithfully to apply, a majority of this Court can strike down legislation based on a completely subjective determination of the "class" at issue.
To provide guidance to the judiciary on the important issue of judging whether a piece of legislation constitutes unconstitutional special legislation, I find great wisdom in the words of former United States Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo. In his analysis of whether a Maryland statute constituted unconstitutional special legislation under Maryland's Constitution, Justice Cardozo stated:
Time with its tides brings new conditions which must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class. If so the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the new condition affects only a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The [Maryland] Constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special evils with which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain the special form .... The problem ... is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by the courts .... If the evil to be corrected can be seen to be merely fanciful, the injustice or the wrong illusory, the courts may intervene and strike the special statute down .... If special circumstances have developed of such a nature as to call for a new rule, the special act will stand.40
In Kentucky, the General Assembly is constitutionally entrusted with identifying in changing times what it believes to be mischief and the ability to try to remedy that mischief. In this case, the General Assembly believes that forced labor-organization membership, or at least forced contribution to a labor organization, is a problem.
*608So it enacted the RTWA, which prevents employees in Kentucky from being forced to support organized labor.
In other words, the General Assembly identified a "condition [that] must be cared for by ... law[,]" i.e., forced labor organization participation. This "condition[ ] affects the members of a class," i.e., employees who are forced into support of a labor organization. The "class" is to be determined as such: who or what is being adversely affected by the condition that the legislation seeks to remedy.
The "correcting statute" in the present case, the RTWA, seemingly does not "apply to all alike," because of the grandfathering-in of pre-January 9, 2017, agreements providing for forced labor-organization participation of employees. In other words, certain employees within the class are being treated differently from other employees within the class because employees bound by pre-January 9, 2017, agreements continue to be forced into labor-organization support. But rendering the RTWA unconstitutional simply on this fact fails to consider Justice Cardozo's wisdom, which seemingly applies an exception to the general rule that that "statute must apply to all alike": "[Kentucky's] constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special evils with which the general laws are incompetent to cope."
Under the Schoo test, however, the General Assembly would apparently be prohibited from attempting to remedy what it believes to be a problem because either (1) the RTWA, if applied to all employees, will violate the Contracts or Takings Clauses, or both, or (2) the RTWA, as it currently stands, is unconstitutional special legislation. This line of thinking, taken to its natural conclusion, would mean that any time parties have entered into a contract, and the General Assembly decides that those kinds of contracts are bad public policy and creates a law preventing such contracts, the law is either (1) unconstitutional special legislation if it exempts from its application contracts already entered into by parties or (2) unconstitutional under the Contracts or Takings Clause if no exemption is afforded. Such an interpretation blocks the General Assembly from ever acting to remedy a purported problem, which is simply an untenable conclusion.
This is Justice Cardozo's point: Determining whether legislation constitutes unconstitutional special legislation requires a flexible analysis, ascertaining the reasons behind everything the legislature is doing.
*609What is the "condition" the legislature is attempting to remedy? Why is the legislature treating one class differently from another? Why is the legislature treating some members of the class differently from others? Does the legislature have good reasons for doing all of this?
Rather than simply striking down legislation because some people or entities are being treated differently from others, both outside and within the "class" at issue, we must ask why this is the case. Such an analysis is in exact conformance with an Equal Protection Clause analysis. The Equal Protection Clause does not render legislation unconstitutional simply because certain people are treated differently from others. A law that treats people belonging to suspect classes differently from others is not unconstitutional simply on that fact alone. Rather, a law that treats people belonging to suspect classes differently from others is unconstitutional if that law fails to satisfy strict scrutiny review, i.e., if no compelling government interest for doing exists or if the law is not narrowly tailored to accomplish its end.
Under the Schoo test, different treatment of certain members of a class renders a law unconstitutional special legislation. Respectfully, I think that this is an untenable restriction on the legislature's ability to act to solve problems and offends the doctrine of separation of powers. In my view, we should analyze whether a law constitutes special legislation, applying the good judgment of Justice Cardozo: "Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by the courts .... If the evil to be corrected can be seen to be merely fanciful, the injustice or the wrong illusory, the courts may intervene and strike the special statute down ...."
