*1 deprive every property. them of reasonable use their We persuaded private they are not the minimal loss stand non-conforming to sustain the termination of their use is outweigh public gain so burdensome as to achieved provisions They enforcement of the of the ordinance. have not shown the ordinance to be or invalid in unreasonable its Gravel, supra; to them. Potomac Sand & Stevens supra; City Salisbury, Borinsky, v. Baltimore v. 508(1965). 212 A. 2d
Judgments affirmed; costs to be paid by appellants. HERMAN
BENJAMIN ZITOMER al. et I. SLATE et al. 673, September Term, 1973.]
[No.
Decided June 1974. *2 argued The cause before Powers, Davidson Moore, JJ. Newton, F. Hickey D. with whom was William
James brief, appellants. for Ehrmantraut, Joseph with were William A. whom brief, Montedonico and Donahue Ehrmantraut on for & appellee Hospital, J. Leland Memorial Inc. Thomas Scanlon appellee. other
Moore, J., opinion delivered the Powers, J., of the Court. *3 concurring opinion page concurs and filed a 730infra. Appellants surviving the are husband children of 6, Ruth Miriam Zitomer who died on November 1969 as a alleged malpractice result of the of her doctor and of the hospital where injuries she was treated for in sustained an automobile accident. demise, two-year
On the date her period of of limitations applicable wrongful was actions under death the then existing provisions Code, 67, Accordingly, Art. 4. the action would 6,1971. then have been barred as of November A wrongful two-count declaration for death filed in was the George’s Circuit Court County July 13, for Prince 1972, on approximately years 23A Mrs. after Zitomer died. Effective July 1,1971, however, on the Assembly Maryland General enlarged had period years.1 limitations to three Theref ore, if this applicable, amendment was the declaration was timely.
The 1971 amendment separate contained a section providing that new year period three of limitations Appropriate explanatory appear body 1. citations and comment opinion. this
contained in the first prospectively section “shall be retrospectively upon to have effect arising prior July 1, of action cause 1968.” latter by section held Appeals was unconstitutional the Court of Maryland 13, 1972 in Westinghouse June Smith v. Corp., 52, 291 Electric A. 2d 452.
Essentially upon authority Westinghouse and of the Appeals decision of the Harlow, Court of Blocher v. April 11, 1973, Md. 303 A. 2d decided the lower granted appellees-defendants’ summary court motions for judgment, holding year three that the statute of limitations unavailing cause of action was barred year period the two of limitations effective on November 1969,the date of death.2 appeal judgments,
On this from those we are confronted with two fundamental issues: Assembly Maryland
(1) Does the General have power enlarging enact a period of limitations as to cause of action for original death not barred period, namely, period limitation when limitation effect the cause of action arose?
(2) power exists, If such did the intend apply year
in the instant case to the new three to a cause of action existence but not barred as of the effective date of namely, July 1,1971? amendment, stated, *4 hereinafter we conclude that these For the reasons the questions in the affirmative and that must be answered judgments reversed and the cause remanded below must be proceedings. for further (cid:127) upon incorporated, part 2. The trial court also relied as of its oral disposition motions, opinion of the of the for Anne Circuit Court County Adams, Culp, al., C-7104,
Arundel the case of et al. et Law No. August 16,1973. dated I 1, July Assembly, by 784, the General Ch.
Effective amendments, 1971, repealed with Laws and re-enacted of 67, death,” (a) 4, for of Art. “Action subsection every part: provided . . . such pertinent read in “.. . years within three after action shall be commenced person.”3 purpose death the deceased enactment, preamble, as stated was follows: as Assembly
“WHEREAS, desires the General wrongful death for bring negligence uniformity other with that of actions actions.
“WHEREAS, logical for the there no reason time limits between variance commencement actions. their
“WHEREAS, be misled to citizens respective by the variance between detriment resulting undue an of limitations statutes rights.” forfeiture of 784, enacted, read as follows:
Section 2 of Ch. provisions enacted, That the “And be it further prospectively shall be this Act upon application to retrospectively to effect have July prior 1,1968.” arising cause of action May 18, opinion dated to the Governor an official expressed Maryland the view Attorney General arising of action for causes the enactment constitutional upon which July “and causes and after expired existing two-year limitations has statute of added.) Atty. Op. Gen. (Emphasis July 1, 1971.” as of 222.4 Article, Proceedings (f). 3. Now Courts and Judicial 3-904 p. 15, pointed infra, Attorney 4. As noted General also out that the that the language phrase ambiguous” “extremely suggested of Section was “ July 1, draftsmanship ‘prior 1968’ error in and should was an ” July ‘subsequent 1, 1968,’ point dispositive “not
have
read
matter,
already
course,
stated.”
because
conclusions
*5
clear,
course,
provision
applicable
3-year
It is
of
is
arising
July 1,
Appellees
after
1971.
to causes
action
however,
vigorously contend,
Legislature
enlarge
power
period of
without the
limitations
2-year period
barred
causes of action not
legislative
July
(even assuming
limitations as
a
accomplish
purpose).
intent to
rules
as
aid in the
Judicial
formulated
an
determination
applied retrospectively or
a
is to be
whether
statute
prospectively
Judge
(later
were collated
Hammond
Chief
Judge)
Corporation,
Janda v. General Motors
(1964). Particularly apposite
“(3) statute, A even so applied retrospectively or will not to divest adversely rights, impair vested affect obligation contracts, or so as violate clause, operate process due or to a bill of post an ex law. from attainder or Aside facto legislative bodies the disinclination past operate events or courts to make a law on transactions, the limitations retroactive legislation only those affect all laws are affecting and, a law intends if operate retrospectively substantive matters does not and the law constitutional offend restrictions, given it will be or limitations added.) (Emphasis intended.” effect possess, general proposition, as a Does a defendant cause right in at the time the a statute vested Plainly against not. It settled that no him arises? right person any has a vested such vests nor completely it running unless has of a statute of limitations is that The rationale here run and barred the action. remedy directly only does operates on the 2d, 22,28. right.5 Jur. extinguish 51 Am. the substantive §§ right, simply destroy affect 5. but “Statutes which do not substantial procedure destroying impairing vested remedies, or not considered as are *6 recognize distinction, frequently however, The a cases “pure between statutes of limitation” and a limitation qualifying statutory right which time is made an integral part right created, right of the so that there is no expiration independent action of the limitation and the extinguishes right. See, general the time limitation the for a discussion, Wisbey Community v. American Stores Corporation, (D.C.D. 1968). Supp. 288 F. Neb. To such situation, governing pure the rules statutes of limitation applicable. not be firmly Maryland is wrongful
It
established in
the
liability
existing
death statute
new
creates a
not
at common
that, accordingly, compliance
law and
with the statute of
precedent
limitations for such
is a
actions
condition
right
action,
the
remedy
maintain
the
limitation
being
right.
treated as a limitation of the
State,
substantive
Parks,
477,
Use
(1925);
Stasciewicz v.
148 Md.
For Maryland, rule in we are essentially arising remitted Code, to cases under former Art. (now 8-103) pertaining against to suits rights, any particular procedure for there is vested no mode of right.” Keehn, the enforcement or defense of the 2d 544 v. Kelch 36 A. (1944). any (except slander) “in
personal representative against might maintained the deceased.” have been 493, 150 (1959), 2d 438 Shockley, Md. A. Chandlee -Appeals upon was called to construe Court provided, statute: “... of limitations contained person injuries to however, that such action for against must an executor or administrator maintainable months after date of the within six calendar commenced of the testator qualification of the executor administrator or intestate.”6 “requested he
Appellant claimed that had been representatives agents of the the authorized induced” file suit and had been lulled deceased’s administratrix security in belief “into false sense of said *7 (6) administratrix had waived benefit six months type.” in cases of this The Court first limitation rejected appellant’s 93, 112 that Art. was a “survival claim § creating new statute” rather a statute a of action than cause question for and stated that the narrow decision was: estoppel as “whether there can be waiver or to a statute in right proviso part merely which the time is and not a of pointed remedy.” It out “most limitation that courts of if a new of have held that the statute creates cause precedent, with limit condition such limit cannot a time as a by estoppel.” Refusing or follow extended waiver this rule, authority line an immutable the Court of J., writing opinion) (Hammond, Judge, held later Chief estoppel was, indeed, waiver or the doctrine of length Scarborough applicable. quoted from The Court at Co., 1949), Ry. (4th F. 2d 253 Cir. Coast Line Atlantic 919,-including following language: denied, 339U. S. cert. of a remedial “... the distinction between statute and substantive statute limitations limitations a fast as rock-ribbed or so hard and no means so judges have believe. many writers would us statute, all, type into the after still falls Each category And this is of a statute limitations. appears 93, provision 6. now Art. 8-104. This § though nonetheless true even we a remedial call pure a statute of and then designate type the substantive as a condition of the very recovery. magic There is no inherent in these words.7
In Dixon,
Checchia,
et
20,
al. v.
was but timely. Appeals holding in noted its Chandlee The Court of part period in 112 is a of the substantive limitation wholly is law but did not exist common by It then looked to Janda v. General conferred the statute. (later summary by Judge supra, there Chief Motors, courts as Judge) of the rules formulated Hammond application of a retroactive aids the determination Significantly, did refer rule the Court not statute vel non. statute, even if the (3), quoted supra, to the effect that a retrospectively Legislature intended, will not so rights. adversely Instead it affect vested to divest [pre- or deciding which law observed that “[i]n applies, look the intent post-amendatory] this Court must Legislature,” quoted the rules laid and it second Janda, down in to wit: Ordinarily affecting
“(2) a statute matters or given retrospective will rights of not be substance transactions, and events operation as to matters litigation time the takes at the effect: not ‘* * * clear, strong its
unless words are so retrospective expression in their that no imperative them, meaning he attached to or unless other can intention could manifest * * * cases). (citing gratified. An otherwise he effect, amendatory takes like other Act enactment, only from time of its legislative prior application passage, has no transactions, contrary an intent is unless clearly expressed implied in the Act or its from provisions.’ Tax Comm. v. Power Company, 182Md. 111, 117.”(Emphasis added.) 24): (p. (2) think rule Dixon Court stated “We controlling.” The was then reached that “there is conclusion language requiring no clear retroactive Legislature’s can out and the intent be carried prospective application.”
719 571, supra, the Court of Harlow, 268 Md. And in Blocher v. involving holding of this Court Appeals reversed 93, 112 as to Art. of the same amendment construction § judgment in Dixon and reinstated before the Court court, agreeing “that this case with its conclusion the trial of his by [supra].” the course Dixon was controlled 581): (p. opinion, Judge for the Court Smith stated body effect “There of law to the is a substantial period stipulated in a where a limitation creating of action it is not to be statute a cause limitations, ordinary considered as an statute upon as a limitation but is to be considered remedy, as well with the result that as the already time of of action accrued at the to causes enlarging subsequent the enactment of a period of action the the limitations on such causes applicable held so as subsequent statute will not be original period, enlarge to extend or legislative give intent particularly where no subsequent application clearly statute a retroactive (Emphasis added.) from, language.” appears its test, Applying this it was observed: Chapter 642
“Examination of of the Acts of shows which this amendment was effected § nothing in the to indicate an intent that it act itself applied retrospectively implication nor is a clear language to that to be effect found Maryland, we As is so often the case amendment. legislative history. We know no have no surrounding circumstances its enactment which retrospective would mandate added.) (Emphasis amendment.” held that the 1966 amendment of was not Court
applicable to the case it. before clearly apposite construing Art. 112 are
These cases
present
They
case.
involve a
of limitations that
right”
statute,
part
conferred
is “a
of the substantive
*10
precedent
which, therefore,
to
is a
compliance with
condition
— precisely the
maintaining an action under the statute
is, we
presented by
4 involved here. It
Art.
