94 Wash. 344 | Wash. | 1917
Respondent had judgment upon a second cause of action for an accounting and balance in his favor against appellants in the sum of $729.80, the matter involved in the first cause of action not being in controversy here. The substance of the allegations of the complaint upon which the accounting and judgment were demanded is that, on about April 10, 1914, the defendant William H. Bell entered into an oral contract with respondent by the terms of which it was mutually agreed that, in consideration of the services and labor of respondent to be performed upon the work of finishing, painting, frescoing and decorating a certain building in the city of Seattle known as the L. C. Smith forty-two story building, for which work the defendant Bell had the contract with the general contractors of the building, the net profits, to be received upon such work or job after ascertaining the same by deducting the necessary and actual expenses of the work from the contract price to be received by the defendant, were to be equally divided between them; that thereupon, defendant Bell having secured the work and contract from the general contractors, respondent, in compliance with the terms of the oral agreement, entered upon the work of decorating the building, and continued to devote his entire time and attention thereto until the same was completed and accepted by the general contractors, architects, and owner of the building; that, during the continuance of the work, the defendant William H. Bell kept, and at the time of the commencement of suit had, all the books, papers and memoranda relating to the work and job,-and that he collected all sums due thereon for the work, the respondent drawing and receiving only a small sum per week out of the moneys so due, known as the drawing account, upon the profits due the respondent;'that the defendant Bell collected and appropriated to his own use, outside of the expenses of the job, and except the sum of $390 drawn in weekly payments by respondent, and except the further sum of $700 paid to the respondent, the entire sum due from the general
Upon issues being joined by answer to the complaint and reply to the affirmative answers, a partial trial was had, the court entering upon the trial of the matter to determine the question of whether or not the parties sustained such relations and such conditions existed as required an accounting. Evidence upon that question was received and the court, determining that such relations existed and that an accounting was necessary, ordered a reference and appointed a referee, and the referee thereupon qualified and proceeded to receive evidence upon the accounting. On the conclusion of the evidence, the referee made his report and findings of fact and conclusions of law in writing and filed the same, and the court entered judgment thereon.
By his report and findings, the referee found that the total receipts received- by Bell under his contract on the Smith building were $12,230; that he expended the following sums on the contract: Materials, $3,203.06; labor, $5,195.68; miscellaneous expenditures, $191.63; interest paid on loans, $43.56; making a total of $8,633.93, expenses. The referee further found that there was chargeable against the receipts for the work on the Smith building, in case the court held that a partnership agreement existed between respondent and Bell, eighteen per cent of the cost of doing the work, or $1,546.20,
Appellants excepted to the report of the referee, to all portions of the report referring to a joint adventure, and to the holding of the court that overhead expenses and interest were not allowable if the arrangement was a joint adventure, and that it was a joint venture. Motions for judgment notwithstanding the decision of the court and for new trial were unsuccessfully made by appellants and each of them.
Upon this appeal much time is devoted to a discussion of the question of whether the arrangement between the parties was a partnership or a joint adventure, and it is contended by appellants that the respondent based his second cause of action upon a partnership; that the court determined the matter, at the time the reference was ordered and the referee appointed, upon the theory of a partnership, and thus prejudiced the rights of the appellants.
It seems to us that brief consideration need be given to this question. We cannot see how appellants were prejudiced upon that matter, although both the trial judge and respondent loosely and in common parlance alluded to the parties as “partners,” and to a “partnership,” since the complaint, as to the second cause of action, clearly alleged only a profit-sharing venture in a single transaction — the contract for the finishing, painting, frescoing and decorating of the L. C. Smith building — and the proofs sustained that contract as
“One distinction [between a partnership and a joint adventure] lies in the fact that while a partnership is ordinarily formed for the transaction of a general business of a particular kind, a joint adventure relates to a single transaction, although the latter may comprehend a business to be continued for a period of years. . . . The principal distinction, however, is that in most jurisdictions where any [distinction] is regarded as existing, one party may sue the other at law for a breach of the contract or a share of the profits or losses, or a contribution for advances made in excess of his share; but this right will not preclude a suit in equity for an accounting.” 23 Cyc. 453.
As to the rights of the party contributing the capital, he
“is entitled to reimbursement for all expenses. . . . But he cannot charge against the fund any part of the expenses of negotiating a loan to be used in the adventure, or interest on such loan, or on advances made by him.” 23 Cyc. 457.
As to joint adventures,
“In the absence of express agreement the law implies an equal division of profits, without regard to any inequality of contribution.” 23 Cyc. 459.
Appellants admit that the ascertaining of the net profits even in a joint adventure contract is not, under such contract as the respondent here claimed, any different from ascertaining the net profits in a partnership, because the term “net profits” has a well defined meaning whether it be in a partnership or in a joint adventure; that the oral contract claimed by the respondent was no different as to ascertainment of the net profits from any partnership, and it is argued from that assumption that the overhead expense, which they claimed was eighteen per cent, should in any event be allowed and deducted. The contest here thus revolves principally upon the question of what are in fact the net profits of the adventure. The appellant Bell contended and testified that his overhead expense in performing such
As to the question generally, whether it was a profit-sharing contract, and as to whether anything was due under it to respondent, appellant Bell clearly concluded the matter by his letter to respondent of September 29, 1914, wherein, among other things, he said that, although he did not have all the accounts footed up accurately, he had roughly computed the probable net profits without extra work done on the partitions, and that the figures totaled approximately
The motions for judgment notwithstanding the decision and for a new trial were without merit and were properly denied. There is no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed.
Morris, Mount, Fullerton, and Parker, JJ., concur.