32 N.J. Eq. 495 | New York Court of Chancery | 1880
* The parties to this suit were married in England, in 1844. They lived together there until August, 1863, when they came to this country. After their arrival they resided in the city of Brooklyn until April, 1865, when they removed to what was then Bergen, but. now part of Jersey City, in this state, whei’e they lived together until in or about November, 1868, when the defendant left the complainant and returned to England. He never lived with her again. She continued to live in Jersey City until the spring of 1870, when she removed to Riverton, in this state. She lived there for about a year—that is, until 1871—when she removed to Detroit, where she has ever since resided.
In Ross v. Ross, L. R. (1 P. & D.) 734, the court said: “A question having been raised as to willing consent, I may-add that if it were established that the wife consented, as one of the conditions of the grant of the allowance, to the husband’s continuing the adulterous intercourse which had been established, such consent would, in my opinion, amount to connivance, even if it were extorted from her by the pressure of the circumstances in which she was placed, unless, of course, the pressure to which she was subjected amounted to that degree of force which would invalidate any agreement. She might be very unwilling to consent, but if, in the end, she withdrew her scruples for the sake of getting an allowance, I think she must be guilty of connivance.”
In Thomas v. Thomas, 2 Sw. & Trist. 113, a wife had threatened proceedings for divorce for adultery, and then entered into a negotiation with her husband, whereby a promise was made for the support of herself and her children, to prevent further proceedings in chancery, where she had taken some
The defendant has been a resident of this state ever since his marriage with Mary Lewis, and the complainant admits that she has never complained to either of them of their intercourse, nor has she even made any application to the defendant for support. She must be adjudged to have acquiesced in the divorce and subsequent marriage. Nichols v. Nichols, 10 C. E. Gr. 60; Singer v. Singer, 41 Barb. 139. The conduct of the defendant towards the complainant is not defensible. He appears to have left her (making provision for her and her children, however), with a determination to get a divorce from her, and that, too, on
The bill' will be dismissed.