*634Beauty may be in the eye of the beholder but legal ambiguity is not. As we shall explain, there is no objective legal ambiguity in the easement here at issue.
Patrick J. Saville, as Trustee, appeals from a judgment entered in favor of respondent James F. Zissler, as Trustee. These Montecito neighbors have a dispute over an easement. The trial court "interpreted" an ingress-egress easement burdening respondent's property for the benefit of appellant's property. The trial court ruled that the easement was ambiguous, decided the case based upon extrinsic evidence *594of historic use, and added language limiting the easement.
We reverse and remand the matter with directions to prepare a new judgment consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. Our analysis is guided by these general principles: 1. A broad grant of a right-of-way easement "will ordinarily be construed as creating a general right of way capable of use ... for all reasonable purposes." ( Laux v. Freed (1960)
Facts
The trial court's 47-page statement of decision provides a detailed factual summary. We draw upon it to explain the facts. (See Axis Surplus Ins. Co. v. Reinoso (2012)
The unpaved dirt road easement was created by a grant recorded in 1994. As Appendix A to this opinion, we attach a photo showing the location of the easement. The document granting the easement is attached as Appendix B.
*635George and Annette Corbett conveyed to Peter and Kristi Lupoli an easement "[p]roviding Grantee access, ingress and egress to vehicles and pedestrians over Grantors' real property from Green Meadows Road to Grantees' real property." The easement runs across "the most easterly portion of Grantors' real property." It is 10 feet wide and 90.46 feet long.
Respondent purchased his property from the Corbetts (the grantor) in 1999. Appellant purchased his property from the Lupolis (the grantee) in 2013. Appellant's rectangular property, which consists of about two acres, fronts onto and is accessible from Picacho Lane. (See Appendix A.) Appellant's property is hereafter referred to as the "Picacho property." The easement provides access from Green Meadows Road over respondent's one acre parcel to the back unimproved portion of the Picacho property. The main entry to the Picacho property is on Picacho Lane.
Peter Lupoli, a lawyer, drafted the document granting the easement. He told the Corbetts that the easement " 'would always be used lightly' " and "sparingly and infrequently."
When Peter Lupoli drafted the easement, he intended it " 'to be prohibitive of construction access' " and to be " 'used infrequently [by the Lupolis and their gardener] for landscape purposes.' " " '[I]t would be used in a non offensive way.' " Peter Lupoli also intended that no " 'heavy vehicles' " would be allowed on the easement. By "heavy," he meant " 'anything much bigger than a pickup truck.' " There was no showing that Peter Lupoli communicated to the Corbetts his subjective intent as to the scope of the easement. The Corbetts did not testify.
Kristi Lupoli testified that the Corbetts "kindly let us have that easement because they knew [that without the easement] it would be very difficult for us to maintain the back part of the [Picacho] property." "The easement definitely makes a difference in being able to use the back part."
Jose Lorenzo, appellant's present gardener and the Lupoli's former gardener, testified that he drove a pickup truck and on average used the easement three times per month for landscaping purposes.
Appellant is a licensed real estate broker. He testified: He paid $4.7 million for the Picacho property. He intended to develop *595it as an estate property, and the easement "was necessary to carry out his plan." Without the easement, "the property value was reduced 40%." "[T]here is no way to drive a vehicle to the rear of the property other than [on] the Easement." Before appellant purchased the Picacho property, no one said that the easement was subject to any restrictions in addition to those expressly set forth in the document granting the easement. *636Appellant originally intended to use the easement for a construction project on the Picacho property that "involves the complete demolition of the house, garage and swimming pool and the construction of significantly larger buildings and amenities. It includes very significant cut and fill." Appellant "contend[ed], based on his review of the Easement[,] that it can be used for all access, ingress and egress - within the ten feet [width] - for any purpose, whether it be construction or digging a well." "[H]e believed he had 'unrestricted['] all vehicle access and all pedestrian access via use of the Easement pursuant to a written agreement."
Darrell Becker, respondent's construction expert, opined that the proposed construction project would take from 18 to 24 months to complete and would involve 14,000 trips to the Picacho property.
