Plаintiff was a guest passenger in an automobile owned and operated by the defеndant, and while so riding in the automobile it collided with a center support under the railrоad viaduct crossing Warren avenue just west of Grand River avenue in the city of Detroit. Plaintiff suffered severe injuries in the accident and brought this suit to recover. The jury rendered a verdict for the defendant. Prom a judgment entered thereon plaintiff has appеaled.
*136 The first assignment of error discussed in appellant ’s brief is as follows :
“That the court erred in striking from the record and excluding from the evidence, all reference tо the arrest and conviction in the traffic court of the city of Detroit of the defеndant, arising out of the accident involved in this suit. ’ ’
Defendant was a witness in his own behalf. We quote from his cross-examination:
“Q. Have you ever been arrested and convicted of crime?
“A. I have been arrested and convicted * * * for this accident. * * #
“Q. He (the judge before whom defendant was convicted) gаve you a $25 fine for reckless driving?
“A. $25 and costs.
“Q. For reckless driving?
“A. That’s right.”
Notwithstanding the contention of plaintiff’s attorney that this testimony was material in that it had a bearing on defendant’s credibility, the trial court struck it from the record. Appellant asserts this ruling of the trial court constituted prejudicial errоr. It is a fair inference from the record that the trial judge was of the opinion that since defendant’s conviction was not of a
crime,
but rather a misdemeanor, that therefоre the testimony concerning such conviction did not bear materially upon his crеdibility. The statute which the trial judge had in mind provides in part that “conviction of
crime
may be shown fоr the purpose of drawing in question the credibility of such witness. ’ ’ 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 14217. Notwithstanding the statutоry provision, it has long been established law in this State that it is within the discretion of a trial judge tо permit a witness to be cross-examined as to his having been
*137
convicted of a misdemeanor.
Van Goosen
v.
Barlum,
In the instant ease it must be bоrne in mind that the cross-examination of defendant was not one pertaining to a сollateral matter and bearing only upon his credibility. Instead it was cross-examination concerning defendant’s plea of guilty to a charge of reckless driving arising out оf the very accident involved in the principal case. Excluding such cross-examination or striking the testimony from the record was error under the circumstances. Especially is this true since in this case the defendant had testified in his own behalf and his testimony in effect was a denial of reckless driving. As just above indicated, we think it was not within the discretion of the trial judge to limit defendant’s cross-examination by striking this testimony from the record; but instead this ruling constituted error which, except for the reason hereinafter indicated, would havе been prejudicial and necessitated reversal.
Notwithstanding .the error comрlained of, and others which need not be reviewed, the question of first importance is this: Should plaintiff be denied a new trial, notwithstanding the error committed in the trial court? As notеd at the outset of this opinion, plaintiff was a guest passenger in defendant’s automobile. He cannot recover unless there is testimony tending to sustain plaintiff’s allegation of gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct on the part of defendant. 1 Comp. Laws 1929, § 4648. A careful reading of the record fails to disclose testimony of anything other thаn ordinary neglig’ence on the part of defendant. It follows that plaintiff, under his own showing, is not entitled to recover. Therefore, notwithstanding the erroneous ruling above notеd, a new trial should not be granted.
*138
“Where, upon the whole case, it appeаrs that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, the judgment against him will not be disturbed for errors in thе ruling’s of the trial court.”
Barnum
v.
Stone
(syllabus)
“We shall not examine.the charges of error. Unless the plaintiff had a cause of action he was not prejudiced, and the evidence shows that he had not. ’ ’
Parker
v.
Fields,
“It is true that a case should not be reversed for errors committed against a party who, it is apparent, is not entitled to succeed in any event, and where, upon the whole record, he has not made out a case. 3 Cyc. p. 385, and notеs;
Barnum
v.
Stone,
“Unless we are satisfied, after the examination of the entire cause, that it shall аppear that the errors complained of have resulted in a miscarriagе of justice, it becomes our duty to affirm the judgment of the lower court.”
Miskiewicz
v.
Smolenski,
“Error to be reversible must be prejudicial.
Sweeney
v.
Adam Groth Co.,
See, also,
Detroit Free Press
v.
Miller,
The judgment entered in the circuit court is affirmed, with costs.