The Schoo test proves to be unworkable because of the mystery as to how the "class" at issue is to be defined. Yet the Schoo test, and really all our special legislation precedent, proves to be untenable in another way-by suggesting different ways of analyzing the second prong. Consider the following statements this Court has made over the years about the special legislation analysis:
"A special law is legislation which arbitrarily or beyond reasonable justification discriminates against some persons or objects and favor others."45
"When asserting the validity of a classification, the burden is on the party claiming the validity of the classification to show that there is a valid nexus between the classification and the purpose for which the statute in question was drafted. There must be substantially more than merely a theoretical basis for a distinction . Rather, there must be a firm basis in reality ."46
"[T]he classification [must] bear[ ] a 'reasonable relation to the purpose of the Act. ' "47
*610"[T]here must be a substantial and justifiable reason apparent from legislative history, from the statute's title, preamble or subject matter, or from some other authoritative source."48
No wonder the trial court in this case and in Claycomb had trouble articulating how to analyze the second prong of the Schoo test. And the dissent offers no guidance as to how courts are to do so while continuing to profess faith in the Schoo test as binding precedent. For example, the dissent places the burden on the Commonwealth to articulate the reasons for upholding certain legislation. This may conform to how Yeoman has articulated the rule, but it is not in conformance with Com., Revenue Cabinet v. Smith , another case involving a special legislation challenge: "Notably, the burden on the ones attacking the [legislation] is the negation of every conceivable basis which might support it .
Justice Keller's final point is a suggestion that I have applied different "readings" of our constitutional provisions in Claycomb versus this case. This suggestion fails to appreciate the fundamental difference between the two provisions. Section 14, at issue in Claycomb , involves pure constitutional language that plainly proscribes "delay" in the ability to seek a remedy through the courts. Sections 59 and 60, on the other hand, proscribe "special" legislation-special is a vague term that has been defined and redefined by precedent from this Court. And, relying on our precedent, what exactly is meant by "special" legislation? The dissent insists on adherence to "longstanding Kentucky precedent" in which our Court has attempted unsuccessfully to define what makes legislation special . But truly that precedent is unworkable today.
And while stare decisis is an important guiding principle, it is not absolute:
Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. Adhering to precedent "is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important than the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right." Nevertheless, when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, "this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent." Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it "is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision." This is particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases "correction through legislative action is practically impossible." Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved ; the opposite is true in cases ... involving procedural and evidentiary rules.50
In the words of this Court: "[This Court is] 'not assigned the duty of maintaining the watch as the law ossifies.' At times, through proper analysis, sound jurisprudence *611mandates we refuse to 'unquestioningly follow prior decisions.' "
Finally, I agree with the majority's conclusion that the Act does not violate Section 55 of Kentucky's Constitution and find the dissent's opposing conclusion unavailing. I only wish to make clear, as the majority seemingly has, that Section 55 cannot, in and of itself, make an otherwise constitutionally sound piece of legislation unconstitutional. "As the Kentucky Supreme Court has explained, if the emergency clause of an otherwise valid statute is invalid, then the statute takes effect at the time it would have become law without an emergency clause."
Hughes and Venters, JJ., join.
2017-SC-000614-TG, --- S.W.3d ----,
See Hayes v. State Property and Bldgs. Com'n ,
Yeoman v. Com., Health Policy Bd. ,
Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Holmes ,
Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson Cty. v. Bd. of Educ. of Louisville ,
St. Luke Hosp., Inc. v. Health Policy Bd. ,
Yeoman ,
See Hayes v. State Property and Bldgs. Com'n ,
Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore ,
Necessarily, the "condition that the legislation seeks to remedy" must be legitimate.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena ,
Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore ,
Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson Cty. v. Bd. of Educ. of Louisville ,
Yeoman v. Com., Health Policy Bd. ,
Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov't v. O'Shea's-Baxter, LLC ,
Tabler v. Wallace ,
Com., Revenue Cabinet v. Smith ,
Payne v. Tennessee ,
Commonwealth v. Terrell ,
Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't ,
Dissenting Opinion
I concur with the majority opinion's holding that the RTWA survives an equal protection challenge if the rational basis test is the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply; I also agree that the RTWA is not a violation of the Takings Clause. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion's holding that the RTWA was not passed in contravention of Kentucky's Constitution relating to special and emergency legislation.