situation
necessary implication of
think,
Dixon
Blacker
the
in
of
no
the statute
appellees here had
vested
appellants’
of
accrued
when
cause
action
limitations
force
amendment,
expired
yet
at the time of the
but which had not
recognized
Appeals
in these
Court of
reason that the
the
pending
permissibility
application
of
the
retroactive
cases
only
legislative
upon finding
intent.
causes conditioned
of
words,
application
an
retroactive
amendment
other
enlarging
period
of limitations
death actions
with
precluded as an unconstitutional
interference
is not
rights,
purport
not
provided the amendment does
vested
original
revive causes of action barred
statute
date
amendment.
limitations on the effective
Baker,
App.
Paraphrasing
in Wittel v.
this Court
amendment
(1970), which held that
We deciding period of whether the Blocher, Dixon existing amended-applies or to the cause as as presented look to the intent of action here “this Court must ultimately Legislature” ground we and must decision the rule that amendatory effect, like act takes other
“[a]n enactment, only from time of its legislative prior passage, and has no contrary is transactions, unless an intent clearly implied act its expressed in the or from provisions.” Sutherland, quoting Blocher, said
or, otherwise 1972): (Sands ed. Construction, 22.36 Statutory intent expressed its legislature has unless the .. implied clearly or such intent that effeet by the language amendment surrounding enactment.” its
circumstances
authority in
weight of
cases
is in accord with the
This
enlarged
application of an
of retroactive
deciding the issue
where the
causes
limitations to accrued
period of
yet expired
the time
existing
has
generally,
Blocher,
it is the
As in
so
Dixon
amendment.
*11
controlling.
is deemed
that
intent
Supp.
F.
Co., 40
353
Chesapeake
Ry.
O.
v.
&
Callahan
(N.
1941);
Gillet,
P. 2d
Mex.
Ky.
298
939
(D.C.E.D.
Wall v.
(Ind.
Corp.,
After the trial court appeal summary judgment, it was contended that language 2, provisions this Act “... shall upon retrospectively to have applied prospectively and effect arising prior July 1, to any to cause action " legislative
1968, power. Rejecting was a valid exercise of contention, Maryland quoted this from Court case of Parks, supra, Stasciewicz from cases other jurisdictions holding precedent death statute is a condition action,
to maintain declared: provision 1971, 784, “The of the Laws of Ch. give
purports to retroactive effect Act to such provisions unconstitutional it violates the Constitution, XIV, United States Amendment Rights and the Declaration of of the State of Maryland, Article 23.”
Turning appellees' protection equal argument the Court by purporting give observed retrospective the Act arising prior July effect to cause of 1,1968, Ch. 784 had reviving
“the action, anomalous result of cause barred, which would otherwise be where death years prior July 1, occurred within three leaving but dead and buried a cause of action where July 1, prior death occurred on or but after July possibility 1969. The mere recital of this deprives appellees demonstrates that this act *12 protection equal is, therefore, of the laws and unconstitutional under the Constitution States, United (Emphasis Amendment XIV.” added.)
Smith thus declared invalid an effort “to revive cause of' absolutely (and thereby impair action theretofore barred rights).” Schrott, vested App. Harlow v. reversed grounds, on Harlow, supra. subject other Blocher v. Its rights vesting expiration the matter was class of with the of existing enjoying an statute of limitations and thereafter protection. purporting constitutional In affect those rights retroactivity provision process, the violated due dealing unevenly in the equal within class it violated protection. to decide the Appeals in was not asked of Smith
The Court retroactivity of terms validity the other absolutely In our thus barred. of action than causes may holding to, and scope not meant judgment of Its was the note, applications. on the one beyond We not, extend such seemingly unqualified out, hand, appellants point the as on striking provision the due down language of the Court well the Court’s reliance process grounds. But we note as Stasciewicz, supra, and Danzer & holding cases Its (1925) in Co., 268 U. Ship Ry. S. Co., Inc. v. & Is. Gulf under the was which cause action barred both amendatory existing at the time period of limitations statement, in its noteworthy Especially Is the Court’s Act. issue, protection defendants equal treatment July arising July prior 1968 but or “on after causes constitutionally favored added) (emphasis could not 1969” prior July 1, This arising 1968. over those causes clearly view, the Court’s statement, Indicates our Constitution, understanding protections only decision, extended class of reach of its hence expiration of possessing rights virtue of the vested those date of the existing period of limitations the effective amendment. 44.18, quotes Sutherland, supra, with the author & Trust Co. v.
