133 A. 817 | Pa. | 1926
Plaintiff Zandras brought an action to recover damages for injuries received in an automobile collision. Binding instructions, asked by Moffett, the defendant, were refused, and a motion for judgment, notwithstanding the verdict returned, was overruled. This appeal followed, it being contended that no negligence was proved, and, further, that the harm complained of was the result of plaintiff's own failure to exercise due care. The evidence adduced at the trial was conflicting, and, in some particulars, diametrically opposed. For present purposes, that offered by plaintiff, with all legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom, is alone to be considered. In passing upon it, however, we cannot accept as true statements which incontrovertible physical facts show to be inaccurate: Maue v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co.,
It appeared the truck of plaintiff, weighing about five tons, was moving north on Broad Street, Philadelphia. Upon signal it stopped, and, at the time, the smaller business car of Moffett was in the rear. When traffic was released by the signal lights, both moved forward to the north, and, before Brown Street was reached, defendant's vehicle passed that of Zandras on the right side, assuming plaintiff's testimony to be true. "There is nothing in the provision [of the Act of June 30, 1919, P. L. 678, section 25, directing cars in the rear to go around those in front to the left] to indicate an intention of the legislature to require that, in all cases, regardless of the circumstances, the width of the highway, the position of the leading vehicle or volume *480
of the traffic, a vehicle must turn to the left in passing another traveling in the same direction. For example, on a wide boulevard such as Broad Street, Philadelphia, or where traffic is congested, such regulation might be unnecessary or even unreasonable and a serious hindrance or menace to the traffic": Piper v. Adams Express Co.,
It is insisted that the car of defendant, after passing on the right side, was turned to the left in front of the truck, and then suddenly stopped without signal. As a result, the driver in the rear was forced to veer to his left, and failed to effect a clearance, and the back of the then standing car of defendant, which had gone ahead, was struck. Zandras, sitting on the right front seat of the truck, approaching from behind, was hit on the leg and injured. It is undoubtedly the law that, if a driver suddenly shifts his line of travel, causing the one in the rear to turn away as a consequence of the sudden emergency, the former may be said, under proper circumstances, to have failed to use reasonable care, and held responsible for loss resulting: Piper v. Adams Express Co., supra; Smith v. Yellow Cab Co., supra; Nold v. Higgins Lumber Co.,
It was the duty of both drivers to have their machines under reasonable control, prepared to stop at an intersecting street if vehicles were passing on it, or if directed to do so by the traffic officer, or by the signal provided for direction of car movements. In the instant case, it appeared there was a red warning set farther north on Broad, which made necessary a stop on the south side of the cross highway, known as Brown Street. This silent order was obeyed by defendant, and his machine, then ten or more feet in front of the truck, was brought to a stand. The driver of the motor, in which plaintiff was riding, still farther back, claimed not to have seen the signal, though its presence is not denied, and was unable to stop in time, resulting in the collision. It was the duty of the defendant to cease movement where he did, when the red light was set against him, and, in so doing, he was certainly not guilty of negligence. All drivers, in congested areas with controls installed, must be on the lookout for warnings which they have every reason to see displayed, when necessary, and to have their vehicles, whether light or heavy, under such management as will enable them to promptly obey signals given, which they are bound to discover, and must have seen, if due observation was made. Even though the way has been apparently cleared, the driver cannot advance carelessly so as to make probable an injury to an individual or car in advance: Gilles v. Leas, *482
On the other hand, the evidence indicates that the truck of the plaintiff was not kept under such control as is required in moving on a thickly traveled highway. Zandras was its regular driver, but, at the time of the accident, was permitting another person, not licensed, to run the machine, while he sat on the right side of the front seat. Under such circumstances, he is chargeable with the acts of his associate, and, if the latter was guilty of contributory negligence, cannot recover: Hepps v. R. R.,
The judgment is reversed, and the record is remitted with directions to enter judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto.