697 F. App'x 445
6th Cir.
2017

Zainah HAMMOUD; Shaefa Mohamed; Eleanor Ewald; Eric Ewald; Cheryl Deanda; Geno Deanda; Paula Newcomb; Robert Radford; Andrea Rowe; Gary Zelony; Anthony Crump; Ernest Forest; Brandy Guiterrez; Henry Koppoe; Timothy Padden; Sonia Vargas; Jennifer Wick; Warren Wick; Carl Novak; Richard Robbs, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WAYNE COUNTY; Richard Hathaway, Wayne County Treasurer; Raymond Wojtowicz; David Szymanski; Felecia Tyler; City of Dearborn; Robert Muery; Allyson Bettis; Randy Walker; City of Lincoln Park; Brad L. Coulter; City of Wayne; Lisa Nocerini; Redford Township; Tracy Kobylarsz; JSR Funding, LLC; James Budziak; Enterprising Real Estate, LLC; Milan Gandhi; Rishi Patel; Nandan Patel; HP Snap Investment, LLC; Hetal Gandhi; Global Realty, LLC; Richard Ingber; Rancilio & Associates; Richard Kosmack; Karen Frobotta; Nancy Jackson; City of Garden City, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-2371

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Filed August 24, 2017

697 F. App‘x 445

U.S.C. § 2255(e); see also Charles, 180 F.3d at 755. It is the prisoner‘s burden to prove that his remedy under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective. See Charles, 180 F.3d at 756. We review de novo a district court‘s judgment dismissing a habeas corpus petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Peterman, 249 F.3d at 461; Charles, 180 F.3d at 755.

The district court did not err in determining that Georgacarakos could not bring his jurisdictional challenge in a § 2241 petition. Georgacarakos‘s petition asserted that he was convicted in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction; thus, he was challenging the legality of his sentence and not its execution. Accordingly, he was required to establish that his § 2255 remedy was inadequate or ineffective.

Establishing that the § 2255 remedy is inadequate or ineffective is a high burden for a petitioner to meet-“[t]he circumstances in which § 2255 is inadequate and ineffective are narrow.” See Peterman, 249 F.3d at 461. The inability to use § 2255 to challenge the legality of a defendant‘s detention is not enough to prove inadequacy or ineffectiveness. Id. Contrary to Georgacarakos‘s argument on appeal, the remedy under § 2255 is also not inadequate or ineffective simply because § 2255 relief has already been denied. Charles, 180 F.3d at 756. In fact, the only circumstance in which this court has found § 2255 to be an ineffective or inadequate remedy is when the petition stated a facially valid claim for actual innocence. Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303, 307 (6th Cir. 2012). Georgacarakos has not set forth a claim of actual innocence and, in fact, does not dispute his involvement in the death of his fellow prisoner.

The motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED for the purposes of this appeal only. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Tarek M. Baydoun, Meridian Law Group, Dearborn, MI, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Cynthia M. Yun, James G. Berry, Wayne County Corporation Counsel, Detroit, MI, for Defendants-Appellees Wayne County, Richard Hathaway, Felecia Tyler

Laurie M. Ellerbrake, Deputy Corporation Counsel, Jeremy Daniel Brown, Licia A. Yangouyian, City of Dearborn, Dearborn, MI, for Defendant-Appellee City of Dearborn

Michael E. Rosati, Lisa A. Anderson, Holly Stockton Battersby, Johnson, Rosati, Schultz & Joppich, Farmington Hills, MI, for Defendants-Appellees Robert Muery, Allyson Bettis, Randy Walker, City of Wayne, Lisa Nocerini, City of Garden City

Julie McCann O‘Connor, O‘Connor, DeGrazia, Tamm & O‘Connor, Bloomfield Hills, MI, for Defendants-Appellees City of Lincoln Park, Brad L. Coulter

William Zvonko Kolobaric, Jeffrey R. Clark, Cummings, McClorey, Davis & Acho, Livonia, MI, for Defendants-Appellees Redford Township, Tracy Kobylarsz

