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Zimmerman v. State
860 S.W.2d 89
Tex. Crim. App.
1993
Check Treatment

*1 ZIMMERMAN, Appellant, Kevin Lee Texas, Appellee.

The STATE

No. 71106. Texas, Appeals of of Criminal

Court

En Banc.

April 9, 1993.

Rehearing Denied June *2 course of also commit-

sion of while in the robbery.1 § ting Tex.Penal Code 19.- See 03(a)(2). phase, punishment At the affirmatively punishment answered is- 37.071(b) sues set forth in Article *3 Procedure,2 ap- Texas Code of Criminal and pellant ap- to death. Direct was sentenced peal to this was then automatic under Court 37.071(h).3 Article will affirm. We error, appellant points of seventeen challenges; sufficiency of the evidence to the verdict; support failure jury’s the the of the grant appellant’s trial court to of chal- two cause; lenges grant for trial court’s of the cause; challenges two of the for the State’s sustaining trial court’s in the conduct State’s Barlow, Beaumont, Douglas appel- M. appellant’s explanation the of lant. innocence; presumption the admission in of by appellant; evidence of the letters written Maness, Atty. Tom Dist. & John R. De- picture admission in of a of Witt, Beaumont, Atty., Dist. Asst. Robert child, decedent with his wife and and of Huttash, Austin, Atty., for the State. testimony of regarding the results another case; capital overruling the trial court’s of appellant’s objection closing to the State’s CAMPBELL, Judge. argument; refusal to the trial court’s submit jury appellant’s requested to the instructions OPINION regarding mitigating evidence and the defini- a May After in a in held Jefferson tions of certain terms contained the two County jury appellant, punishment addressing appel- found Kevin Zim- Lee issues. After merman, guilty 1987, capi- sufficiency point, of the October lant’s we will address the L_G_H_(hereinafter slaying majority tal appellant’s points “the of of error in the decedent”). aggravating they The in during element of the order4 which occurred by murder provided appellant’s of the commis- course trial. language continuing 1. The relevant from indictment lence would constitute threat society; read that “did then and there while in and committing evidence, attempting (3)if the course and to com- by the whether the raised Robbery, intentionally mit cause death of killing in de- conduct the defendant G_ [L_ H_, JR.], styled, hereafter the Com- response ceased was unreasonable in to the plainant, stabbing Complainant with a any, by provocation, the deceased. if knife, deadly weapon, that in to-wit: the man- (c) prove must each issue submitted state capable causing of its ner use serious doubt, beyond jury and the shall reasonable death, bodily injury and AGAINSTTHE PEACE special "yes” or return a verdict of "no” on AND DIGNITY OF THE STATE.” each issue submitted. The record that all three issues were reflects appellant's

2. At the time of Article 37.071 respect with submitted provided part: in relevant L_ G_ H_ murdering conduct in (b) presentation On of the of the conclusion indicated, punishment phase], evidence [at the the court 3. Unless all article referenc- otherwise following shall three to the submit issues to the Code of Criminal Procedure. es are Texas jury: Appellant’s point will fifth of error be ad- (1) the conduct of the whether defendant dressed out Since fourth of order. of the caused the death deceased was points legal and fifth of error involve identical deliberately with committed the reason- conjunction principles, will address them expectation able that the death of deceased though alleged result; even record reveals that or another would (2) points of error probability errors addressed in those did whether there is a that the consecutively. criminal vio- occur defendant would commit acts of eight, appellant argues returned to the room where that the evidence at trial was insufficient to Weber were. Appellant sustain his conviction. does not time, After some Gonzales went sufficiency contest of the evidence to struggle ensuing bathroom and heard a prove that a murder occurred. nearby room, appel- bedroom. In that does, however, contend that the evidence is Weber, knives, lant and armed with attacked prove killing insufficient to the decedent. After the two men stabbed decedent occurred the course of the com- times, appellant the decedent 31 took the robbery. mission of a our review gave decedent’s wallet to Weber. briefly upon will focus the facts of the mur- Then, Weber, Gonzales, appellant, left in der, specifically but will focus on those facts try get appellant hospi- their ear to to a proved robbery.

which *4 only tal. the car broke after While down review, In conducting this must time, we consid appellant finally short did reach the er all of in the evidence the record in the hospital, where he treatment received for verdict, light jury’s most favorable to the and knife wound. jury decide whether reasonable Appellant subsequently was arrested and every have found from that evidence element placed jail. jail, in appellant While in wrote beyond of the offense a reasonable doubt. numerous letters to Weber and to the district 307, 319, Virginia, Jackson v. 443 U.S. attorney. At the introduced 2781, 2789, (1979); S.Ct. 61 L.Ed.2d 560 Gee many pieces correspondence appel- of which sa v. 158-159 signed. lant had written and one of these (Tex.Cr.App.1991).purpose Our is not to reevaluate attorney, appellant letters5 to the district evidence, weight credibility the and wrote that: but to ensure that the reached a rational H_[the decision. Moreno v. Mr. decedent] never stabbed me H_ (Tex.Cr.App.1988). got fight. into a Mr. we never (sic) had 4 or 5 dolars on him hundred with, charged was and found drinking we were so I decided to kill him of, guilty violating § Tex.Penal 19.- Code fucking money. got and take his When we 03(a)(2). presented The State twelve wit- H_did back to Mr. not leave the room pieces physical nesses and numerous of evi- opened my because I took out knife and during guilt-innocence phase dence the trial’s stabbing him an in the and started course prove appellant’s guilt. Appellant pre- to accidentally got him I stabbing me light sented three in witnesses. Viewed (sic) my in arm. After he was dead stabed verdict, jury’s most to the favorable the testi- and I him over took the robbed —I rolled mony adduced at trial established follow- money pocket and took his out his front ing: if George wallet. I told that he Weber Weber, him, Appellant, George Kay any thing ever I kill too an Gon- said would zales, arrived a Motel in at 6' Beaumont on we left. The car broke down on side of motel, they George flag somebody at I October 1987. While road made decedent, staying hospital met the who also was down to take me to the and he did. (sic) drinks, ditch, having through I in the motel. After some the knife suggested they go my my decedent wallet that all kicked off shoes and threw fair, money returning fair. After from the all four out. I don’t know how much there G_[the people returned to room. After a was but it not much because (sic) time, bought jewlry Kay Kay short the decedent and Gonzales some decedent] room, gave at the much it I went to the decedent’s and the dece- fair but however paid George dent inter- it to him to be cool and Gonzales have sexual told Then, split, course. the decedent and Gonzales I would handle the rest. error, opinion. appellant' arguments In his seventh contests his substantive later this admissibility We will of this letter. address decedent’s maintain control of the corroborated obtain or

