This appeal involves the third-time dismissal rule established by OCGA § 9-11-41 (a). Appellants Nasser Zohoury, Southeastern Apartment Corporation, and World Capital Corporation brought this action against 12 defendants, seeking damages for fraud, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion. Appellees answered and counterclaimed, contending that appellants brought multiple lawsuits against appellees for the purpose of harassment and interference with their business. Appellants acknowledge the existence of at least five other actions involving these parties.
According to appellees, the sole purpose of these lawsuits was to file meritless lis pendеns notices. It does not appear from the record that appellants have conducted any discovery. In response to interrogatories and requests for production, appellants each served a single blanket objection, requiring appellees to file a motion for sanctions and to compel.
At the hearing on appellees’ motion to dismiss or in the alternative to compel for failure to respond to discovery, appellants voluntarily dismissed in open court. Appеllees then asked that the dismissal be made a dismissal with prejudice under OCGA § 9-11-41 (a): “the filing of a third notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon *749 the merits.” The trial court сoncluded the voluntary dismissal in open court was on the merits because appellants had dismissed their claims more than three times. The trial court dismissed the action with prеjudice, and ordered the clerk to dismiss and cancel the related lis pendens notices.
1. Appellants raise 12 enumerations of error, all pertaining to the dismissal of this аction with prejudice under OCGA § 9-11-41 (a). “The unambiguous language of that statute provides that a third notice of dismissal from any court of an action based upon the same claim оperates as an adjudication on the merits.”
Harris v. Sampson,
2. Appellants also contend that certain third-party claims against appellees should not be considered previous claims for purposes of OCGA § 9-11-41 (a) because they were not “proper” third-party claims and were therefore void.
1
Assuming without deciding that dismissal of a void action would not constitute a dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-41 (a), appellants have failed to show that their previous claims werе void. It is axiomatic that a third-party action must seek indemnity or some other claim derivative from the main action; it may not simply tender a substitute defendant.
Lamb v. K. M. Ins. Co.,
3. Appellants similarly maintain that some of the earlier dismissals should not be considered for purposes of OCGA § 9-11-41 (a), because they were duplicаtive of prior pending actions and thus sub *750 ject to dismissal under OCGA § 9-2-5 (a). This argument is likewise without merit. As stated in the Code section, the existence of a prior pending action is “a goоd defense” to a second action, but this does not, without more, render the second action void or a nullity.
4. Appellants also contend the dismissal with prejudice was improper because some or all of the actions should have been consolidated under OCGA § 9-11-42 (a). This contention is without merit, because that Code section requires the consent of all parties for consolidation. See
Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Ford,
5. Because appellants had already entered a vоluntary dismissal in open court, they contend the trial court had no jurisdiction once they had dismissed their complaint, and its order was for this reason a nullity. A trial court, however, must have the power to limit and define actions taken by the parties before it. In
Faircloth v. Cox Broadcasting Corp.,
While the attempted dismissal in Faircloth was automatic under *751 OCGA § 9-11-41 (e) instead of voluntary under subsection (a), the court’s inherent power to еnter orders in the interest of judicial economy is particularly applicable in this case. The trial court did nothing more than reduce to writing the legal effect accomplished by operation of law with the third voluntary dismissal. Otherwise, as appellees point out, appellants can continue to file actions, record lis pendens notices, and involve appellees in ceaseless litigation, “regardless of whether one or one hundred voluntary dismissals [have] been filed,” dismissing without prejudice as soon as a motion to dismiss is set for hearing or at the hearing itself.
6. Appellants’ remaining enumerations of error are without merit. Their complaint that appellees’ oral motion at the hearing should have been made in writing is fоreclosed by OCGA § 9-11-7 (b) (1) (motion shall be made in writing “unless made during a hearing or trial”). Under USCR 6.2, the trial court had discretion to hear the matter without waiting 30 days for a response. See
Kidd v. Unger,
7. In their brief, appellants ignorе well-established and controlling law, selectively omit controlling portions of the Code sections relied upon, and attempt to appeal matters not raised аnd matters consented to by the parties below. For these reasons, we conclude the appeal is frivolous and impose a penalty of $1,000 against appеllants and their counsel pursuant to Court of Appeals Rule 15 (b).
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
It should be apparent that such an exception would allow incompetent or malicious plaintiffs to file an infinite number of void actions, thus wholly vitiating the purpose of the rule.