Case Information
*1 Filed 3/30/20
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
ROBERT ZOLLY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, A154986 v. (Alameda County
CITY OF OAKLAND, Super. Ct. No. RG16821376) Defendant and Respondent.
The City of Oakland (City) entered into various waste management contracts with Waste Management of Alameda County (WMAC) and California Waste Solutions Inc. (CWS). As part of those contracts, WMAC and CWS agreed to pay franchise fees to the City, and the City redesignated part of WMAC’s franchise fee as a fee imposed pursuant to Public Resource Code section 41901 (the Redesignated Fee). Plaintiffs Robert Zolly, Ray McFadden, and Stephen Clayton filed a complaint for declaratory relief against the City, challenging the legality of those fees under the California Constitution, article XIII C (article XIII C). [1]
The City demurred, arguing the franchise fees were not subject to article XIII C, the Redesignated Fee challenge was time-barred, and the Redesignated Fee was properly imposed. The trial court granted the City’s demurrer without leave to amend as to the franchise fees but with leave to *2 amend as to future increases to the Redesignated Fee. Plaintiffs declined to amend, and judgment was entered. We affirm the judgment in part as to the Redesignated Fee and reverse in part as to the franchise fees.
I. BACKGROUND
Because this appeal challenges a trial court order sustaining a
demurrer, we draw the relevant facts from the complaint and matters subject
to judicial notice.
[2]
(
Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp.
(2016)
A. Factual Background
The City initiated a request for proposal procurement process for three franchise contracts regarding garbage, mixed materials and organics, and residential recycling services. The initial procurement process resulted in the City’s Public Works Department (PWD) receiving contract proposals from only two firms, WMAC and CWS. PWD recommended the City award all three contracts to WMAC, stating the structure “provided the lowest overall rate option for Oakland residents.”
Rather than accept PWD’s recommendation, the City directed PWD to solicit new best and final bids from WMAC and CWS. PWD again recommended the City award all three contracts to WMAC. The City instead awarded all three contracts to CWS. Following a lawsuit by WMAC regarding the procurement process, WMAC and CWS reached a settlement in which WMAC would receive the garbage and mixed materials and organics contracts, and CWS would receive the residential recycling contract, subject *3 to the City’s agreement. The City approved the settlement and amended the ordinance awarding the franchise contracts.
The City’s ordinance approving the mixed materials and organics contract provided for an initial franchise fee of $25,034,000, with subsequent franchise fees “ ‘adjusted annually by the percentage change in the annual average of the Franchise Fee cost indicator.’ ” Similarly, the City’s ordinance approving the residential recycling contract provided for an initial franchise fee of $3 million, with subsequent franchise fees “ ‘adjusted annually by the percentage change in the annual average of the Franchise Fee cost indicator.’ ”
Thereafter, the City passed an ordinance reducing WMAC’s franchise fee by $3.24 million and designated that amount as the Redesignated Fee to compensate the City for the cost of “preparing, adopting, and implementing the Alameda County Integrated Waste Management Plan.” The ordinance imposing the Redesignated Fee provides for a possible annual adjustment to reflect the impacts of inflation if certain criteria are met. In the event the Redesignated Fee is invalidated or the City is unable to collect that amount, then WMAC’s franchise fee is increased by the amount left uncollected.
Based on “citizen complaints,” an Alameda County grand jury “undertook a comprehensive investigation related to the solicitation and award of [the City’s] Zero Waste contracts.” The grand jury found the franchise fees paid by haulers were disproportionately higher than the franchise fees paid to other Bay Area municipalities and special districts. That grand jury also found the City’s procurement process was mishandled and subject to political considerations.
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiffs filed an initial complaint, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged violations of article XIII D, section 6, subdivision (b)(1), (2), and (3). The complaint asserted both the rates charged for refuse, recycling, and disposal collection and the franchise fee were excessive, not representative of the actual service costs or otherwise supported by any legitimate cost justification, and amounted to an improperly imposed tax that should be subject to article XIII C.
The City filed a demurrer to the initial complaint. The demurrer alleged the complaint failed to state a cause of action, any claims regarding the Redesignated Fees were barred by the statute of limitations, and plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.
The trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. The court concluded all three causes of action contained insufficient allegations “that the allegedly ‘excessive and disproportional refuse, recycling and disposal collection charges . . . being imposed on Plaintiffs’ multifamily dwelling (“MFD”) properties’ . . . are a ‘fee or charge’ as defined in article XIIID, section 6, or are being ‘extended, imposed, or increased by any agency’ within section 6, subdivision (b).” Specifically, the court emphasized the complaint does not allege the franchise fee or rates are “ ‘imposed by an agency’—i.e. by the City—as distinguished from being charged to ratepayers by the private entities who contracted with the City.” The court also noted plaintiffs did not address the City’s argument that the Redesignated Fee was untimely.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a first amended complaint, again seeking declaratory relief and alleging violations of article XIII C and article XIII D, section 6, subdivision (b)(1), (2), and (3). The amended complaint asserted the City imposed an excessive franchise fee, failed to determine “how much *5 the franchise fees would need to be to solely offset the cost to the [City] of the waste haulers’ operations,” and passed those fees on to ratepayers to avoid the limitations of Proposition 218. The amended complaint contended the City imposed such increased rates “through the guise of negotiated contracts,” fully knowing the franchisees would pass the charges on to ratepayers.
The City demurred to the amended complaint, arguing the franchise fees were beyond the purview of Proposition 218 and noting plaintiffs failed to cure the statute of limitations bar to the Redesignated Fee challenge.
The trial court again granted the City’s demurrer with leave to amend.
The court noted the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Jacks v. City of Santa
Barbara
(2017)
Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint (SAC) for declaratory relief, alleging the franchise fee and Redesignated Fee violated article XIII C. Specifically, the SAC alleged “[n]either of the franchise fees bears a reasonable relationship to the value received from the government and they are not based on the value of the franchises conveyed . . . .” The SAC *6 challenged the validity of the Redesignated Fee, and further claimed the challenge was timely as to all future increases to the Redesignated Fee.
The City again demurred, restating its prior arguments and asserting
Jacks
, ,
The trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend as to the Redesignated Fee increases, but “only to the extent Plaintiffs can legitimately allege . . . that the [Redesignated Fee] in fact was increased as of July 1, 2016 or thereafter.” The court denied leave to amend all other aspects of the SAC. Notably, the court concluded the lack of a direct pass-through of the franchise fees to the customers distinguished the franchise fee in from that charged by the City.
Plaintiffs declined to amend. The court subsequently entered judgment against plaintiffs and dismissed the matter with prejudice. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We independently review a trial court’s order sustaining a demurrer.
(
Brown v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co
. (2016)
“[W]hen a demurrer is sustained with leave to amend, but the plaintiff elects not to amend, it is presumed on appeal that the complaint states the strongest case possible.” ( Ram v. OneWest Bank, FSB (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1, 10.)
A. Article XIII C
In
Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City of Redding
(2018)
“In 1996, the voters adopted Proposition 218, known as the ‘ “Right to
Vote on Taxes Act.” ’ ( , ,
“Significantly, Proposition 218 did not define the term ‘tax.’ That definition was provided 14 years later, with the passage of Proposition 26 in November 2010. Proposition 26’s findings stated that, despite the adoption of Propositions 13 and 218, ‘California taxes have continued to escalate.’ (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2010) text of Proposition 26, § 1, subd. (c), p. 114.) The findings also took note of a ‘recent phenomenon whereby the Legislature and local governments have disguised new taxes as “fees” in order to extract even more revenue from California taxpayers *9 without having to abide by [the] constitutional voting requirements.’ ( Id ., subd. (e), p. 114.)” ( Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City of Redding , supra , 6 Cal.5th at pp. 10–11.)
“To ensure the effectiveness of Propositions 13 and 218, Proposition 26 made two changes to article XIII C. First, it specifically defined ‘ “tax,” ’ and did so broadly, to include ‘any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government.’ (Art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (e).) However, the new definition has seven exceptions. A charge that satisfies an exception is, by definition, not a tax.” ( Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City of Redding , supra , 6 Cal.5th at p. 11.) As relevant here, one exception involves charges “imposed for entrance to or use of local government property . . . .” (Art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (e)(4).)