The contents of this letter were §§ 19.- testimony According property. Tex.Penal Code by the of Gonzales. See her, 29.02, reviewing arguing 03(a)(2), were After and the decedent and 31.03. at the light

about an incident had occurred most favorable Suddenly, “picked up a knife verdict, fair. appellant’s ar- conclude that decedent] stabbed him [the merit. guments are without Gonzales then went into the shoulder.” testimony, the fact Concerning Gonzales’ out, only to see bathroom and came back robbery that she pled guilty she stabbing appellant and Weber the dece- both not mean not commit does claims she did dent, “yelling ‘Don’tkill me. Please who was most, robbery At this no occurred. let me die. Don’t kill me. Please don’t don’t not rob testimony means that she did ” stopped let me die.’ After the decedent appel- It does not mean the decedent. moving, appellant get his tickets— “went to did not rob him. lant and Weber pockets.” of his wallet out testimony, ap- Concerning which Weber’s testimony Appellant argues contradicts, jurors were pellant’s letter only taking property de- proves “that credibili- assign it as much or as little free to AFTER the scribed this witness occurred Moreover, ty they desired. murder, alleged and not as conclusion of argument that the rob- *5 contradicts his letter part parcel Appellant a and thereof.” also bery “part parcel of’ the mur- was not argues, upon testimony from based other letter, appellant specifically stat- In his der. Gonzales, robbery. no that there was kill [the decedent] ed that he “decided to cross-examination, admitted On Gonzales money.” fucking take his exchange testimony, pled in her she that for ap- that Finally, even if the facts showed stated, guilty degree robbery. to second She body he pellant decedent’s after robbed the however, in no that she had fact committed died, disposi- already that would not be had robbery. According appellant, only “[t]he from tive. If the State introduces evidence despite conclusion to be drawn is that the rationally jury conclude that pled robbery, which the could guilty fact that [Gonzales] intent to obtain or appellant formed the testimony indicated that there was her property ei- Also, argues of the victim’s robbery.” appellant in fact no maintain control during testimony the commission that Weber’s that the decedent ther before or altercation, murder, appellant proven that a the that then the State “has started self-defense,6 robbery, acting in and that in the course of Weber were murder occurred robbery, proves appropriation that the evi- oc- although there was no the element of State, support convic- dence was insufficient to the murder.” Nelson v. curred after the response, argues 126, (Tex.Cr.App.1992), In the re- tion. State 20, appel- denied, January that the evidence was sufficient to show 1993. Since hearing rationally the in the course of the evi- lant murdered decedent conclude from robbery requi- mere committing “[t]he because appellant had formed dence that intent, that not taken until after fact the wallet was site we overrule Appellant finally had succeeded eight. Weber and error by stabbing him until subduing the victim four and five Appellant’s points of error killing he was does not mean that the dead the trial at two instances where are directed committing a rob-

was not in the course challenges grant appellant’s court refused bery.” points In veniremembers. for cause of two five, offense, respectively, appellant four and prove To State Harrington and John argues that Lionel required appellant that killed to show decedent, to, have been excused because during the Thomas should prior that against a bias a defen- murder, they each exhibited requisite intent to appellant had argument. argued makes no such at trial that he acted appeal, appellant On self-defense. testify. Concerning argument right ap dant’s not to The State re- the State’s that sponds court not err be- pellant failing that the trial did has waived error Harrington cause both and Thomas stated object granted at the time the trial court Also, they that would follow the law. challenge, past preserva our decisions on the appellant preserve failed to clarity. error lacked tion such have any potential (Tex.Cr.App.1989), error for review. v. 784 S.W.2d 38 Barefield denied, 1011, 110 t. 497 U.S. cer preserve In order to error stem 3256, (1990), 111 L.Ed.2d 766 we cited S.Ct. ming from a trial court’s denial of a defen (Tex.Cr.App.1985), Guzmon challenge prospective for of a dant’s cause denied, t. 475 U.S. cer juror, things: must defendant show three (1986), 89 L.Ed.2d 734 for the S.Ct. “(1) peremptory challenges; exhaustion of his proposition appellant does not “[i]f (2) request peremp denial of a for additional object when veniremember is excused for (3) tory challenges; seating cause, may challenge ruling he juror upon have whom defendant would Barefield, appeal.” 784 S.W.2d at 41. peremptory challenge.” exercised a Bell v. Guzmon, however, lodged appellant had (Tex.Cr.App.1986), challenges no to two of denied, 1046, 107 cert. 479 U.S. S.Ct. for cause. 697 S.W.2d at 412-13. (1987). L.Ed.2d 860 The record reveals language implying from statutorily al Barefield failed to exhaust his lodged when the chal must be peremptory challenges. lotted number of lenge is ruled was an erroneous sum review, appellant presents nothing Since applicable portion mation of the of the Guz- points we overrule of error four and five. opinion. mon Appellant’s points of error two and three grant are directed to the trial court’s of two Moreover, Barefield, *6 challenges of the State’s for cause of two objected immediately after the trial had points veniremembers. In of error two and challenge. granted court 784 the State’s three, respectively, appellant asserts that the argued that at 41. The State excusing Imogene trial court erred Whit- any by failing error to had waived aker and Julie Freeman. The trial court challenge prior object to the to the State’s upon and Freeman excused Whitaker based ruling trial court’s thereon. Since testimony against the their that their beliefs lodged objection before the venire- had his penalty preclude them from ever death would prior ques to member was dismissed and answering punishment issues affirmative- veniremember,7 tioning of next this Court ly- objection timely pre that the held was Whitaker, ap- Concerning veniremember the issue for review. Id. served vacillate, pellant ar- admits that she did but case, attorney unequivocally stat gues overwhelming testimony that was “[h]er challenge during the opposition ed her to the that, strong feelings while she had about the voir dire. penalty, to death she would be able to listen State, citing Purtell v. 761 perform her function as a The the evidence and denied, juror.” argues response (Tex.Cr.App.1988), 360 cert. State L.Ed.2d 104 the record shows that Whitaker was biased 490 U.S. S.Ct. this, (1989), argues further against penalty. the death From impression to the attorney “gave argues trial court committed the distinct State abandoning opposi her Additionally, that she no abuse of discretion. the Court was by failing “to renew challenge” appellant waived error tion to the State granted the objection the Court by failing object the trial court her when when conclude, however, ...” challenge challenge We granted the for cause. questioning of the next venire- been excused and 924-25 7. See Fuller v. Court, Writing Judge (Tex.Cr.App.1992). begun for the was far too late” to consti- member had "[a]ppellant's objection af- Overstreet stated that timely objection. tute a already question had ter the veniremember Purtell, following exchange defense counsel dispositive. between Purtell cause, challenged and Whitaker occurred: a veniremember for expressed the veniremember’s based So now DEFENSE COUNSEL: penalty. The final opposition to the death you you’ve of what I had asked —Because exchange on voir dire occurred between the earlier, you you answer [the felt like veniremember, attorney and the dur defense fairly on the evi- punishment based issues] that he ing which the veniremember stated you you telling Are me now that dence. could not follow the court’s instructions be fairly can’t them based on the evi- answer opposed to the death cause he was “still dence? court penalty.” 761 S.W.2d at 366. The trial Yes. WHITAKER: attorney “Any specifically asked the defense reviewing the entire voir dire After further, thing at sir?” which defense Whitaker, we cannot conclude that record “No, torney at responded sir.” It was the the trial court committed an abuse discre torney’s response nothing “that he had fur jurors Prospective tion. should be excused impression ther created the distinct [that] prevent for cause if their views would abandoning opposition that he was substantially impair performance of their motion to dismiss for cause.” Id. Witt, jurors. Wainwright v. duties as 412, 424, 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. case, appellant’s attorney In this was (1985); Moody respond by not offered a chance to the trial Also, (Tex.Cr.App.1992). a trial court’s appellant’s attorney court. While remained juror prospective is re decision to excuse challenge granted, silent when the she an standard viewed under abuse discretion already opposition made her had known “great given to because deference must be challenge. While it would have been position is in the court who best time, opposition better to voice that a second prospective jurors see and hear the and to we conclude that her tanta silence was not responses.” Moody, evaluate their objection. mount to an abandonment of her especially This is true in S.W.2d at 888-889. long hold that the voir as juror like this where the vacillates situations dire record reflects that an demeanor, expression, and “elements such as lodged during either the voir dire and/or voice, emphasis tone of all of which ruling, the time of the trial court’s record, escape purview are cold abandoned, appel was not assessing message important factors in *7 objections lant will be able to raise on State, 185, conveyed.” Nichols v. granting challenges to the for Hav cause. denied, (Tex.Cr.App.1988), cert. 488 U.S. ing pre determined that the issue has been (1989), 109 S.Ct. 102 L.Ed.2d 808 served, appel we now address the merits of grounds by, on other Butler v. overruled arguments. lant’s 125, 130(Tex.Cr.App.1992); Harris v. S.W.2d Our review of the record shows that App.1989); Green v. veniremember stated that did Whitaker she (1989). By her final aforementioned re capital punishment, not believe in that but sponse, expressly veniremember Whitaker really judgment she “could make a true ac to an indicated that she would not be able cording just to the evidence and blot out fairly. punishment More swer the issues beliefs, long making was] as [her] [she over, position trial court was in the best penalty decision for the death ...” She Having her demeanor. concluded to assess disapproval did that her of the death state discretion, its that the trial court acted within automatically penalty would not cause her to appellant’s point of error two. we overrule punishment issues in a certain answer Freeman, ap- Concerning veniremember way. that she could over She also stated vacillated, but punishment pellant admits that she too come her beliefs answer whole, testimony, taken as a according Howev that her questions to the evidence. er, could listen to the evi- immediately be “indicated that she the record reveals that dence, or the de- challenge, from the State granted trial court whether fore the penalty. you still feel that the death Do fense, fairly honestly and render judge it way? responds that a decision.” State reveals that Freeman also biased record way. I still feel that FREEMAN: penalty. against the death you still feel like Do PROSECUTOR: that the trial court committed contends State penalty are your feelings on the death granting in the State’s

no abuse of discretion your abil- going impair or interfere with challenge for cause. juror in this cause? ity to be a going If I’m to answer FREEMAN: juror informa- on her Freeman indicated question honestly, probably would. that in not believe questionnaire that she did tion During the initial penalty. the death State’s dire exami- During the remainder of the voir Freeman, indicated Freeman examination nation, attorney prosecu- appellant’s able to intro- would never be inconsistent an- tor continued to elicit both compel her to evidence to duce sufficient indi- Freeman would swers from Freeman. affirmatively. punishment issues answer the attorney be that she would cate to challenged After the State Freeman punishment based fair and answer the issues cause, attorney proceeded to ex- and then indicate on the evidence examination, During this amine Freeman. would not be able prosecutor she following exchanges occurred between in punishment issues a manner answer appellant’s counsel: Freeman and imposition of the in the that would result penalty, regardless of the evidence. death you say- Are COUNSEL: DEFENSE examination, the fol- During the final then, really just consid- you can’t ing, exchange transpired: lowing you answering questions, er those answering them? you can’t be honest be fair to Can PROSECUTOR: knowing they are of Texas the State honest FREEMAN: I —I couldn’t be penalty in this case? seeking the death my if would mean answering them answer No. something like that. FREEMAN: penalty or [the] death just to be in the I wouldn’t even want the entire Having a review of conducted situation like that. Freeman, we conclude voir dire of After the amined Freeman. cross-examination, to know is tions based on whatever stood strongly against is that your function as a many people swer following DEFENSE COUNSEL: FREEMAN: Yes. FREEMAN: DEFENSE COUNSEL: you? appellant’s [*] the you, right? questions just # dialogue transpired: then, do, can Yes. the attorney During that examination that the death n even you based juror? You could an- prosecutor you answer those though you feel [*] evidence is on the concluded What we If penalty, as I’ve further ex- # evidence; perform under- given ques- need [*] the judge’s position to assess veniremember who Nichols, to a member of pellant’s the sustaining the State’s the trial court’s decision demeanor, trial court committed explanation of discretion was serts that dire examination O’Quinn, appellant’s accorded Freeman granting presumption In point of error three. constituted a the trial court expression, and of the the State’s highest the venire. of error committed, of veniremember presumption innocence, equivocates much that attorney, at 195. Since objection no abuse of discretion deference prime challenge for cause. to excuse should be committed error one, appellant as factors such as During the voir *8 we overrule tone of voice. example of the in stated so of innocence reference to due to the appellant’s no abuse that “as Dennis ap- by Zimmerman is inno fact, now Mr. your he sits there In PROSECUTOR: stating objected, prosecutor The cent ...” you thought I think questionnaire inno presumption of appellant “has a and I can’t be a fair you put down when the “obvious Appellant argues that in cence.” I believe juror don’t impartial because twelve, through objection nine prosecutor’s points and In implication of the erred appellant that the trial court sanctioning by thereof the Court was that contends the 75, 75A, 78, and actually admitting in exhibits presumption of innocence did not All of the exhibits are letters Appellant Appel respectively. mean that was innocent.” George mailed to Kyles by appellant lant directs our attention to written co-actor) while the two (Tex.App. (appellant’s 747 S.W.2d 64 Weber — Beaumont jail separate cells. pet.) argues further that this error men were no hearsay by constituted proscribed “the exact error asserts that the exhibits constitutes they proof’ no and “that were admitted on Kyles.” the decision in The State response, In objection authored them. proper appellant was because the argues that each of the letters was presumption of innocence does not mean that the State appellant properly authenticated and that a defendant is in fact innocent. preserve any issue for has failed to review Kyles present ap- the court of While did of some of the regarding the authentication situation, peals appellant’s reli- with similar exhibits. misplaced. Kyles, ance thereon is identical, prosecutor, explaining presumption Exhibits 75 and 75A are innocence, being excerpt an from exhibit presumption stated that “the of with exhibit 75 innocent, trial, objected you’re appellant to exhibit innocence does not mean 75A. At hearsay, attorney grounds ...” at 64. The defense 75 on the that it constituted laid, objected proper predicate prosecutor’s comment to the that no had been you jury] nothing effect “that have to consider a within the exhibit indicated [the letter, innocent, regard ...” person but it doesn’t mean that “who wrote 75A, objected only that the they really appellant are innocent.” Id. The [sic] exhibit hearsay, proper that no appeals against court of decided the issue document constituted laid, and that the letter appellant upon predicate based the conclusion that no had been occurred, definitively by attorney-client privil protected harm had but did not ege.9 conclude that the comment constituted er-

ror.8 identical, the exhibits are Since sustaining prosecu- appellant argue

The trial below that one of court’s of the since did constituted, of author tor’s herein no error. the exhibits contained no indicia prosecutor’s ship, remark that had we will address authentica presumption arguments. Authentication of handwrit “a of innocence” was a correct tion by comparison per prosecutor ing may statement of law. While the be established jury. by experts by meaning did not elaborate formed either remark, presumption art. 38.27. Proof of innocence does Tex.Code Crim.Proc. carry comparison writing samples to other is suffi with it the connotation that a de- Therefore, fails to contest under

fendant is fact innocent. we cient when authenticity either his handwrit conclude that the trial court committed no oath the ing unsigned, or of his sustaining error in the State’s when the document signed. signature the document is Ca appellant’s point overrule of error one. when wrote, attorney-client privilege, protected by appeals have 8. The court of "It would made, argu- been better if the comment had not been no counsel on makes question Appellant. is whether it harmed but concerning privilege. ment every in a case was If loose remark criminal privilege merits of the issue. need not reach the reversal, very cause few convictions would George he At Weber testified that *9 And, up. philosophic ever there is some stand appellant. The rec- had received the letter from prosecutor 747 in what the said.” substance letter that the State obtained the ord reflects added.) (Emphasis S.W.2d at 65. Characteriz- subpoena a of all such materials means of markedly ing a as a "loose remark” is comment appellant’s possession. We note that Weber’s deeming erro- from that same comment different publication privileged act- of this communication neous. by destroying privilege the of the ed as a waiver of the letter. See Burnett v. confidential nature objected appellant’s 9. While trial counsel (Tex.Cr.App.1982). 642 S.W.2d the basis that it introduction of exhibit 75A on 431, constitut- the exhibit was irrelevant and that macho v. 765 S.W.2d Watson, attempt by the to show the 606 S.W.2d State App.1989); Ex Parte ed 902, argues (Tex.Cr.App.1980). character of the decedent. response appellant that waived error 75A, appellant Exhibit a letter from concerning photo- introduction of the attorneys, appel bears to one of his former graph. ap notarized. signature lant’s and is Since signature under pellant denied his trial, objected never appellant to the introduc- At oath, be authenticity of this exhibit could solely on the basis of rele- tion of exhibit by comparing it established with however, and was vancy. appeal, appellant On exemplars appellant’s writing that were also picture of [the “the introduction of a exhibit 75 was admitted into evidence. Since have wife and child decedent’s] 75A, nothing excerpted portions than of more of attempt ... to show the character been an was authenticat exhibit 75 also could be and family man.” When the decedent as a decent by comparison. we conclude ed complaint appeal differs from on of error occurred the admission that no Rezac, trial, made at the error is waived. 75 and 75A and overrule exhibits at 870. nine ten. points of error - Judge concurring opinion, Baird In his appellant’s points of Addressing states, appellant presents the same com- “As twelve, pertain to error eleven and which trial, Rezac is plaint on as he made at 80, and we note that both exhibits exhibits 78 disagree with concur- inapplicable.” We Weber, of from each are letters com- ring opinion’s that the same assertion signature Appellant “Lil Z.” which bears appeal as was plaint being advanced objected of to the introduction these never trial, following At advanced at trial. alleged failure to on the letters based State’s exchange occurred: only a Appellant lodged authenticate them. As to the COUNSEL]: [DEFENSE Concerning hearsay objection to exhibit 71 we proffer of exhibit State’s objected on the at trial exhibit pro- object not relevant to to it. It’s hearsay, relevancy, failure to grounds already picture ceeding. [the a There’s appeal, lay proper predicate. On decedent] in hearsay ar relevancy or appellant makes no exhibit This COURT]: [State’s [TRIAL exhibits guments, argue tries to but isn’t in. 46] sufficiently authenticated. Since were not No, appeal differs from complaint made on COUNSEL]: No. [DEFENSE complaining of lodged error that’s not. is waived. Rezac insufficient authentication exhibit [State’s It’s COURT]: [TRIAL (Tex.Cr.App. not in evidence. tendered. It’s 46] 1990). Additionally, predicate object We’re COUNSEL]: [DEFENSE any error due to its insuffi preserve failed to al- because there 71] to it exhibit [State’s State, 719 Beck v. specificity. cient See ready is another one. (Tex.Cr.App.1986).10 Hav object to 71? You [TRIAL COURT]: appellant has failed ing concluded that review, anything for we overrule present rel- Yes. On COUNSEL]: [DEFENSE points error eleven and twelve. evancy. six, exchange This demonstrates appellant ar relevancy objection at trial was based admitting erred in