approval MewYork case of Farmer’s Loan (1928)as Railroad, 236N.Y.S. 250 follows: York Cent. New attempts purports single where a section “Even separable entirely classes two distinct to cover Improperly, it eases, properly and the one other upheld as class covered, though constitutionally may even thus be as to the other.” condemned involving the issue retroactive early case
An Wisconsin enlarged of limitations also contains application of an language: pertinent true, language of
“It the act of 1859 is sufficiently general to include a case where the barred, well as one where it was not. *13 suppose
But we do not
this is a sufficient
holding
reason for
inoperative
the law
and void in
every
may
cáse. It
be held valid
applicable
to
that class of actions where
competent
it was
for the
Legislature to extend the time for bringing suit.”
Rohrer,
Pleasants v.
(1863).
Wis. 577
problem
separability,
points
as Sutherland
(§
out
44.02),
essentially
“is
application.”
one of
Maryland
it has
been
held
though
even
constitutional
provisions
unconstitutional
of a statute are contained in the
section, they may
same
entirely
separable.
distinct and
Maryland Unemployment Compensation
Albrecht,
Board v.
87, 96,
(1944).
Read any purpose of Ch. 784 belies Legislature retroactively have the Act to causes arising subsequent July 1,1969, by limiting its terms such “arising prior July 1,1968.” effect to causes Quite clearly, however, section, literally, taken itself, contradicts arising prior July 1,1968 causes would be barred as of the date of enactment of the amendment even under the three year period, purpose limitátions unless the absurd were permit attributed to the revival of dead past reaching indefinitely claims back on the sole brought condition suit had been upon them more than years two but less than three after the cause arose.8 previously Attorney We have referred to the General’s Maryland’s counterpart 8. Victoria, to the Statute of 9 and 10 ch. 93 (Lord Campbell’s Act) originally 299, 1852, enacted as ch. Acts of period carried a 12-month of limitations. Ch. Acts of 1950 increased the enlarged years. to 18 months and ch. Acts of 1959 it to 2 A literal reading provision, therefore, permit would going revival of claims back at least to and its “rationale” would seem to extend to claims since 1852 inasmuch as the variance between the limitations for negligence beginning. death and other actions existed from the
725 “extremely ambiguous” and his 2 as characterization July 1, was an “prior to 1968” phrase suggestion that the “subsequent to read draftsmanship should have in and error interpreted, 4). logically n. As July 1, (supra, 1968.” believed, provision would still Attorney General 1, prior July 1969 but arising to as to causes invalid July arising after on and causes of action for “constitutional existing upon which the 1, 1971, and causes of July 1, expired as has not two-year statute course, added.) Smith, in Plaintiffs (Emphasis 1971” statute, as interpretation of the in this perceived no benefit 1968, July 1, prior to had arisen of action their cause application received, of its upon, literal they insisted Attorney General, add, might with the terms. We 1, 1969, arising prior July could plaintiffs causes with interpretation support in a sensible equally little have found because, causes, it still to their of the section rights. transgressed upon vested hand, application determined, on the other
We have 1, arising July 1969 is not provision after to causes of the equally view that constitutionally We are of the foreclosed. Appeals Smith, in presumption Court of of the it, deciding appeal before in effect the purposes of retroaetivity limiting what it said meant presumption July 1,1968, we arising prior to is not a causes considering applicability required to make are We, therefore, of causes. write on to another class section given determining meaning to be slate clean provisions language requiring 2 that “the of this Act of § retrospectively upon or applied... to have effect shall arising prior July 1, cause of action 1968.” in the of statutes is to primary
The rule construction Legislature. and actual intention effectuate the real 531, Height App. supra; State, v. 225 Baker, 10 Md. Wittel v. 1, (1961); Hull, 168 Md. 176 251, A. 2d 212 Bouse v. Md. 170 sought in legislative intent is to be (1935). The A. 645 and if there is in the words used first instance statutory language ambiguity obscurity there is no 726
usually
need to look
no
elsewhere
ascertain
intent of
Legislature.