Section 59 and Special Legislation.
A. The delegates at the 1891 Constitutional Convention made the barring of special legislation a priority.
Lawmakers at the 1891 Constitutional Convention in Kentucky were concerned not just with special laws being enacted for railroad companies, but for all corporations and localities that had enacted laws specific to them. "The universal disapproval of every person in Kentucky suggested sharp and effective remedies for the evils of such a system of law-making. Outside of all questions of economy the demoralization of the Legislature, the inequality of laws so passed had produced the grossest of wrongs, and the demand for a change on this subject was absolute and universal." 1890 KY. CONST. DEBATES , at 5566-67.
"[T]he primary purpose of section 59 was to prevent special privileges for those with wealth and power sufficient to sway the Assembly and to ensure equality under the law." White v. Manchester Enterprise, Inc. ,
*612In discussing Section 60 of the Constitution, which also deals with special legislation, the following statements were recorded: "Therefore, that, whilst the law was uniform and general in its provisions, it was not uniform and general in its operation, but was special and local in its operation, dependent entirely upon the will of a particular locality." 1890 KY. CONST. DEBATES , at 5762. "The very definition of a general law is that it must be uniform."
B. Section 59 requires that a law apply equally to all in a class.
Section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution prohibits special legislation and states, in relevant part:
The General Assembly shall not pass local or special acts concerning any of the following subjects, or for any of the following purposes, namely:
Twenty-fourth: To regulate labor, trade, mining or manufacturing.
...
Twenty-ninth: In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.
For a law to be general in its constitutional sense it must meet the following requirements: (1) it must apply equally to all in a class, and (2) there must be distinctive and natural reasons inducing and supporting the classification. Yeoman v. Com, Health Policy Bd. ,
"[T]he fact that the legislature deals with a special subject (such as charitable gaming) does not necessarily make it special legislation." Commonwealth v. Louisville Atlantis Community/Adapt, Inc. ,
*613The law must apply equally to all in a class and there must also be distinctive and natural reasons supporting the classification. Otherwise, the legislation is constitutionally invalid and must be struck as impermissible special legislation. Yeoman ,
The RTWA provides that no employee is required to become, or remain, a member of a labor organization, or to pay dues, fees, or assessments to a labor organization. The RTWA only applies to employment and union contracts after January 9, 2017, the effective date of the RTWA. The Commonwealth argues that the class under the RTWA is "all employers" and "all employees" in the state.
Accepting this classification as true, the RTWA treats employers and employees within the class differently. The methods and practices of those employers and employees associated with labor organizations are not only altered, but are extinguished going forward. The employers and employees not associated with labor organizations are left in the same position as they were prior to the RTWA. Not only does the RTWA treat union employers and employees disparately to non-union employers and employees, the RTWA applies differently to union employers and employees based on their date of employment, namely, union members prior to January 9, 2017 are exempted. The reasoning for this, of course, is that if the RTWA applied to union contracts prior to this date, it would violate the contracts and taking clauses of the Kentucky and federal Constitutions.
Nevertheless, the RTWA, on its face, treats the union members prior to January 9, 2017 differently than other employees in the state and differently than employees of labor organizations after January 9, 2017. KRS 336.130(3) specifies that "... no employee shall be required, as a condition of employment or continuation of employment, to ... [p]ay ... any dues, fees, assessments, or similar charges of any kind or amount to a labor organization ...." The restriction on payments is explicitly limited to labor organizations as a condition of employment or continuation of employment. Thus, the statute clearly fails to "operate alike on all individuals and corporations." Jefferson Cnty. Police Merit Bd. v. Bilyeu ,
Even if we adopt the Commonwealth's proposition that the RTWA is general in its written form, the legislation is special in its operation because it only alters membership and dues for union employers and employees. This is a violation of the legislative intent of the 1891 constitutional convention and the Yeoman test: "it must apply equally to all in a class." Yeoman ,
The Commonwealth argues that no other state has held right to work acts unconstitutional. After a thorough search of the constitutional provisions in other jurisdictions, only one case was revealed that alleged right to work laws were a violation of that state's special legislation provision. That case was Eastern Oklahoma Bldg. & Const. Trades Council v. Pitts ,
Because the RTWA in the instant case was passed by the legislature, without any attendant constitutional amendment, I would hold that it is a violation of the Commonwealth's constitutional provision prohibiting special legislation.