gues the trial court 71 was exhibit argument that State’s photograph of the victim with exhibit already anoth- duplicative because there was child. contends and infant wife rule, however, that a requirement predates obviates recognize case that the Beck 10. We exhib- opposing of such an party and that Texas Rule the introduction criminal evidence rules of governs au- sufficiently specific current lodge Criminal Evidence it must of letters such and identification thentication exhibit. the authentication Nothing in the the exhibits discussed herein. *10 trial, objected appellant At to exhibit picture er of the decedent the record. On only grounds on the constituted appeal, appellant argues that 61C objec hearsay. Appellant lodged no trial picture obviously could was irrelevant “and upon the tions to the exhibit based attempt part have been an on the of the alleged properly authenticate the failure to to show the character of the decedent State Therefore, need not letter. we address family Appellant a decent man.” in no Rezac, argument appeal.11 way presented argument this to the trial appellant 870. We conclude that has waived Therefore, underlying court. the rationale any regarding error the admission of exhibit Purtell, supra, entirely both Rezac and appellant’s point of error 61C and overrule applicable disposition and controls the of this seven. question. appellant Since denied the opportunity upon to the com- court rule fourteen, appellant argues point In of error

plaint appeal, advanced on we will not ad- admitting testi- that the trial court erred appellant’s arguments. Having dress con- mony by on cross-examina- elicited the State error, appellant cluded that waived about the results of tion of a defense witness point overrule his of error six. case, Johnny capital another the case of Paul Penry. Appellant argues that the seven, In appellant com jury. Ap- trying impermissibly to bias the plains of the admission in of exhibit pellant purpose in asserts that the State’s 61C, by appellant. In a letter written eliciting testimony obviously to “was letter, appellant admits that he robbed and demonstrate that mental retardation while Appellant, citing killed the decedent. Cama case, may in a murder a capital be an issue (Tex.Cr.App. cho v. mentally may re- retarded defendant even 1989), argues that the admission of the letter penalty, important- and more ceive death against hearsay violated the rule because ly, mentally Appellant was not even retard- appellant’s signa State failed to corroborate argues that no error was ed.” The State ture. volunteered committed because the witness original comments about the case required interpret Camacho us to Article testimony “intimating possi- given had direct dispositive. 38.27 and is not Article 38.27 Appellant’s mental condition ble issues as provides competent give that “It is evi- possi- might which well be a fore-runner to handwriting by by comparison dence of made Penry punishment stage.” ble claim at the experts by jury. by comparison or Proof appellant’s gener- The State also only shall not be sufficient to establish preserve anything for al failed to handwriting sig- of a witness who denies his review. Camacho, appel- nature under oath.” writing lant had denied his under oath. 765 phase, Dr. During guilt-innocence Win- 38.27, interpreting S.W.2d at 432. article During appellant. del Dickerson testified literally required deny cross-examination, which defendant to volunteered Dickerson oath, signature that a Penry his under we held comments about “the decision” Later, handwriting of his “Johnny Penry’s defendant’s sworn denial case.”12 Paul obligate hand- prove questions specif- would also the State to Dickerson prosecutor asked by comparison Ap- Penry alone. ob- writing ically more than about the case. deny signature jected introduction of such evidence