Alan D. Wallace, an attorney and adjunct professor at UCLA and Loyola law schools, testified as an expert witness for appellant. He did not appear at the trial; a video of his deposition was shown. Wallace spoke "about how the [real estate] industry views things and how [respondent's] interpretation of the [easement] affects the industry." Wallace "opine[d] that to rely on historic use [of the easement] or intent [of the parties creating the easement] would wreak havoc in the industry." "It would be disastrous to have to ferret out what the grantor or grantee intended because something is not delineated in the document." Wallace agree[d] that [appellant] as a buyer and broker had a reasonable duty to investigate the Easement if there was something unclear; but since this was a standard easement, no investigation was required." The easement "is clear on its face; ... when the words are as broad as this, there is no reason to consider intent or historic use." The trial court rejected Wallace's testimony and his legal opinion.
Respondent's Complaint and Appellant's Cross-Complaint
Respondent filed a complaint against appellant for declaratory and injunctive relief. It alleges: "[Respondent] contends the grant of Easement is general in that the Easement does not specify or limit the extent of use nor the extent of the burden imposed upon [respondent's] Property. Therefore, [respondent] contends that the permissible use is determined in the first instance by the intention of the parties. Once the Easement has been used for a reasonable period of time, and it has been [so used], [respondent] contends the extent of its use is established by its past use."
The complaint requests "a declaration that use of the Easement is limited to its historic use, not exceeding twelve (12) vehicle trips per year unrelated to construction activity." It also requests the issuance of a permanent injunction prohibiting appellant and his successors in interest from "a. Using the *637Easement for ingress and egress related to construction activity; and [¶] b. Using the Easement ... in excess of twelve (12) vehicle trips in any twelve-month period."
Appellant filed a cross-complaint against respondent alleging causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief and to quiet title to the easement. Appellant contended that he may "pav[e] or otherwise *596resurfac[e] the Easement to make it accessible year round."
Trial Court's Ruling in Its Statement of Decision
The trial court denied appellant's "request to 'exclude extrinsic evidence or parol evidence' related to the parties['] 'intent in drafting or signing the Easement.' " It rejected appellant's argument "that the Easement is not ambiguous and there is no reason to look outside of the document." The court concluded that the easement is ambiguous because the grant of the easement "is silent on the subject of frequency of use of the easement, what vehicles are contemplated, or the purpose of its use." (See post , pp. 597-98.)
The court considered the servitude to be "a 'General Easement' for pedestrian and vehicular access, ingress and egress, failing to specify the nature and extent to which the Easement may be used." The court continued, "The rule is well-settled that where a grant of an easement is general as to the extent of the burden to be imposed on the servient tenement, an exercise of the right, with the acquiescence and consent of both parties, in a particular course or manner, fixes the right and limits it to the particular course or manner in which it has been enjoyed." This rule was set forth in Winslow v. City of Vallejo (1906)
The court concluded that the testimony of Kristi Lupoli was controlling. She said that the purpose "was to allow limited and infrequent access to [the Lupolis'] back yard for landscape purposes and occasional access for their caterers; ... the Easement was not ... intended for heavy use, frequent use or construction related activities." (Italics omitted.) The court determined that appellant's "proposed use of the Easement [for his construction project] is unreasonable" because it "would overburden the Easement."
The court rejected appellant's contention that he may pave the easement: "[T]here has never been a need to pave the Easement for its intended use." "[T]here is only one reason [appellant] wants to pave the Easement; he wants to do so to accommodate his intention to overburden the Easement."
*638Judgment
The judgment provides that the easement may be used for pedestrian and vehicle access, ingress, and egress "only as reasonably necessary for landscape maintenance at the rear of the [Picacho] property and other incidental use, at occasional and reasonable times." "[T]he easement may not be used for any other purposes," including "access, ingress and egress related to construction activity on the [Picacho] property." "The Easement road surface shall remain unpaved." The judgment grants a permanent injunction prohibiting appellant and his successors in interest "from using the Easement in a manner inconsistent" with the judgment. The court "reserve[d] jurisdiction over this case as there may well be future disputes over the Easement."
Appellant's Concession that the Issue of Access for His Construction Project Is Moot
In his opening brief appellant asserts, "The issue of access for [his] construction project has ... become moot and its reasonableness under a proper interpretation of the Easement's unlimited scope does not have to be considered." Appellant explains: "[He] no longer intends to use the Easement to build his *597house; by the time this appeal has been briefed, heard, and decided, construction of the house will have already begun and decisions regarding access routes and staging will have been made based on not using the Easement." "After construction is completed - without use of the Easement - [he] still intends to use the Easement as a service entrance, e.g. for maintenance workers, gardeners, and cleaners, and for other purposes related to maintaining the house as reasonably necessary. Those purposes are imminently [sic ] reasonable for an ingress-egress easement in a premier street [in] Montecito."