“Second, Proposition 26 requires the local government to prove ‘by a
preponderance of the evidence that . . . [an] exaction is not a tax, that the
amount is no more than necessary to cover the reasonable costs of the
governmental activity, and that the manner in which those costs are
allocated to a payor bear a fair or reasonable relationship to the payor’s
burdens on, or benefits received from, the governmental activity.’
(Art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (e).)” (
Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City of Redding
,
supra
,
B. Whether the Franchise Fee is a Tax
Plaintiffs contend whether the SAC alleged an adequate cause of action
is governed by
Jacks
, ,
1. Whether Franchise Fees Are Subject to Article XIII C In Jacks , the City of Santa Barbara and Southern California Edison (SCE) entered into an agreement to include a charge on SCE’s electricity bills equal to 1 percent of SCE’s gross receipts from the sale of electricity within Santa Barbara, which SCE would then transfer to Santa Barbara (the surcharge). ( Jacks , supra , 3 Cal.5th . at p. 254.) This charge, along with another 1 percent charge, constituted the fee SCE paid for the privilege of using city property to deliver electricity. ( Ibid. ) Utility consumers filed a class action challenging the surcharge as an illegal tax under Proposition 218. ( Jacks , at p. 256.) The trial court held a franchise fee is not a tax under Proposition 218 and thus the surcharge was not subject to voter approval. ( Jacks , at p. 256.) The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding the surcharge was a tax requiring voter approval under Proposition 218 because its “ ‘primary purpose is for the City to raise revenue from electricity users for general spending purposes.’ ” ( Jacks , at p. 257.)
The California Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.
( ,
supra
,
In analyzing how franchise fees fit within this framework, the Supreme Court noted “[h]istorically, franchise fees have not been considered taxes,” and neither Proposition 218 nor Proposition 26 evidence an intent to change that historical characterization. ( , , 3 Cal.5th at pp. 262–263.) It explained, however, while “sums paid for the right to use a jurisdiction’s rights-of-way are fees rather than taxes. . . . , to constitute compensation for the value received, the fees must reflect a reasonable estimate of the value of the franchise.” ( Id . at p. 267.) The Supreme Court further explained “fees imposed in exchange for a property interest must bear a reasonable relationship to the value received from the government. To the extent a franchise fee exceeds any reasonable value of the franchise, the excessive portion of the fee does not come within the rationale that justifies the imposition of fees without voter approval. Therefore, the excessive portion is a tax. If this were not the rule, franchise fees would become a vehicle for generating revenue independent of the purpose of the fees.” ( Id. at p. 269.) The court thus held “a franchise fee must be based on the value of the franchise conveyed in order to come within the rationale for its imposition without approval of the voters.” ( Id. at p. 270.)
The City argues Jacks is inapposite because the court adjudicated the surcharge—a fee placed directly on the customers’ bills—rather than the other 1 percent fee encompassed in SCE’s electricity rates. We disagree. The structure of the fee at issue—whether the surcharge in Jacks or the franchise fee in the instant matter—does not alter the key question: whether a charge *12 constitutes a legitimate fee or an unlawful tax. Both Jacks and the present case raise this same question. And Jacks thus guides our analysis.
While a true franchise fee is indisputably a nontax, Jacks instructs us to look beyond any label and determine whether such a fee “reflect[s] a reasonable estimate of the value of the franchise.” ( Jacks , , 3 Cal.5th at p. 267.) The Supreme Court did not limit this analysis to the surcharge, but rather addressed all “charges that constitute compensation for the use of government property.” ( Id. at p. 254.) The Supreme Court explained while compensation for use of government property is exempt from Proposition 218’s requirements, imposed charges only constitute such compensation if there is “a reasonable relationship to the value of the property interest.” ( , at p. 254.) Any imposed charge beyond such an amount constitutes a tax and requires voter approval. ( Ibid. )
The City next contends Jacks is inapposite because it analyzes franchise fees under Proposition 218 rather than under the later-adopted Proposition 26. The City argues the status of the franchise fees instead are controlled by article XIII C, which expressly exempts franchise fees from the definition of taxes.
“The interpretation of constitutional or statutory provisions presents a
legal question, which we decide de novo.” (
Wunderlich v. County of Santa
Cruz
(2009)
Section 1, subdivision (e) of article XIII C defines “ ‘tax’ ” as “any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government, except for” seven exemptions. Relevant here is the fourth exemption, which applies to “A charge imposed for entrance to or use of local government property, or the purchase, rental, or lease of local government property.” (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (e)(4).) The fourth exemption does not expressly state the charge for entrance to or use of local government property must be reasonable. This absence contrasts with the first three exemptions, which do explicitly include such a requirement. (See id. , § 1, subd. (e)(1) [“A charge imposed for a specific benefit conferred or privilege granted directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the local government of conferring the benefit or granting the privilege.”]; id. , subd. (e)(2) [“A charge imposed for a specific government service or product provided directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the local government of providing the service or product.”]; id. , subd. (e)(3) [“A charge imposed for the reasonable regulatory costs to a local government for issuing licenses and permits, performing investigations, inspections, and *14 audits, enforcing agricultural marketing orders, and the administrative enforcement and adjudication thereof.”].) However, subdivision (e) also contains a broad statement regarding the government’s burden of proof: “The local government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a levy, charge, or other exaction is not a tax, that the amount is no more than necessary to cover the reasonable costs of the governmental activity, and that the manner in which those costs are allocated to a payor bear a fair or reasonable relationship to the payor’s burdens on, or benefits received from, the governmental activity.” (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (e).) This provision requires that a charge be “no more than necessary to cover the reasonable costs of the governmental activity” in order to be exempt from the “tax” definition. ( Ibid. ) However, the subdivision is silent as to whether this requirement applies to all seven exemptions, or only to the first three exemptions that explicitly include a reasonableness requirement. On this question, we find the provision ambiguous and look to the intent and objective of the voters in enacting the provision to guide our interpretation.
The ballot materials uniformly indicate a desire to expand the
definition of what constituted a “tax” for purposes of article XIII C. “One of
the declared purposes of Proposition 26 was to halt evasions of Proposition
218.” (
Brooktrails Township Community Services Dist. v. Board of
Supervisors of Mendocino County
(2013)
Likewise, the analysis by the Legislative Analyst explained Proposition 26 “expands the definition of a tax and a tax increase so that more proposals would require approval by two-thirds of the Legislature or by local voters.” (Voter Info. Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2010) analysis of Prop. 26 by the Legislative Analyst, p. 57.) It further states: “This measure broadens the definition of a state or local tax to include many payments currently considered to be fees or charges,” while noting other fees and charges “Are Not Affected.” ( Id. at p. 58.) Nowhere does the analysis identify any narrowing of the definition of a state or local tax.
Here, the intent and objective of the voters in passing Proposition 26 is clear. The purpose was to expand the definition of “tax” to require more types of fees and charges be approved by two-thirds of the Legislature or by local voters. Proposition 26’s Findings and Declarations of Purpose expressly note it was passed in response to “the recent phenomenon whereby the Legislature and local governments have disguised new taxes as ‘fees’ in order *16 to extract even more revenue from California taxpayers without having to abide by these constitutional voting requirements.” (Voter Info. Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2010) text of Prop. 26, § 1, subd. (e), p. 114.) As noted by the California Supreme Court, the purpose of Proposition 26 “was to reinforce the voter approval requirements set forth in Propositions 13 and 218.” ( Jacks , supra , 3 Cal.5th at pp. 262–263.)
In light of this extensive evidence regarding the voters’ intent in
passing Proposition 26, we conclude a franchise fee, arguably subject to the
fourth exemption in article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e), must still be
reasonably related to the value of the franchise. ( ,
supra
, 3 Cal.5th at
p. 267.) Only that portion with a reasonable relationship may be exempt
from the “tax” definition. (See
City of San Buenaventura v. United Water
Conservation Dist
., ,
Finally, the City contends the franchise fee does not qualify as a “tax”
under article XIII C because it was not “ ‘imposed by local government.’ ”
Specifically, the City asserts the franchise fee constitutes contract
consideration and is not imposed merely because it is passed on to
ratepayers. However, if we accept the City’s reasoning, any local government
could avoid running afoul of article XIII C by merely contracting with a third
*17
party to impose the desired tax on residents rather than enacting it directly.
