81-5908 | SCOTUS | Mar 15, 1982
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Petitioner seeks review of the State Supreme Court’s decision upholding his murder conviction and death sentence. He argues that his conviction and death sentence should be set aside because they were based in part on evidence obtained in flagrant violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. He objects to the State Supreme Court’s holding that, by calling the Chief of Police for assistance, he consented to a broad-ranging 12-day search of his furniture store. Because I believe that this petition raises serious Fourth Amendment claims
On December 24, 1975, four persons were killed at a furniture store owned by petitioner. Petitioner’s wife, her parents, and another person had been shot to death, and petitioner had been shot in the abdomen and was seriously wounded. That night, shortly after the shootings, petitioner called the local Police Chief, a personal friend of petitioner, and requested immediate assistance. The Police Chief testified: “He told me that he had been shot. I said, what happened. He said please come help me, hurry.” In response to this call, the police entered the store, found petitioner, who was bleeding badly, and rushed him to the hospital. The police found four bodies, searched for the killer, and secured the building.
Later that night, a local detective arrived to direct the investigation. The store was searched again that night and repeatedly over the next 12 days. No effort was made to ob
The detective testified that in conducting these warrant-less searches, he relied on a so-called crime scene exception to the warrant requirement. He specifically stated that he did not have petitioner’s consent to all of the searches. The trial court upheld the searches under this crime scene rationale. Although the State Supreme Court recognized that a crime scene exception is inconsistent with Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1978-06-21" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/mincey-v-arizona-109905?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="109905">437 U. S. 385 (1978), it nevertheless upheld the searches, reasoning that the police were at the store at the “invitation” of petitioner. 402 So. 2d 365" court="Fla." date_filed="1981-06-11" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/zeigler-v-state-1714859?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="1714859">402 So. 2d 365, 372 (Fla. 1981).
The decision below stretches the consent exception to the warrant requirement beyond recognition. Particularly when the defendant’s life hangs in the balance, courts should be careful that convictions are not based on illegally obtained evidence. Here, the conclusion that a seriously wounded de
Petitioner also objects that his alleged consent to a search of his home was not voluntary. The morning after the crimes, police asked to see peti
As a result of this purported consent, the police searched petitioner’s home and seized numerous items of evidence that were introduced at trial. These circumstances — the extraction of consent from a recuperating and drugged patient in a hospital bed — demand the most careful scrutiny before the consent may be deemed voluntary. If the petition for certiorari were granted, I would address this issue as well.
Because I continue to believe that the death penalty is under all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment, I would also grant the petition for certiorari in this case and vacate the judgment below insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death sentence.
The State contends that petitioner shot himself and called the police as part of a deliberate scheme to pin the blame on another. This contention is irrelevant to the scope of petitioner’s consent. Whether or not the call for help was self-serving, the question remains whether it can reasonably be construed as a consent to a search unlimited in time and location.
Lead Opinion
Sup. Ct. Fla. Cer-tiorari denied.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1976-07-22" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/gregg-v-georgia-109532?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="109532">428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.