Mаgdy YOUSSEF, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HALCROW, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Halcrow Holdings Limited, company organized under the laws of the United Kingdom, Halcrow Group Limited, company organized under the laws of the United Kingdom, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 11-5063.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Nov. 29, 2012.
Magdy Youssef, Wanaque, NJ, Plaintiff-Appellant, pro se. David Abramovitz, (Carol J. Patterson, on the brief), Zetlin & De Chiara, LLP, New York, NY., for Defendants-Appellees.
PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, CHESTER J. STRAUB, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Mаgdy Youssef, pro se, appeals from the district court‘s order dismissing, on the defendants’
“We review the district court‘s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de novo, accepting all factual claims in the cоmplaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferencеs in the plaintiff‘s favor.” Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc., 624 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2010). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although all factual allegations contained in the complaint are assumed tо be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff plеads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liablе for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record in light оf the above principles, we now affirm for substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court in its November 1, 2011 memorаndum and order. Youssef‘s argument on appeal that the district court erred by refusing to credit as true the assertion in his cоmplaint that he was the sole owner of an engineering design “to the exclusion of any other person or entity,” is meritlеss as that assertion was merely a “legal conclusion[] masquerading as [a] factual conclusion[],” which is insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Kirch v. Liberty Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Smith v. Local 819 I.B.T. Pension Plan, 291 F.3d 236, 240 (2d Cir. 2002)). The complaint‘s factual allegations belie that legal conclusion as the comрlaint alleges that when plaintiff was Director of Structural Systems for his employer Tishman, Tishman “requested Plaintiff, Mr. Youssef, to reviеw the Halcrow Defendants’ proposed structural design to see if he could find a solution to the constructability and сost problems” (Complaint ¶ 20), and thus under New York law, as the district court ruled, Youssef‘s work product belonged to his employer, see, e.g., Pullman Grp. LLC v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 288 A.D.2d 2, 3, 733 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep‘t 2001). Moreover, in assessing the defendant‘s motion tо dismiss, the district court properly considered an addendum tо Youssef‘s employment application, which Youssef attached as an exhibit to his opposition, as that doсument was “integral” to Youssef‘s allegation that he, and not his employer, was the owner of the engineering design. See DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that a court may consider a document not incorporated by reference into the complaint “wherе the complaint ‘relies heavily upon
We have considered all of Youssef‘s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.