[¶ 1] Arjuna Zerr appeals from a ’judgment dismissing his action seeking declaratory relief against North Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”). We conclude the district court did not err in dismissing his complaint based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Zerr did not exhaust his statutory administrative remedies. We affirm,
I
[¶ 2] In September 2013, Zerr was severely burned in an explosion and fire at an oil well site in Mountrail County while working for Summit Oilfield Service, Inc., WSI accepted Zend’s claim and began providing him benefits, including temporary total disability benefits and medical treatment benefits..
[¶ 3] On May 5,2015, WSI mailed Zerr a Notice of Intention to Discontinue/Reduce Benefits (“NOID”) stating that he was noncompliant with vocational services for failing to perform several vocational rehabilitation requirements between November 2014 and April 2015. The NOID informed Zerr his weekly disability benefits would be discontinued on May 26, 2015, but also provided specific steps for him to become compliant with vocational services. The NOID states that if he felt the decision was incorrect, he should write to his claims adjuster within thirty days of the NOID’s date to request reconsideration; and, further, that if a request for reconsideration was not received within thirty days, the decision would be final.
[¶ 4] It is undisputed Zerr received the NOID at his residence in California some time after May 5, 2015, but he alleged he did not immediately open the letter or otherwise respond until more than thirty days after the date of the letter due to his mental conditions. WSI subsequently discontinued Zerr’s disability benefits as of May 26, 2015. Some months later,- Zerr obtained legal counsel.
[¶ 5] On December 23, 2015, Zerr’s attorney sent a letter to WSI stating that Zerr had been diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and depression and that he avoids opening his mail and communicating with others as it сauses flashbacks of the explosion. His attorney requested WSI reopen this matter and restart temporary total disability benefits to Zerr or, in the alternative, issue a second NOID so Zerr could appeal. On January 12, 2016, WSI sent Zerr’s counsel a letter rejecting his “request for reconsideration” of its May 2015 decision because it was not received within the thirty-day appeal period under N.D.C.O. § 65-01-16. The January 2016 letter also stated WSI’s decision was final.
[¶ 6] In May 2016, Zerr sued WSI for declaratory relief. He allegеd that while he received the NOID sent to him in California by regular mail some time, after May 5, 2015, he did not immediately open the NOID, respond to the NOID within thirty days, or seek to come back into compliance due to his mental conditions of PTSD and depression dirеctly related to his work injuries. He alleged that he has a continuing need to receive temporary total disability benefits, that his right to continue receiving the benefits is a property right protected by due process, and that WSI violated his due process rights in terminating the benefits by not allowing him additional time to request reconsideration of the NOID or to come back into compliance. He
[¶ 7] In June 2016, WSI moved to dismiss Zerr’s complaint under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6), asserting a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Zerr opposed WSI’s motion. The district court granted WSI’s motion, concluding as a matter of law that Zerr received proper notice of WSI’s intent to terminate his benefits and WSI had not violated his due process rights. The court also concluded Zerr had not exhausted administrative remеdies.
II
[¶ 8] Zerr argues the district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that his complaint failed to state a claim for relief. He contends the district court had subject matter jurisdiction either because he exhausted his administrative remedies or WSI foreсlosed him from doing so.
[¶ 9] Chapter 32-23, N.D.C.C., authorizes courts to issue declaratory judgments, and we review declaratory judgment actions under the same standards as other eases. N.D.C.C. § 32-23-07;
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Lagodinski,
[¶ 10] We have long held that “[a] court’s authority to grant declaratory rеlief, however, requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies.”
Tooley v. Alm,
[¶ 11] “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claim presented in the complaint.”
Vogel,
A
[¶ 12] “Ordinarily, a party must exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking declaratory or injunctivе relief.”
Robertson v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau,
[¶ 14] Zerr claims he exhausted his administrative remedies or WSI foreclosed him from doing so. Zerr asserts his counsel, upon learning of his situation, submitted a letter to WSI requesting it to reopen the matter and reinstate his disability benefits, supported by his psychiatrist’s report, or issue a second NOID to provide Zerr an opportunity to appeal the decision through an administrative process. WSI denied his requests, stating its decision was final. Zerr contends he was left with no choice but to bring his claim in district court because he was left without an administrative remedy at that point.
[¶ 15] Section 65-01-16, N.D.C.C., provides an administrative hearing and appeals process for disputing WSI decisions. Under N.D.C.C. §§ 65-01-16(3) and (4), after WSI issues a notice of decision by informal intеrnal review, a party has thirty days from the day the notice of decision was mailed to file a written request for reconsideration. “Absent a timely and sufficient request for reconsideration, the notice of decision is final and may not be reheard or appealed.” N.D.C.C. § 65-01-16(4). When a timely request for reconsideration is filed, WSI has sixty days after receipt to issue an administrative order. N.D.C.C. § 65-01-16(5). A claimant has thirty days from an administrative order to file a request for assistance from the decision review office or to file a written request for rehearing. See N.D.C.C. §§ 65-01-16(6), (7). Under N.D.C.C. §§ 65-01-16(8) and (9), a rehearing must be conducted under N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32, and a party may appeal a post-hearing administrative order to the district court under N.D.C.C. ch. 65-10. “Any notice of decision, administrative order, or posthearing administrative order is subject to review and reopening under section 65-05-04.” N.D.C.C. § 65-01-16(10).
[¶ 16] Under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-03, WSI has “full power and authority to hear and determine all questions within its jurisdiction, and its decisions, except as provided in chapter 65-10, are final and are entitled to the sаme faith and credit as a judgment of a court of record.” WSI also retains statutory authority to exercise continuing jurisdiction to reopen and review claims under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-04.
See Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins.,
[¶ 17] Under the undisputed jurisdictional facts in this case, Zerr failed to mеet the
B
[¶ 18] Zerr contends WSI denied him due process in terminating his benefits.
[¶ 19] Generally, “[t]he right to continuing disability benefits under the Workers Compensation Act is a property right protected by the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions.”
Rojas v. Workforce Safety & Ins.,
[¶ 20] Relying on
Rojas,
[¶ 21] The term “actual notice” is defined by statute. Section 1-01-23, N.D.C.C., states: “Actual notice shall consist in express information of a fact.” It is undisputed that the information in the NOID provided information adequate to give Zerr pretermination notice of the contemplated action, a summary of the evidence supporting the proposed termination, and a pretermination opportunity to respond in writing. “Where the law prescribes a written notice as a method of giving information, the receipt of a letter containing the information is conclusive proof of knowledge of the purpоse thereof.”
Brown v. Otesa,
[¶ 22] Unlike in
Rojas,
here Zerr admitted receiving the NOID. We conclude as a matter
oí
law that Zerr received actual notice. We decline to expand the scope of our due process holding in
Rojas
to include a claimant’s refusal or claimed inability to
' [¶ 28]' We conclude Zerr failed to exhaust his statutory administrative remedies and the district court did not err in dismissing thе action based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We further conclude that not opening mail received is not equivalent to not receiving mail and that the district court did not err in dismissing the action for failure to state a claim for relief.
III
[¶24] We have considered Zerr’s remaining arguments and find them unnecessary to our decision or without merit. The judgment is affirmed.