The concurring opinion appears to concede that the RTWA is unconstitutional if we apply our special legislation precedent that has been applicable since the adoption of our current Constitution. The concurrence takes issue with the two-part test in Schoo v. Rose ,
*615It applies to all organizations dealing with employers. It applies to all employers and all persons in the Commonwealth." (emphasis in brief). The Commonwealth stated: "[S]ection 1 of the KRTW Act applies to all Kentucky employees." (emphasis in brief).
Accepting that classification as true, as the Commonwealth has the burden of proving the validity of the legislation, the RTWA is unconstitutional special legislation as stated in this opinion and the concurrence. "This Court will not permit a statute to survive by simply defining a class in a narrow fashion which will yield, ipso facto, a self-sustaining classification." Yeoman ,
The Commonwealth has maintained that, "economic development was the General Assembly's express purpose for enacting the KRTW Act,"
In University of Cumberlands v. Pennybacker ,
With all due respect to the wisdom and writing of former Justice Benjamin Cardozo, this Court is not bound by the 1933 interpretation of a provision in the Maryland state constitution. Citing several cases, "[t]he highest court of Maryland has considered this provision, and defined its meaning and effect.... Our endeavor in what follows is to extract the essence of the decisions and to give effect to it as law." Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore ,
But suppose we adopted the concurring opinion's proposition and analyzed special legislation under the framework of Justice Cardozo. "Rather than simply striking down legislation because some people or entities are being treated differently from others, both outside and within the "class" at issue, we must ask why this is the case."
Why would the General Assembly enact a law that only affects labor organizations? What is the condition that the legislature is attempting to remedy? The Commonwealth could answer that its intention is to increase economic investment in the state. Another answer might be that the General Assembly simply disfavors unions. Why is the legislature treating some members of the class differently from others? Does the legislature have good reasons for doing all of this? If the goal is to increase economic investment, the law is greatly attenuated from the purpose because it provides no consequence, good or bad, to the majority of the employers and employees in the state - those being non-union employers and employees. Even under this approach, the RTWA is special legislation. It treats members of a class differently, regardless of how such class is determined, and there is no legitimate reason for this disparate treatment, whether we are relying on the "express purpose" given by the Commonwealth or whether we conclude that this is anti-union legislation.
This discussion brings me to my final point on the issue of special legislation. Today this Court also renders its decision *617in Commonwealth v. Claycomb , 2017-SC-000614-TG, --- S.W.3d ----,
Section 55 and Emergency Legislation.
The unions argue that the RTWA was passed in violation of Section 55 of the Constitution dealing with emergency legislation. Section 55 states:
No act, except general appropriation bills, shall become a law until ninety days after the adjournment of the session at which it was passed, except in cases of emergency, when, by the concurrence of a majority of the members elected to each House of the General Assembly, by a yea and nay vote, entered upon their journals, an act may become a law when approved by the Governor; but the reasons for the emergency that justifies this action must be set out at length in the journal of each house.
Ky. Const. § 55 (emphasis added).
The "emergency" for the RTWA is that "it is critical to the economy and citizens of Kentucky to attract new business and investment into the Commonwealth as soon as possible, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act takes effect upon its passage and approval by the Governor or upon its otherwise becoming a law." The RTWA became effective on January 9, 2017, when signed by the Governor, instead of ninety days after the legislative session pursuant to Ky. Const. § 55.
The majority opinion cites to Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Geary ,
In Geary , HB 525 dealt with a surcharge upon insurance premiums collected in the state which funded a trust for the payment of incentives to firemen and policemen.
