207 Conn. 496 | Conn. | 1988
These consolidated cases arise out of the collapse, on June 28,1983, of a suspended span of the Mianus River Bridge on the Connecticut Turnpike (1-95) in Greenwich. The dispositive issue is the constitutionality, under both the state and federal constitutions, of General Statutes § 52-584a which bars actions against architects and engineers seven years after substantial completion of a project, irrespective of whether a claim has arisen by that time.
After the state impleaded TAMS, each plaintiff filed a substitute complaint, in the alternative, against the third party defendant TAMS, adopting and restating the identical allegations made by the state in its complaint against TAMS. Each of the complaints in the alternative against TAMS sought monetary damages
After the plaintiffs accepted the state’s offers of judgment, the state amended its pleadings to assert a subrogated claim against TAMS pursuant to § 13a-144, seeking damages for the amounts paid to the plaintiffs.
On this appeal the plaintiffs claimed that the trial court erred: (1) in granting TAMS’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to General Statutes § 52-584a without an uncontroverted showing that at least one half the members of its partnership were licensed in Connecticut; (2) in rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim that summary judgment could not enter in TAMS’ favor based on General Statutes § 52-584a because that statute violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to equal treatment under article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution;
We need not address these alternate grounds since we find no error in the court’s judgments granting summary judgment for TAMS. In view of the important public policy questions raised by the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims it is preferable for us to address the merits of these claims directly.
I
First, however, we must address the plaintiffs’ first claim of error. The plaintiffs claim that TAMS failed to establish that it qualified as a firm of architects or engineers within the meaning of § 52-584a and there
The plaintiffs argue that § 52-584a extends only to those individuals who qualify under Connecticut law as architects and engineers.
We need not reach the question, however, of whether there was a genuine issue of material fact which should have precluded the granting of TAMS’ motion for summary judgment. Section 20-298a became effective in 1965, eleven years after TAMS signed a contract to do design work for the bridge and six years after the bridge work was accepted by the state. The plaintiffs cite no authority and make no reasoned argument why § 20-298a should apply retroactively to TAMS. Further, the statute is concerned only with the manner in which architects and engineers may form partnerships and is not involved in any way with the licensing of either profession. At the legislative hearing on the statute, Carmine Lavieri, appearing for the Connecticut Chapter of the American Institute of Architects and the Connecticut Society of Architects, stated:
“Now with respect to [House Bill No.] 2626, this bill came about because the Attorney General has issued rulings in the past to the Architectural Examining Board and to the Board of Registration for Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors to the effect that architects cannot be in partnership with anybody else but architects; engineers cannot be in partnership with anybody but engineers, on the basis of the way the statutes now exist.
“There are many situations where it seems desirable for architects and engineers to form a joint partnership or perhaps a joint venture for one particular project. Many of the other states have this provision, and this bill was put in to accomplish that purpose.”
The plaintiffs, once again, offer no authority or logical reason why this statute should be grafted on to § 52-584a. There is no merit to this claim of error.
The plaintiffs’ complaints in the alternative against TAMS were filed in 1986, twenty years beyond the date of substantial completion of the bridge. Therefore, unless § 52-584a is unconstitutional in one or more of the aspects claimed by the plaintiffs, the trial court was correct in granting TAMS’ motion for summary judgment.
