¶ 1 Plaintiff was injured, sought workers’ compensation benefits, and approximately thirteen months later her employment was terminated. Plaintiff filed a petition in the District Court and alleged she had been terminated from employment in retaliation for her workers’ compensation claim. She alleged her termination violated public policy and she possessed a tort claim pursuant .to Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 1 which entitled her to a jury trial in District Court. She alleged 85A O.S.Supp. 2013 7 of the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act denied her a jury trial and violated Article 2 19 of the Oklahoma Constitution. 2
¶ 2 We hold plaintiffs retaliatory discharge action is not a Burk tort, but a statutory action based upon 85 O.S.2011341 which was the retaliatory discharge statute in effect when her workers’ compensation injury occurred. Adjudicating the' appeal does not require determining whether 85A O.S. 7 violates Okla. Const. Art. -2 19. However, 'our analysis assumes 85A O.S: 7 is constitutional and thereby expresses a statutory continuation of Oklahoma’s long-recognized public policy creating an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine by condemning an employer’s conduct taken to retaliate for an employee’s statutorily-protected actions related to a workers’ compensation claim. We also conclude plaintiffs 85 O.S.2011 341 retaliation claim does not violate 85A O.S.Supp. 2013 7. The judgment granted to a party claiming to not be plaintiffs employer is affirmed on that ground, but the judgment is reversed as to the other defendant and reversed on all other issues adjudicated .therein. ■
¶ 3 Defendants filed motions to dismiss and argued plaintiffs remedy was before the Workers’ Compensation Commission and not the District Court. Go Mart, Inc.’s motion additionally sought dismissal alleging it “was never Plaintiffs employer.” The Oklahoma Attorney General appeared and argued 85A O.S.Supp. 2013 7 was constitutional. The trial judge granted the two motions to dismiss by two separate journal entries 3 and determined (1) plaintiffs exclusive remedy was a proceeding before the Workers’ Compensation Commission pursuant to 85A O.S. 7, (2) Go Mart was not. plaintiffs employer and entitled to a dismissal, (3) plaintiffs Okla. Const. Art. 2 19 right to a jury trial is not violated by 85A O.S. 7, and (4) no . common law right to a. jury trial exists for a retaliatory discharge claim. Plaintiff brought an extraordinary writ proceeding in this. Court which was recast to an appeal. The appeal was retained by this Court. 4
¶ 4 Plaintiffs petition in error raises three arguments:. (1), 85A O.S. 7 does not apply because her “original injury” occurred on January 29, 2013, prior to the.effective date of that statute; (2) 85A O.S.Supp. 2013 7 is unconstitutional because it deprives her of a trial by jury and access to common law damages; and (3) 85A O.S.Supp.2013 7 is an unconstitutional special law that sanctions or creates disparate remedies for those who complain of employment discrimination. We conclude plaintiffs first assignment of error and assоciated argument is sufficient to show error requiring reversal as to one defendant, and we must affirm the dismissal as to another defendant. We need not address the other claims raised on appeal.
II. Judgment Granting Go Mart’s Motion to Dismiss
¶5 The judgment granting Go Mart’s motion to dismiss must be affirmed on appeal. The trial court' used alternative grounds when granting Go Mart’s motion to dismiss. One of these grounds was “the Court finds that Go Mart, Inc. was not Plaintiffs employer.” This finding was based upon two documents attached to Go Mart’s motion dismiss, “Exhibit 1,” an affidavit and “Exhibit 2;” a photocopied sheet of paper appearing to contain a “CompSouree Oklahoma” mark with the designation of “Renewal Information” to insured “Go Mart, Inc.” with “additional businesses” including “Station 27, Inc.” The affidavit is given by a person identifying himself as the president of. Station 27, Inc., and states “Plaintiff never worked for" Go Mart, Inc.” The affidavit states “Go Mart is a separate business corporation from Station 27.” Thе affidavit states there is. common' ownership of the two corporations with- a common worker’s compensation policy covering both companies. The affidavit of the president does not identify or expressly refer to Exhibit 2, and it appears in the record as an exhibit with counsel, not a witness, arguing 5 in the motion to dismiss what the exhibit is and .what it contains. 6 Go Mart’s motion states plaintiffs allegations against" Go, Mart are based upon an alleged employer status as a necessary condition to establish legal liability. This allegation is not contradicted by plaintiff.