Whereas, the general fund appropriations for fiscal year 1981-82 for the professional firefighters foundation program fund as provided by KRS 95A.200 through 95A.990, and the law enforcement foundation program fund as provided by KRS 15.410 through 15.510 will lapse on June 30, 1982, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 6 and 9 of this Act, shall become effective on July 1, 1982, and all other sections of this Act shall become effective upon its passage and approval by the Governor.
In Geary , the Franklin Circuit Court had found that, while the reason contained in the act justifying an emergency was "woefully weak," it was not inclined to declare it unconstitutional.
Although we are of the opinion that the court must have the ultimate authority of determining whether an emergency actually existed, the legislative judgment in that respect must be accorded the same presumption of validity that it enjoys in other instances of constitutional inquiry. That is, if there is any rational basis for concluding that the circumstances cited as constituting an emergency justified more expeditious action than would ordinarily be true , the courts should not interfere with the legislative discretion.
In McIntyre v. Commonwealth ,
The question also came before the Supreme Court of Illinois in Graham v. Dye ,308 Ill. 283 ,139 N. E. 390 [ (1923) ]. Although the Constitution of Illinois is not so explicit as the Constitution of Kentucky, the court, holding the act void where no actual emergency appeared, although one was attempted to be declared, said:
"The Constitution does not authorize the passage of an emergency statute, except in case an emergency exists making it important, if not absolutely necessary to accomplish the full purpose of its enactment, that it take effect immediately upon its approval, and by plain language requires the expression of what the emergency is in the preamble or body of the act. To say the mere declaration that an emergency exists fulfills the requirement of the Constitution would be a plain disregard of the language that the emergency shall be expressed in the preamble or body of the act. The statement that an emergency exists is not an expression of the emergency."
McIntyre v. Commonwealth ,
Based on Geary and the Court's acceptance of the Illinois court's rationale in McIntyre , I am even more convinced the RTWA violates the emergency legislation provision of Section 55. The stated emergency in Geary was "woefully weak," yet it stated more of a basis than the RTWA. The legislation in Geary , with specificity, noted that without expeditious action by the legislature, the incentives provided to firefighters and law enforcement via specific, enumerated statutes would lapse. No *619such specificity exists within the RTWA. While the statute in the Illinois case, discussed in McIntyre , only stated that an emergency existed, but mentioned nothing about what the emergency was, the RTWA is similar. "To attract new business and investment into the Commonwealth as soon as possible" is not sufficient to satisfy the constitutional provision. If such were sufficient, the state needing more jobs, money and investment would be a pretext to the emergency passage of a myriad of laws. Would there ever be a time when attracting business and investment would not be a goal of the Commonwealth? This writer, as I would hope do most Kentuckians, possesses a desire for increased prosperity for our Commonwealth. However, this desire cannot manifest itself as a constitutional blanket which would cover otherwise infirm legislation.
Geary goes further and holds that the emergency must require more expeditious action than would ordinarily be true. Geary ,
The majority notes, and I would agree, that policy such as the economic policy which is at the core of the RTWA is within the purview of the General Assembly. The citizens, as voters, sit in judgment of the soundness of legislative policy. However, Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution are unique to the Commonwealth and to our jurisprudence. As a justice on this Court, I took an oath to uphold both the United States and Kentucky Constitutions. This I must do, despite the direction of any prevailing political winds.
Thus, I would hold that the RTWA violates Sections 59 and 60, as well as Section 55 of the Kentucky Constitution, and is therefore unconstitutional on its face and in its application. Without commentary on the propriety of the RTWA as it relates to public policy, our General Assembly must follow the lead of Oklahoma. The policy espoused in the RTWA can properly be implemented in the Commonwealth of Kentucky via appropriate constitutional amendment.
Cunningham and Wright, JJ., join.
I also do not share the majority's opinion as to the applicability of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31 , --- U.S. ----,
This writer does not believe that every piece of legislation that has "grandfather" provisions will be deemed impermissible legislation. Constitutionality is decided on a case by case basis, and, despite the majority opinion's contention that this dissenting opinion would hold all grandfather provisions unconstitutional, such attacks would have to undergo the rigorous constitutional analysis engaged herein.