pellant herein did not his relevancy.” trial court handwriting under oath. this “on the basis of his objection, and Dickerson testi- fundamentally.. overruled the case differs from Camacho oath, error, signature handwriting under this appellant preserved or his 11. Had the record proof handwriting properly proven comparison constituted sufficient reveals according comparison the terms of Article letter. handwriting compared expert 38.27. At facts, of the statement of 12. From the context handwriting exemplars to the hand- apparently were references these comments compari- writing in the letter. Based son, Lynaugh, Penry 492 U.S. 109 S.Ct. expert had writ- believed that (1989). deny 106 L.Ed.2d 256 ten the letter. failed to Since *11 timely nothing “To be presents for review. the mental retardation generally fied about objection must be raised ‘at the earliest Penry and “the sec- aspects of the decision ground of punishment opportunity,’ or ‘as soon as the special provision second [i.e. ond counterbalancing provision objection apparent.’” v. becomes Johnson versus issue] law, 272, 291 present (Tex.Cr.App.1990), in our ...” which is not — U.S. -, denied, 111 S.Ct. cert. appellant lodged a rele At (1991), on other overruled 115 L.Ed.2d of the testi vancy to the admission grounds, Heitman mony. appeal, appellant On (Tex.Cr.App.1991). Appellant waived consti testimony was irrelevant and that the by objecting only after the second any error attempt by the tuted an bias made. comment was Therefore, any jury. error is waived because from appellant’s argument on differs Concerning the second comment about Rezac, 782 S.W.2d at that advanced at trial. testimony, the rec- of Dickerson’s distortion Having appellant concluded that has subject comment reveals that the ord error, point of overrule his waived we testimony Dickerson’s and was error fourteen. During closing argument, about exhibit 61C. let- attorney, in reference to the thirteen, appellant’s appellant com- killing and ter wherein admitted prosecutor’s plains of two instances of decedent, robbing stated that “It’s jury argument. Appellant contends that the letter] because [in the truth of the words by prosecutor constituted two comments you they are not true.” appellant “over his Dr. Dickerson told an effort to strike at reveals, argu- testimony responds that the counsel.” The State Our review of Dickerson’s appel- however, the con- entirely proper and that never stated that ments were that he concerning During one preserve error false. cross- lant failed tent of the letter was ad- prosecutor, of the instances. Dickerson examination appel- not know which of mitted that he did guilt-inno- During closing argument at the which were false. stories true and lant’s were argued that: phase, prosecutor cence correct in his prosecutor was Well, testimony Kay is what Gonzales’ attorney had dis- appellant’s argument that just you how you it And to show decide is. testimony. Having con- torted Dickerson’s Kay attorney] what [appellant’s distorted arguments are with- cluded that is, you ask the testimony can Gonzales’ merit, point of error thir- out we overrule particu- those reporter to transcribe court teen. you think are different parts lar Also, you to tell you different. know are sixteen, fifteen, error Appellant’s points tes- attorney] distorts the [appellant’s how interrelated, each involv- are and seventeen reporter] to tran- timony court [the ask re- to submit ing trial court’s refusal char- part Dr. Dickerson’s scribe the about jury. points quested instructions [referring to exhibit acterization of this seventeen, sixteen, respec- fifteen, error appellant admitted he robbed in which 61C trial court argues that the tively, appellant [Appellant’s at- decedent]. and killed proposed his to submit refusing erred in said torney] [Dr. Dickerson] said that of the term “de- the definition instruction on untrue. Think back— was on the liberately,” proposed instruction his objected attorney point, At this in the sec- of the terms contained definition “mis- grounds prosecutor on the issue, refusing to punishment ond “attacking argument stating” her regarding instruction proposed submit his counsel.” the defendant over responds The State mitigating evidence. require that his argues that these comments mitigating evidence there was no conviction be reversed. require special instruction would adequately ad- the instructions submitted ini Concerning prosecutor’s appel- each of subject matter of dressed distortion of Gon regarding the tial comment requested instructions. lant’s testimony, conclude that zales’ *12 denied, fifteen, (Emphasis original), cert. 431 U.S. Addressing point of error even (1977). 933, 2642, required 53 L.Ed.2d 250 though the trial court was not to 97 S.Ct. jury Additionally, judge on the of “deliber the trial in this case went instruct the definition State, 265, ate,” by beyond required giv- 270 Morin v. 682 S.W.2d what this Court has State, dictionary 665 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); jury apparently Russell v. is ing the what 771, (Tex.Cr.App.1983), “deliberately.” pre- cert. de 780 We are not definition of 1073, 1428, nied, 465 104 79 U.S. S.Ct. pared say that such a definition is errone- to (1984), in the trial court did appellant’s point L.Ed.2d error and overrule of ous jury struct the that “deliberate means some fifteen. something thing more than intentional and sixteen, Addressing point of error premeditation, than and is a conscious less in appellant’s requested observe that involving thought process which decision jury sought to instruct the on the struction engage in more than mere will to embraces “probability” and definition of the terms however, Appellant requested, the conduct.” “criminal acts of violence.” This Court has jury the trial court instruct that: however, held, already that a trial court need doing Deliberately means a manner of “deliberately; probability; crimi not define by resulting an act characterized from violence; continuing nal threat [and] acts of consideration; thorough char- careful and society charge jury during ... its acterized of the conse- awareness stage capital murder punishment of a willful, slow, unhurried, quences; planned 105, 107 King trial.” v. 553 S.W.2d premeditated steady though as denied, (Tex.Cr.App.1977), cert. 434 U.S. allowing time for decision. The term “de- (1978). 1088, 1284, 55 L.Ed.2d 793 98 S.Ct. liberately” meaning differ- therefore has Accordingly, appellant’s point we overrule of ent and distinct from the term “intention- error sixteen. ally.” already You have found seventeen, appellant ai’- point of error intentionally murder was committed be- refusing gues the trial court erred in an crime cause intent was element of the requested mitigat submit his instruction capital of murder. You must now decide ing During appellant in evidence. causing whether the defendant’s conduct (1) evidence that he had twice been troduced deliberate, as, death as well intention- (2) child, abandoned as a had suffered some you al. If have a reasonable about doubt (3) abuse,13 good had been a son for his child whether his conduct was deliberate or (4) mother, adoptive plate had had a metal intentional, merely you Spe- must answer (5) ten, age had a inserted into his skull “no,” you cial Issue # even if are certain (I.Q.),14 low-average intelligence quotient intentionally that he caused the victim’s (6) difficulty trusting people due to his had death. paranoid personality. Appellant claims that equated Appellant’s instruction provide the the instructions “[n]owhere did “deliberately” “planned premeditat with jury expressing a vehicle for its rea with deliberate, To conduct ed.” be response to the evidence and soned moral only need arise from a conscious decision to sentencing sup rendering its decision.” act after at least brief consideration. Nar port position, appellant directs our of this 415, 424 vaiz v. Penry Lynaugh, v. attention to the case Moreover, statutory

App.1992). re “[t]he 2934, 106 302, L.Ed.2d 256 109 S.Ct. U.S. quirements conduct be com (1989). deliberately mitted does not mean interpreted Penry, a As we have premeditated act.” v. must be a Granviel 107, sentencing offends no federal (Tex.Cr.App.1976) capital scheme presented no evidence of his actual lant herein I.Q., information con- 13. The record is devoid "low-average, I.Q. cerning depth the child abuse. and breadth of but that his percentile," "[a]bout and that 80% in the 15th I.Q. Penry implies person of 70 that a with brighter” walking than people [were] around Penry, presumptively retarded. or below is him. 1, 2941, Appel- n. 1. n. 109 S.Ct. at U.S. at if provisions constitutional scheme both U.S. 96 S.Ct. 49 L.Ed.2d jury mitigat perhaps Ly allows the to consider also 929] relevant of Franklin v. 164, 108 ing supra provides naugh, [487 evidence and U.S. some S.Ct. noted, As expressing 155.]