¶7 Alleged error must be raised in the trial court to preserve the issue as • a ground urged as error on appeal. 11 Plaintiffs trial court response to Go Mart was silent on the issue of Go Mart’s status as an employer as well as Go Mart’s use of its exhibits attached to the motion. Plaintiffs application for extraordinary reliеf does not raise these issues! The District Court’s judgment dismissing Go Mart as a party is affirmed on the issue of Go Mart’s status as not plaintiffs employer.
III. Judgment Granting Station 27’s Motion to Dismiss
¶8 The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the law that governs the claim in litigation, not the underlying facts.
12
Station 27’s motion to dismiss cited
IV. 85A O.S.Supp.2013 7 and Plaintiffs Retaliation Claim
¶ 9 The statute challenged by plaintiff is 85A O.S. Supp.2013 7 (Laws 2013, c. 208, 7, eff. Feb. 1, 2014), which states as follows.
A.An employer may not discriminate or retaliate against an employee when the employee has in good faith:
1. Filed a claim under this act;
2. Retained a lawyer for representation regarding a claim under this act;
3. Instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under the provisions of this act; or
4. Testified or is about to testify in any proceeding under the provisions of this act.
B. The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims based on subsection A of this section.
C. If the Commission determines that the defendant violated subsection A of this section, the Commission may award the employee back pay up to a maximum of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00). Interim earnings or amounts eamable with reasonable diligence by thе person discriminated against shall reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.
D. The prevailing party shall be entitled to recover costs and a reasonable attorney fee.
E. No employer may discharge an employee during a period of temporaiy total disability for the sole reason of being absent from work or for the purpose of avoiding payment of temporary total disability benefits to the injured employee.
F. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an employer shall not be required to rehire or retain an employee who, after temporary total disability has been exhausted, is determined by a physician to be physically unable to perform his or her assigned duties, or whose position is no longer available.
G. This section shall not be construed as establishing an exception to the employment at will doctrine.
H. The remedies рrovided for in this section shall be exclusive with respect to any claim arising out of the conduct described in subsection A of this section.
Emphasis added.
The effective date of this statute is February 1, 2014, and plaintiffs petition alleges her
¶ 10 Title 85A O.S.Supp.2013 7 expressly condemns actions taken by an employer concerning claims and proceedings “under this act” or “under the provisions of this act:” In (A)(1), filed a claim under this act', In (A)(2), retained a lawyer for representation regarding a claim under this act; In (A)(3), instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding tmder the provisions of this act] and (A)(4), testified or is about to testify in any proceeding under the provisions of this act. The phrase “this act” refers to the “Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act” in Oklahoma Statutes Title 85A. 17 The language in 7 referencing “this act” unambiguously refers to the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act, and is judicially construed as an expression of legislative intent to accomplish that result which we are not empowered to rewrite. 18 The retaliation statute in 85A, section 7, facially applies to conduct relating to the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act, and does not apply to conduct relating to other workers’ compensation statutes.
Y. Public Policy and Plaintiffs Retaliatory Discharge Claim
¶ 11 Since plaintiffs claim of retaliatory discharge is not based on the express language in 85A O.S.Supp. 2013 7, then upon what legal basis may she assert a retaliatory discharge claim? Defendants claim the former statutes on the issue are repealed, and 7 in effect at the time the District Court action was commenced bars all retaliatory discharge claims in a District Court when they are based upon an employer’s response to an employee’s conduct related to a workers’ compensation claim. Defendants rely оn language in 7(G) stating “This section shall not be construed as establishing an exception to the employment at will doctrine.” This reliance is misplaced. On the other hand, plaintiff relies upon Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 19 for bringing a Burk action, and her reliance is misplaced.
¶ 12 We conclude: (1) Title 85A O.S.Supp. 2013 7 shows a continuation of a public policy creating an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine consistent with application of
¶ 13 For mаny years and by different statutes, the Legislature has provided legal remedies for workers who have been terminated from employment in retaliation for their efforts to obtain workers’ compensation benefits. The former Retaliatory Discharge Act was originally created by H. B. No. 1353, Ch. 217, O.S.L.1976, pp. 337-338, 85 O.S.Supp. 1976 5-7.
20
Oklahoma’s first “Workmens Compensation Law” was enacted in 1915 and administered by the State Industrial Commission.
