SHEILA ZINNERMAN, Plaintiff, vs. WORTHINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION 1:17-00123-KD-B
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION
June 08, 2018
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Sheila Zinnerman‘s
The Eleventh Circuit has summarized the limited scope of relief available under
“The only grounds for granting [a Rule 59] motion are newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.” In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999). “[A]
Rule 59(e) motion [cannot be used] to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005).
Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007). See also Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int‘l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1344 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Reconsidering the merits of a judgment, absent a manifest error of law or fact, is not the purpose of Rule 59[]“); Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d 1438, 1442 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The purpose of a
At the outset, Zinnerman does not present newly discovered evidence or argue a manifest factual error, and thus appears to base her
Zinnerman contends further, that the Court placed an undue burden on her: namely, “that she must do more than demonstrate a prima facie case and put forth evidence that the employer‘s proffered reasons are false.” (Id. at 3 (citing Williams v. Vitro Serv. Corp, 144 F.3d 1438, 1441 (1998) and Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1532 (11th Cir. 1997)). According to
As noted in this Court‘s ruling, the Supreme Court explained that the pretext argument Zinnerman proposes here lacks merit:
...[the proposed argument is that] if the plaintiff provides the asserted [nondiscriminatory] reason to be false, the plaintiff wins. But a reason cannot be proved to be a “pretext for discrimination” unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason....
***
... [the proposed argument is] to mean that “the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination” is replaced by the mere burden of “demonstrat[ing] that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.” But that would be a merger in which the little fish swallows the big one. Surely a more reasonable reading is that proving the employer‘s reason false becomes part of (and often considerably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the real reason was intentional discrimination....
***
....Undoubtedly some employers (or at least their employees) will be lying. But even if we could readily identify these perjurers, what an extraordinary notion that we “exempt them from responsibility for their lies” unless we enter Title VII judgments for the plaintiffs! Title VII is not a cause of action for perjury; we have other civil and criminal remedies for that. The...notion of judgment-for-lying is seen to be not even a fair and evenhanded punishment for vice, when one realizes how strangely selective it is: The employer is free to lie to its heart‘s content about whether the plaintiff ever applied for a job, about how long he worked, how much he made—indeed, about anything and everything except the reason for the adverse employment action. And the plaintiff is permitted to lie about absolutely everything without losing a verdict he otherwise deserves. This is not a major, or even a sensible, blow against fibbery....
....Title VII does not award damages against employers who cannot prove a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, but only against employers who are proven to have taken adverse employment action by reason of (in the context of the present case) race [and/or other discrimination]. That the employer‘s proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish that the plaintiff‘s proffered reason of race [and/or other discrimination] is correct.....
St. Mary‘s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515-517, 521, 523-524 (1993) (emphasis in original)
Moreover, Zinnerman‘s reliance on Thomas v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 2018 WL 1952698, *3-4 (11th Cir. Apr. 25, 2018) is inapposite. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit found the lower court erred on summary judgment, and concluded that the evidence presented by the plaintiff, together with a certain comment, was sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to disbelieve Home Depot‘s proffered nondiscriminatory reason. Id. Here, however, Zinnerman did not produce “evidence sufficient to cast doubt on defendant‘s proffered non-discriminatory reason.” Id. at 4. Zinnerman‘s argument focuses on whether she submitted evidence sufficient to cast doubt on “the reason” (including the incorrectness of it), not the “non-discriminatory reason” (whether involving discriminatory animus, basis, etc.). There is a difference. Eleventh Circuit case law consistently instructs the district courts to not re-examine or second guess an employer‘s business decisions --
In sum, “Title VII does not require that the employer‘s decision be rational or that an employer hire or promote the most qualified applicant, nor does it even guarantee success for those having greater merit. Title VII only requires that the employer make such decisions without regard to race, sex, religion, color, or national origin [or protected conduct].” Smith v. Alabama Dept. of Public Safety, 64 F.Supp. 2d 1215, 1228 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (quoting Harris v. Delchamps, Inc., 5 F.Supp. 2d 1316, 1321 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (citing Gilchrist v. Bolger, 733 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1984))).
As this Court‘s summary judgment ruling comports with binding precedent, there is “no manifest error of law” upon which
DONE and ORDERED this the 8th day of June 2018.
/s/ Kristi K. DuBose
KRISTI K. DUBOSE
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE