Zenco Development Corporation v. City Of OverlandZenco Development Corporation v. City Of Overland
1 Zenco Development Corp. (Zenco) brought this
I. BACKGROUND
2 Zenco owns and operates a restaurant/tavern in the City of Overland. Zenco‘s city liquor license expired on July 31, 1984.2 Zenco sought rеnewal of the license, but the city aldermen refused to renew the license. The City informed Zenco of the non-renewal by letter dated August 14, 1984. No municipal ordinances require any notice and hearing before not renewing a liquor license.3
3 Proceeding under Missouri law, Zenco first sought an alternative writ of mandamus in the state circuit court. That court issued the alternative writ and scheduled a hearing to determine whether a preemptory writ should issue. Both parties рresented testimony and evidence in the mandamus action. While the case was under advisement, Zenco sought dismissal of the state mandamus action. The court denied the motion to dismiss and, on January 2, 1985, the court formally denied the preemptory writ and dissolved the alternative writ.
4 While the state court had taken the mandamus action under advisement, Zenco filed the present action in federal court alleging that the City denied Zenco procedural due process in refusing the liquor license renewal. The federal district court dismissed the action after granting the City‘s motion for summary judgment. The district court determined that Zenсo did not have a property interest in the renewal of the license, and therefore Zenco had no right to procedural due process protection. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
5 Zenco argues on appeal that it has a protectable property interest in the renewаl of the municipal liquor license. Zenco claims the City violated its due process rights by failing to give Zenco notice that the license was in jeopardy, the reason for such jeopardy, and failing to give Zenco a predeprivation hearing.
6 A discussion of whether a party has a right to procedurаl due process must start with the question of whether the party has a property interest in the thing taken away. We are guided by well-established principles. Acсording to the Supreme Court, “[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Propеrty interests “are created and their dimensions defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Id.
8 Zenco asserts that the legislature, in response to the Randall decision, enacted
9 A district court‘s detеrmination concerning the law of the state in which the court sits is entitled to considerable deference. Parkerson v. Carrouth, 782 F.2d 1449, 1451 (8th Cir.1986). We will overturn the district court‘s interpretation оf state law only if we find them ” ‘fundamentally deficient in analysis, without a reasonable basis, or contrary to a reported state-court opinion.’ ” McCarthy Bros. Const. Co. v. Pierce, 832 F.2d 463, 467 (8th Cir.1987) (quoting Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 827 F.2d 373, 375 (8th Cir.1987)). We cannot fault the district court in concluding that Randall controlled the result here. Indeed, two cases subsequent to the enactment of
III. CONCLUSION
10 Thus, Zenco has failed to demonstrate that the interpretation of Missouri law by Judge Cahill in the district court is error or contrary to the views expressed by the Missouri appellate courts.
11 Accordingly, we affirm.
Notes
Any person aggrieved by official action of the supervisor of liquor control affecting thе licensed status of a person subject to the jurisdiction of the supervisor of liquor control, including the refusal to grant, the grant, the revocation, the suspеnsion, or the failure to renew a license, may seek a determination thereon by the administrative hearing commission pursuant to the provisions of section 161.272, RSMo, and it shall not be a condition to such determination that the person aggrieved seek a reconsideration, a rehearing, or exhaust any оther procedure within the office of the supervisor of liquor control.
From a reading of the statute, it appears as though the review procеdures only apply to the decision of the supervisor of liquor control, a state official. Thus, while this statute may provide review for decisions conсerning state liquor licenses, it does not provide review for decisions regarding municipal liquor licenses.
Vaughn, 744 S.W.2d at 547 (citations omitted).We deal here with a liquor business, and the renewal of a liquor license. The liquor business stands on a different plane than other commercial and business operations. It is placed under the ban of the law and is differentiated from all other occupations. No person has an inherent or natural right to engage therein. Those who engage in the business of the sale of liquor have no legal rights except those expressly granted by statute and by license.