59 So. 618 | Ala. | 1912
The bill in this case is filed for the purpose of enjoining a judgment at law. A temporary injunction was issued, and the cause was heard on the motion to dissolve the temporary writ for want of equity in the bill, and on the denials in the sworn answers of the respondents. The chancellor, upon the hearing, dissolved the temporary writ of injunction, and for this decree the present appeal is prosecuted.
The bill alleges that, Zavelo being indebted to Gold-stein for the sum of $366.43 for goods purchased, Gold-stein brought five separate suits in a justice court for amounts aggregating said sum; that on the day the suits were brought Zavelo executed his several notes to Goldstein for said sum of $366.43, and mailed them to Goldstein before service of summons; that judgment was rendered in each of said suits in the justice court, and Zavelo appealed each of the cases to the circuit court; that, pending the appeals, the notes matured, and Zavelo sent Goldstein checks to cover the first three notes, which checks Goldstein collected, notifying Zavelo of the application of the same to the payment of the accounts sued on in the order of their filing on
The sworn answer of the defendant Goldstein showed that Zavelo’s indebtedness to Goldstein arose out of the purchase of two separate bills of goods, the first
It will be seen that the purpose of the bill is to enjoin the collection of a judgment at law, upon the ground that the debt had been paid before the judgment was rendered. The case as presented is one in which a trial was regularly had upon issues formally made up, the parties being present, and no excuse being
It does not appear whether the defense of payment during pendency of appeal was attempted to he presented on the trial of the case, nor whether Zavelo’s failure to obtain the credit claimed was due to his failure to plead payment or to his failure to support such plea by proper proof. So the question presented is whether a party who has failed to plead and prove his defense in a suit at law may afterwards come into equity for relief.
In Beadle v. Graham, 66 Ala. 102, it was held that a bill to enjoin a judgment as inequitable, because of a defense which might have been made at law, is “maintainable only when the party invoking the jurisdiction had a valid defense, and was prevented from making it by the fraud of the opposite party or by accident or mistake unmixed with negligence on .his part. * * * A bill in such a case as this, to be sufficient, must show two things: First, that his failure to make defense was not attributable to his omission, neglect, or default; and, secondly, that his defense is good to the entire cause of action or such part of it as he proposes by his bill to litigate.” To the same effect are the following cases: Collier v. Falk, 66 Ala. 223; Campbell v. White, 77 Ala. 397; Hair v. Lowe, 19 Ala. 224; Peterson v. Blanton, 76 Ala. 264; Roebling v. Stevens, 93 Ala. 39, 9 South. 369.
The complainant admits in his bill a balance due the respondent Goldstein of about $130, and he fails to make any tender of this amount, or to offer to pay the same, though he does offer in his bill to pay what may be found to be due upon a trial of the case.
In Yonge v. Shepperd, 44 Ala. 315, it is held' that a party seeking the injunction of a judgment must pay
Our conclusion is that on the facts as made by the bill and the sworn answer of the respondent the chancellor properly dissolved the preliminary injunction, and his decree will be here affirmed.
Affirmed.