Although we find the RTWA unconstitutional under Sections 59 and 60 of the Constitution, we briefly mention the heightened rational basis standard that has been applied to constitutional challenges enhanced by the special legislation provisions. Consider this scenario: an independent contractor wants to negotiate with an employer that is a member of a labor organization. The independent contractor has the ability to negotiate the terms for the work provided, including payment and any benefits or conditions. The independent contractor could engage in this negotiation process before the passage of the RTWA and maintained such right after January 9, 2017. The passage of the RTWA did not eliminate union workers' abilities to contract with their employers. But what it did do was treat union workers' contracts prior to January 9, 2017 differently than those after the effective date. Collective bargaining units, and those whom the units represent, were deprived of the arm's length negotiation and contract relationships left undisturbed for non-union individuals and entities.
[T]he equal protection provisions of the Kentucky Constitution are enhanced by Section 59 and 60.... So far as we can determine, none has anything like the combination of broad constitutional protection of individual rights against legislative interference vouchsafed by our 1891 Kentucky Constitution. Because of this additional protection, we have elected at times to apply a guarantee of individual rights in equal protection cases that is higher than the minimum guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. Instead of requiring a "rational basis," we have construed our Constitution as requiring a "reasonable basis" or a "substantial and justifiable reason" for discriminatory legislation in areas of social and economic policy.
Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Cheyenne Resources, Inc. ,
Here, the RTWA treats business contracts negotiated by a union to perform work differently than it treats contracts negotiated by companies to perform work. Therefore, the statute constitutes special legislation in violation of Section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Office of the Governor ex rel. Matthew G. Bevin, etc., Brief to Kentucky Supreme Court, p. 16.
Id. at p. 32.
Concurring Opinion.
The majority opinion cites to McIntyre v. Commonwealth ,
Dissenting Opinion
While I fully agree with Justice Keller's astute separate opinion, I write separately to further lay out my opinion on the matter. It is the distinguished role of this Court throughout the ages to be a stabilizing force, standing apart from the political headwinds which sweep through the legislative process. Legislation from our General Assembly is political in the making. Our decisions are non-political and are based on the guiding hand of our state constitution. If this Court is not vigilant in protecting equally the weak and the strong, the poor and the rich, the accused and the victims, then some individuals and some rights may be trampled underfoot. Social and economic issues are matters of legislative concern rather than this Court's-so long as basic constitutional mandates are satisfied. Yet, such mandates were not satisfied here.
It is the position of this dissent that the legislation in question fails because it does not meet the requirements and proscriptions of our state constitution. More particularly, the legislation violates Section 59 of our state constitution.
Section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution provides greater protections than those of our sister states, as Justice Keller lays out. Section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution *620reads: "The General Assembly shall not pass local or special acts concerning any of the following subjects, or for any of the following purposes, namely: ... [t]o regulate labor, trade, mining or manufacturing." Because of this unique constitutional directive, we cannot blindly follow the rulings of our sister courts from around the nation on this matter-unless we follow the lead of Oklahoma and do so through a constitutional amendment. As Justice Keller notes, when Oklahoma (the only other state with similar protections) enacted its so-called "Right to Work" law, it did so through an amendment to its state constitution.
