80 Neb. 503 | Neb. | 1908
Plaintiff brought this action in the district court against Trude, as sheriff, and Loverin & Brown ¿Company. The object of the action was to enjoin the defendant from levying an execution upon the property of the plaintiff upon the ground that the judgment, upon which the execution was issued, was void. The judgment in question whs rendered originally in the county court for more than $200, and a transcript thereof was filed in the district court, whence the execution issued. The judgment was al-’ leged to be void for two reasons: First, because the summons was neither issued nor signed by the county judge, but was issued by one F. E. Bourne, an assistant in the
No answer or demurrer had been filed to the petition by the defendant Trude, and the record itself does not disclose that the cause was submitted to the court for determination, except upon the motion. On the oral argument in this court, ho wever, it was conceded by both parties that the whole case was submitted to the trial court for decision upon the record. We are unable to determine from the record whether or not it was the intention of the parties, in submitting the case to- the district court, that the evidence offered by way of affidavits upon the hearing of the motion to dissolve the restraining order should be considered as evidence upon the trial of the principal cause. We are inclined to the view, however, that it is immaterial what their understanding was in that respect, because of the fact that no answer or demurrer was filed to the petition, and all the facts well pleaded in the petition must be taken as true. It therefore becomes necessary to determine whether or not the petition states a cause of action.
Where an act is complete in itself, and does not purport to be an amendatory act, although the provisions of the act may be in conflict with other provisions of the statutes, this court has held that the act is not in conflict with that clause of the constitution above referred to. In State v. Cornell, 50 Neb. 526, it was held that an act complete in itself is not inimical to the constitutional requirement that no law shall be amended unless the new act contains the section or sections so amended, although such complete act may be repugnant to or in conflict with a prior law not referred to nor in express terms repealed by the latter act. Other cases that hold substantially to the same doctrine are Canham v. Bruegman, 77 Neb. 436; State v. Omaha Elevator Co., 75 Neb. 637, and State v. Drexel, 74 Neb. 776.
In the latter case it was held that the repealing clause of an act of the legislature, repealing “all acts and p „rts of acts in conflict herewith,” only repeals such acts of the existing statutes as are so repugnant to the act last passed as that both cannot stand. Prior statutes are repealed pro tanto, and to the extent only that they conflict with the act last passed. Section 5, ch. 34, laws 1897, above referred to, is as follows: “All acts or parts of acts in conflict with this act be and hereby are repealed.” Applying the doctrine laid down in the case last above cited, it would follow, that the passage of chapter 34, laws 1897, would have the effect of repealing or modifying sections 8 and 20, ch. 20, Comp. St. 1895, to the extent that they required the personal act of the county judge in issuing or
The summons issued from the county court commanded the officer to summon “T. Zimmerman, whose first name is unknown to the plaintiff,” and the return to this summons shows that it was served by leaving a copy at the usual place of residence of the' appellant. Plaintiff contends, that the summons was issued pursuant to the provisions of section 148 of the code, which reads as follows: “When the plaintiff shall be ignorant of the name of the defendant, such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name and description, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding may be amended accordingly. The plaintiff in such case must state, in the verification of his petition, that he could not' discover the true name, and the summons must contain the words h’eal name unknown/ and a copy thereof must be served personally upon the defendant.” It is urged that, under the decision in the case of Enewold v. Olsen, 39 Neb. 59, personal service was required in order to give the conrt jurisdiction, and that the summons, showing that it was left at the usual place of residence, was sufficient to show that the court did not acquire jurisdiction. This contention could have no application, however, where the action was brought upon a written instrument, where the parties thereto had executed the same by signing the initial letter or letters or some contraction of the Christian name. Section 23 of the code provides that, in such a case, it shall be sufficient to designate such person by the name, initial letter or letters, or contraction of the full name or names, instead of the Christian, or first, name or names in full. It must be borne in mind that this was an action in the county court for more than $200, and was a term case, and that in such cases the county court is a court of record, and all presumptions are to be indulged in favor of the regularity of its proceedings and judgments.
Plaintiff’s petition was defective in another particular. He does not allege anywhere in his petition that no appearance was made by him in the case in the county court, and, for aught that appears in his petition, he may have appeared and made a defense in the action in the county court. The presumption being in favor of the regularity of the proceedings and judgment of the county court, the plaintiff in this -case must fail, unless he avers facts sufficient to show affirmatively that the court was without jurisdiction. This he has not done.
It follows that the judgment of the district court was right and should be affirmed.
By the Court: For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion, the judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.