This result would directly conflict with the purpose of Propositions 218 and
26. (See
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of San Diego
(2004) 120
Cal.App.4th 374, 394 [purpose of Prop. 218 is to “ ‘protect[ ] taxpayers by
limiting the methods by which local governments exact revenue from
taxpayers without their consent’ ”];
Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City of
Redding
,
supra
,
Neither of the two cases cited by the City,
County of Tulare v. City of
Dinuba
(1922)
2. Whether the SAC Adequately Alleged a Cause of Action As we conclude in the prior section, a franchise fee may constitute a tax subject to article XIII C to the extent it is not reasonably related to the value received from the government. The SAC adequately raises such allegations. First, the SAC recounts the manner in which the contracts were awarded and notes the ordinance approving the final contracts provided for the following franchise fees: (1) an initial franchise fee of $25,034,000 for the mixed materials and organics contract, with subsequent franchise fees “ ‘adjusted annually by the percentage change in the annual average of the Franchise Fee cost indicator’ ”; (2) an initial franchise fee of $3 million for the residential recycling services contract, with subsequent franchise fees “ ‘adjusted annually by the percentage change in the annual average of the Franchise Fee cost indicator.’ ” Next, the SAC asserts these contracts “were not the product of bona fide negotiations” and, as a result, various financial analyses were not performed. The SAC further states the City “did not complete a value analysis of the government property interests conveyed.” As a result, alleges the SAC, a grand jury found these franchise fees “are *19 disproportionately higher than franchise fees paid to other Bay Area municipalities and special districts,” and the City’s procurement process was mishandled and subject to political considerations. The SAC supports these allegations by noting the plaintiffs’ rate increases ranged from 79.76 percent to 155.37 percent. The SAC also states no evidence was presented to the grand jury that the City analyzed service or disposal costs. The SAC thus claims the franchise fees do not “bear[ ] a reasonable relationship to the value received from the government,” “are not based on the value of the franchises conveyed,” and were set based on the prior franchise fee “without any analysis or determination of the value of the prior franchise.” These allegations sufficiently state a claim under the standard set forth in . C. Redesignated Fee
The City passed an ordinance creating the Redesignated Fee, pursuant to Public Resources Code section 41901, to redesignate part of WMAC’s franchise fee as a fee to compensate the City for the cost of “preparing, adopting, and implementing the Alameda County Integrated Waste Management Plan.” While plaintiffs are not challenging the initial creation of the Redesignated Fee, the ordinance also provided for possible annual increases to the Redesignated Fee. Plaintiffs contend the SAC adequately sought declaratory relief as to the validity of those future Redesignated Fee increases. While the SAC does not contend any Redesignated Fee increases have occurred and plaintiffs acknowledge such increases are not guaranteed to happen every year, plaintiffs contend declaratory relief is appropriate because the parties have an actual controversy about the validity of the “automatic” Redesignated Fee increases.