We have held the purpose of Section 59 is to "prevent special privileges, favoritism, and discrimination, and to [e]nsure equality under the law." Ky. Harlan Coal Co. v. Holmes ,
Thus, to determine whether the statute is special legislation we must first determine what the class consists of and whether the statute treats all class members equally. KRS 336.132 specifically states that "[a]ny agreement, understanding, or practice, written or oral, implied or express, between any labor organization and employer which violates an employee's rights as set forth in subsection (3) of Section 1 of this Act shall be unlawful and void, ...." An agreement or understanding is a contract and the statute restricts what an agreement or understanding can require. Therefore, it is clear that the statute places restrictions on the freedom of contract. As this Court has acknowledged, the Commonwealth has "very substantial policies in favor of the freedom of contract." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hodgkiss-Warrick ,
After looking at the class, the next question we must examine is whether the legislation places the restriction equally on all contracts. KRS 336.130(3) specifies that "no employee shall be required, as a condition of employment or continuation of employment, to ... [p]ay any dues, fees, assessments, or similar charges of any kind or amount to a labor organization ...." The restriction on payments is explicitly limited to labor organizations as a condition of employment or continuation of employment. Thus, the statute clearly fails to "operate alike on all individuals and corporations." Bilyeu ,
Webster's Dictionary defines employ as "1. To put to service or use. 2. To apply or devote (e.g., time) to an activity. 3. a. To put to work. b. To provide with gainful work." Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 429 (1994). This definition would cover people working under a contract negotiated by a union and those who are not. The problem with the statute arises because it does not cover all members of the class. It would cover union contracts-but not other contracts between employees and employers.
Unions negotiate business agreements-often incurring large costs in the process. Unions must invest in a strike fund in case *621contract negotiations necessitate a strike, spend countless man hours, and expend various other resources in negotiating the contract. All employees get the benefits of the contract in terms of wages and benefits whether they are union members or nonunion workers. Under prior law, nonunion workers under the contract would have to cover their proportional share of the union's cost of negotiating and enforcing the contract. Even under this prior law, the nonunion workers were exempt from paying any part of union costs for any activity beyond the cost of the contract under which they are working. For example, they were not required to contribute to any political activity of the union. The legislation that has been designated as "Right to Work" gives these employees the benefit of working under a contract that was negotiated at considerable cost, yet prohibits the contract from requiring that the nonunion worker pay any share of the cost of the contract. No other contracts are treated in this manner under our laws.
I will offer a couple examples to better illustrate my point. Assume a company called Work Development, Inc., negotiated a contract to supply vehicle parts to Toyota. Work Development, Inc., incurred the expense of negotiating the terms and conditions of the work they would perform on behalf of Toyota as well as the expenses incident to developing the specifications for the part. The contract negotiated by Work Development, Inc., would be an employment contract since it amounts to an agreement to do gainful work for someone else. The question then arises: would the statute prohibit Work Development, Inc., from negotiating a contract that would make it the sole provider for the part? It would not. Would the statute require Work Development, Inc., to share the negotiated terms of the contract and force it to share the proprietary information on the productions specifications with any competitor who wished to supply the same part to Toyota? No. Would the statute prohibit Work Development, Inc from negotiating compensation for its work in developing the contract or requiring any competitor to pay a proportional share of the cost of developing the specification of the component part if a competitor were to make and supply some parts under said contract? No.
While this statute would not prohibit Work Development, Inc. from negotiating such a contract, the statute prohibits just such conduct by labor unions. Therefore, Work Development, Inc., would be treated differently under the statute than a union-even though both the union and Work Development, Inc., negotiated contracts to do work for someone else. Therefore, this statute fits the very definition of special legislation-as it treats one member of the class (a company negotiating a contract for employment) differently than another (a union negotiating the same type of contract).
Let us look to a different example. Suppose a landowner wishes to have a boundary of coal mined. With that goal in mind, the property owner negotiates a contract with a company called Coal Works, Inc., to mine the coal. Coal Works would have to do the work of developing and applying for a mining permit. Upon receiving the permit, Coal Works would be tasked with building roads across the property to the location of the coal boundary. Does the statute prohibit Coal Works from negotiating contracts stating they have the exclusive right to mine the coal? No. If another company mines part of the coal, would the statute prohibit the contract from providing that a proportional share of the cost of developing the permit and building the roads being paid to Coal Works? Certainly not. However, the statute prohibits a union from being compensated for the work it *622does in negotiating a contract. This statute would not have the same effect on Coal Works' contract to do the work of mining the coal for someone else as it would on a union's contract to perform work.
Here, the statute treats business contracts negotiated by a union to perform work for someone differently than it treats contracts negotiated by companies to perform work for someone. Therefore, the statute constitutes special legislation in violation of Section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution.
Cunningham and Keller, JJ., join.