*1 IN THE SUPREME COURT 459
YOUNG WOODALL [343 (1996)] (HICKS) ALLEN KIMBERLY individ- YOUNG CHRISTOPHER WOODALL capacity Department ual and as an officer of the Winston-Salem Police and POLICE DEPARTMENT and THE WINSTON-SALEM CITY OF WINSTON-SALEM
No. 265PA95 (Filed 1996) 13 June (NCI4th)— pursuing 1. Automobiles and Other § Vehicles speed gross negligence from officer — standard limit — exempt speed A pursuing observing officer is from limit pursuant to N.C.G.S. 20-145 when he acts with “a reck- § others,” gross negligence less which is a standard. 2d, Highway
Am Jur §§ Automobiles and Traffic 208.
Necessity propriety prima of instruction as to facie speed limit. 87 ALR2d 539.
2. (NCI4th); Sheriffs, Automobiles and Other Vehicles and Other Law Enforcement Officers (NCI4th)— pursuing exceeding speed limit— officer — gross negligence
absence of plaintiff’s may
Although forecast of evidence have shown police officer, it was insuffi- gross negligence cient to show the officer within the of N.C.G.S. 20-145where it tended to show that the officer saw only approaching headlight on; a car him with the officer vehicle, following started but he did not activate his blue siren; light and the officer did not know the at which he traveling, posted limit; it might but have been in excess of the traveling a witness said she saw the immediately department accident; police policy before the required patrol that the blue and siren be activated when a speed limit; car exceeded the the officer entered an intersection while a in his direction and making turn; struck vehicle while it was a left on, officer testified that his but a witness stated that she could not tell whether were on. Highway 2d,
Am Jur Automobiles Traffic §§ 208. *2 Frye dissenting.
Justice
Justice Whichard 7A-31of a unani- discretionary pursuant to N.C.G.S. review On App. 132,458 S.E.2d Appeals, 119 N.C. the Court of mous decision of part denial of the reversing in affirming in and by Hooks, J., judgment, entered motion for defendants’ Forsyth County. Supreme Superior Court, Heard in the April Court 11 December 1995. injury property damage grow- personal and is an action for City of Winston- accident that occurred
ing from an automobile with the Christopher Allen Woodall was an officer Defendant Salem. City per- Department acting and was of Winston-Salem Police the accident. formance of his duties at the time of summary judgment. The materials defendants moved for The summary judgment motion support opposition to the filed in and in May 1992, approximately a.m. on 30 that at 2:00 showed northerly duty in a direction on Peters driving was on and Woodall him Parkway approaching when he saw a Chevrolet Camaro Creek fol- only Woodall turned and started headlight on. Officer said, light he He did not activate his blue lowing this vehicle. so, given the car he was follow- because if he had done it would light activate his blue to elude him. He intended to ing better chance following. he was when he was closer to the vehicle speed he was not know the at which Officer Woodall said he did forty-five per hour, miles traveling, might it have been in excess of but speed Police posted limit. The Winston-Salem which was Department’s policy requires that the blue and siren be activated A to the accident patrol car exceeds the limit. witness when a n traveling she saw defendant Woodall “say immediately The witness said she could before the accident. were on.” not the of the vehicle for certain whether or traveling south on Peters time defendant Woodall was At the northerly plaintiff proceeding in a direction Parkway, the Creek oncoming A Parkway, approaching Officer Woodall’s vehicle. on the approached Woodall as Officer plaintiff a left turn at the intersection of the When made intersection. Parkway vehicle driven Road, Link her vehicle was hit the defendant. City liability did not have insurance for the
The of Winston-Salem $2,000,000 participate and did not in a first claim it pool pursuant risk N.C.G.S. 160A-485at the government local court the motion for sum- time of accident. Department mary and denied the motion as judgment as to City to the and Officer Woodall. part. reversed in It held that summary judgment Woodall were entitled to based on sover- immunity up including $2,000,000 for claims to and
eign based on N.C.G.S. 20-145. claims discretionary petition review. We allowed defendants’ *3 Parrish, Wright, F. Wright, Rabil, L.L.P, & Melvin Newton Jr., Gerber, plaintiff-appellee. E. Nils for Carlyle Sandridge Rice, P.L.L.C., by & W. Womble Gusti Frankel, defendants-appellants. for Attorney, Shaver, High Police amicus
AnnFrances M. Point Attorneys. North Association curiae Carolina for of WEBB,Justice. large Appeals’ opinion grounded in this case is in
The Court of provides part: 20-145,which part reading on its of N.C.G.S. apply The set forth in this Article shall not limitations safety operated regard with for under the to vehicles when due apprehension of in the chase or violators direction of any persons charged suspected of such the law or of with of not, however, protect violation .... shall consequence of a reckless dis- driver of such vehicle from the safety others. regard of the of Appeals, relying on Bullins
N.C.G.S. 20-145
of
580,
and Goddard v.