II
A
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GENERAL STATUTES § 52-584A UNDER ARTICLE FIRST, § 1 (EQUALITY OF RIGHTS), AND ARTICLE FIRST, § 20 (EQUAL PROTECTION), OF THE CONNECTICUT CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
The plaintiffs have briefed a claimed violation of article first, § 1, as a field of inquiry separate from consideration of the state and federal equal protection clauses. In the context of this case all three of these concepts are merged. The equality of rights provision contained in article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution has a meaning equivalent to the equal protection clause contained in the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. Lublin v. Brown, 168 Conn. 212, 219, 362 A.2d 769 (1975); State ex rel. Brush v. Sixth Taxing District, 104 Conn. 192, 195, 132 A. 561 (1926). Similarly, “ ‘ “[t]he equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions have the same meaning and limitations.” ’ Daily v. New Brit
“ ‘When a statute is challenged on equal protection grounds . . . the reviewing court must first determine the standard by which the challenged statute’s constitutional validity will be determined.’ Ryszkiewicz v. New Britain, 193 Conn. 589, 596, 479 A.2d 793 (1984). ‘ “When a statutory classification impinges upon an inherently suspect class or affects a fundamental personal right, the statute is subject to strict scrutiny and is justified only by a compelling state interest.” ’ State Management Assn. of Connecticut, Inc. v. O’Neill, 204 Conn. 746, 750, 520 A.2d 1276 (1987); Keogh v. Bridgeport, supra, 66; Frazier v. Manson, 176 Conn. 638, 645, 410 A.2d 475 (1979); see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335-42, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1972). Otherwise, a statute will stand if the classification bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest. State Management Assn. of Connecticut, Inc. v. O’Neill, supra; Ryszkiewicz v. New Britain, supra, 597; Keogh v. Bridgeport, supra.” Ecker v. West Hartford, supra, 237-38.
The plaintiffs claim that because § 52-584a impinges on their fundamental right to access to the courts, it is subject to strict scrutiny and must be struck down unless justified by a compelling state interest. A right is fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis if it is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the constitution. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, reh. denied, 411 U.S. 959, 93 S. Ct. 1919, 36 L. Ed. 2d 418
“ ‘The key to discovering whether a right is fundamental is in assessing whether the right is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, [supra, 34].’ Cardo v. Lakeland Central School District, 592 F. Sup. 765, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Such rights include ‘first amendment rights, which are explicitly provided for by the Constitution, see e.g., Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-85, 97 S. Ct. 568, 574-575, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 2698, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1983); the right to travel interstate, which has been found to be implicit in the Constitution, see, e.g., Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 103 S. Ct. 1838, 1842-43, 75 L. Ed. 2d 879 (1983); Shapiro [v. Thomas, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969)]; and the right to vote, which is the guardian of all other rights. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 1081, 16 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1966).’ Cardo v. Lakeland Central School District, supra.” State Management Assn. of Connecticut, Inc. v. O’Neill, supra, 751. Further examples of fundamental rights implicitly, guaranteed by the constitution are those of marriage; Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 98 S. Ct. 673, 54 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1978); privacy; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, reh. denied, 410 U.S. 959, 93 S. Ct. 1409, 35 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1973); and freedom of association. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488 (1958).
The court’s function under this test is to decide whether the classification and disparate treatment inherent in a statute bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state end and are based on reasons related to the accomplishment of that goal. Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., supra, 577. “A classification ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’ ” Id., 578, quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S. Ct. 560, 64 L. Ed. 989 (1920).
Every presumption is to be given in favor of the constitutionality of the statute. New Milford v. SCA Services of Connecticut, Inc., 174 Conn. 146,148, 384 A.2d 337 (1977); Wilson v. Connecticut Product Development Corporation, 167 Conn. 111, 114, 355 A.2d 72 (1974). “[CJourts will assume that the legislature intended to
“[legislative enactments carry with them a strong presumption of constitutionality, and ... a party challenging the constitutionality of a validly enacted statute bears the heavy burden of proving the statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” Beccia v. Waterbury, 192 Conn. 127, 133, 470 A.2d 244 (1984); McKinney v. Coventry, 176 Conn. 613, 621, 410 A.2d 453 (1979); Engle v. Personnel Appeal Board, 175 Conn. 127, 134, 394 A.2d 731 (1978).
Section 52-584a is a statute of repose in that it sets a fixed limit after which the tortfeasor will not be held liable and in some cases will serve to bar an action before it accrues. The clear mandate of General Statutes § 52-584a “was to create a seven year absolute maximum on actions against architects and engineers, based upon the finite barrier of substantial completion, regardless of the nature of the claim, while leaving any other lesser limitations in effect.” R. A. Civitello Co. v. New Haven, 6 Conn. App. 212, 229, 504 A.2d 542 (1986).