21
From 1915 until 1976 when
¶ 14 In Ingram v. Oneok, Inc., 23 this Court examined the former Workers’ Compensation Retaliatory Discharge Act, 85 O.S.1981 5-7. This Act authorized an employee’s action in District Court based upon the employee’s allegations of employment terminatiоn-due to employee’s workers’ compensation claim. 24 We stated therein “The. underlying issue for decision is whether the Retaliatory Discharge Act created a.new cause of action based upon a.statutory liability other than penalty or forfeiture.” We noted an appellate court had relied on our opinions in Hinson v. Cameron, 25 and Smith Engineering Works v. Custer, 26 for the proposition “there is no common law. liability for discharging'an employee at will with or without cause” and the Court’s conclusion’“ “but for the statute,’ no liability would exist.” 27
¶ 15 A few years after
Ingram
we characterized the former
1fl6 Former 86 O.S.Supp. 2010 5 prohibited certain actions by ah employer in retaliation relating to an employee’s worker’s compensation proceedings pursuant to former title 85.
30
Section 5’s prohibited retaliatory activities referenced an employee’s' claim and certain actions “under the provisions of this title,”
ie.,
Title 85,' ‘Workers’ Compensation.” In 2011 the Legislature repealed 86 O.S.Supp.2010 5 (last amended'in 2005) by Laws 2011, c. 318, 87. At the time of this repeal the Legislature enacted a slightly modified version of 5 and codified it in
¶ 17 Defendants argue the administrative remedy in 85A O.S.Supp. 2013 7 must apply to defeat any District Court action brought by plaintiff because- 7 may not be construed as creating an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine and 341 had been repealed when Young’s District Court action was brought. They argue 7 negates any
present public policy
in support of limiting the employment-at-will doctrine in the context of a retaliation claim in a District Court, and based upon their reasoning plaintiff may not bring
any type of retaliation claim
in District Court. In other words,
any
District Court retaliation claim violates 7(G). Section 7(G) states “This section shall not be construed as establishing an exception to the employment at will doctrine.” May 7 be read as consistent with 341 so that an action brought under 341 does not violate 7? Yes, it may. As 'we now explain, a 341 remedy aftеr the effective date of 7 does not conflict with that provision because of (1) the constitutional necessity of 7 being based upon a public policy, a constitutionality on this one point we assume for answering this question, and (2) the express language of 7 creating an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine for the purposes of 7. Further,
if
7 is read as an exclusive remedy in the sense of barring a
Burk
tort
as defendants and the Attorney
¶ 18 The meaning of language in a statute is construed by courts as internally consistent and externally consistent with the constitution, ie., the meaning of the statute’s language is construed so that it does not contradict either itself or the constitution. 38 First, and as a matter of the meaning of words in 7, they create a statutory exception to the employment-at-will doctrine for the circumstances listed on the face of the statute. A typical statement of the employment-at-will rule given in Burk v. K-Mart Corp. is that an employer may discharge an employee for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong. 39 The language of 7 imposes statutory limits on the employer’s conduct relating to discharge from employment, and 85A O.S. 7 expressly and unambiguously acts as a legislatively-created limitation on the employment-at-will doctrine.
¶ 19 Secondly, this legislatively-created limitation on the employment-at-wiil doctrine
must
be an expression of a
public policy
if we assume it is constitutional. A statute may in certain circumstances constitutionally vest a quasi-judicial power in an administrative (executive) agency to exercisе adjudicative authority or render decisions in individual proceedings.
40
In
Tenneco Oil Co. v. El Paso
¶ 20 In а public rights analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court looks at whether Congress has acted with a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional legislative powers and created a statutory “private” right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency adjudication when that regulatory scheme “virtually occupies the field.”
45
If the statutory right fails this test it is, a dispute for an Article III federal court.
46
We need not determine in this proceeding the validity of the Legislature’s purpose in enacting 85A O.S.Supp.2013 7,
47
or provide a complete analysis for distinguishing public, private, or quasi-public rights.
48
However, we
¶21 The elements of a Burk tort were explained: in Vasek v. Board of County Com’rs of Noble County, with the following. 52
A viable Burk claim must- allege (1) -an actual or constructive discharge (2) of an at-will employee (3) in significant part for a reason that violates an Oklahoma public policy goal (4) that is found in Oklahoma’sconstitutional, statutory, or decisional law or in a federal constitutional provision that prescribes a norm of conduct for Oklahoma and (5) no statutory remedy exists that is adequate to protect the Oklahoma policy goal.