(1988),
YOUNG WOODALL be negligence, liable for he could be sued his official capacity, which means the would be liable his tort. Appeals’ reading certainly
The Court
of Bullins and
Goddard
reasonable. In
we
new trial when the court
jury
charged
upon any
“that the defendant would not be liable
aspect
you
. . .
. . .
negligence unless
find
that the conduct of the
intentional, purposeful,
officer . . .
purpose
for the
made
injuring
plaintiff.” Goddard,
N.C. at
[1] We can see no
good
reason
why
there should be a
distinction
between the standards of care
on
based whether the officer’s vehicle
was in the collision. The statute makes no such distinction. The
standard,
statute
sets the
and it is
In
negligence. Goddard, the
rely
Court seemed
the first
sentence
the section
*4
says
apply
which
“operated
the
limit shall not
to vehicles
regard
due
police.”
held, rely
under the direction of the
We
ing
phrase,
on this
jury
that an officer is liable if the
finds he is ei
ther
or
negligent
proceeding
that he
in reckless
safety of
others.
Assembly adopted, the when statute was this held in Goddard, which in 1959, provided by was decided the that standard of care the statute is an negligence standard. Id. at S.E.2d at Assembly 824. The General not has amended the statute to change result, says plaintiff. it is law, now settled as the the The fail- legislature ure of a to interpreted by amend a statute which has been
IN THE SUPREME approves the court’s legislature that the a court is some evidence 423, 435, Wortman, interpretation. But DiDonato cf. not neces- legislative inaction is (1987) (stating S.E.2d inquiry must focus approval, and that the sarily legislative evidence is clear. case, meaning of the statute itself). In this on the statute In order to have recovered canon of construction. We do not need this proved have Woodall, plaintiff would have to against Officer is incon- negligent. So far as Goddard grossly Woodall was case, with this it is overruled. sistent
[2] Applying
standard, we
hold
motion for
granted Officer Woodall’s
court should have
activating
the blue
following the Camaro without
judgment. His
the caution
entering the intersection while
his
acts of discretion on
exceeding the
limit were
flashing, and his
negli
may
grossly
but were not
have been
which
A
headlights were on. witness
testified his
gent. Officer Woodall
that the
on. This is not evidence
not tell whether
she could
did not show Officer
forecast of evidence
headlights were off. The
had been introduced
negligent. If this evidence
grossly
Woodall was
been
should have
against
claim
Officer Woodall
trial,
in his favor.
Summary
allowed
judgment should
been
dismissed.
Inc.,
467,
The defendants and pol- Attorneys public advance several of Police Carolina Association immunity. parties argue that icy in favor of absolute arguments to in this situation policy subjecting a public is people immunity necessary encourage to enter to Absolute trial. necessary say enable officers They it is also public service. liability. fully effectively without fear of perform their duties lan- we are bound acknowledge arguments, these Although we clearly 20-145 states of the statute. N.C.G.S. guage “[t]his . the conse- protect driver . . from not, however, shall *5 (Emphasis others.” the quence of a reckless must be made Any plain language of the statute added.) change to the legislature. Appeals which the Court of part of the decision of Wereverse that We remand N.C.G.S. 20-145. plaintiff proceed under allowed the THE SUPREME COURT for court further remand to to the Court opinion. entry consistent with this of a ANDREMANDED. REVERSED Frye
Justice
Williams,
majority notes,
held in Goddard
this Court
As
provided
of care
128, 110
that the standard
S.E.2d
Goddard, 251
negligence standard.
