Young v. StateYoung v. State
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Hines
James Billy Young appeals his convictions for driving while under the influence of alcohol and failure to obey a stop sign, contending, inter alia, that the implied consent warning provision of
Construed to support the verdicts, the evidence showed that the arresting officer observed Young drive through a stop sign. Young’s breath smelled of alcohol and the officer asked Young to get out of the car. Young staggered as he walked and performed poorly on field sobriety tests. The officer read Young the implied consent warning and requested that he take State-administered breath tests. Young’s two tests showed alcohol concentrations of 0.142 and 0.144 grams, over the then-legal limit of 0.10 grams.
Young moved to suppress the results of the tests, and any testimony about them, challenging the constitutionality of
1. Young contends that the implied consent warning contained within
When evaluating an equal protection claim, the legislation is presumed to be valid, and the claimant must establish that he is sim
ilarly situated to members of a class of persons who are treated differently from him, and that there is no rational basis for such different treatment.
Farley v. State,
272 Ga. 432, 433 (531 SE2d 100) (2000). However, ‘‘[c]riminal defendants are ‘similarly situated’ for purposes of equal protection ‘only if they are charged with the same crime or crimes.’
Woodard v. State,
269 Ga. 317, 321-322 (3) (496 SE2d 896) (1998).”
State v. Jackson,
271 Ga. 5 (515 SE2d 386) (1999). As a DUI defendant, Young is not similarly situated with those charged under
2. The State introduced evidence of the results of the Intoxilyzer 5000 breath test. For such evidence to be admissible, the State must show that the testing machine “was operated with all its electronic and operating components . . . properly attached and in good working order.”
Nonetheless, Young contends that the trial court should have granted his motion to exclude any evidence of the test results, contending that the evidence showed the Intoxilyzer 5000 was not operating properly at the time of the tests. He bases this contention on evidence that: at 8:56 p.m., the arresting officer communicated by radio with his dispatcher that he had stopped Young; the video camera mounted on the officer’s car showed 8:58 p.m. as the time of the stop; the officer left the scene, with Young, at 9:13 p.m.; the police incident report showed the incident was “cleared” at 9:19 p.m.; 1 and the tests were administered at the police station, approximately three minutes driving time away from the scene, at 9:15 p.m. and 9:18 p.m., according to the internal clock on the Intoxilyzer 5000. Young argues that the recorded times of the tests could not be correct if the other times are correct, and that this compels the conclusion that the machine was not in proper working order at the time of his tests. “An accused may always introduce evidence of the possibility of error or circumstances that might have caused the machine to malfunction. Such evidence would relate to the weight rather than the admissibility of breathalyzer results.” Lattarulo v. State, 261 Ga. 124, 126 (3) (401 SE2d 516) (1991). The evidence upon which Young relies does not serve as a basis for the exclusion of the chemical test results.
Young also contends that this evidence, and the doubt it cast on the accuracy of the Intoxilyzer’s clock, rendered the evidence insufficient to satisfy
Judgments affirmed.
All the Justices concur.
Notes
The officer testified that this referred to the time when Young’s vehicle identification number was cleared in the computer system.