William D. BROUWER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 01-7295
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
May 20, 2002
21 F. App‘x 925
Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Submitted April 23, 2002.
PER CURIAM.
William D. Brouwer seeks to appeal the district court‘s order denying relief on his motion filed under
The district court, acting sua spontе, determined from the face of Brouwer‘s motion that his claims were barred by the one-year limitations period set forth in
Because it was not “indisputаbly clear from the materials presented to the district court” that Brouwer could not salvage his motion, we grant a certificate of appealability, vacate the district court‘s order, and remand to the district court to provide Brouwer with the notice and opportunity to respond to which he is now entitled pursuant to Hill. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
REMANDED.
Clyde YOUNG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lonnie M. SAUNDERS; Larry W. Huffman, Regional Director, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 01-7782
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
May 20, 2002
21 F. App‘x 925
Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Submitted April 23, 2002. Clyde Young, Appellant Pro Se. Pamela Anne Sargent, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Clyde Frank Young, a Virginia inmate, brought this action pursuant to
The Supreme Court has held that a neutral, generally applicable law does not offend the Free Exercise Clause, even if the law has an incidental effect on religious practice. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-79, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). See also Hines v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, 148 F.3d 353, 357 (4th Cir.1998); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 654 (4th Cir.1995) (explaining Smith). In the context of regulations that affect inmates, the Supreme Court has held, prior to Smith, that the regulation must be reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. O‘Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987). In O‘Lone, the Supreme Court provided the following fаctors for lower courts to weigh when evaluating constitutional challenges to prison regulations: (1) a regulation must have a logical conneсtion to legitimate governmental interests invoked to justify it; (2) the inmates should have alternative means of exercising their religious rights; and, (3) accommodating thе inmates’ rights should not severely impact other inmates, prison officials, and allocation of prison resources generally. Id. at 350-52, 107 S.Ct. 2400. Relying heavily upon O‘Lone, the district court found thаt the regulations restricting Young‘s possession of these items were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and granted summary judgmеnt to Saunders.
The penological interests enumerated by Saunders to limit access to candles, incense, and a lodestone survive both the Smith and O‘Lone tests. Signifiсantly, the regulations that limit Young‘s access to these items are general in their applicability and do not target the religious practice of Vоodoo. Furthermore, Saunders’ concerns over the safety and security of the facility and its inhabitants provide adequate support for the conclusion that accommodating Young‘s request for these items would have undesirable results in ACC. O‘Lone, 482 U.S. at 353, 107 S.Ct. 2400. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief as to Young‘s claims for candles, incense, and a lodestone.
On appeal, however, Young provides several counter-arguments to the penological interеsts enumerated by the Appellees in denying access to prayer oil and religious powder that warrant further review. Although Appellees claim а compelling interest in protecting the safety and security of the facility, they have failed to articulate the manner in which these legitimate goals are advanced by restricting the purchase of non-flammable prayer oil and religious powder. Second, although the district court accepted for purposes of decision that Egyptian Freemasonry Voodoo is a valid religious practice and that Young needed prayer оils and religious powder to practice that religion, the record fails to provide any information about the demands of this religion. Without this factual finding, thе second prong of the O‘Lone test, whether Young is able to participate in other religious observances of his faith, cannot be considered. Finally, the record provides no insight as to how the allowance of non-flammable prayer oil and religious powder, subject to inspection, would affеct other inmates, prison personnel, or prison resources.
Because crucial factual issues remain, summary judgment was pre-mature and Young‘s сlaims regarding his requests for prayer oil and religious powder should be allowed to proceed. For this reason, we
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terrenсe Renard RUSSELL, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 01-7804
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
May 20, 2002
21 F. App‘x 927
Before MICHAEL and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Submitted April 1, 2002. Terrence Renard Russell, Appellant Pro Se. James L. Trump, Office of the United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Terrence Renаrd Russell seeks to appeal from the district court‘s orders denying his motion filed under
As to several of the claims, the district court found that, assuming that counsel‘s performance was deficient, based on Russell‘s offensе level, the sentence would be the same; therefore he could not show prejudice as required to prove ineffective assistance оf counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In addressing Russell‘s claim that the errors, viewed together, resulted in prejudice, the district court held that cumulative errors are not reсognized in the Fourth Circuit. The court cited Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 852 (4th Cir.1998), for this proposition. In Fisher, we held that it is not appropriate to consider the cumulative effect of attorney error when the individual claims of ineffective assistance do not violate the defendant‘s constitutional rights. Id. at 852-53.
The individual claims in Fisher were reviewed on the merits and determined not to amount to error. Thus, cumulatively, we held they could not amount to error. Id.; see Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086