This action of trespass on the case for contribution was brought under G. L. 1956, chap. 6 of title 10, the uniform contribution among tortfeasors act. The case is before this court on the plaintiff’s exceptions to certain rulings on the pleadings.
The case presents a question of first impression in this state. It raises the issue whether the spouse of an injured party is a joint tortfeasor, as the term is defined in §10-6-2 *546 of the act, subjecting him to an action for contribution under §10-6-3.
We shall discuss briefly the pertinent facts. The plaintiff’s motor vehicle, while being operated by her agent, was involved in a collision with a motor vehicle operated by defendant, resulting in injuries to defendant’s wife who was a passenger in his vehicle at the time of the accident. She brought suit against plaintiff to recover damages for her injuries. It is admitted that a fair and reasonable settlement was entered into between plaintiff and defendant’s wife, whereby plaintiff paid defendant’s wife the sum of $6,375.
Sometime thereafter plaintiff brought the instant action. The defendant’s third plea to plaintiff’s amended declaration alleges in substance that at all times material he was married to the injured party; that he was not and could not have been “jointly or severally liable in tort” to his wife for the injuries in question; that he was not a joint tortfeasor within the meaning of the act; and that therefore plaintiff was not entitled to contribution thereunder. The plaintiff’s demurrer to- such plea was overruled by a justice of the superior court and, after taking an exception to such ruling, she filed a motion for entry of decision for defendant, citing Ewell v. Cardinal, 53 R. I. 469 (1933), as authority for the filing thereof. This motion was heard and granted by another justice- of the superior court, plaintiff’s exception to such ruling being noted on the record. The case is before us on her exceptions to both rulings.
In
Trotti
v.
Piacente,
99 R. I. 167,
In discussing, with approval, the case of
Schubert
v.
August Schubert Wagon Co.,
The question is whether defendant’s immunity from suit by his wife for damages resulting from his tortious conduct extends to an action for contribution under the act. This, in turn, depends upon the question whether defendant is a joint tortfeasor within the meaning of §10-6-2, which defines the term “joint tortfeasors” to mean “two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person * * We hold that defendant is a joint tortfeasor within the contemplation of the act and therefore liable in an action for contribution thereunder.
In so holding we are not unmindful of the split of authority on this issue in jurisdictions which have adopted the act. See Annot.,
Moreover, the term “liable in tort,” as -used in §10-6-2, means any person or persons who have negligently contributed to another’s injury, including a husband who has negligently contributed to his wife’s injury. The term refers to culpability. This concept was acknowledged as late as
Trotti,
As we have already stated, we recognize the split of authority in jurisdictions which have adopted the uniform act and where the doctrine of interspousal immunity prevails. We acknowledge the force of defendant’s arguments, but we are not convinced by them. After careful consideration we have been persuaded by the reasoning of the courts in
Smith
v.
Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co.,
“Whatever may be the law in the majority of other jurisdictions (as to which see 19 A.L.R. (2d) 1003, et *549 seq.), it is established in out own State that a tortfeasor has a right of contribution against a joint tortfeasor even though the judgment creditor be the latter’s spouse, parent, or minor child; in other words, a tortfeasor may recover such contribution even though, for some reason, the plaintiff who has obtained a judgment against ¡both of them is precluded from enforcing liability thereunder against the joint tortfeasor * * *. The theory is that as between the two tortfeasors the contribution is not a recovery for the tort but the enforcement of an equitable duty to share liability for the wrong done. Undoubtedly, therefore, the use plaintiff in this case can recover from Puller half the amount of the judgment it paid to Puller’s wife and daughter. The question here, however, is whether the use plaintiff can make such recovery from Puller’s insurance carrier, or, since the use plaintiff is merely entitled to take over Puller’s right in that regard, whether Puller himself could recover from the Insurance Company the sum due by him to the use plaintiff under its claim for contribution.”
The uniform contribution among tortfeasors act was enacted in this state by P. L. 1940, chap. 940, as a modem mechanism for a fairer administration of justice. See Hackett v. Hyson, 72 R. I. 132. We cannot believe that in enacting such act the legislature intended to extend the doctrine of interspousal immunity to actions under the act in the light of modern-day conditions. Such intent would be contrary to common sense and justice. We are convinced that the legislature intended contribution in a case such as this. We agree with the words of Dean Prosser that “There is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone * * * while the latter goes scot free.” Prosser, Torts, 2d ed., chap. 8, §46, p. 248. In enacting this act we believe the legislature intended to include the spouse of an *550 injured party as a joint tortfeasor “liable in tort for the same injury.”
The plaintiff’s exceptions are sustained, and the case is remitted to the superior court for further proceedings.