Zant v. PittsZant v. Pitts
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Fletcher
Pitts was convicted of murder and other crimes and sentenced to death. His conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in
Pitts v. State,
259 Ga. 745 (386 SE2d 351) (1989). Pitts thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus raising a number of issues, including ineffectiveness of counsel. The habeas court found that trial counsel were generally effective, but that they were ineffective for failing to introduce evidence that Pitts might be mentally retarded, even though recently enacted
The habeas court found as a fact that at the time of trial, Pitts’ attorneys “had at their disposal” the results of mental examinations conducted by two “qualified experts from Central State Hospital” which showed that Pitts had an IQ of 70 and was “mildly mentally retarded.” The court found further that trial counsel failed to present this evidence because they erroneously believed they could take advantage of
Given these facts, which are not clearly erroneous, we agree with the habeas court’s legal conclusion that trial counsel were ineffective 1 for failing to pursue a possible verdict of guilty but mentally retarded. See Bowley v. State, 261 Ga. 278 (4) (404 SE2d 97) (1991).
Although the
Fleming
procedure is by the terms of the
Fleming
opinion available to defendants tried before the effective date of
If, after a full evidentiary hearing on the issue of retardation, a jury finds Pitts to be mentally retarded, his death sentence will be vacated and he will be sentenced to life imprisonment. Fleming v. Zant, supra at 691. If, on the other hand, a jury finds he is not mentally retarded, the conviction and death sentence may then stand.
We find no error in the habeas court’s factual or legal conclusions, or the remedy fashioned by the court.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.
Notes
The habeas court properly applied the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 695-696 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), and found that counsels’ action fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there was a reasonable probability that Pitts suffered prejudice as a result of counsels’ action.