This language expressly recognizes a Burk tort may exist when no statutory remedy exists that is adequate to protect the Oklahoma public policy goal. We have since explained the adéquacy of a statutory remedy “is to be decided under the sufficiency test of Vasek, which in turn applied McGrndy,” 53 This test requires us to ask: “Were the remedies available to the plaintiff sufficient to protect Oklahoma’s public policy goals?” 54 We conclude the combined reinstatement with actual and punitive damages remedy in 341 is adequate to protect the public policy expressed in that statute.
¶22 The former
¶23 We have concluded plaintiffs retaliation claim in the District Court, is governed by
¶ 24 We are aware our 1994 opinion
Groce v.
Foster
60
held that under the limited public policy exception an employee could assert a
Burk
tort against a former employer when the employee’s action was based, in part, on the former
VI. Conclusion
¶ 25 We remand to the District Court for further proceedings on plaintiff’s 85 O.S.2011 341 statutory retaliation claim. The District Court held no common-law right to a jury trial existed for the plaintiff. However, the motion to dismiss filed by Station 27 contains no argument or authority challenging plaintiffs constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial for a 85 O.S.2011 341 claim. Station 27’s Reply in the District Court expanded the nature of its argument and stated plaintiff lacked a right to a jury trial for statutory remedies in a general sense, but did not address a constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial in the context of a 341 action. Several weeks after the parties filed their motions, response, and reply, the Attorney General appeared and filed a brief “on the merits of the constitutional claim” addressing 85A O.S. 7. This brief included an Expansion on the 85A O.S. 7 constitutional issue and stated retaliatory discharge claims were not entitled to a jury trial at common law. However, this filing also did not specifically address a constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial in the context of a 341 District Court action or the previous workers’ compensation retaliation statutes. .
¶ 26 We hold the date of Young’s injury for the purpose of her workers’ compensation claim applies to her retaliatory discharge claim in a District Court. The workers’ compensation retaliation statute in effect on the date of her injury was 85 O.S.2011 341. The
¶ 27 The District Court’s judgment is affirmed as to Go Mart, Inc.’s dismissal based upon its status as not plaintiffs employer. The District Court’s judgment is reversed on Station 27, Inc.’s motion to dismiss because Young possesses a retaliatory action in a District Court pursuant to 85 O.S.2011 341. The District Court’s judgment on the constitutionality of 85A O.S.Supp.2013 7 is reversed because that statute does not apply to Young’s claim. In summary, the judgment granted to a party claiming to not be plaintiffs employer is affirmed on that ground, but the judgment is reversed as to the other defendant and reversed on all other issues adjudicated therein. The matter is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
.
. Okla. Const. Art. 2 19:
The right of trial by jury shall be and remain inviolate, except in civil cases wherein the, amount in controversy does not exceed One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00), or in criminal cases wherein punishment for the offense charged is by fine only, not exceeding One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00). Provided, however, that the Legislature may provide for jury trial in cases involving lesser amounts. Juries for the trial of civil cases, involving more than Ten Thousand Dollars ,($10,-000.00), and felony criminal cases shall consist of twelve (12) persons. All other juries shall consist of six (6) persons. However, in all cases the parties may agree on a lesser number of jurors than provided herein.
In all. criminal cases where imprisonment for more than six (6) months is authorized the entire number of jurors must concur to render a verdict. In all other cases three-fourths (3/4) of the whole number of jurors concurring shall have power to render a verdict. When a verdict is rendered by less than the whole number of jurors, the verdict shall be signed by each juror concurring therein.
.Each journal entry grants judgment to a single defendant and neither contains a certification for a judgment on fewer than all claims or parties, Neither entry contains any indication it is a final adjudication after a previous adjudication involving a different defendant. The parties did not brief whether plaintiff’s petition alleges a- single cause of action against two defendants or the relationship between an alleged cause of action and the defendants, other than Go Mart’s argument that plaintiff’s petition against it relied upon, alleged employer status. Because the two journal entries were filed in the District Court on the same day and have a combined effect of dismissing plaintiff’s petition, we treat the simultaneous journal entries filed in the same case as a judgment for the purpose of an appeal.
. 12 O.S.Supp.2013 Ch.
. .Argument of counsel is not evidence,
Carbajal v. Precision Builders, Inc.,
: We affirm the judgment for Go Mart, Inc., and need not 'address the "convertible to admissible evidence at' trial" standard in current District Court Rule 13(c).
. Both plaintiff and defendants state 85A O.S.Supp.2013 7 provides for statutory subject matter jurisdiction in the Commission. Based upon the arguments presented by both parties we have assumed 7 is constitutional for the purpose of addressing specific claims in this opinion.
. Record on Accelerated Appeal, Tab 13, Defendants' Reply in Further Support of Motions to Dismiss, pg. 1, footnote 1.
.
Darrow v. Integris Health, Inc.,
.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Bd. of Regents of University of Oklahoma v. Lucas,
.
In re M.K.T.,
.
Darrow v. Integris Health, Inc.,
. 12 O.S.2011 2012 (B)(1) states:
B, HOW .PRESENTED. Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:
1, Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
.
Seneca Telephone Co. v. Miami Tribe of Oklahoma,
.
Shero v. Grand Sav. Bank,
. Seneca Telephone Co. v. Miami Tribe of Oklahoma, supra,
and
Samson Resources Co. v. Newfield Exploration Mid-Continent Inc., supra,
at note 14.
Cf. Simonson v. Schaefer,
. 85A O.S.Supp.2013 1 states in part: “Sections 1 through 106 and 150 through 168 of this act shall be known and may be cited as the ' "Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act.”"
.
Multiple Injury Trust Fund v. Coburn,
.
.
WRG Const. Co. v. Hoebel,
.
Robinson v. Fairview Fellowship Home for Senior Citizens, Inc.,
.
Ingram
v.
Oneok, Inc.,
.
.
Ingram
v.
Oneok, Inc.,
.
.
.
Ingram v. Oneok, Inc.,
.
Gunn
v.
Consolidated Rural Water & Sewer Dist. No. 1, Jefferson Cnty., Okla.,
.
Ingram v. Oneok, Inc.,
. 85 O.S.Supp.2010 5 provided:
A. No person, firm, partnership, corporation, or other entity may discharge, or, except for nonpayment of premium, terminate any group health insurance of any employee because the employee has in good faith;
1. Filed a claim;
2. Retained a lawyer for representation regarding a claim;
3. Instituted or caused to be instituted.any proceeding under the provisions of this title;
4. Testified or is about to testify in any proceeding under the provisions of this title; or
5; Elected to participate or not to participate in a certified workplace medical plan as provided in Section 14 of this title.
B. No persоn, firm, partnership,, corporation, or other entity may discharge any employee during a period of temporary total disability solely on tire basis of absence from work.
C. After an employee’s period of temporary total disability has ended, no person, firm, partnership, corporation, or other entity shall be required to rehire or retain any employee who is determined to be physically unable to perform assigned duties. The failure of an employer to rehire or retain any such employee shall in no manner be deemed’ a violation of this section.
D. No person, firm, partnership, corporation or other entity may discharge an employee for the purpose of avoiding payment of temporary total disability benefits to the injured employee.
.
A. No employer may discharge or, except for non-payment of premium, terminate any group health insurance of any employee because the employee has in good faith:
1. Filed a claim;
2. Retained a lawyer for representation regarding a claim; •
3. Instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under the provisions of this act;
4. Testified or is about to testify in any proceeding under the provisions of this act; or
5. Elected to participate or not to participate in a certified workplace medical plan as provided in this act.
B. No employer may discharge any employee during a period of temporary total disability solely on the basis of absence from work.
C. After an employee’s period of temporary total disability has ended, no employer shall be required to rehire or retain any employee who is determined to be physically unable to perform assigned duties. The failure of an employer to rehire or retain any such employee shall in no manner be deemed a violation of this section.
D. No employer may discharge an employee for the purpose of avoiding payment of temporary total disability benefits to the injured employee.
E. An employer which violates any provision of this section shall be liable in a district court action for reasonable damages, actual and punitive if applicable, suffered by an employee as a result of the violation. An employee discharged in violation of the Workers' Compensation Code shall be entitled to be reinstated to his or. her former position. Exemplary or punitive damage awards made pursuant to this section shall not exceed One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,-000.00). The employee shall have the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
. 85 O.S.2011 301 provides the name for the 2011 Act as the "Workers’ Compensation Code.”
.
. Compare
85 O.S.2001 6:
Except as provided in Section 29 of this act, a person, firm, partnership or corporation who violates any provision of Section 5 of this Title shall be liable for reasonable damages, actual and punitive if applicable; suffered by an employee as a result of the violation. An- employee discharged in violation of the Workers' Compensation Act shall be entitled to be reinstated to his former position. Exemplary or punitive damage awards made pursuant tot this section shall not exceed One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,-000.00). The burden of proof shall be upon the employee.
85 O.S.2001 7:
Except as otherwise provided for by law, the district courts of the state shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown, to restrain violations of this act.
