Craig Zottola, Appellant, v AGI Group, Inc., Respondent, et al., Defendant.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
June 9, 2009
[882 NYS2d 445]
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the defendant AGI Group, Inc., to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it is denied.
In November 2005, while seeking to buy a boat on the Internet, the plaintiff found a Web site showing the boat he
On or about November 18, 2005, the plaintiff ordered the boat over the telephone from AGI‘s representative. He then transferred the sum of $15,000 to AGI‘s account at the Bank of America branch at 100 West 33rd Street in Manhattan, as payment for part of the cost of the boat. The boat was damaged on its way to New York. According to the plaintiff, the defendant Boss Boats, LLC, took responsibility for the damage and was supposed to deliver a different boat to him. When neither the boat was delivered nor his money refunded, the plaintiff commenced this action on November 13, 2006.
After settlement negotiations broke down, AGI moved to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that the minimum contacts needed to exercise in-personam jurisdiction over it were lacking. It alleged that it was a Florida corporation whose only presence outside Florida was by way of the Internet, and the only contacts with the plaintiff were by the Internet or telephone. AGI also alleged that its main business was in the field of items used in home improvements. It further alleged that it “never sold any merchandise to any buyer in the State of New York” and it “had never been approached by a New York company or individual since the inception of our company to obtain merchandise from our company either through our store or our web site.” The president of AGI also averred that he believed that it had never done business in New York State. This, AGI contended, was insufficient to provide the minimum contacts required to permit New York to exercise in-personam jurisdiction over it. The Supreme Court granted the motion. We reverse.
Due process requires that to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the nonresident defendant must have “minimum contacts” such that maintenance of the action does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice (see e.g. International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 US 310, 316 [1945]). Due process is not offended “[s]o long as a party avails itself of the benefits of the forum, has sufficient minimum contacts with it, and should reasonably expect to defend its actions there . . . even if not ‘present’ in that State . . . New York‘s long-arm statute,
To satisfy the “transacting business” requirement under
In response to AGI‘s assertions that it lacked the minimum contacts, the plaintiff made a prima facie showing that there were sufficient minimum contacts to permit New York to exercise in personam jurisdiction over AGI. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged first, that “[both of] the defendants” (including AGI) agreed to deliver the boat in New York. Second, he provided proof that the money for the purchase of the boat was paid to AGI by wire transfer to a New York bank branch, not a Florida bank. Third, according to the “Manufacture‘s [sic] Statement of Origin,” the boat in question was transferred on March 14, 2005, to AGI, and on December 2, 2005, AGI transferred the “Statement of Origin and boat” to the plaintiff at his New York address. This was sufficient to show that AGI accomplished this transaction in New York State, sufficiently availed itself of the benefits of doing business in this State, and had a substantial relationship with this State such that due process would not be offended by subjecting it to this State‘s juris
In light of our determination, we need not reach the plaintiff‘s remaining contention. Spolzino, J.P., Dillon, Florio and Angiolillo, JJ., concur.