means a reasoned L.Ed.2d we have Ju- moral re reasonably holding rek read sponse making is that evidence an individ youth given circumstance of punishment. ualized constitution assessment of Goss *13 State, ally 162, 165 adequate deciding consideration in the 826 (Tex.Cr.App.1992). S.W.2d special claim, regard issues. We see no to analyzing reason Penry-type a we look to family circumstances of Graham’s presented see if the at spe evidence trial is background positive and character traits cifically to relevant a defendant’s “moral cul light. a different Graham’s evidence of pability,” i.e. provides whether evidence a upbringing transient and otherwise non for concluding basis the defendant is closely character more violent resembles deserving capital punishment. less of Id. at age, employment Jurek’s evidence histo If relationship particu 165. between the ry, Penry’s and familial ties it does than special lar case’s evidence and the issues is of mental evidence retardation and harsh that the special provide such issues no means physical abuse. jurors respond morally for the in a rea way, at -, soned Id. at the statute is unconstitutional as 113 S.Ct. this,

applied. Id. From a defendant is enti conclude that not entitled to an only regarding mitigating tled to an if additional instruction additional instruction jury’s evidence relevant to the case in manner evidence. The of all of a assessment beyond special appellant’s scope that is relevant ex issues. evidence could be pressed through Id. special second issue. Moreover, appellant’s in requested All of appellant’s evidence fell within following language: struction includes the special the ambit of the second issue. All of you If an aspect decide that of the de- this evidence past related to his fendant’s character and record or circum- tory personality pertained appel and mitigating of the crime is a circum- stances propensity lant’s character and for constitut stance, give you aggravating must not it ing danger society. Goss, a future 826 Thus, your judgment, if ih a miti- effect. State, 166; S.W.2d at v. Earhart 823 S.W.2d gating independently circumstance calls 607, (Tex.Cr.App.1991); 632 Ex Parte Bal for though a life sentence it also even dree, 213, (Tex.Cr.App.1991). 810 S.W.2d 217 “yes” Spe- support tends to a answer to a Penry’s child Unlike evidence of abuse Issue, cial you Special must not answer damage, appellant’s brain evidence “does not “yes,” you Issue rather either answer but act, explain tend to his excuse or criminal may it no you use as a for a vote basis State, Lackey 111, ...” v. 819 S.W.2d 134 mercy your for “life” in write word State, (Tex.Cr.App.1989). See also Mines v. verdict form. (Tex.Cr.App.1992); 950-51 language This constitutes incorrect state Nobles v. 506 an Penry only that, App.1992). Concerning appellant’s requires ment evidence of the law. case, jury “provided having good adoptive appropriate in an be been a son for his mother, recently expressing with for its ‘reasoned Supreme Court has a vehicle de ” 328, 109 response.’ moral at S.Ct. “positive cided that U.S. such evidence charac Penry require, require at does howev ter traits” does not the trial court to 2951-52. er, jury both jury. a that if a finds certain evidence Penry submit instruction to Gra — nature, U.S. -, Collins, mitigating aggravating in then ham v. S.Ct. (1993). its jury give must evidence Writing 122 L.Ed.2d (cid:127) stated, mitigating majority, effect. Justice White jury a de- example, For could consider Penry are [W]e not convinced mitigating both a circum- mitigat youth fendant’s be extended to cover the sorts of aggravating stance circumstance. ing suggests without a evidence Graham mitigating because Youth seen as of Jurek could be [v. wholesale abandonment Rezac, maturity jury refused. age. request often coincides A for counsel was with might young be merciful defendant Appeals towards at 870-871. Court in the belief that the defendant could live a reversed, holding of Rezac’s invoca productive being life after incarcerated for an erroneously of counsel was right tion of his jury, extended time. The same placed jury. Rezac v. before the might youth aggravating also view as an 1986). (Tex.App. We — Dallas circumstance based the belief reversed, holding: young simply use re defendant would Thus, maining years to continue a life of crime. theory upon by failed to state the relied — Collins, at -, See Graham U.S. Appeals. Because the trial the Court of (1993) (Souter, dissenting). S.Ct. at 917 J. opportunity to rule judge did not have an Nothing Penry require would this or jury quash based on the on motion other faced with evidence which is both *14 making impermissible ap- inferences from mitigating aggravating give the evi counsel, right his pellant’s invocation of Likewise, only mitigating dence its effect. nothing presented appellate review. is neither could the be instructed that it give only aggravating must the evidence its Rezac, at 782 S.W.2d 871. appellant’s requested effect. Since instruc holding upon in Rezac is based Purtell Our incorrectly mitigating tion on stated State, (Tex.Cr.App.1988), v. 761 360 S.W.2d law, we discern no error in the trial wherein we stated: court’s refusal to submit that instruction.

Having appellant’s arguments concluded that perfect appeal, ... In order to an issue for merit, point are devoid of we overrule his of objection “required an is to inform the trial error seventeen. objection judge of the basis of the opportunity it.” afford him the to rule on judgment The of the trial court AF- addition, objection “af- ... should FIRMED. opposing opportunity to ford counsel an MALONEY, JJ., OVERSTREET and objection supply remove the or other testi- concur in the result. mony.”

CLINTON, J., dissents. Purtell, 365-366, quoting at Zil State, lender v. 557 S.W.2d BAIRD, Judge, concurring. reaching the App.1977). before reasons, following For the I concur in the point appellate of error an court merits of a disposition point of sixth of error whether the of error must determine join opinion. and otherwise so, objection. comports If with the trial judge opportunity trial had the to rule on the I. objection opposing could counsel have six, appellant’s point To resolve any error. cured plurality appellant’s complaint finds complaint appeal. differed from his on II. (Tex. Citing Rezac v. 782 S.W.2d 869 Cr.App.1990), plurality holds having any Relevant evidence is “evidence preserve complaint failed to for review.1 his tendency to make the existence of fact disagree. I consequence to the that is of determination probable probable of the action more or less plurality’s reliance Rezac is mis- than it would be without the evidence.” Tex. objected placed. Rezac to the admission of a 1) may provid- Except as be videotape contending, no R.Crim.Evid. 401. the State had 2) Constitution, him, or probable videotape ed for in the our statutes cause plurality an Specifically, wife and child could have been dent’s] attempt 1. holds: of the dece- to show the character trial, appellant objected At to the introduc- family dent as a decent man." When com- solely tion of exhibit 71 on the of relevan- basis plaint that made at differs from cy. appeal, On waived. the error is (citation omitted). picture Majority Opinion at “the dece- [the introduction of object to it rules, [Appellant’s Counsel]: We’re admissible. evidence is all relevant already because there Conversely, 71] exhibit [State’s irrele- Tex.R.Crim.Evid. is another one. Id. Never- evidence is inadmissible. vant theless, if may be excluded relevant evidence object Judge]: to 71? You [Trial outweighed by danger substantially relevancy. [Appellant’s Counsel]: Yes. On issues, mis- prejudice, confusion of the unfair complain appeal appellant continues On of un- leading jury, byor considerations ruling Exhibit 71: on State’s of cumu- delay, presentation due needless absolutely no relevance of the There was Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 403. lative evidence. depicting the portion of State’s No. and child to the issue Montgomery v. decedent’s wife rehearing), guilty of (Opinion on or not (Tex.Cr.App.1990) whether alleged in the indict- relevancy of evidence capital murder held an by Appellant, appeal. pointed out preserves the issue for ment. As properly Cf., of his wife and Montgomery, picture at 387. Cohn introduction of a obviously (Tex.Cr.App. irrelevant child was fact 1993) attempt on the J., concurring) (“bolstering” only have (Campbell, been the character of part anal to show to invoke Rule 403 insufficient family man. as a decent Although Montgomery concerned the decedent ysis). true, offenses, it was may we have have been admissibility of extraneous While such *15 guilt or admissibility clearly of evidence not relevant to the issue governs held 259, State, Long 823 S.W.2d innocence. general. in v. However, objec (Tex.Cr.App.1991). an

271 preserve relevancy insufficient to tion to is photograph of the purpose appeal probative if the value of the issue for family his was to together with decedent by substantially outweighed is the evidence against Appel- jury inflame the arouse and prejudice. A further danger of unfair any testimony was irrelevant lant. The re objection upon Rule 403 is now based proper jury and was not issue before Montgomery, at 388. quired. 810 S.W.2d any purpose. for Appellant’s pg. Brief 24. III. trial objection informed the Appellant’s judge erred Appellant contends the objection, the trial judge of his of the basis trial, the admitting exhibit 71.2 At State’s objection and the State judge ruled on photographs of the de- tendered two any error. to cure given opportunity was depicted 46 the de- exhibit ceased. State’s Zillender, and, See, Purtell, supra. supra, autopsy. appeared before the ceased as he complaint on presents the same As with depicted the deceased State’s exhibit inapplica- Rezac is he made at objected: his wife and child. ble. [Appellant’s Counsel]: As to the State’s IV. object to it. proffer exhibit 71 we of State’s failed to contends The State proceeding. It’s not relevant objection under specific grounds for state already picture deceased] of [the There’s objec- 52(a). Tex.R.App.P. While in evidence.... stated, we have have been better tion could Judge]: [State’s 46] This exhibit [Trial of exclu- ground the “correct held that when isn’t in. opposing judge and was obvious sion No, not. [Appellant’s Counsel]: No. that’s general counsel, from no waiver results Zillender, objection.” 557 S.W.2d imprecise ten- Judge]: [State’s 46] It’s exhibit [Trial State, See, 827 S.W.2d Lankston v. at 517. It’s not evidence. dered. admitting State's Trial Court erred Appellant's six The 2. states: 71, character of evidence of the Exhibit No. deceased. and, (Tex.Cr.App.1992); family previously Tex. been admitted without had 52(a) objection R.App.P. (specific grounds for objection. Prior to the admission of State’s specific grounds “if must be stated were intro- Exhibit the deceased’s wallet was context”). Here, by apparent not from the objection. without duced into evidence exhibits, viewing proposed argu- and the photographs of the de- wallet contained counsel, grounds ment of sisters, mother, and children. ceased’s wife objec- objection apparent.3 Appellant’s are photograph was and dis- Each identified relevancy tion to the Exhibit 71 State’s jury from cussed before the without any preserve sufficient to error as to appellant. Rule violation of 401. State, Stoker 788 S.W.2d However, appellant’s relevancy objection App.1989), we held: preserve any did not error as to violation probative Rule 403. Whether the value of It that when ... is well established substantially exhibit 71 out same is introduced from another by danger weighed prejudice of unfair source, objection, without the defendant is the Court because there was no before position complain appeal. not in on See, Long, such at trial. also, Id., 12. 788 S.W.2d at See Boles v. 271; and, Montgomery, S.W.2d at State, (Tex.Cr.App. 598 S.W.2d 279-280 at S.W.2d 1980) (“Where complained of admit facts are objection by competent ted without other V. evidence, presented.”); no reversible error is character, good Evidence of the deceased’s 701; Armstrong, 718 Havard v. defense, unless attacked is irrelevant. 195, 205(Tex.Cr.App.1989); Armstrong v. and, 59, 62 Womble v. (Tex.Cr.App.1985) (opinion rehearing) (Tex.Cr.App.1981). photo Because other (Testimony good of deceased’s character family graphs of the deceased and his were “was irrelevant to issue before *16 objection, the error in the admitted without rebuttal”). also, proper and was not See 71 was waived. admission State’s exhibit Hatley v. App.1976). The State does not contend comments, I concur. With these any State’s Exhibit makes the existence of consequential probable. fact more or less MILLER, J., joins opinion. Further, the State does not direct our atten to, found, any tion nor have we instance

the trial where the character of the deceased questioned. clearly State’s exhibit attempt convey

character and circumstances of the deceased.

Such evidence does not tend to make

consequential probable. fact more or less judge admitting the trial erred Exhibit 71.

VI.

The State contends waived the photographs

error because of the deceased’s Lankston, judge supra, him at a time when we stated: to understand proper position to do the trial court is in a procedural default ... are standards implemented by something [Appellate splitting courts] it. not to be hairs in the about appellate regards specificity, complaints courts. As all a those should reach the merits of party has to do of a to avoid forfeiture parties requiring read some without complaint judge is to let the trial special script to make their wishes known. wants, why know what he he thinks himself Lankston, 827 at 909. it, clearly enough entitled to and to do so

Case Details

Case Name: Zimmerman v. State
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Apr 7, 1993
Citation: 860 S.W.2d 89
Docket Number: 71106
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
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