YORK v CITY OF DETROIT (AFTER REMAND)
Docket No. 87229
Supreme Court of Michigan
Argued December 4, 1990. Decided September 23, 1991.
438 Mich 744
REFERENCES
Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights §§ 7, 16-19; Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 111, 116, 184, 208.
Civil liability of prison or jail authorities for self-inflicted injury or death of prisoner. 79 ALR3d 1210.
Because the plaintiff‘s requested jury instructions described an erroneous standard for § 1983 liability, the trial court correctly refused to give them. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in finding the refusal to give the instructions erroneous and in reversing the jury‘s verdict of no cause of action with respect to the plaintiff‘s § 1983 claim.
1. A claim against a municipality under
2. Deliberate indifference contemplates actual or constructive knowledge and a conscious disregard of a known danger. Mere negligence will not amount to deliberate indifference. A negligent failure to detect suicidal intent or to prevent suicide does not establish deliberate indifference to a prisoner‘s medical needs, absent some basis to impute knowledge, actual or constructive. Thus, mere negligence cannot constitute a municipal policy of deliberate indifference.
3. Section 1983 itself is not the source of substantive rights, but rather provides a remedy for the violation of guaranteed rights. A pretrial detainee‘s right to medical treatment is based upon the Fourteenth Amendment and is at least as great as that afforded under the Eighth Amendment to a person convicted of a crime: to be free from deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care may be established by a showing of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. While a serious medical need may encompass both physical and psychiatric problems, a negligent failure to detect suicidal intent or to prevent suicide will not establish deliberate indifference to a prisoner‘s medical needs.
4. In this case, the trial court correctly declined to give the requested jury instruction which would have reduced the standard of § 1983 liability for an alleged violation of the decedent‘s right to medical care to mere negligence. The plaintiff was
Chief Justice CAVANAGH, concurring in the result, stated that
Justice LEVIN, concurring, stated that a lockup in a precinct police station is not a jail or penal institution, and thus the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the applicability of rules and regulations promulgated by the Department of Corrections on the basis of its supervisory responsibility respecting jails and penal institutions. However, the question whether a lockup located in a facility that serves both as a jail and as a lockup is subject to the department‘s regulatory authority should be left open.
Reversed.
Justice MALLETT took no part in the decision of this case.
182 Mich App 92; 452 NW2d 641 (1989) reversed.
119 Mich App 512; 367 NW2d 333 (1985) overruled.
1. CIVIL RIGHTS — VIOLATIONS BY MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — POLICIES AND CUSTOMS — DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE.
A claim against a municipality under
2. CIVIL RIGHTS — JAIL SUICIDES — NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO DETECT — DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE.
A negligent failure to detect suicidal intent or to prevent suicide of a prisoner does not establish deliberate indifference to the prisoner‘s medical needs absent some basis to impute knowledge, actual or constructive; deliberate indifference contemplates actual or constructive knowledge and a conscious disregard of a known danger; mere negligence does not constitute a municipal policy of deliberate indifference (
3. CIVIL RIGHTS — PRETRIAL DETAINEES — MEDICAL RIGHTS — DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE.
A pretrial detainee‘s right to medical treatment is based upon the Fourteenth Amendment and is at least as great as that afforded under the Eighth Amendment to a person convicted of a crime: to be free from deliberate indifference to a serious medical need (
Charlie C. Taylor, P.C. (by Horace D. Cotton), and Stone & Richardson, P.C. (by Ralph H. Richardson), for the plaintiff.
City of Detroit Law Department (by Donald Pailen, Corporation Counsel, and Joanne D. Stafford, Assistant Corporation Counsel), for the defendant.
AFTER REMAND
BOYLE, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
We granted leave in this case to determine whether the trial court erred by refusing instructions requested by the plaintiff concerning the
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff, Ruthie Mae York, initiated this action in 1982 against the City of Detroit for the suicide death of her husband, William York, Jr. The plaintiff alleged that, pursuant to
After a four-day trial, the jury found no cause of action with respect to the plaintiff‘s § 1983 claim. The jury did find the city liable with respect to the defective building claim and found the amount of plaintiff‘s damages to be $650,000, reduced by eighty-two percent because of the decedent‘s comparative negligence.
