273 Pa. 439 | Pa. | 1922
Opinion by
Appellant was plaintiff in two issues, framed in the court below, for the purpose of determining whether she, as the assignee of two beneficiary certificates issued on the life of her stepfather, George A. Brown, or defendants, who were his executor and next of kin, were entitled to the proceeds of the certificates, the associations issuing them having paid into court the amounts due thereon. At the trial, the court below refused plaintiff’s point for binding instructions, directed the jury to render a verdict for defendants, later refused plaintiff’s motion for judgment non obstante veredicto and entered judgments on the verdicts; Whereupon plaintiff apfpealed, assigning those rulings as error. The controlling questions are the same in the two cases, which were argued together and will be decided in one opinion. Im
The Masonic Life Association was incorporated under the laws of the State of New York, which authorized it to issue “a certificate, policy or other evidence of interest to or make any promise or agreement with its members, whereby, upon the decease of a member, any money or other benefit, charity, relief or aid is to be paid...... to his legal representatives, or to the beneficiary designated by him,” he having also the right, from time to time, to change his beneficiary. Decedent was a member of this association and a beneficiary certificate was issued to him, payable to his executors or administrators.
The Knights Templar & Masonic Mutual Aid Association was incorporated under the laws of the State of Ohio, which authorized it to issue beneficiary certificates to its members and to provide therein “for the payment of stipulated sums of money to the families, heirs, executors, administrators or assigns of the deceased members,” who likewise had the right, from time to time, to change their beneficiaries. Decedent was a member of this association also, and a beneficiary certificate was issued to him payable to his legal heirs.
Subsequently he married, and his wife and her minor daughter, the plaintiff in this case, went to live with him. He thereupon changed his beneficiaries so as to make each certificate “payable to my wife Clarissa C. Brown or in the event of her prior death then to my executors or administrators.” After the death of his wife, he again duly changed his beneficiary in each certificate, so as to make it payable to “Harriet F. Young, my stepdaughter [plaintiff herein], and in case of her death, to her heirs.” After this latter change was made, the two associations, as theretofore they had done, sent bills for fees and assessments to decedent, and he forwarded some or all of them to plaintiff’s husband, who paid them. It does
It is evident from a consideration of the above cited statutes of New York and Ohio, where these associations were incorporated, that if the actions had been brought in those states, plaintiff, as the beneficiary named in the certificates, probably would have been entitled to binding instructions in her favor; for it thus appears there is no public policy in either state holding that a stepchild has no insurable interest in the life of her step-parent. It is urged by appellees, however, that, as the suits were brought in this State, we should enforce our public policy which forbids recovery under such circumstances (United Brethren Mutual Aid Society v. McDonald, 122 Pa. 324; United Security Life Ins. Co. v. Brown (No. 3), 270 Pa. 273), the objection being applied to assignments as well as to the original policies, if thereafter the assignee pays the premiums, though for many years prior thereto the insured had himself paid them: Downey v.
Without further prelude, we turn to a consideration of the only question we intend to decide, viz: Assuming that plaintiff had no insurable interest in decedent’s life, merely because she was his stepdaughter, had she such an interest by reason of the family relationship which existed between them?
In Hummel v. Supreme Conclave Improved Order Heptasophs, 256 Pa. 164, we allowed a stepdaughter to^
In Carpenter v. United States Life Ins. Co., 161 Pa. 10, and 174 Pa. 636, the beneficiary was not related to the insured, but had been befriended and was being educated by him at the time of his death. It was held she could recover on a policy of life insurance taken out by him in his own name and assigned to her. True, he paid the premiums on it; the case was not decided on this ground, however, but because “without any legal obligation other than friend, he chose to assume all the burdens incident to this domestic relation of parent and child. His conduct and promises for years warranted her in believing the relation would continue while his life lasted.” In McGraw v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 5 Pa. Superior Ct. 488, a niece, who was supported by her uncle until her marriage, and then went to her own home, was held to have an insurable interest in his life; but it does not appear, from the report of the case when the policy was issued. So, also, in the case of Corson’s App., 113 Pa. 438, 444, greatly relied on by defendants, it is expressly recognized that, if the insured stands in loco parentis to the beneficiary, the latter has an insurable interest.
Probably it would be conceded that decedent at one time stood in loco parentis to plaintiff; but in any event the law clearly says that where, as here, a man marries and takes his wife’s minor child into his home, and treats her as his own, that relation arises; this is shown by the cases above cited and by 2 Kent’s Com. 192; Moritz v. Garnhart, 7 Watts 302, 304; Lantz v. Frey, 14 Pa. 201, 202; 29 Cyc. 1670-1; 20 R. C. L. 593-5; Beard’s Est., 1 Pa. C. C. R. 283-4, per Penrose, J. It is urged, however, that it was sundered and the insurable interest ceased when plaintiff married and left to make a home of
In the light of these principles the facts in the present case must be considered; they are as follows: Decedent was a lawyer, lived in Lock Haven in this State, and never had any children. When he married plaintiff’s mother, plaintiff was twelve or thirteen years of age and was living with her grandparents. She remained with them about six months, then went to live with decedent and continued a member of his family about ten years, when she was married, and she and her husband established a home of their own, where they lived for about three years, after which they together returned to decedent and lived with him for about two years. They then separated (and later were divorced), plaintiff obtaining a position in and moving to Philadelphia where she lived for eleven or twelve years. During this time she returned to decedent’s home every summer, staying with him from the first of July to the middle of September. While in Philadelphia she supported herself in part, but received considerable aid from him. When her mother was taken ill, plaintiff gave up her position, returned to decedent’s home and nursed her mother about
More than a year after the assignments to plaintiff decedent made his will, and therein stated: “Whereas since the death of my wife, I have transferred to my stepdaughter my two life insurance policies, there is an advantage in them that will give her a preference when my death occurs, I therefore direct that if I shall die by violence, so that my accident insurance shall come into play, that said accident insurance shall be payable to my sister.” Defendants insist that this will was not admissible for any purpose, but, as was pointed out by Judge Eoss in Dull’s Est., supra, it is evidence to show the relation in loco parentis was not sundered by the marriage and plaintiff’s removal to the home of her husband; and especially is this so in the instant cases, since decedent made no testamentary gift to plaintiff, and hence could only have intended this paragraph to show that his relations with her remained unchanged. Defendants contend that the effect of allowing plaintiff to recover these sums of money would be to give her “a preference out of his estate”; this is true, but it is exactly what the above-quoted paragraph of the will proves decedent intended.
We are aware that some of the above facts depend upon parol testimony, and therefore would ordinarily be a matter for consideration by a jury. In this case, however, defendants educed the evidence referred to by cross-examination of plaintiff, which not being disputed must be taken as true (Dunmore v. Padden, 262 Pa. 436; Krewson v. Sawyer, 266 Pa. 284); in apparent recognition of this legal principle, they say in their paper-book: “The plaintiff has established all these facts by her own testimony. If any one was entitled to challenge her credibility it would be the appellee, and the appellee does not do so.” This was the attitude of both counsel in both arguments in this court; defendants fairly planted their contention solely upon the facts that plaintiff was only a stepdaughter of decedent, was not living with him at the time the assignments were made, and that her husband for her had paid all the later premiums ; for the reasons stated, this was a broken reed which gave appellees no support.
The judgments of the court below are reversed and judgment in each ease is here entered for plaintiff non obstante veredicto.