133 Mo. App. 130 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1908
The plaintiff, an attorney at law, instituted this suit as of quantum meruit against his former client, the defendant, to recover the' reasonable value of services rendered in several suits at law and in equity pending in the courts of this State, and for the sum of $15 in cash which he had advanced to defendant at his instance and request. Plaintiff recovered in the circuit court and the defendant prosecutes the appeal.
The causes of action relied upon are stated separately in seven separate counts contained in the petition. The first and second counts of the petition and the causes of action therein stated, were withdrawn from the jury, and will therefore not be further noticed here. There is no complaint with respect to the recovery on the seventh count in the petition, which concerns only the item of $15 advanced by the plaintiff to the defendant at his instance and request. All of the argument advanced for a reversal of the judgment pertain to the plaintiff’s recovery on the third, fourth, fifth and sixth counts of the petition. Those counts only, and the proceedings at the trial thereon, will be noticed in the opinion.
About this time, a Kansas City man instituted a suit against the present defendant in which he sought to recover $10,000 damages against him for alleged slander. Plaintiff in the present action devoted a great deal of time in preparing a defense in that case, appeared in court at Kansas City at the instance and request of defendant, and participated in the trial of the cause, which lasted about two weeks. This trial resulted in a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff in that case filed a motion for new trial therein, which was afterwards sustained by the court on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and this slander
About this time or shortly thereafter, the defendant became involved in two separate suits, wherein two citizens of Kansas City instituted separate actions against him, seeking to recover $50,000 damages each, on account of alleged malicious prosecutions instituted against them by defendant. In these suits, the present plaintiff acted as attorney for defendant, took depositions in the case at the city of Little Rock, Arkansas, in gt. Louis and Kansas City, Missouri, and prepared several motions and demurrers which he caused to be filed in the court at Kansas City. The demurrers to the petitions were sustained. He investigated the law on the subject, etc., and devoted some ten or fifteen days and portions of the nights to preparing the cases for trial. They had not been disposed of, however, at the time he withdrew as defendant’s attorney therefrom for the reason the defendant refused to compensate him in accordance with his alleged agreement thereabout. The fifth count in the petition stated a cause of action arising out of the services rendered to defendant as attorney in the two cases for malicious prosecution mentioned.
About this time, the present defendant caused the several Kansas City men mentioned to be-indicted in the city of gt. Louis on the charge of obtaining a stock of goods from him under and by means of false pretenses. The plaintiff, his attorney, at the instance and request of defendant, aided and assisted the circuit attorney of the city of gt. Louis in preparing and presenting the criminal phases of the litigation mentioned and in- drawing the indictments thereunder. There was- a large and
Aside from some evidence introduced by defendant in connection with the cross-examination as to a contract for fixed compensation, the evidence tends to prove that plaintiff was to charge the defendant, and the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff, reasonable compensation for his services in and about the several matters mentioned. The amount of the fee was to be determined with reference to the amount of services rendered; that is, such an amount as the services were reasonably worth. The defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff on account from time to time as the litigation progressed. It appears the defendant 'did pay t*he plaintiff a small amount and, in keeping with the original agreement, about July, 1905, further agreed to pay him on account of his services theretofore rendered in the slander suit, the sum of $950; on account of the malicious prosecution suits, $50; on account of the injunction suit, $75; and on account of the criminal cases, $250; making a total of $1,325. These items were not to be in full for his services, but were the amount which the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff on account within a few days or a few weeks thereafter. In the latter part of July, of that year, plaintiff received a draft payable to defendant for about $6,000 covering the amount due him, less some expenses deducted at Kansas City, on the note and deed of trust involved in the injunction suit above referred to. Upon committing this draft to defendant, he sought to persuade the defendant to pay him out of the fund thereby evidenced, the several amounts above given, in accordance with his agreement so to do. The defend
The court instructed the jury on each cause of action set up in the several counts of the petition separately, and in substance as follows: that if the jury believed from the evidence the defendant employed the plaintiff to represent him as attorney in the several suits mentioned and that the plaintiff did represent the defendant as attorney in such suits without an express-agreement ¡regarding the amount of compensation for his services or the time for paying the same, then the law would imply an agreement on the part of the defendant to pay the plaintiff reasonable compensation therefor. And the law will also imply an agreement on the part of the plaintiff to continue in charge of the several cases until their final determination, and that the compensation for such services would become due when the plaintiff had performed the services which he had agreed to perform in the particular case or cases. But if the jury found an express agreement had been entered into, between the parties regarding the amount of' compensation or the time when the same was to become due, or the services to be rendered, then the express agreement, if any, would govern regarding the amount of compensation and the time when the same is due, and the services to be rendered.
The court further instructed on each of the counts mentioned separately, substantially to- the effect that if they found from the evidence the plaintiff Avas acting as attorney for the defendant in the several suits mentioned and before the termination of the several suits withdrew as attorney for defendant without reasonable cause, as defined in the instructions, and abandoned the cases, then the plaintiff could not recoA^er on those-counts pertaining to the case or cases from which he had withdrawn during their pendency. On the question of plaintiff’s withdrawal from the cases pending at the
The principal argument advanced in this court for a reversal of the judgment is that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover at all on the fourth, fifth and sixth counts of the petition, and that the court erred in submitting matters arising on these counts to the jury for the reason the evidence shows the plaintiff withdrew from the cases therein mentioned before their final de
In so far as plaintiff’s services rendered in the injunction suit are concerned, that case was entirely disposed of and the defendant had collected the amount due on the note and deed of trust. The evidence discloses that the plaintiff had rendered laborious and valuable
We find no fault with the charge given by the learned judge to the jury. When read together, the case was well instructed.
An argument is directed against so much of plaintiff’s instruction as directs the jury .that in event an express agreement was entered into respecting plaintiff’s compensation and when the same became due, then such express agreement would govern as to the amount of compensation and the time when it was due, etc. It is said so much of the instruction was error for the reason there was no evidence of an express agreement in the case. The instruction referred to was one giving the jury abstract propositions of law for their guidance, and the feature thereof now under consideration was no doubt incorporated to elucidate the duty of the jury, with respect to certain evidence tending to prove an express contract for fixed compensation, sought to be developed by the learned counsel for defendant, with respect to some of the cases. It appears from a careful reading of the record that during the cross-examination of the plaintiff, defendant’s counsel had him identify several contracts, receipts and papers which were introduced in
Highly respectable members of the St. Louis and Kansas City bar testified to the value of plaintiff’s services. The jury returned a verdict awarding him $1,465. A remittitur was entered and judgment given thereafter for $1,315.
That the plaintiff’s case was meritorious, is evidenced by the unusual fact that the jury returned a verdict for attorney’s fees on two of the counts which the trial court declined to approve entirely for the reason'he deemed the recovery on these counts excessive. The motion for new trial was overruled upon plaintiff entering a slight remittitur on these counts. The learned trial judge very carefully supervised this matter and upon a careful consideration of the evidence, we are persuaded the judgment as it now stands after remittitur entered, is not excessive and it will therefore be affirmed. It is-so ordered,