At approximately 1:30 A.M. on January 13, 1981,
According to Ruthie Mae York, the decedent had been drinking heavily that night. Officer George Lapum could smell alcohol on the decedent‘s breath, but, according to Lapum, the decedent could walk unassisted and Lapum did not recall any staggering. Ruthie York testified, however, that at one point her husband was sitting on the floor with his back against a wall, so drunk he could not get up. A police officer helped him up, and the decedent began swinging at the officer.
The decedent was arrested for felonious assault and transported to the 16th Precinct of the Detroit Police Department. According to Lapum, the decedent went quietly and showed no sign of being suicidal. At the precinct, the decedent was placed in a cell.
Officer Timothy Bar was the “doorman” at the precinct that night. His duties included the processing of incoming prisoners. Bar checked on York at 7:15 A.M., at which time York yelled at him. Bar did not recall what York had said, but described it as an angry yell. According to Bar, there was nothing at all unusual about a detainee yelling at the doorman. Bar noticed nothing that would indicate that the decedent was suicidal. At about 7:30 A.M., a maintenance person discovered the decedent hanging from the bars across the top of the cell in a noose fashioned from his shirt.
The doorman and another officer took the decedent down and called an emergency medical ser-
Before trial, defense counsel moved to exclude any reference to rules promulgated by the Department of Corrections. Counsel for the plaintiff responded that the city‘s callous indifference to these rules would be evidence of deliberate indifference to decedent‘s constitutional rights. The court ruled that the department rules did not apply to police station lockups used for the detention of persons not convicted of a crime. Although the rules were held not to be binding, the court ruled that it would allow expert testimony with regard to those rules.
Frank Donley, employed by the Department of Corrections, testified as an expert for the plaintiff. Donley testified regarding the department‘s rules for jails, lockups, and security camps which were in effect in 1981. He referred to rule 791.555(1), which provides, “A jail or lockup shall provide 1 or more detoxification cells which shall be designed for detention of chemically impaired persons during the detoxification process only,” 1979 AC, R 791.555(1), noting that during an inspection of the 16th precinct in 1979, he notified the precinct commander that there was no detoxification cell at the precinct. He also made reference to rule 791.553 regarding visual or electronic surveillance in the area occupied by detainees.2 1979 AC, R 791.553.
The plaintiff also introduced a 1980 letter from the Department of Corrections to sheriffs and chiefs of police regarding suicides in Michigan jails and lockups. According to the letter, eleven people had committed suicide in Michigan jails and lockups as of June 4, 1980. Seven of those eleven suicides were alcohol related; two were drug related. Most occurred in the Wayne County area, and most in lockups. The letter contained a profile of the person most likely to attempt suicide in detention: a white male, in his twenties, arrested on a minor charge such as driving under the influence of liquor or disorderly conduct. According to the profile, such a person usually attempts or commits suicide within an hour or two of incarceration. The letter described alcohol and drugs as “critical factors,” and recommended a number of precautionary actions, including becoming aware of available detoxification or substance abuse programs in the community, reviewing policies on detention practices, particularly where the person
so that the equipment can be installed without need for alteration of the physical plant. (3) Plans for the use of the equipment shall be submitted to the commission for review and approval before purchase and installation. (4) Two-way communication capability shall be provided between any remotely controlled security gate or door and its control point. (5) Outlets for multi-channel radio or television hookup for education and recreational purposes should be provided in an inmate-occupied area.
Frank Donley testified that he became involved with the training of Detroit precinct doormen in November, 1978, at the request of the Detroit Police Department training division. Detroit Police Inspector and Director of Training James Jackson testified that training is required for precinct doormen and detention officers. This program, consisting of 160 hours of training, began in 1979. The training program included the subjects of mental illness and suicide. Inspector Jackson testified generally that under these subjects, doormen would be trained to take action upon observing overt symptoms of mental illness or potential suicide. He said that violent behavior by itself would not necessarily fall within the rubric of abnormal behavior and that depression “perhaps” would fall in the category of behaviors included under mental illness, as would intoxication. He stated that when detainees were intoxicated to the point of exhibiting abnormal symptoms such as passing out or falling down, or appeared deranged in some way, it was the policy of the department to send them to a hospital. Plaintiff‘s expert, Frank Donley, acknowledged that it was the policy of the City of Detroit to send persons needing detoxification to the hospital, but expressed doubt whether the policy was practiced.
III. ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeals found that the trial court had erred in refusing to give certain instructions
I instruct you that the City of Detroit was required by state statute [
MCL 791.262 ;MSA 28.2322 ] to know and enforce rules 791.553, 791.555, 791.635 and all other applicable provisions of the Michigan Department of Corrections rules and regulations for jails, lockups and security camps.
Plaintiff also requested the following instruction:
I [f]urther instruct you that since defendant was presumed to know the law, and since Rules 791.553, 791.555 and 791.635, were the law, these rules are further evidence of defendant‘s knowledge of the serious risk of harm and of steps that a reasonable person in defendant‘s position would have taken to minimize such risk. I further instruct you that defendant‘s failure to comply with the regulation or regulations is evidence from which you may infer, given the totality of the circumstances, that they failed to take the steps a reasonable person in their position would have taken to minimize the serious risk of harm. If you find all of the above, then you must find defendant liable for deliberate indifference to William York, Jr.‘s serious medical needs.
These instructions attempt to describe a standard for § 1983 liability. However, because the requested instructions describe an erroneous standard, the trial court properly declined to give them.
A. STANDARD FOR MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER § 1983
In order to establish a claim against the City of
This rule is most consistent with our admonition in Monell... and Polk Co v Dodson, 454 US 312, 326 (1981), that a municipality can be liable under § 1983 only where its policies are the “moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.” [Id. at 388-389.]
In the instant case, where the alleged municipal
[I]t may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. [Id. at 390.]
In a concurring opinion, Justice O‘Connor phrased the factual standard for finding a policy of deliberate indifference as follows:
Where a § 1983 plaintiff can establish that the facts available to city policymakers put them on actual or constructive notice that the particular omission is substantially certain to result in the violation of the constitutional rights of their citizens, the dictates of Monell are satisfied. Only then can it be said that the municipality has made “‘a deliberate choice to follow a course of action... from among various alternatives.‘” [Id. at 396.]
B. STANDARD FOR UNDERLYING CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION
Section 1983 itself is not the source of substantive rights; it merely provides a remedy for the violation of rights guaranteed by the federal con-
A pretrial detainee‘s right to medical treatment is based upon the Fourteenth Amendment, City of Revere v Massachusetts General Hosp, 463 US 239 (1983). The pretrial detainee‘s right is at least as great as that afforded under the Eighth Amendment to a person convicted of a crime. Id. at 244. Under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner has a right to be free from deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Estelle v Gamble, supra at 104.
The United States Supreme Court has not defined the exact degree of culpability which must be shown to establish a violation of the due process right to medical care. See Canton v Harris, supra at 386, n 8. However, the prevalent rule in the federal circuit courts defines the right analogously to that guaranteed convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment. That is, a pretrial detainee‘s right to medical care is violated by deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Rushing v Wayne Co, 436 Mich 247, 276; 462 NW2d 23 (1990) (BOYLE, J., concurring).6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Hamm v
Distinguishing the eighth amendment and due process standards in this area would require courts to evaluate the details of slight differences in conditions. Many city and county jails have convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees. That approach would result in the courts’ becoming “enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations,” a situation against which the Supreme Court has warned. Therefore, the level at which states provide pretrial detainees with basic necessities—in addition to being “reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective“—must meet the standards applied under the eighth amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment... with reference to medical needs, they must not be deliberately indifferent to detainees’ serious medical needs. Life and health are just as precious to convicted persons as to pretrial detainees. [Id. at 1574.]
We find that reasoning persuasive and adopt the prevailing federal approach. A pretrial detainee‘s Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care is violated by deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.
Thus, the plaintiff could not establish a constitutional violation absent a showing of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Mere negligence does not amount to deliberate indifference. Estelle v Gamble, supra at 106. And while a serious medical need may encompass both physical and psychiatric problems, Roberts, supra at 724, it is established beyond question that a negligent
C. INSTRUCTIONAL ISSUES
We conclude that the trial court correctly declined to give the second requested instructions8 which would have reduced the standard of § 1983 liability for an alleged violation of the decedent‘s right to medical care to mere negligence.