David M. Ottenwess, Ottenwess, Taweel & Schenk, Detroit, MI, for Defendants-Appellees JSR Funding, LLC, James Budziak, Global Realty, LLC, Richard Ingber

Gregory G. Dean, Law Office, South Lyon, MI, for Defendants-Appellees Enterprising Real Estate, LLC, Milan Gandhi, Rishi Patel, Nandan Patel

Hetal Gandhi, Pro Se

Vincent P. Hoyumpa, Fischer Garon Hoyumpa & Rancilio, Mt. Clemens, MI, for Defendants-Appellees Rancilio & Associates, Richard Kosmack, Karen Frobotta, Nancy Jackson

BEFORE: KEITH, BATCHELDER, SUTTON, Circuit Judges.

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs-Appellants are all former owners of real property in Wayne County, Michigan. In approximately 2012, they became delinquent in paying their property taxes, and, pursuant to the Michigan General Property Tax Act (“GPTA“), Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78 et seq., the Wayne County Treasurer‘s Office took steps to foreclose upon the properties. Plaintiffs failed to timely redeem the properties, and the Wayne County Circuit Court entered foreclosure judgments against Plaintiffs in June 2015, transferring the properties to Wayne County in fee simple absolute by quit claim deed. Plaintiffs did not appeal the foreclosure judgments.

After the properties were transferred to Wayne County, the municipalities in which they were situated exercised their right under Michigan law to purchase the properties, see Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78m (giving municipalities a right of first refusal to purchase foreclosed property for a public purpose prior to any public auction of the property), and the respective municipalities then contracted with developers, who agreed to make substantial improvements to the properties and to invest a minimum of 50% of the properties’ sale value for the public good.

Plaintiffs brought a purported class action on behalf of approximately 800 similarly situated property owners, seeking equitable and compensatory relief. Specifi-cally, Plaintiffs alleged that Wayne County and affiliated individuals (“the Wayne County Defendants“) “illegally and unconscionably” and “without required notice” under Michigan and federal law-foreclosed on Plaintiffs’ real properties. Plaintiffs further alleged that the Wayne County Defendants conspired with the other Defendants to unlawfully deprive Plaintiffs of their real properties and rights of due process and equal protection.

Plaintiffs brought ten claims in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging violations of their state and federal due-process and equal-protection rights; a civil racketeering claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO“), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.; and violations of several Michigan statutes. The Defendants filed motions to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs’ due-process and equal-protection claims and that Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently plead a civil RICO claim. The district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss, finding that the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, stripped it of subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ due-process and equal-protection claims. The district court also dismissed Plaintiffs’ civil RICO claim, finding that the Wayne County and municipal Defendants cannot be held liable as a matter of law and that Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently plead a civil RICO claim against the other Defendants. Having dismissed Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.

Plaintiffs timely appealed. We review de novo a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). See DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 516 (6th Cir. 2004) (“We review a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) de novo where it requires no fact-finding.“); Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (“We review de novo a district court‘s dismissal of a suit pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).“). We review for an abuse of discretion the district court‘s decision to decline exercising supplemental jurisdiction. Gamel v. City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 2010).

After carefully reviewing the record, the applicable law, and the parties’ briefs, we are convinced that the district court did not err in its conclusion that the Tax Injunction Act barred it from adjudicating Plaintiffs’ due-process and equal-protection claims. Neither are we convinced that the district court erroneously dismissed Plaintiffs’ civil RICO claim. The district court‘s opinion carefully and correctly sets out the law governing the issues raised and clearly articulates the reasons underlying its decision. Thus, issuance of a full written opinion by this court would serve no useful purpose. And, with no federal claims remaining, the district court‘s decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims was not an abuse of discretion. See id. at 952 (“When all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations usually will point to dismissing the state law claims, or remanding them to state court if the action was removed.“); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Accordingly, we affirm.

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