“The ‘actual controversy’ language in Code of Civil Procedure section
1060 encompasses a probable future controversy relating to the legal rights
*20
and duties of the parties. [Citation.] For a probable future controversy to
constitute an ‘actual controversy,’ however, the probable future controversy
must be ripe. [Citation.] A ‘controversy is “ripe” when it has reached, but
has not passed, the point that the facts have sufficiently congealed to permit
an intelligent and useful decision to be made.’ ” (
Environmental Defense
Project of Sierra County v. County of Sierra
(2008)
“A ripeness inquiry involves a two-step analysis: First, whether the
issue is appropriate for immediate judicial resolution; and second, whether
the complaining party will suffer a hardship from a refusal to entertain its
legal challenge. [Citation.] [¶] Under the first test, ‘ “courts will decline to
adjudicate a dispute if ‘the abstract posture of the proceeding makes it
difficult to evaluate . . . the issues’ [citation], if the court is asked to speculate
on the resolution of hypothetical situations [citation], or if the case presents a
‘contrived inquiry’ [citation].” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] [¶] Under the second
test, courts generally will not consider issues based on speculative future
harm. [Citation.] This is particularly true where the complaining party will
have the opportunity to pursue appropriate legal remedies should the
anticipated harm ever materialize.” (
Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern
California v. Winograd
(2018)
Here, the record indicates plaintiffs’ challenge to future Redesignated Fee increases does not present an actual controversy proper for adjudication. *21 Any future Redesignated Fee increase is based on the percentage change in the annual “Consumer Price Index—All Urban Consumers, Series ID cuura422sa0, Not Seasonally adjusted, San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose.” That potential increase, however, is not implemented for any particular year if WMAC’s gross receipts for the prior calendar year were less than the calendar year before that. Thus, while the ordinance imposing the Redesignated Fee provides for fee increases, it is uncertain whether or when those will occur and, if they do, the actual amount of such an increase. Nor do plaintiffs explain how the court could assess whether those future unknown increases exceed the City’s future costs for “preparing, adopting, and implementing the plan, as well as in setting and collecting the local fees.” (See Pub. Resource Code, § 41901.)
Plaintiffs contend if the current Redesignated Fee exceeds the City’s current costs, as alleged in the complaint, then any future Redesignated Fee increase would also exceed the City’s costs. But this presumes the City’s costs remain static, and the SAC contains no such allegations. Rather, it is reasonable to assume the City’s costs may increase by the time of any Redesignated Fee increase. The degree of any such cost increase, however, is unknown, and the SAC is entirely silent regarding this issue.
Nor are plaintiffs’ arguments regarding hardship persuasive. Plaintiffs contend they incur such hardship because they are currently paying a Redesignated Fee that exceeds the amount allowable by law. But the trial court concluded plaintiffs’ challenge to the current Redesignated Fee was time-barred, and plaintiffs have not challenged that ruling on appeal. Instead, plaintiffs only contend the SAC “adequately alleges a claim for declaratory relief as to the automatic increases.” Accordingly, any harm plaintiffs currently are incurring is based on their own failure to timely *22 challenge the Redesignated Fee. As discussed above, what, if any, harm plaintiffs may incur from future fee increases is uncertain at this time, and plaintiffs have not demonstrated they will be unable “to pursue appropriate legal remedies should the anticipated harm ever materialize.” [3] ( Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California v. Winograd , , 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 893.) Accordingly, plaintiffs’ challenge to future Redesignated Fee increases is not ripe for adjudication.
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. We affirm the court’s order sustaining the City’s demurrer as to the Redesignated Fee increase. However, we reverse the trial court’s order sustaining the City’s demurrer as to the validity of the franchise fee. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).) *23 ____________________________ Margulies, J.
We concur:
_____________________________
Humes, P. J.
_____________________________
Banke, J.
A154986
Zolly v. City of Oakland
Trial Court: Superior Court of Alameda County
Trial Judge: Hon. Paul D. Herbert
Counsel:
Zacks, Freedman & Patterson and Andrew M. Zacks; Katz Appellate Law and Paul J. Katz for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Barbara Parker, Doryanna Moreno, Maria Bee, David Pereda and Celso Ortiz, City Attorney; Chao ADR, PC and Cedric C. Chao; DLA Piper LLP, Tamara Shepard and Mauricio Gonzalez, for Defendant and Respondent.
Notes
[1] Unspecified references to “article” are to the California Constitution.
[2] On March 8, 2019, plaintiffs requested this court take judicial notice of an excerpt from the “2015–2016 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report.” We deny this request because the exhibit is unnecessary to resolve the issues raised in this appeal.
[3] The trial court rejected the City’s argument that plaintiffs’ challenge to the future Redesignated Fee increases are also time-barred, and the City did not contest that ruling. We do not independently opine on that holding or whether other legal arguments may bar such a claim in the future as neither party has raised such arguments in this appeal.