.
.We need not determine whether the language used in 85A O.S.Supp.2013 7 is constitutionally sufficient to prohibit a party bringing a Burk tort without the need for the Court analyzing adequacy of remedies using tests such as Vasek v. Board of County Com’rs of Noble County, as discussed herein.
Due to the nature of the controversy as framed and briefed by the parties, we also need not determine either (1) if any public or quasi-public right possessed by the People must be construed as prohibiting an employer from using an award of a statutory benefit as cause for retaliation in an employee's private employment status, or (2) if an employee or employer possess personal constitutional rights influencing the creation or scope of a cause of action for workers’ compensation retaliation in an employee's private employment status.
Democratic Party of Oklahoma v. Estep,
. This conclusion is consistent with our history of recognizing 341 and the former
.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
v.
Getty Oil Co.,
.
Burk
v.
K-Mart Corp.,
. Okla. Const. Art. 7 1:
The judicial power of this State shall be vested in the Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, a Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, the Court on the Judiciary, the State Industrial Court, the Court of Bank Review, the Court of Tax Review, and such intermediate appellate courts as may be provided by statute, District Courts, and such Boards, Agencies and Commissions created by the Constitution or established by statute as exercise adjudicative authority or render decisions in individual proceedings. Provided that the Court of Criminal Appeals, the State Industrial Court, the Court of Bank Review and the Court of Tax Review and such Boards, Agencies and Commissions as have been established by statute shall continue in effect, subjectto the power of the Legislature to change or abolish said Courts, Boаrds, Agencies, or Commissions. Municipal Courts in cities or incorporated towns shall continue in effect and shall be subject to creation, abolition or alteration by the Legislature by general laws, but shall be limited in jurisdiction to criminal and traffic proceedings arising out of infractions of the provisions of ordinances of cities and towns or of duly adopted regulations authorized by such ordinances.
.
.
Tenneco Oil,
.
Tenneco Oil,
. In Philip Hamburger’s article,
The Inversion of Rights and Power,
63 Buff. L. Rev. 731 (2015), the author addressed how the public rights doctrine is used to justify an administrative determination of a private right. He stated the Court seized upon its phrase in
Murray's Lessee
to cast the government’s assertion of administrative power in terms of enforcement of a public right.
.
Granfinanciera,
S.A.
v. Nordberg,
.
Granfinanciera,
S.A. v.
Nordberg,
.
Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC,
.
See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,
Of course, not every statute is an expression of a public policy.
See, e.g., Peterson v. Browning,
832
Further, not every statutory obligation creates a limit on the employment contract.
Shero v. Grand Sav. Bank,
Shero,
noted the employer’s conduct "does' not violate the public policy drawn from the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act ... [and] does not interfere with the legally'protected recovery regime for those who suffer work-related harm and thus violates no public policy of this state.”
Shero
at n. 5,
The parties’ arguments logically include several issues but they are not expressly stated or briefed with supporting authority, We thus -decline to address when an employer's alleged interference with public policy also involves public or quasi-public rights, or how these concepts relate to (1) a' changeable legislative public policy, (2) personal state -constitutional rights and if certain rights provide a historical "floor" for a minimal protec-five guarantee, and (3) the Legislature’s authority to abolish a cause of action.
See, e.g., Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC,
.
Red Rock Mental Health v. Roberts,
.
Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co.,
.
Torres
v.
Seaboard Foods, LLC,
.
Vasek,
.
Shephard v. CompSource Oklahoma,
.
Shephard,
.
Gunn v. Consolidated Rural Water & Sewer Dist. No. 1,
. 85A O.S.Supp. 2013 400(I) states in part: "The Court shall be vested with jurisdiction over all claims filed pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Code.”
. Multiple Injury Trust Fund v. Coburn,
-Because the Legislature tied application of -a retaliation statute to the particular workers’ compensation statute in effect at the same time and our conclusions herein, we need not address whether a District Court retaliation claim/action is a substantive right for purposes of applying 85A O.S.Supp.2013 400.
See, e.g., Multiple Injury Trust Fund v. Coburn,
at 4,
.
Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc.,
.
Ingram v. Oneok, Inc.,
.
.
Shero v. Grand Sav. Bank,
. See, e.g., Shirazi v. Childtime Learning Center, Inc.,
. We note our result is also consistent with a
general
principle stating when a statute creates both a right and a remedy for its enforcement the statutory remedy is exclusive.
R. R. Tway, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
.
Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC,