176 Pa. 1 | Pa. | 1896
Opinion by
The sheriff conveyed the land in dispute “to Coleman Wells,
The conveyance of the land to Wells as executor was prima facie evidence that he held it for the estate, and his sale of it to Strauss was an indication that he supposed he so held it. It was conceded that the money paid for the land was furnished to Wells as stated in Ms written acknowledgment or receipt to which we have already referred. The learned trial judge thought this fact, considered by itself, raised a resulting trust in favor of the defendant, and as the plaintiff admitted that he purchased with notice of the defendant’s claim he was not entitled to recover. The jury were therefore instructed to find for the defendant. This instruction was obviously based on the familiar principle that, where in a purchase of land the consideration is paid by one and the conveyance is made to another, the presumption is that the latter holds the title in trust for the former. But tMs presumption is not conclusive. It may be rebutted by evidence which satisfactorily shows that it was not the intention of either party that the beneficial interest should be in the party paying: 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 13, and cases cited; Lynch v. Cox, 23 Pa. 265, and Hays v. Quay, 68 Pa. 263. In other words the presumption may be overcome by proof that it is at variance with the mutual intention or understanding of the parties, and any circumstance which throws light on the transaction or explains its true character is admissible for the purpose of strengthening or rebutting it: Strimpfler v. Roberts, 18 Pa. 283.
In our case the money that was paid to the sheriff by the executor was furnished to him by a son of Wms. Barber, deceased, whose estate held three judgments against the land, amounting at the time of the sale to over $1,600. The judgments were first liens. The land once belonged to Williams Barber, who
It seems to us that this is a case in which something more was required to sustain the defendant’s contention than the furnishing of the money as stated in the receipt given by Wells. It is evident that he so regarded it because he supplemented the receipt with testimony tending to show that the money was furnished under an agreement that Wells was to hold the land in trust for the heirs. If anything was made clear by this testimony it was that Pardon Barber desired to have the deed of the land, that Coleman Wells as executor desired to have the deed of it, and that each distrusted the other. It also appeared from the testimony that while there was mutual distrust there was mutual profession of anxiety to protect the interests of the heirs. While Nicholson, who represented Wells and Barber in effecting the arrangement with the execution creditor
We think that in view of the evidence in the case, oral and documentary, it was for the jury to find under proper instructions from the court with what intention the land was bought, and the money required in the purchase of it was furnished. We think too, that it was competent for either party to show the assets and liabilities of the estate of Williams Barber at the time of the sale, and subsequent conversations between Wells and Pardon Barber in reference to the transaction consummated by it. These were matters proper for the consideration of the jury in determining whether it was the intention of the parties that Wells should receive and hold the title to the land as trustee for the heirs, or for the benefit of the estate.
There is another matter to which attention should be directed in tins case. Wells sold the land for 150.00 seven years after he received the deed for it, and ten years after the death of Williams Barber. It does not appear that any heir or creditor demanded that he should sell it. His delay in and manner of making the sale were not consistent with the existence of any valid claim against the estate. If he held the land for the estate there was apparently no one interested in it except the heirs, and they were not consulted. The undisputed evidence shows that the sale of the land was conducted by the attorney of the estate, who bid it off for Strauss on the latter’s instruction to do so “as cheaply as possible.” Under these and other circumstances surrounding and connected with the sale, it is for the court and jury to consider and determine on a retrial whether, in any aspect of the case, the sale made by Wells
To the extent that the rulings complained of are in conflict with this opinion the specifications of error are sustained.
Judgment reversed and venire facias de novo awarded.