96 Iowa 52 | Iowa | 1895
The agreed statement upon which the decision of the district court was basted shows the following facts: John Miller, a resident of the state of Ohio, died leaving a will which was admitted to probate in this state, and which contained a provision as follows: “I give and devise to my grandson, Ernest G. Preston, the following .'described premises, to-wit: The southeast quarter of section eight, township eighty-one, range thirty-three west of the fifth P. M., in Guthrie county, Iowa, — 160 acres, — together with the rents and issues thereof during his natural life; he, however, paying to his mother, Ella Preston, ,§5.00 each and every month during her natural life, said payments
The questions, we are required to' determine are whether the will vested in Preston a title in fee simple, or a life estate only, and whether the covenants of the deed have been broken. The district court found and adjudged that the title in fee simple vested in Preston, and that the covenants, of his deed had not been broken. It is claimed by the appellant, and admitted by the appellee, that the decision of the district court was based upon the rule in Shelley’s Case. A statement of that rule is as. follows: “When a person takes, an estate of freehold, legally or equitably, under a deed; will, or other writing, and in the same instrument there is a limitation by way of remainder, either with or without the interposition of another estate, of an interest of the same legal or equitable quality, to his heirs or heirs of his body, as a class of personsj, to take in succession, from generation to generation, the limitation to' the heirs entitles the ancestor to. the whole estate.” 4 Kent, Comm. 225; Pierson v. Lane, 60 Iowa, 60 (14 N. W. Rep. 90). Another statement