We have stated in dictum that “ ‘[t]here is no reason, constitutional or otherwise, which prevents the legislature from enacting a statute, such as § 8324 [now § 52-584], which starts the limitation on actions for negligence running from the date of “the act or omission complained of,” even though at that date no person has sustained damage and therefore no cause of action has come into existence. Indeed, such a provision accords with the purposes of statutes of limitation. One purpose is to prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale claims concerning which the persons interested have been thrown off their guard by want of prosecution. Anderson v. Bridgeport, 134 Conn. 260, 266, 56 A.2d 650 [1947].’ [Vilcinskas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
The plaintiffs argue that § 52-584a violates article first, § 1, and the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions, in that it fails to serve a public purpose and creates a classification that lacks a rational basis. They do not claim that statutes of limitation or repose in and of themselves lack a public purpose. We have recently said “[t]he enactment of ‘[statutes limiting the time within which an action may be brought are the result of a legitimate legislative determination which balances the rights and duties of competing groups.’ ... A statute of limitation or of repose is designed to (1) prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale and fraudulent claims by allowing persons after the lapse of a reasonable time, to plan their affairs with a reasonable degree of certainty, free from the disruptive burden of protracted and unknown potential liability, and (2) to aid in the search for truth that may be impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents or otherwise.” (Citation omitted.) Ecker v. West Hartford, supra, 239-40; see also Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., supra, 582. The
The plaintiffs claim that § 52-584a cannot pass the rational basis test because there is no justification for differentiating architects and engineers from others who are similarly situated, such as other members of the construction industry on the one hand and owners or possessors on the other. They also frame the argument in another way, characterizing § 52-584a as impermissible special interest legislation, citing extensive legislative history to support this claim. The argument, in essence, boils down to the question of whether there is a rational basis for the distinction between architects and engineers from other possible targets of liability arising out of similar claims.
Statutes in other jurisdictions that address this problem are not uniform. Provisions vary as to the type of actions precluded, the classes of people protected and the time in which such actions must be commenced. Further, the courts have dealt with the abrogation of rights, with questions of special legislation and with equal protection claims. All but six states (Arizona, Iowa, Kansas, New York, Nebraska and Vermont) have enacted statutes of repose for certain limited subjects of the construction industry. These statutes have been invalidated in thirteen states
The plaintiffs claim that the cases holding such statutes unconstitutional are the better reasoned decisions. The plaintiffs cite, among other cases, Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967), in which a four year statute was held unconstitutional on the ground that it singled out contractors and architects for immunity from all those whose negligence in connection with construction might result in injury. The Supreme Court of Hawaii also found discrimination against the owner or possessor of property who might be held liable for damage or injury for which the engineer and contractor were in fact liable. Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 10-13, 514 P.2d 568 (1973) (holding classification unreasonable in immunizing the engineer and
It is our view that rational distinctions do exist between architects and engineers and others involved in the construction process. Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 715-16, 437 N.E.2d 514 (1982); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 275-78, 382 A.2d 715 (1978). The owner of real estate
Very strong factors distinguishing architects and engineers from contractors were found in O’Brien v. Hazelet & Erdal, 410 Mich. 1, 17-18, 299 N.W. 2d 336 (1980), where the court stated: “The legislature might have concluded that the different education, training, experience, licensing and professional stature of architects and engineers made it more likely that a limitation on their tort liability would not reduce the care with which they performed their tasks than would be the case with contractors.
“The legislature may also have thought it necessary to reduce the potential liability of architects and engineers in order to encourage experimentation with new designs and materials.”
We conclude that the classification of architects and engineers in a manner different from other groups
B
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GENERAL STATUTES § 52-584A UNDER ARTICLE FIRST, § 10, OF THE CONNECTICUT CONSTITUTION.