20-145is an
N.C.G.S.
recently before this Court
This statute was
at
This Court has
apprehension of a law viola
an officer in the chase or
conduct of
person,
colliding with another
vehicle
tor results
officer’s
object.
held to the standard
care
vehicle, or
officer
reasonably prudent person would exercise in the
like circumstances. If the
duties
a like nature under
official
circumstances,
complies
under these
with this standard
statutory speed
exempt from the
laws. Goddard
he is
Trollinger, 227
(1959);
Glossom v.
S.E.2d
Christenberry, 6 N.C.
(1946);
Id. change Assembly not amended the statute to notes, the General has standard, today as the ordinary negligence and until it was settled law. majority says statute is clear and now far as Goddard “is inconsistent with
overrules Goddard in so case.” over- the statute is so clear that we should
I do not believe it for decades as rule Goddard and those cases which followed passed by proper interpretation of the statute the General Assembly. care in Bullins stated a different standard of
While the Court injuries complained the officer’s vehi- of do not result from when the opinion person, vehicle, object, the con- colliding with another cle pursuing were not cluded that the officers that case Thus, apparently pursue the vehicle. the Court continuing *6 IN THE SUPREME COURT 465
YOUNG v. WOODALL (1996)] N.C. 459
[343 have simply applied would reached the same result had it Goddard standard to stating the facts of that case without a different Having standard. restated the recently, Goddard standard so I would not now discard it.
Therefore, respectfully majority’s I opinion dissent from the in this case.
Justice Whichard exempts
Section 20-145 of the North Carolina General Statutes
law
pursuit
enforcement officers from
laws while
of viola-
However,
“protect
tors of the law.
does not
the driver
consequence
such vehicle from the
a
disregard
reckless
safety
of others.” N.C.G.S.
(1993).
§ 20-145
In
Goddard
128,
interpreted
251 N.C.
from Goddard and it one imposing when gross negligence. agree. the officer acts with I language pursuing exempt N.C.G.S. 20-145is clear. A officer is from observ- ing disregard limit when he acts with “a reckless negligence of others.” Gross is wanton conduct done with conscious or rights reckless for the of others. 580, 583, Bullins v. (1988). 369 S.E.2d Therefore, majority correctly holds that tan- gross negligence, tamount to as enunciated and that negligence is the standard to which law enforcement officers should be held under N.C.G.S. 20-145.
Applying gross negligence standard, majority also con- cludes, however, that the trial court should Summary judgment. disagree. judg- Woodall’smotion I appropriate ment is when genuine there is no issue of material fact undisputed party facts establish that a is entitled to 1A-1, as matter of law. N.C.G.S. Rule It 56(c) (1990). is a drastic employed measure and should be with caution. Koontz v. Winston-Salem, 513, 518, 186 S.E.2d v. KILPATRICK
STATE establishing burden that no tri- Defendant, movant, as the has the Enters., Inc., Simplistic fact Roumillat *7 issue of exists. able All inferences of fact 57, 62-63, 414 S.E.2d 341-42 the nonmovant. movant and in favor of be drawn must Id. dispute principles mind, the without record shows
With these Camaro, upon turning giving chase to around and Peters Creek the intersection of Link Road Woodall entered Parkway was in his He a direction. while notify did he lights activate his blue nor did not departmental Camaro, pursue to as dispatcher of his intentions deposition his required. Although he testified in his regulations alleged affi- excessive, not a witness to accident her travelling she a car davit that “observed Parkway.” concedes that if he proceeding down Peters Creek Woodall department policy required on speeding, him to turn all of equipment. Further, headlights whether even had his emergency he on, while the disputed. He asserts that witness “say whether or not the of the she could certain to were on.” forecast of evidence is sufficient create vehicle as to Officer Woodall acted genuine issue of material fact whether “a others” within with 20-145; summary judgment was thus intent of N.C.G.S. § improper. respectfully
I therefore dissent. KILPATRICK STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA LUBY ALVIN No. 337A95 (Filed 1996) 13 June first-degree (NCI4th)— Law murder —dis- 1. Criminal covery records State’s witnesses — motion —criminal process compel disclosure denied —due prosecu- first-degree trial err in a murder court did not compel supply by denying motion to the State tion defendant’s records all the witnesses in the the criminal prosecutor against him. The record shows that the informed case