Maryland
Carver,
Medical
v.
Service
(1965).
Md.
While
as to what the
must
have meant or should
meant
have
cannot be substituted for
clearly
used,
an intent
revealed
the words
if
result the
language
produces
preposterous,
statute
is bizarre or
compelled
there
be
apparent
the conclusion
intent
not
intent. Hillyard
the real
v. Board of
150, 154,
Supervisors,
(1970).
259 Md.
Court, determining meaning words only the literal consider light meaning In the and effeet considered their 'but objectives purposes of the setting, may result enactment, consequences ** * meaning another with one rather than from legislative prevailing over literal the real intent construction intent.’ omitted] ‘[T]he [citation harmony with the manifest intent of should absurdity.’ an and should not lead to act Maryland Board Sanza v. State omitted].” [citation 319, 340, 226 (1967). 2d ors, 245Md. A. Cens pointed out, language of if taken lit- As we have *16 “contradictory Legislature erally, a Intention” the shows enlarged period application of require to retroactive the and at the time limit that in same effectively preclude retroactivity way as either to or such a retroactivity wrongful virtual boundless death else confer claims. read, therefore,
Literally produces the section bizarre and results, preposterous in defiance of reason and common saying sense, we In that the have no hesitation Legislature possibly meant the section could not have what by says. this is a case of words its terms While not by apparently inadvertence or mistake and which Inserted Incapable rejected surplusage they are because be meaning repugnant rest any or are of the sensible it, nullify v. State Tax statute and tend to Pressman Commission, 78, 88, 102 204 Md. (1954), believe, A. 2d 821 we nevertheless, Legislature essence of what in including intended retroactivity provision is expressed, in the words “to arising cause of action prior July 1, 1968,” but the words “shall be . applied___retrospectively____”
Having in purposes mind amendatory of the act as forcefully expressed preamble, in the quoted supra, we Legislature believe the real intent adding retroactivity provision was this: the benefit of the enlarged period of persons, limitations should extend to all consistent with principles,9 constitutional possessing causes for might of action death yet and who be misled to by existing their detriment variance in limitations at the time the enactment unduly and as a result their forfeit rights. This provision construction of compelled by reason by and common sense obviously remedial — nature expressed preamble amendment as in the remedial in the Judge sense defined Chief Orth in Wittel Baker, supra, v. as follows: change
“... a statute which makes a State, designed substantive law the but which is prior to correct an inadvertent error made in some change or a law has been found (Emphasis respect.” added.) be undesirable some (1973) Charlson, App. 80, Barrett 305 A. 2d opinion by Judge Scanlan, again in an we construed the permitting grief damages amendment to Art. suffering observed, express upon mental based enactment, language preamble it to that “is remedial nature and ‘should accorded liberal sought objective with the construction consistent Assembly.” Chapter accomplished’ the General 784 is also very a remedial effort of the correct definite *17 assume, permit, provisions 9. “The court will whenever the of the statute only Legislature its effect that the intended enactment have within the Maryland Unemployment Compensation constitutionality.” limits of Board Albrecht, supra. v. 183 Md. retroactivity provision should mischief, accordingly, its and objective of its liberally with the construed consistent pertinent here, did Court in find as enactment. We quoting Holmes Barrett, language Justice Cardozo Justice Supreme in Beeck v. Sabine speaking for Court Van and (1937): Towing Co., Inc., 800 U. S. 350-51 “ n Deathstatutes have their roots dissatisfaction law have been archaisms of the which with the opinion. origin in their the course this traced to grudging if a misfortune a narrow It would be exemplify were and process of construction very remedied. There are perpetuate the evils to be wrought are to be into times when uncertain words legislative policy consistency unity with a and generative law, new which is source of itself legal system. ‘The impulse transmitted policy power to decide what the has be, will, and it has intimated its of the law shall if recognized indirectly, that will should be however ” added.) obeyed.’ (Emphasis course, attempt, is, that the courts It axiomatic construction, supply guise omissions or under Amalgamated remedy possible statute. Cas. defects statutory provision A Helms, supra. Co. v. Ins. face, however, already