Since appellant concedes that the case has become moot to the extent it concerns access for his construction project, we need not review the portion of the judgment prohibiting him from using the easement for construction activities. (See Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court (1988)
Interpretation of Easements and Standard of Review
" 'An easement is a restricted right to specific, limited, definable use or activity upon another's property, which right must be less than the right of ownership.' [Citation.]" ( Scruby v. Vintage Grapevine, Inc. (1995)
*639"An easement agreement is subject to the rules of interpretation that apply to contracts. [Citations.] ... As with all contracts, the paramount goal of interpreting a writing creating an easement is to determine the intent of the parties. [Citation.]" ( Hill v. San Jose Family Housing Partners, LLC (2011)
Winslow v. City of Vallejo
Based on Winslow , supra ,
The trial court here determined that, as in Winslow , the scope of the allegedly "general" easement is restricted to its historic use. The trial court erred as a matter of law. The easement is not a general easement within the meaning of Winslow . Unlike the easement in Winslow , the instant easement specifies its precise location, width, and length. The easement also specifies its purpose: to provide "Grantee access, ingress and egress to vehicles and pedestrians over Grantors' real property from Green Meadows Road to Grantees' real property." A comment to the Restatement Third of Property *640(Restatement) observes, "The purpose of an easement for 'ingress and egress' may [as here] be specifically defined as the entrance and exit of people, or people and vehicles, or more generally defined as access to the dominant estate." ( Rest.3d Property, Servitudes, § 4.10, com. d, italics added.) There is nothing objectively ambiguous about the easement.
Ambiguity is defined as follows: "Doubtfulness; doubleness of meaning ... indistinctness, or uncertainty of meaning of an expression used in a written instrument. Want of clearness or definiteness .... [¶] Ambiguity exists if reasonable persons can find different meanings in a ... document." (Black's Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 79, col. 2.) The instant easement could have been drafted with greater specificity to narrow its scope. The easement could have expressly stated that it was limited to landscaping purposes. It does not. The lack of such specificity does not make the easement objectively "ambiguous" as a matter of law. As we discuss below, the language utilized is not doubtful, susceptible to double or different meanings, indistinct, uncertain, unclear, or indefinite.
An ambiguity is not apparent from the "failure" to specify how frequently the road can be used. It would be unusual for a residential ingress-egress easement to quantify the number of trips allowed per day, week, or month. Similarly, it would be unusual for such a residential easement to specify the type of vehicle allowed on the road. As to the allegedly unspecified purpose of the easement, the purpose is clear: to permit pedestrians and vehicles to go from point A to point B by traversing the servient estate.
The grant of the easement here is more specific than the grant of an easement in Laux , supra ,
After Laux v. Freed was decided, the Court of Appeal construed a grant "in broad terms" of an easement "for road purposes" as creating " ' "a general right of way ... for all reasonable purposes." ' [Citation.]" ( *599Wall v. Rudolph (1961)
Since the parties to an express right-of-way easement presumptively contemplate "normal future development," such an easement will generally not be restricted to its historic use. (See Red Mountain, LLC. v. Fallbrook Public Utility Dist. (2006)
In support of their position that the servitude is restricted to its historic use, both the trial court and respondent rely upon Rye v. Tahoe Truckee Sierra Disposal Co., Inc. (2013)
Rye is distinguishable. It does not discuss the ingress-egress aspect of the easement. The appellate court noted, "The scope of the easement for ingress and egress from the area subject to the easement was not litigated." ( *600Rye , supra , 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 87, fn. 3,
Rye is also distinguishable because Tahoe Truckee was not a bona fide purchaser. As we explain in the next part of this opinion, appellant is entitled to the protection afforded a bona fide purchaser. The trial court did not rule on the bona fide purchaser issue, but at oral argument in this court respondent stipulated that appellant is a bona fide purchaser.