The plaintiffs claim that the statute is unconstitutional under the right of redress section of the Connecticut constitution which provides “[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person, for any injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.” They claim that the statute violates this section by abolishing common law rights of actions for both personal injuries and death, which existed at the time of the adoption of our constitution in 1818 and its “reincorporation” in 1965,
We recently considered a similar constitutional claim in Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., supra. In Daily, the plaintiff employees claimed that General Statutes § 52-577a, the product liability statute, was unconstitutional because it barred a cause of action even before it accrued, in violation of article first, § 10. They claimed that if workers are injured on the job by equipment older than the ten year statutory limitation of liability, their causes of action could be absolutely foreclosed even before they might arise. Since workers are limited to workers’ compensation benefits after the statutory period they claimed that they were deprived
We stated in Daily: “The plaintiffs further argue that the ‘open court’ provision of Connecticut’s constitution restricted the power of the legislature to abolish a cause of action recognized at common law. This same claim was raised in Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 286, 363 A.2d 11 (1975), where we held that ‘article first, § 10, recognized all existing rights and removed from the power of the legislature the authority to abolish those rights in their entirety . . . [but] the legislature retains the power to provide reasonable alternatives to the enforcement of such rights. Where such reasonable alternatives are created, the legislature may then restrict or abolish the incorporated common-law or statutory rights.’ See also Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4-5 (Fla. 1973); 16B C.J.S. 509-10, Constitutional Law § 710; Ruben & Williams, ‘The Constitutionality of Basic Protection,’ 1 Conn. L. Rev. 44, 46 n. 13 (1968), and cases cited therein. The claimed injuries suffered as a result of an alleged defective product, like injuries suffered in an automobile accident, could be linked to the preconstitutional common law action of trespass on the case and, as such, could be considered a constitutionally incorporated common law right. It is clear then that the framers of the state constitution intended that our courts be available for redress for the type of injury involved here.” Id., 585. We concluded, however, that the workers’ compensation statutes provided a reasonable alternative to access to the courts and, therefore, § 52-577a did not violate article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution.
The plaintiffs seek to distinguish Daily by arguing that § 52-584a differs from the product liability statute because the legislature has not provided any reasonable alternative to access to the courts for injuries arising out of the defective work of architects and
The MaePherson rule abolishing the privity requirement in negligence cases was gradually applied to build
“An architect may be held liable for negligence in failing to exercise the ordinary skill of his profession, which results in the erection of an unsafe structure whereby anyone lawfully on the premises is injured. An architect’s liability for negligence resulting in personal injury or death may be based upon his supervisory activities or upon defects in the plans. The liability of the architect, moreover, is not limited to the owner who employed him; the modern view is that privity of contract is not a prerequisite to liability.” 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Architects § 25. “The effect of these legal developments on architects and engineers was to extend their liability beyond the date of completion of an improvement to all foreseeable users. See, e.g., Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., Inc., 78 Ill. App. 2d 153, 222 N.E.2d 584 (1966).” R.A. Civitello Co. v. New Haven, 6 Conn. App. 212, 225, 504 A.2d 542 (1986).
The plaintiffs, upon whom rests the burden of proving § 52-584a unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, have cited no authority that the rule of privity in negligence actions was not applicable in 1818 nor are we aware of any such authority.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
General Statutes § 52-584a provides: “actions against architect or professional engineer. No action or arbitration, whether in contract, in tort, or otherwise, (1) to recover damages (A) for any deficiency in the design, planning, contract administration, supervision, observation of construction or construction of an improvement to real property; (B) for injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such deficiency; (C) for injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any such deficiency, or (2) for contribution or indemnity which is brought as a result of any such claim for damages shall be brought against any architect or professional
“(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, in the case of such an injury to property or the person or such an injury causing wrongful death, which injury occurred during the seventh year after such substantial completion, an action in tort to recover damages for such an injury or wrongful death may be brought within one year after the date on which such injury occurred, irrespective of the date of death, but in no event may such an action be brought more than eight years after the substantial completion of construction of such an improvement.