contradictory in its intention on its indicated, impels requiring 2 as construction. We construe § enlarged period shall be of limitations persons retrospectively with prospectively to all who, with constitutional death claims consistent existing principles, may yet variance be misled date of enactment of the amendment. limitations as of the inapposite authority upon holding, we find So contending appellees rely in that a statute which has been manifestation of is ineffectual as a declared unconstitutional App. 514, 2d Ingel, 18 Md. legislative intent. A. State 2d see, State, 315 A. (1973); Johnson v. argument date of oral this (1974) decided after the appeal. *18 events, may properly
At all 2 of Ch. be looked a to as simple historical Legislature, record intent of ineptly phrased, enlarged however period to have the applied retroactively. limitations The conclusive surrounding enactment,” Blocher, “circumstance [the] supra, Assembly Ch. 784 is that General has stated its application to the intent as the Act. annihilate To even — — a purpose as a record memorandum of a to have the protection enlarged period applied of the of limitations retroactively would, view, in our do principal violence to the statutory construction, aim of to effectuate the real and Legislature. intention Baker, supra; actual of the v. Wittel Height State, supra; v. Maryland Unemployment Compensation Albrecht, For, supra. Board v. intended the retroactive beyond dispute. statute is enlargement period
We conclude wrongful in applicable actions death occurring July deaths on or 1,1969. after
Judgments reversed; re- case proceed- manded for further ings; paid by appel- costs to be lees. J.,
Powers, concurring: reasoning expressed I concur well as in as the result opinion by Judge written reached for the Court Moore. concerned, however, I problems am about the which have past, may arise, arisen in the continue to because of the limitation concept that the time contained limitation, applied death statute is not a true statute of to be only remedy, a to the but is substantive element of the cause action, precedent right or a condition to maintain the action. Appeals
When the Court of
first
this
interpretation,
Parks,
If I read appropriate point I accomplish, feel it out remain, they may how significant differences limitation, although it is now the same eliminated. time year Article, three duration fixed Courts § generally, civil at 5-101 for actions law remains statute which creates cause of action. It therefore substantive, procedural. remains It remains a condition precedent action, to maintain the and is not a Parks, supra, limitations. State v. Smith v. true Westinghouse supra. Electric, plea limitations, timely
A (Maryland 2), filed d Rule 342 required wrongful is not in order to attack a death action late; question may by demurrer, filed be reached summary judgment, a motion for and no doubt could be the first infancy raised for time trial. The disabilities insanity, Article, 5-201, Courts the time extend limits fixed in 5-101 and other sections of the same subtitle, filing wrongful do not extend the time for death action. period, consistently
Elimination of—the built-in time as a action, construed substantive element of the cause merely would make a death many one of the subject civil actions at law to the true statutes of limitation.1 *20 Assembly wishes, If the General it indicates preamble Chapter does, it to remove the differences “citizens misled to their respective detriment between variance statutes of resulting rights”, an undue forfeiture of it can by amending Article, so (f) say, do Courts 3-904 to make it “An upon action under this subtitle accrues the death of the injured person.” 1. It should be noted that if the act which caused death battery, year Article, 5-105, the one fixed in
assault would Courts appear apply.