126 Ky. 474 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1907
Opinion op the Court by
Affirming.
Appellant was convicted of housebreaking. The indictment was returned under section 1162, Ky. St. 1903, which reads: “If any person * * * shall feloniously break any dwelling house or any part thereof, or any outhouse belonging to or used with any dwelling house, and feloniously take away anything of value, although the owner or any person may not be there, he shall he confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than ten years.”
The offense involved is akin to the crime of burglary. It has most of the elements of the latter, except that it need not be done in the nighttime, and the offense to be committed after the entry to complete the felony is confined to larceny. So that the decisions bearing upon the essential fatures of burglary are apposite to the question at bar. It is held without exception that any force applied to effect the entry is sufficient to constitute that part of the offense —as, for example, the raising of a latch (State v. Wilson, 1 N. J. Law, 439, 1 Am. Dec. 216), the raising of a window (State v. Boon, 13 Ired. (N. C.) 244, 57 Am. Dec. 555), or pushing open a closed door (State v. Conners, 95 Iowa, 485, 64 N. W. 295). It is also held that there is a constructive forcible entry if by fraud or deception an entry is obtained, as where by a knock at the door the owner is induced to believe
The law regards force and fraud with equal abhorrence; and whether the tenant’s possession is invaded by one means or the other for the purpose,of stealing from his home is all one in the eye of the law. Conceding that appellant had the right to enter the house in question to take away his own clothes, and had he entered under such circumstances and then formed and executed the intention to steal the landlord’s clothes he would not have been guilty under the statute, our case comes down to a narrower state of facts; for, appellant having gone away under arrangement with his landlord, his relation as co-tenant of the house had ceased for the time being. Though he had the right, notwithstanding, to remove his clothes from the house, he had not the right to enter the house for that purpose, except by the consent of the landlord. When, therefore, he simulated. that he desired the key for that purpose, but in reality for the purpose of stealing from the house, he
We perceive no error in the instructions. The judgment is consequently affirmed. ,