Zoda v. ZodaZoda v. Zoda
In a matrimonial action, the defendant husband appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Isseks, J.), entered April 23, 1985, which (a) denied that branch of his motion which was to reargue a prior order of the same court (Isseks, J.), entered February 8, 1985, which, inter alia, granted the plaintiff wife pendente lite relief, and (b) denied that branch of his motion which was to dismiss the plaintiff wife’s complaint for failure to state a cause of action; (2) from an order of the same court (Martin, J.), dated August 20, 1985, which, after a hearing, held him in contempt for violation of a stay contained in an order to show cause of the same court (Ferraro, J.), dated November 9, 1984, which provision stayed him, inter alia, from disposing of marital property pending trial of the action; (3) as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the same court (Beisner, J.), dated
Appeal from so much of the order entered April 23, 1985, as denied the defendant’s motion for reargument dismissed. No appeal lies from an order denying reargument (Ginsberg v Ginsberg,
Order entered April 23, 1985, otherwise affirmed.
Order dated August 20, 1985, affirmed and order dated October 22, 1985, affirmed insofar as appealed from.
Appeal from the order entered December 16, 1985, dismisséd (see, Matter of Aho,
Judgment entered February 19,1985, affirmed.
The plaintiff is awarded one bill of costs.
Special Term correctly found that the plaintiff’s complaint was sufficient to withstand that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (see, Bulger v Bulger,
In addition, we find that the court had before it sufficient evidence to determine with reasonable certainty that the defendant had violated the stay provision of an order to show cause signed by Justice Ferraro (see, Pereira v Pereira,
Finally, on the record before us, we do not find that Special Term abused its discretion in denying that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to modify the award of temporary maintenance and child support (cf. Romanoff v Romanoff,