“(c) For purposes of subsections (a) and (b) of this section, an improvement to real property shall be considered substantially complete when (1) it is first used by the owner or tenant thereof or (2) it is first available for use after having been completed in accordance with the contract or agreement covering the improvement, including any agreed changes to the contract or agreement, whichever occurs first.
“(d) The limitation prescribed by this section shall not be asserted by way of defense by any person in actual possession or the control, as owner, tenant or otherwise, of such an improvement at the time any deficiency in such an improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or death for which it is proposed to bring action.”
General Statutes § 13a-144 provides in pertinent part: “DAMAGES FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED ON STATE HIGHWAYS OR SIDEWALKS. Any person injured in person or property through the neglect or default of the state or any of its employees by means of any defective highway, bridge or sidewalk which it is the duty of the commissioner of transportation to keep in repair, or by reason of the lack of any railing or fence on the side of such bridge or part of such road which may be raised above the adjoining ground so as to be unsafe for travel or, in case of the death of any person by reason of any such neglect or default, the executor or administrator of such person, may bring a civil action to recover damages sustained thereby against the commissioner in the superior court. . . . This section shall not be construed so as to relieve any contractor or other person, through whose neglect or default any such injury may have occurred, from liability to the state; and, upon payment by the comptroller of any judgment rendered under the provisions of this section, the state shall be subrogated to the rights of such injured person to recover from any such contractor or other person an amount equal to the judgment it has so paid. The commissioner, with the approval of the attorney general and the consent of the court before which any such action is pending, may make an offer of judgment in settlement of any such claim.”
Article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution provides: “All men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community.”
Article first, § 20, of the Connecticut constitution provides: “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry or national origin.”
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution provides: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
Article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution provides: “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.”
In Connecticut an architect is defined as one who “engages in the practice of architecture.” General Statutes § 20-288 (2). A professional engineer is one.who is qualified “to engage in engineering practice” which includes, inter alia, “planning, design or responsible supervision of construction, in connection with any public or privately-owned structures . . . works or projects wherein the public welfare or the safeguarding of life, public health or property is concerned . . . .” General Statutes § 20-299 (1).
“[General Statutes] Sec. § 20-298a. partnerships of architects and professional engineers. Notwithstanding the provisions of this chapter and chapter 391, one or more architects and one or more professional engineers, each of whom is licensed under the provisions of said chapters, may form a partnership, joint enterprise or association, the title of which may include the words ‘architects’.and ‘engineers.’ At least half of the partners or principals in any such partnership, joint enterprise or association shall be licensed architects and all of its announcements, cards, printed matter and listings shall indicate as to each member whether he is an architect or a professional engineer.”
McClanahan v. American Gilsonite Co., 494 F. Sup. 1334 (D. Colo. 1980); Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corporation, 435 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1983); Turner Construction Co. v. Scales, 752 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1988); Universal Engineering Corporation v. Perez, 451 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1984); Overland
Cournoyer v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 744 F.2d 208 (1st Cir. 1984); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, Dykes, Goodenberger, Bower & Clancy, 740 F.2d 1362 (6th Cir. 1984); Deville Furniture Co. v. Jesco, Inc., 697 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1983); Adair v. Koppers Co., 541 F. Sup. 1120 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Cudahy Co. v. Ragnar Benson, Inc., 514 F. Sup. 1212 (D. Colo. 1981); President & Directors v. Madden, 505 F. Sup. 557 (D. Md. 1980); Smith v. Allen-Bradley Co., 371 F. Sup. 698 (W.D. Va. 1974); Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970); Barnhouse v. Pinole, 133 Cal. App. 3d 171, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1982); Salinero v. Pon, 124 Cal. App. 3d 120, 177 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1981); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels
The plaintiffs merely assert the claim that the “reincorporation” of the right of redress section updates the time for determining existing rights, without citing any authority or offering any logical argument why this should be so. We, therefore, do not.consider this argument.