Opinion by
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of Quarter Sessions of York County quashing an appeal taken to it from a judgment of an alderman of the City of York. The alderman found the defendant guilty of violаting a city ordinance and “imposed a penalty of $300 fine and in default of the payment thereof to be committed to jail for 90 days.”
The defendant took her appeal to the Court of Quarter Sessions. Upon motion of the city, that court *583 quashed the appeal on the ground that it should havе been taken to the Court of Common Pleas. The defendant appealed.
“The sole question presented,” as accurately stated by the court below, “is whether the suit instituted in the name of the city for the violation of one of its ordinances is a suit for a penalty and thus civil in nature, or is a summary сonviction, a criminal proceeding, from which an appeal would lie to the Quarter Sessiоns Court.”
The appellant contends that The Third Class City Code, particularly section 1017 of the Act of Junе 28, 1951, P. L. 662, 699, 53 PS §36017 provides for a dual procedure to be used by third class cities in enforcing ordinances, and thаt the city used the criminal procedure as a result of which her appeal is to the Court of Quаrter Sessions and not to the Court of Common Pleas.
This has been a troublesome problem to the legal profession for many years. In
Pleasant Hills Borough v.
Carroll,
We might add here another observation he made in the same casе: “The distinctions between the suits for penalties and summary convictions have been well defined and оught to be well known, but confusion between these two proceedings has arisen because both сourts 'and legislatures, at times, have not adhered to
*584
those well defined distinctions. Summary convictions аre in their nature criminal prosecutions, generally for the violation of a statute, imposing both a fine and imprisonment, and should be in the name of the Commonwealth. On the other hand, a proceeding for the violation of a municipal ordinance has almost uniformly been held to be a civil proceeding and should be brought in the name of the borough. These distinctions and the reasons for them are learnedly discussed in the cases of Commonwealth v. Betts, supra [76 Pa.
465];
Milton Borough v. Hoagland, supra [3 Pa. C.C. 283]; City v. Duncan, supra [
As noted by the court below in this case, the
Rashinsky
case is one of the outstanding and most quoted cases on this question. It, and many othеr well-reasoned lower court opinions, have held that a proceeding brought in the name of a municipality for the recovery of a penalty due the municipality, although begun by a warrant, is nevertheless, a civil proceeding.
Harrisburg v. Schaflander,
69 D. & C. 141 (Dauphin 1949);
Commonwealth v. Morand,
67 Dauph. 344 (1955) ;
Commonwealth v. Clark (No. 2),
14 Lanc. L. R. 42 (1896) ;
Commonwealth v. Weachter,
22 Montg. L. R. 198 (1906) ;
City of Chester v. Bershad,
It can be argued, as contended by the appellant, that the legislature has indicated its intent to author *585 ize dual procedures, and there are court decisions holding contrary to those cited above. It is true, as Judge TIargest said, neither the legislature nоr the courts have always adhered to the clearly defined distinction between a summary proсeedings and a suit for a penalty.
Lower courts .have considered the above provision of The Third Class City Code, and other statutes containing similar language, and most of them have concluded, as did the court below, that the legislature did not intend by these provisions to sweep aside the distinction bеtween the two proceedings imbedded in the law after a century of careful consideratiоn.
The question is a procedural one and involves no great principle of law, but it is important thаt it be settled. We shall, therefore, as far as is within our power to do so, put the problem to rest.
It is оur opinion, that an action brought against a defendant for the violation of a municipal ordinance is a suit for the recovery of a penalty due the municipality and is a civil proceeding. It is not a summary proceeding, which is a criminal proceeding, even though it may be started by a warrant. A judgment entered against a defendant for the violation of a municipal ordinance is for a рenalty, even though it may be referred to by the legislature and the magistrate as a “fine”. Appeаls from judgments entered by magistrates to recover penalties for violation of municipal ordinаnces must be taken to the Court of Common Pleas. The Courts of Quarter Sessions have no jurisdiction ovеr such appeals.
Judge Anderson, speaking for the court below, was correct in stating “that the proceedings before the magistrate resulting in the fine imposed on the defendant were not criminal in nature, but constituted rather a civil suit for the collection of a penalty.”
Order affirmed.