As a Bona Fide Purchaser, Appellant Was Entitled to Rely on the Language of the Grant of the Easement
"The elements of a bona fide purchaser are payment of value, in good faith and without actual or constructive notice of another's rights. Absence of notice is an essential requirement in order that one may be regarded as a bona fide purchaser. [Citation.]" ( Oakdale Village Group v. Fong (1996)
Appellant was a purchaser for value, and there is no evidence that he was not acting in good faith when he bought the Picacho property. The question is *643whether he had actual or constructive notice of the Lupolis' claim concerning the easement's restrictions. The language of the grant of the easement did not provide such notice. The lack of notice is supported by the following illustration from a comment to the Restatement: "There is an easement appurtenant to Whiteacre for ingress and egress over a private road crossing Blackacre. In the absence of other facts or circumstances, Able, the owner of Whiteacre, and Able's family, tenants, and invitees, are entitled to use the road 24 hours a day by any form of transportation that does not inflict unreasonable damage or unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of Blackacre." ( Rest.3d Property, Servitudes, § 4.10, com. c, illus. 1; see Woods v. Shannon (2015)
When he purchased the Picacho property, appellant did not have "notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry" whether, as the trial court said in its judgment, the easement could be used "only as reasonably necessary *601for landscape maintenance at the rear of the [Picacho] property." ( Civ. Code, § 19.) Before the purchase, Kristi Lupoli told him that the easement "had been used for gardening." She did not say or suggest that this was the only permissible use. As we have explained ante , because the easement is not a general easement within the meaning of Winslow , the historic use of the easement did not fix its scope. (See Mayer v. Smith (Ct.App.2015)
As a bona fide purchaser, appellant could reasonably rely on the language of the grant of the easement. That language gave him "a use limited only by the requirement that it be reasonably necessary and consistent with the purpose[ ] for which the easement was granted," i.e., "access, ingress and egress to vehicles and pedestrians over Grantors' real property from Green Meadows Road to Grantees' real property." ( City of Pasadena v. California-Michigan Land & Water Co. , supra , 17 Cal.2d at p. 582,
The evidence does not show that the parties to the grant of the easement - the Lupolis and the Corbetts - intended that the easement would be used "only as reasonably necessary for landscape maintenance at the rear of the [Picacho] property." The Lupolis testified that this was their subjective intent. "Although the intent of the parties determines the meaning of the contract, the relevant intent is the objective intent as evidenced by the words used by the parties and not either party's subjective intent. [Citation.]" ( Kashmiri v. Regents of University of California (2007)
Extrinsic Evidence
Appellant argues that, because the easement is clear and unambiguous on its face, the trial court erroneously admitted extrinsic evidence of the intent of the parties to the grant of the easement. But facial ambiguity is not the test for the admissibility of extrinsic evidence. "In ascertaining the intent of the parties, the court may resort to extrinsic evidence not *602only to resolve a facial ambiguity but to determine the existence of and resolve a latent ambiguity. [Citations.] An ambiguity is latent if the resort to extrinsic evidence reveals that what appears to be perfectly clear language is in fact susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation. [Citations.]" ( Los Angeles City Employees Union v. City of El Monte (1985)
The situation here is different from the English case involving two cotton-bearing ships named "Peerless." (Raffles v. Wichelhaus , 2 Hurl. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (1864) [mutual mistake].) There the contract, on its face, was patently unambiguous. The contract said that Peerless would transport cotton from Bombay to Liverpool. But there were two ships named Peerless arriving at Liverpool from Bombay months apart during a frenzied cotton market caused by the Civil War in the United States. Thus, there was a latent ambiguity. Extrinsic evidence led the English court to conclude that there was no contract at all because there had been no "meeting of the minds."
The Judgment's Prohibition Against Paving Easement
The judgment decrees, "The Easement road surface shall remain unpaved." Appellant claims that he should be allowed to improve the easement "with an appropriate impermeable, permanent surface" to "ensure that the pathway is usable at all times, including in inclement weather." "The owner of a dominant estate may do that which is reasonably necessary to enjoy the easement and, as an incident thereto, keep it in repair and fit for use. [Citation.]" ( Scruby, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at pp. 706-707,
Since appellant will not be using the easement for his construction project, he has not shown that paving the easement at this time is reasonably necessary to keep it in repair and fit for its intended use. Therefore, the paving prohibition shall remain unless and until there is a proven need for paving.
Disposition
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to prepare a new judgment consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. The trial court is not required to incorporate in the judgment the exact language set forth below. It may vary the language so long as its essence is preserved. The new judgment should include a provision that the easement may be used to the extent that the use is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of *603the easement and is consistent with the purpose *646for which the easement was granted, i.e., access, ingress and egress to vehicles and pedestrians over Grantors' real property from Green Meadows Road to Grantees' real property, provided that the use does not unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of, unreasonably damage, or materially increase the burden on the servient estate.
Appellant shall recover his costs on appeal.
We concur:
PERREN, J.
TANGEMAN, J.