Plaintiff would have instructed the jury as follows:
I [f]urther instruct you that since defendant was presumed to know the law, and since Rules 791.553, 791.555 and 791.635, were the law, these rules are further evidence of defendant‘s knowledge of the serious risk of harm and of steps that a reasonable person in defendant‘s position would have taken to minimize such risk. I further instruct you that defendant‘s failure to comply with the regulation or regulations is evidence from which you may infer, given the totality of the circumstances, that they failed to take the steps a reasonable person in their position would have taken to minimize the serious risk of harm. If you find all of the above, then you must find
defendant liable for deliberate indifference to William York, Jr.‘s serious medical needs.
The first paragraph of this instruction would have allowed the jury to infer defendant‘s knowledge of a risk of harm on the basis of the mere existence of the Department of Corrections rules. The second paragraph would have permitted the jury to infer from the defendant‘s failure to comply with those rules that the defendant failed to take reasonable steps to minimize the risk of harm. If both inferences were made, the jury would have been instructed that it “must” find the defendant liable for deliberate indifference to the decedent‘s serious medical needs.
The first premise—that the existence of the rules shows the city‘s knowledge of a serious risk of suicide—is fallacious. As noted above, the law requires actual or constructive knowledge of the risk of suicide before the failure to take steps to prevent that harm will amount to deliberate indifference. Edwards, Camic, Oliver, supra. While it is no doubt true that at least one purpose of the Department of Corrections rules is to reduce the risk of jail suicides, it does not follow that the existence of those rules informed the City of Detroit of a suicide risk.
The instruction, by its reference to the steps that a reasonable person would have taken, suggests that the applicable standard by which the defendant‘s conduct was to be judged was a standard of negligence. By requiring the jury to find the defendant liable for deliberate indifference to the decedent‘s serious medical needs if the jury drew the permitted inference that the defendant did not act reasonably to minimize the risk of serious harm, the instruction equated negligence with deliberate indifference. This was erroneous
Most significantly, the instruction defined reasonable steps as those described in the Department of Corrections regulations. In effect, the plaintiff asked the court to tell the jury that failure to follow the department regulations would by itself establish deliberate indifference. Thus, the proposed instructions would have required a verdict for the plaintiff solely on the basis of a finding that the rules were violated. This is contrary to law. The violation of applicable state statutes, or of applicable administrative rules and regulations, ipso facto, does not amount to a constitutional violation. Edwards, supra; Danese v Asman, 875 F2d 1239, 1245, n 5 (CA 6, 1989) (state statutes and regulations do not create federal constitutional rights); Roberts, supra (failure to comply with state regulations, assuming they apply, is not a constitutional violation).
Finally, we turn to the plaintiff‘s remaining requested instruction, which would have provided as follows:
I instruct you that the City of Detroit was required by state statute [
MCL 791.262 ;MSA 28.2322 ] to know and enforce rules 791.553, 791.555, 791.635 and all other applicable provisions of the Michigan Department of Corrections rules and regulations for jails, lockups and security camps.
The trial court did not err in refusing the plaintiff‘s requested instruction that the defendant was required to know and enforce the Department of Corrections rules for jails, lockups, and security camps, because at the time of William
It is clear that the Department of Corrections act,
Subject to constitutional powers vested in the executive and judicial departments of the state, the department shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the following: (a) Probation officers of this state, and the administration of all orders of probation, (b) pardons, reprieves, commutations and paroles, and (c) penal institutions, correctional farms, probation recovery camps, prison labor and industry, wayward minor programs and youthful trainee institutions and programs for the care and supervision of youthful trainees. [
MCL 791.204 ;MSA 28.2274 . Emphasis added.]
At the time of the events underlying this case,
The director... shall promulgate rules and regulations which shall provide: * * *
(d) For the management and control of state penal institutions, correctional farms, probation recovery camps, the wayward minor program and youthful trainee institutions and programs for the care and supervision of youthful trainees separate and apart from persons convicted of crimes.... [1966 PA 210, § 6. Emphasis added.]
