STANLEY ZOLDAN, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, - vs - VILLAGE OF LORDSTOWN, Defendant, MICHAEL CHAFFEE, AN INDIVIDUAL, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
CASE NO. 2014-T-0002
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO
June 30, 2014
2014-Ohio-3007
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.
Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2012 CV 2610. Judgment: Cross-appeal dismissed.
Matthew M. Ries, Harrington, Hoppe & Mitchell, Ltd., 108 Main Avenue, S.W., Suite 500, Warren, OH 44481 and Neil D. Schor, Harrington, Hoppe & Mitchell, Ltd., 26 East Market Street, #1200, Youngstown, OH 44503 (For Defendant-Appellant/Cross Appellee).
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
{¶1} On January 10, 2014, appellant/cross-appellee, Michael Chaffee, an individual, filed a notice of appeal from a January 10, 2014 entry of the Trumbull County
{¶2} The record in the instant matter reveals that Zoldan filed a complaint on November 19, 2012, against the Village of Lordstown and Chaffee alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process, defamation of character, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On November 22, 2013, the Village of Lordstown and Chaffee filed a motion for summary judgment. In the January 10, 2014 entry, the trial court granted summary judgment on all of the claims against the Village of Lordstown on the grounds of sovereign immunity, but denied sovereign immunity to Chaffee. Instead, the trial court dismissed the defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims as time-barred and permitted the malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims remaining to be adjudicated against Chaffee.
{¶3} On January 31, 2014, Chaffee filed a motion to dismiss with this court alleging that the cross-appeal should be dismissed because it did not involve a final, appealable order since the trial court granted judgment as to fewer than all of the claims in the case.
{¶4} Zoldan filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss the cross-appeal on February 11, 2014. It is Zoldan‘s position that once the trial court‘s order became appealable for one party, it became appealable for all.
{¶5} Chaffee filed a reply in support of his motion to dismiss on the cross appeal on February 18, 2014.
{¶6}
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
and whether arising out of the same or separate transactions, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. In the absence of a determination that there is no just reason for delay, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
{¶7} This court has repeatedly held that where there are multiple claims and/or parties involved, an entry entering final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties is not a final, appealable order in the absence of
{¶8} Here, the trial court did not enter judgment on all of the pending claims and did not include the requisite
{¶9} We recognize that the trial court‘s order addresses the issue of immunity under
{¶11} Based upon the foregoing analysis, Chaffee‘s motion to dismiss the cross appeal is hereby granted since there is no final appealable order as to the cross-appeal. However, the appeal filed by Chaffee can proceed.
{¶12} Cross-appeal dismissed.
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.,
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.,
concur.