The plain meaning of the word “penal” excludes from its scope a lockup such as that at the 16th precinct which is used for the temporary detention of persons not convicted of crimes. “Penal,” in its plain and commonly understood sense, refers to punishment. The word is defined as “of, pertaining to, or involving legal punishment... prescribing punishment... used in or for punishment... subject to or incurring punishment....” The Random House College Dictionary (1984), p 981.
The purported authority for the Department of Corrections’ rule-making power over municipal lockups is found in § 62 of the act, which, at the time of the events underlying this case, provided:
The department shall supervise and inspect local jails and houses of correction for the purpose of obtaining facts in any manner pertaining to the usefulness and proper management of said penal institutions and of promoting proper, efficient and humane administration thereof, and shall promulgate rules and standards with relation thereto; and any reasonable order with respect to such penal institutions may be enforced through mandamus or injunction in the circuit court of the county where the penal institution is located, through proper proceedings instituted by the attorney general on behalf of the commission. The board of supervisors may determine whether the sheriff‘s residence is to be a part of the county jail. Any sheriff, superintendent or employee of any penal institution, subject to inspection under the provisions of this act, who shall refuse to admit any member of the commission, or any duly
authorized agent of the commission, for the purpose of visitation and inspection, or who shall refuse or neglect to furnish the information required by the commission, or its duly authorized agent, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished as provided in the laws of this state. [1964 PA 111, § 62. Emphasis added.]9
The Legislature‘s reference to “local jails and
A “jail” is... distinguishable both in law and in common understanding from a temporary place of detention, like a police station or lockup.... While the primary function of a “jail” is a place of detention for persons committed thereto, under sentence of a court, it is also the proper and usual place where persons under arrest or awaiting trial are kept until they appear in court and the charge is disposed of.
While a “jail” is commonly understood to be used to detain persons before trial, it is primarily a place of detention for persons “under sentence of a court,” that is, persons convicted of misdemeanors and minor offenses. We find no basis in the language of the legislation for authorizing the department to promulgate rules which are mandatory for municipal lockups.
We are not persuaded by the Young panel‘s interpretation of the authorizing statute by reference to the rules themselves. The Court in Young noted that the rules by their own terms applied to lockups and to holding cells within lockups. The panel reasoned that it would be inconsistent were the department rules not to apply to a holding cell within a municipal police station.
The fact that the rules themselves purport to govern local lockups or holding cells is not control-
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err in declining to instruct the jury as plaintiff requested. The requested instructions were erroneous because they would impose § 1983 liability upon the city on a finding of mere negligence, or upon the violation of rules which, even if applicable, did not establish a violation of constitutional rights. We conclude that the Department of Corrections rules were not binding because the Department of Corrections, at the time of William York‘s death, did not have rule-making power over municipal lockups such as that involved in this case.
BRICKLEY, RILEY, and GRIFFIN, JJ., concurred with BOYLE, J.
CAVANAGH, C.J. I agree with the result reached by my Sister BOYLE‘S majority opinion, and with her sound and scholarly analysis of the federal constitutional and
In arguing that the applicable statutes, as they existed prior to 1984, did not authorize the department to regulate “a lockup... which is used for the temporary detention of persons not convicted of crimes,” ante, p 764, my colleague makes short shrift of the language of then-
I see no need or basis in this case to reject the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in Young. Admittedly, however, the issue is now largely moot in light of 1984 PA 102, which explicitly provides that the department‘s regulatory authority does not extend to municipal lockups. See ante, p 765, n 9. Because of that, and because the trial court‘s instruction on this issue was at worst harmless error, in my view, in light of plaintiff‘s complete failure to establish any underlying constitutional violation, I agree with the result reached by Justice BOYLE.
LEVIN, J. I concur in the view expressed by the majority that a lockup in a precinct police station is not a “jail” or “penal institution,” and therefore the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the applicability of rules and regulations promulgated by the Department of Corrections on the basis of its supervisory responsibility respecting jails and penal institutions.
I would leave open the question whether a lockup located in a facility that serves both as a jail and as a lockup is subject to the regulatory authority of the Department of Corrections.
The conclusion that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the applicability of rules and regulations promulgated by the Department of Corrections makes it unnecessary to consider the parameters of a § 1983 claim.
MALLETT, J., took no part in the decision of this case.